Judgment.- This Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal is against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Guntur, dated 31st July, 1948, in C.M.A.No. 23 of 1948, and raises three important questions: (1) whether the Insolvency Court can order dividends paid on time-barred debts, expunged from the schedule, to be put back into Court; (2) whether the Official Receiver, like a full owner, can acknowledge and pay at his will and pleasure time-barred debts; and (3) whether a creditor authorised and directed by the Official Receiver can file a petition under section 50, Provincial Insolvency Act, in the Insolvency Court, to have debts incorrectly or improperly admitted expunged from the schedule and get a valid order. C.M.A.No. 23 of 1948 was an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur, dated 19th January, 1948, in I.A.No. 233 of 1947, in O.P.No. 54 of 1935, an application of the respondent, Venugopala Rao, a creditor of the insolvent in I.P.No. 54 of 1935, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur, to expunge two Khata debts amounting to Rs. 9,135 said to be due to the appellant, Subbamma, from one Seetharamamma, from the schedule of proved debts. The learned Subordinate Judge expunged these two debts and directed the appellant, Subbamma, to repay the sum of Rs. 2,689-4-0, paid by the Official Receiver, Guntur, to her as dividend on these expunged debts, with interest thereon up to the date of realisation. The learned District Judge confirmed the order of the Subordinate Judge as he had no hesitation in agreeing that it was correct. He has given two reasons for supporting the expunging of the debts, firstly, that they are Khata debts which became barred on 9th April, 1932, and, secondly, that there was obviously an interpolation and subsequent insertion in the accounts of the appellant in a desperate attempt to revive these debts which were given up for good by the appellant at the settlement of accounts, with Seetharamamma, on 12th February, 1935, when the entire sum due by Seetharamamma to the appellant was fixed at Rs 4,426-6-0 for which a promissory note was executed, which promissory note had already been allowed for in the insolvency petition, and dividend paid therefor. In other words, the learned District Judge considered that this alleged debt of Rs. In other words, the learned District Judge considered that this alleged debt of Rs. 9,135-6-0 was not only time-barred, even if true, but it was also given up at the settlement of accounts on 12th February, 1935, and was sought to be fraudulently revived and claimed by interpolations and subsequent insertions in the accounts, a conclusion which the Subordinate Judge too arrived at. I see no reason to differ from these two findings of fact by the learned District Judge, and the question of law has to be considered with reference to these two facts. I may add that the learned District Judge’s finding regarding the bogus nature of the debt of Rs. 9,135-6-0 sought to be dishonestly revived is supported not only by the tell-tale over-writings, etc., in the accounts, but also by the curious fact that the debt of Rs. 4,426-6-0 due really to the appellant, Subbamma, as per the settlement of accounts dated 12th February, 1935, was claimed by her nearly three years before this alleged additional debt of Rs. 9,135-6-0 was claimed by her in the insolvency proceedings. There can be no explanation at all for this except on the basis that she too was aware’ that only Rs. 4,426-5-0 was the debt really due to her, and that she therefore proved that debt first and drew the dividend in respect of it, and waited for a sufficiently long time before coming forward with the subsequent fraudulent claim regarding the abandoned debt of Rs. 9,135-6-0. The Official Receiver could have easily seen this subsequent claim to be fraudulent if he had looked into the accounts carefully and taken note of two significant facts, namely, that the settlement of accounts on 12th February, 1935, settled the liability of Seetharamamma only at Rs. 4,426-6-0, regarding which a promissory note was executed, and that that amount alone was claimed in the Insolvency Petition at first, the bogus claim regarding Rs. 9,135-6-0 being made three years later, namely, on 6th October, 1945. But, as usually happens, the Official Receiver was not careful enough, and admitted the subsequent claim in respect of this settled or abandoned debt of Rs. 9,135-6-0, and paid the dividend in respect of it too. 9,135-6-0 being made three years later, namely, on 6th October, 1945. But, as usually happens, the Official Receiver was not careful enough, and admitted the subsequent claim in respect of this settled or abandoned debt of Rs. 9,135-6-0, and paid the dividend in respect of it too. Later on, the respondent objected to the inclusion of this bogus debt, and the Official Receiver called upon the appellant to produce her accounts or sufficient evidence to show that the debt of Rs. 9,135-6-0 was really due to her. In spite of eight or nine adjournments given to the appellant, she failed to produce the accounts or other evidence before the Official Receiver and convince him that her claim in respect of this Rs. 9,135-6-0 was true. That, even if it was true, it was time-barred ages ago, is obvious. The Official Receiver was now in a quandary. He had admitted this bogus debt as genuine, and had disbursed Rs. 2,689-4-0 of the trust monies of the insolvent’s estate in his hands in respect of this bogus claim. So, he did not himself file in the Insolvency Court an application under section 50 of the Insolvency Act for expunging this bogus debt, allowed by him to be entered in the schedule of creditors erroneously, but asked the present respondent, by his order dated 23rd December, 1946, to move the Insolvency Court for such expunging. The respondent moved the Subordinate Court, Guntur, the Insolvency Court, by I.A.No. 233 of 1947. The Court allowed him to put in a petition, without the least objection by the present appellant, and untimately expunged the debt and ordered the appellant to refund the dividend already drawn by her. Even in the appeal before the District Judge, the appellant did not raise any. objection to the Official Receiver’s not putting in a petition himself under section 50 of the Insolvency Act and allowing the respondent to put in such a petition. It is only in this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal that this ground has been taken belatedly. On the merits, I have absolutely no doubt that the learned District Judge was quite right in holding this claim for Rs. 9,135-6-0 to be not only time-barred but also a fraudulent revival of a settled or abandoned debt. But Mr. Chalapathi Rao, for the appellant, has raised three legal grounds before me against the lower appellate Court’s order. On the merits, I have absolutely no doubt that the learned District Judge was quite right in holding this claim for Rs. 9,135-6-0 to be not only time-barred but also a fraudulent revival of a settled or abandoned debt. But Mr. Chalapathi Rao, for the appellant, has raised three legal grounds before me against the lower appellate Court’s order. The first is that the orders of both the Courts below were illegal because the debt was expunged under section 50 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, on the application of a creditor, and not upon the application of the Official Receiver. This contention has considerable force in it, though I cannot agree with it and quash the orders of the lower Courts in the circumstances of this case. Firstly, it was not raised in either of the Courts below, and cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal after the appellant has tried her luck on merits in both the Courts below and failed. Secondly, the respondent must, in the light of the Official Receiver’s directions to him to file this petition, be taken to have filed the petition in the Court only as an agent of the Official Receiver and on his specific directions. It was urged by Mr. Chalapathi Rao that the Official Receiver cannot be allowed to delegate his statutory power thus and that his permission or direction is of no avail. There is force in this. But, as the appellant did not raise this objection before the Sub-Judge or District Judge, and those Courts also allowed the respondent to proceed with the petition and appeal, I consider this to be only an irregularity not going to the root of the matter and vitiating the entire proceedings and necessitating the allowance of such a belated legal contention taken for the first time in this Civil Miscellaneous second Appeal. The second contention was that, once a dividend had been paid, it could not be directed to be refunded even though it had been paid in respect of a time-barred and expunged debt, though no more, dividend need be paid in respect of that expunged debt. Reliance was placed on the ruling of Somayya, J. in Gangaraju v. Lakshminarayanamurthi1. The second contention was that, once a dividend had been paid, it could not be directed to be refunded even though it had been paid in respect of a time-barred and expunged debt, though no more, dividend need be paid in respect of that expunged debt. Reliance was placed on the ruling of Somayya, J. in Gangaraju v. Lakshminarayanamurthi1. This ruling has been considered and rejected by the lower appellate Court, and, in my view, rightly, because in this case it is not merely the payment of a dividend in respect of an expunged debt, but the payment of a dividend in respect of a settled and non-existent and time-barred debt. Somayya, J., simply said that a dividend paid could not be recovered on the sole ground that the debt in respect of which it was paid had been expunged. No doubt, a time-barred debt is not extinguished in law but only the remedy to recover it is extinguished. But a debt which has been settled or given up years ago, like this debt, has no existence, and any dividend claimed and taken away in respect of it by a person, like the appellant, will be in the nature of taking by cheating or by false pretences, and in the nature of stolen property, and can be ordered to be put back into Court, even if the law is that the dividend paid in respect of a genuine and subsisting time-barred debt cannot be. Indeed, the appellant ought to thank her stars that she was not ordered to be prosecuted in addition, for dishonestly passing off such a settled and non-existent time-barred debt as a genuine and subsisting one. I have not the least doubt that the insolvency Court has got not only the right, but also the duty, to order dividends paid on time-barred debts expunged by it from the schedule to be put back into Court. There is clear authority, English and Indian, for that position. The rulings of Venkataramana Rao, J., (who has relied on English rulings also) in Chandrayya v. Chinnappareddi2 of Rajamannar, J., (as he then was) in Ramamma v. The Official Receiver3, and of the Bombay High Court in In re Ramachandra Ganujee Waikar 4, show this beyond the shadow of a doubt. The rulings of Venkataramana Rao, J., (who has relied on English rulings also) in Chandrayya v. Chinnappareddi2 of Rajamannar, J., (as he then was) in Ramamma v. The Official Receiver3, and of the Bombay High Court in In re Ramachandra Ganujee Waikar 4, show this beyond the shadow of a doubt. The facts in those cases were a bit different from the facts in our case, but nothing turns on those facts regarding this point. The third contention of Mr. Chalapathi Rao was that the Official Receiver was a full owner of the insolvent’s property, which vested in him, and, so, like any other full owner, could, at his will and pleasure, acknowledge and pay time-barred debts, as he did, and the Court could not order a refund of the dividend he knowingly and willingly paid in respect of them. I cannot agree at all. The Official Receiver never paid the dividend in this case knowing the debt to be time-barred and settled. Besides, he is a trustee in respect of the entire body of creditors and has no power at all, like ordinary full owners, to spend the money on himself, or to make a gift of it to others, however deserving, or to acknowledge or pay time-barred debts, or settled debts, or other debts not binding on the insolvent’s estate under the law, including the law of limitation. Otherwise, the Official Receiver can include any number of time-barred debts in the schedule, and the insolvent’s genuine creditors, whose debts are not time-barred, will get only a pittance along with persons whose worthless claims have been hopelessly barred years and years ago! Of course, in this case, it is not even a genuine time-barred debt, but a debt given up and extinguished long ago and revived dishonestly. All the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant have failed, and I am satisfied that the lower appellate Court’s judgment and decree are correct and proper, and so confirm the same and dismiss this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal, but without costs, as the legal point under section 50 of the Provincial Insolvency Act has not been raised in the lower Courts and has not been considered by either of the Courts below, and this must have been the main reason inducing the appellant to file this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal. Leave refused. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.