Judgment.-The appellant in this case has been convicted of the offence of rape and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500 by the Sessions Judge of Anantapur. The facts of the case are these. The victim of the rape is P.W.1 aged about ten years. She was living with her mother P.W. 3 who was abandoned by her husband while P.W. 1 was a baby. P.W. 3 has been earning her livelihood by doing cooly work and sometimes by begging. They were both living in a village called Garlandinne. There was also a brother of P.W. 3 living in the same village almost next to her house. Another brother of P.W. 3 lives at a place called Jambulandinne which is a hamlet of Garlandinne and which is within a distance of about a mile from the latter place. The village Magistrate of the place lives at Jambulandinne and the accused also lives in the same village as P. W. 3. According to the evidence of P.W.1, the victim, she left her village on 16th July, 1949, at about 3 p.m., for Jambulandinne to fetch from her uncle’s house Junnapalu (milk got from a cow or buffalo within a few days after she calved). The milk was not available and her uncle P.W. 8 promised that he would send it the next morning and she returned. While she was coming back to her village, she was met by the accused who was coming from Garlindinne. He is said to have been in a tipsy condition with red eyes. After making enquiries as to where P.W.1 was going, he is said to have caught her arm and dragged her into a pit which is by the side of the path, laid her down on her back, himself sat down in front of her and placed her legs on his thighs. P.W.1 started weeping and shouting The accused then gagged her mouth with her own cloth. She lost consciousness and the only thing she knew when she regained consciousness was that she found the accused tying her petticoat to her after washing it in water in a ditch nearby She found blood on her petticoat and also found her vagina bleeding. The accused is said to have asked her not to tell any one of what happened, threatening to kill her in case of disclosure. The accused is said to have asked her not to tell any one of what happened, threatening to kill her in case of disclosure. She was proceeding to her house weeping. On the way she met P.W.6 who questioned her as to why she was weeping. She complained to him of what the accused did to her. He advised her to go home and inform her mother. P.W.1 went home and informed her mother of what the accused did. The mother and daughter thereupon went to the house of the accused who was already known to P.W.3 but did not find him there. P.W.3 went to the place where he was alleged to be and questioned him. He is said to have challenged her to do what she liked. The mother and daughter then went to Jambulandinne for the purpose of giving a complaint to the village Magistrate but he was not in the village. Thereupon, on the advice of P.Ws.7 and 8, they went to Anantapur to obtain a medical certificate. It is alleged that the doctor who examined P.W.1 refused to give a certificate unless a fee was paid and as they were not in a position to pay, they came back without a certificate. After their return, they again went to the village Magistrate and made a report orally which he reduced to writing and it is Ex. P-2 in the case. On his sending the reports to the police, the investigation started and the accused was arrested. On the requisition of the police, on 18th July, 1949, the lady doctor at Anantapur examined P.W.1 and gave a certificate. Thereafter the charge sheet was laid against the appellant. The case against the accused rests mainly on the evidence of P.W.1 and that of P.Ws.3 and 6 who speak to the complaint made immediately after the occurrence. The fact that the girl was raped is not seriously disputed and the medical evidence shows that she must have been raped. The doctor found the following injuries (1) contusion on the inner aspect of both thighs, (2) hymen torn and there was slight bloody discharge from the vagina, (3) swelling over the labia majore (4) Vagina admits a finger easily. The doctor found the following injuries (1) contusion on the inner aspect of both thighs, (2) hymen torn and there was slight bloody discharge from the vagina, (3) swelling over the labia majore (4) Vagina admits a finger easily. The doctor was of opinion that the girl was raped and that there was forced penetration but for which, for a girl of her age, the vagina would not admit a finger. Vaginal smears were sent to the Chemical Examiner but no trace of spermetozoa or gonococci was found. The doctor is positive and her evidence admits of no doubt that the girl was raped. The only question is as to who committed it whether it is the appellant or some one else committed it and it is falsely foisted on the appellant. Mr.Chinnappa Reddi who appears for the petitioner contends that the case has been falsely foisted on the accused at the instance of one Kamma Hanumappa on account of the ill-feeling between the said Hanumappa and his brother on the one side and the accused on the other. Advantage is taken of the statement made by P.Ws.1, 3 and 7 that they met Hanumappa just at the time when P.Ws.1 and 3 were proceeding to Anantapur during the night of 16th July, 1949, for obtaining a medical certificate and it is urged that Hanumappa has instigated P.Ws.1 and 3 to implicate the appellant. The learned Sessions Judge has given good reasons for rejecting the suggestion that this case has been falsely foisted at the instance of Hanumappa and I entirely agree with him. Certain discrepancies were relied on by the learned advocate to show that the version given by P.W.1 is not a true one. The learned Sessions Judge has carefully considered everyone of them and has pointed out how they do not affect the fundamental fact in this case that the accused committed rape on P.W.1. There is no doubt one discrepancy which the learned Judge himself points out as inexplicable. In the committal Court, P.W.1 stated that by the time she regained consciousness, the accused was not present. But in the Sessions Court she stated that when she regained consciousness, the accused was present and that he washed her langa in water in a side ditch and had asked her not to tell any one on pain of being thrown into a well. But in the Sessions Court she stated that when she regained consciousness, the accused was present and that he washed her langa in water in a side ditch and had asked her not to tell any one on pain of being thrown into a well. The evidence of the Circle Inspector shows that there was no water anywhere near the scene when he examined the scene of occurrence two days after, that is on 18th July, 1949, and P.W.6 also stated in the Sessions Court that he saw P.W.1 wearing wet clothes when he saw her weeping which he did not state in the committal Court. As the learned Judge points out there is no doubt that there is this discrepancy but it does not affect the truth of the prosecution version. There seems to be no object in improving the version given in the committal Court and I agree with him. This does not affect the truth of the story given by P.W.1. The next contention of Mr. Chinnappa Reddi is that the evidence of this girl should not be acted upon unless it is corroborated by independent testimony connecting the accused with the crime. As already stated, the commission of rape not being disputed, the only question is whether the accused committed it. It is urged that the evidence of P.W.1 should not be acted upon without corroboration by independent testimony connecting the appellant with the crime. It is further contended that the corroboration of P.W.1’s story by P.Ws.3 and 6 is not such a corroboration as their evidence is only corroboration of her own previous statements under section 157, Evidence Act. Stress is laid that apart from her previous statements made immediately after the occurrence, there should be independent corroboration. No decision of this Court or authority of a binding nature has been cited before me either in support of or contrary to the proposition contended for by the learned advocate for the appellant. Stress is laid that apart from her previous statements made immediately after the occurrence, there should be independent corroboration. No decision of this Court or authority of a binding nature has been cited before me either in support of or contrary to the proposition contended for by the learned advocate for the appellant. But he relies on the decisions of other Courts and they are Surendra Nath Das v. Emperor1, Emperor v. Nur Ahmed2, Sikandar Mian v. Emperor3 , V. Toe Sein v. The King4, Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya5 and Nura v. Rex 6 In Surendra Nath Das v. Emperor1 , the medical evidence showed that the victim had lost her viriginity at least three months before the occurrence and she had frequent intercourse prior to the occasion complained of. She was intimate with a prostitute who was connected with the accused and the learned Judge has found that there were other improbabilities in the story. In fact, the facts clearly show that the accused could not be convicted on the story of the victim. Being a jury case the learned Judges stated that the story of such a girl should not be accepted unless it is corroborated by independent evidence in material particulars connecting the accused and for corroboration they referred to the well-known case of Rex v. Baskerville7, which is a case of an accomplice. In Emperor v. Nur Ahmed2, which is also a Jury Case, Lort Williams, J., stated as follows: “The accused being Muhammadans and the girl a Hindu it is unfortunate that the jury was composed as it was” (the Jury consisted of three Hindus and two Muhammadans. The verdict was guilty by a majority of three to two) “It is obvious from the references which I have made to the evidence that this case is unsatisfactory from many points of view apart from the direction given by the Judge to the Jury”. The learned Judge then found that there has been a miscarriage of justice. It is clear in this case therefore that the learned Judge was satisfied that the evidence was not acceptable and they even characterised the composition of the Jury as unfortunate as is clear from the observations referred to above. The learned Judge then found that there has been a miscarriage of justice. It is clear in this case therefore that the learned Judge was satisfied that the evidence was not acceptable and they even characterised the composition of the Jury as unfortunate as is clear from the observations referred to above. They followed the principle laid down in Surendranath Das v. Emperor1, that the evidence of the prosecutrix must be corroborated by independent evidence and they put the prosecutrix in a rape case on the same footing as an accomplice in other cases. In Sikander Mian v. Emperor3, the learned Judges were dealing with a case where there was independent evidence which was not put to the Jury. It must be mentioned here that they refer to the case in Surendra Math Das v. Emperor1, and Henderson, J., who was a party to the judgment in that case states as follows: “I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by taking the individual words of Lort Williams J., and weighing them in a balance in view of the fact that his judgment was delivered extempore as far as I remember. I do not think he intended to lay down any more than what was laid down by my learned brother in Sarat Chandra Chakraburthy v. Emperor.8" Referring to the previous statement he laid down that the corroboration of a previous statement though admissible under section 157, Evidence Act, is not the kind of corroboration expected in such a case. He states that the rule is a rule of prudence and lays down the proposition that a previous statement made by the prosecutrix cannot possibly be corroboration within the meaning of this rule. In U Toe Sein v. The King1, Sharpe, J., follows the decision in Emperor v. Nur Ahmed2, and he seems to think that the corroboration that is sought for is of the same kind as that of an accomplice. In Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya3, the facts were found against the rape. On the medical evidence no injuries were discovered on the private parts of the victim and the judgment seems to indicate that the offence of rape has not been committed. In Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya3, the facts were found against the rape. On the medical evidence no injuries were discovered on the private parts of the victim and the judgment seems to indicate that the offence of rape has not been committed. But in dealing with this point of corroboration, Beaumount, C.J., states: “I do not know that I am prepared to go as far as the Calcutta High Court went in Surendra Nath Das v. Emperor4, in saying that the corroboration of the complainant’s evidence in a rape case must be dealt with on the same footing as the corroboration of an accomplice’s evidence. Subsequent conduct of the complainant in a rape case is the type of corroboration which has no application in the case of an accomplice. It is of course obvious as pointed out by Calcutta High Court in Harendra Prasad v. Emperor5, that a prosecutrix in rape cases is not an accomplice”. In Nura v. Rex6, the facts showed that there was no rape at all. The learned Judge finds that the girl appears to have had some previous experience of sexual life and the facts that there was no mark of injury in any portion of her body clearly suggested that there had been no tussle between her and the other person alleged. In fact they seem to hold that no rape has been committed on her. As against these decisions, the Public Prosecutor relies on Harendra Prasad Bagchi v. Emperor5, which has been referred to in the judgment of Beaumount, C.J., in Emperor v. Mahdeo Tatya3. In the above Calcutta case which is also a decision of a Bench, Sen, C.J., who delivered the judgment referring to Surendra Math Das v. Emperor4 , observes as follows: “There the girl was older and used to sexual intercourse before the occurrence. No signs of rape were found on medical examination. On the contrary, the doctor said that the indications were that no force had been used. The Court found that the evidence indicates clearly that she had consented and that she told untruths in many matters. In such case a warning to the Jury of the kind referred to by the learned Judge would be necessary and I agree that the omission to give the Jury such a warning on the facts of that case rendered the charge bad. In such case a warning to the Jury of the kind referred to by the learned Judge would be necessary and I agree that the omission to give the Jury such a warning on the facts of that case rendered the charge bad. But if the learned Judge was expressing the view that in every case of rape the Judge must direct the Jury that they should not convict the accused on this testimony of the prosecutrix unless it was corroborated in material particulars to the same extent as is required in the case of an accomplice evidence, then I would most respectfully and emphatically dissent from it. The laying down of such a rule would tantamount to saying that every prosecutrix in a rape case should be treated as if she were an accomplice so far as her credibility is concerned. Reference was made to certain observations of Judges in England in regard to this matter. The manners, customs, and mode of life of women in this country are very different from those of women in England. A rule or practice which appropriately maybe of general application there would not necessarily have the same utility or application here. If this be the English rule or practice, I do not think that it is desirable in cases of this description to import it without qualification here. The Indian Law of evidence nowhere suggests such an inflexible rule and conditions here do not, in my opinion, warrant the engrafting of such a rule in our system”. In Soosalal Bania v. Emperor7, which is not referred to in any of the decisions above nor cited by either side, the learned Judge says that where a tender girl was alleged to have been raped, a statement made by her stating that she was raped and uttered immediately after the rape, crying and weeping, is admissible as explaining her act of crying under section 8 and by way of corroboration under section 157 of the Evidence Act. When the victim of an offence of rape is an innocent girl of tender age, her evidence will carry great weight. A statement made by her by way of disclosure immediately after the occasion will strongly corroborate her credibility and go to prove the consistency of her conduct and also her want of consent. When the victim of an offence of rape is an innocent girl of tender age, her evidence will carry great weight. A statement made by her by way of disclosure immediately after the occasion will strongly corroborate her credibility and go to prove the consistency of her conduct and also her want of consent. It is clear from the above decisions that the view of Lort Williams, J., that the evidence of a prosecutrix in a rape case requires corroboration in the same manner as that of an accomplice though it is shared by Ghosh, J., in Emperor v. Nur Ahmad1, is not shared by Henderson, J., who was a party to the Judgment in Surendranalh Das v. Emperor2, as is clear from his remarks in Sikandar Mian v. Emperor3. At any, rate such a view is dissented from in the later decision of the Calcutta High Court in Harendra Prasad Bagchi v. Emperor4. The view of Sen, J., in the above case has been approved by Beaumount, C.J., in Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya5. The Rangoon and Allahabad decisions specifically do not refer to this aspect. As stated already no decision of this Court or any authority of a binding nature has been cited before me in support of the view that the evidence of a prosecutrix in a rape case is on the same footing as that of an accomplice. An accomplice is a person who voluntarily participates in the commission of the crime along with others. In fact, he is as much an offender as the accused in the dock except that he is taken as a witness against the others. In the case of a prosecutrix for rape she is a victim of the offence and not an offender. If she is a consenting party it ceases to be an offence except in the case of those who are below a certain age as in such cases, the. falsity is not so common as in the other cases. The case of an accomplice therefore materially differs from that of a prosecutrix for rape and the evidence of both cannot be placed on the same footing. I agree with the view expressed in Harendra Prasad Bagchi v. Emperor4, which is approved in Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya5. In law therefore the evidence of a prosecutrix does not require corroboration like that of an accomplice. I agree with the view expressed in Harendra Prasad Bagchi v. Emperor4, which is approved in Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya5. In law therefore the evidence of a prosecutrix does not require corroboration like that of an accomplice. The next question is whether the rule of prudence requires that there should be corroboration. Henderson, J., in Sikandar Mian v. Emperor3, states that the rule of prudence requires that the evidence of a prosecutrix in a rape case must be in material particulars by independent testimony connecting the accused with the crime and he further states that the previous statement of the prosecutrix though corroboration under section 157 of the Evidence Act is not the kind of corroboration sought in such cases. He even states that it is not a rule of prudence but is a rule of folly to depend upon such former statements as corroborative evidence. There is no doubt that in sexual offences utmost caution and scrutiny of the evidence of the prosecutrix are necessary before it is acted upon. It will be clear from the decisions which lav down the rule as to the necessity for corroboration the facts are such that either no offence of rape can be inferred or the accusation against the accused is based on a background of enmity and ill-feeling and the cases-many of them-were tried with the aid of a jury who returned a verdict of guilty in circumstances in which the Court would not find the accused guilty. It was natural therefore that Judges who had to deal with such cases should express themselves strongly in favour of corroboration. Beaumont, C.J., also has expressed himself strongly in favour of corroboration in Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya5. There also the facts of the case throw considerable doubt whether rape was committed. The case was tried with the aid of a jury who found the accused guilty. In my opinion, even the rule of prudence is enunciated on account of the peculiar facts of the case which normally would not end in a conviction but the jury however returned a verdict of guilty. The case was tried with the aid of a jury who found the accused guilty. In my opinion, even the rule of prudence is enunciated on account of the peculiar facts of the case which normally would not end in a conviction but the jury however returned a verdict of guilty. I have yet to see a case where as in the present case, a young girl of immature years and tender age has been raped and who has made a disclosure of it at the earliest possible opportunity to her mother and another, the Court still insisted upon corroboration by independent testimony connecting the accused with the crime. Each case depends upon its facts and if after taking all the circumstances into consideration the evidence of the prosecutrix could be believed, then the accused could be convicted on her evidence alone, although there is no corroboration by independent testimony connecting the accused with the crime, Section 114 (b) of the Evidence Act says that “an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars.” There is no such provision for a prosecutrix in a rape case. This shows that neither law nor prudence requires such corroboration. As stated already each case depends on its factsand on the credibility or otherwise of the prosecutrix. If she is proved to be a credible and a satisfactory witness, no corroboration in my opinion is necessary. In assessing the value of her evidence her conduct immediately after the offence is committed is of great value. Such a conduct is relevant under section 8. The clause itself makes a distinction as to what is relevant under section 8 and what may be relevant under section 157. A complaint relating to the crime in circumstances under which it was made and the terms of it are relevant whereas a mere statement that she was ravished is not relevant under section 8 though it may be under section 157 or section 32(1). The complaint in the section does not mean complaint to Court as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. It means merely an allegation against a person who has committed the outrage on the prosecutrix. Such a complaint has been held to be admissible even under English law-vide In re Lilyman1. The complaint in the section does not mean complaint to Court as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. It means merely an allegation against a person who has committed the outrage on the prosecutrix. Such a complaint has been held to be admissible even under English law-vide In re Lilyman1. It has been pointed out by Hawkins, J., in the above case that not only the fact that the complaint was made by the prosecutrix shortly after the alleged occurrence but also the particulars of such a complaint may be given in evidence not as being evidence of the facts complained of but as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of a prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness box. In this case, there is the evidence of P.W. 6 who saw her weeping immediately after the occurrence and to whom she told what happened and this was followed by what she told her mother P.W. 3 as soon as she reached the village. Their evidence shows that her conduct was consistent with the story given in the witness box. There is therefore no reason to disbelieve her story that it was the appellant who committed the outrage on her. I agree with the learned Sessions Judge in the appreciation of her evidence and find the accused guilty of the offence of rape. The conviction is therefore confirmed. As regards the sentence, a sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment and the fine imposed by the lower Court will meet the ends of justice. The sentence of imprisonment is therefore reduced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and the fine is confirmed. The order of compensation will stand. With this modification the appeal is dismissed. V.S. ----- Sentence reduced.