The Chief Justice.-The applicant was assessed to income-tax by the Income-tax Officer, Cuddalore circle, South Arcot district, by his order dated 4th February, 1948. He filed an application before the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 33-A(2) of the Act for revision of this order dated 18th February, 1949. The application was rejected in limine by the Commissioner on the ground that the revision petition was barred by time. According to the petitioner, the order sought to be revised was received by him only on 24th February, 1948. He has filed this application for the issue of a writ of mandamus to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, directing him to entertain his application and to dispose of it in accordance with law, because according to him the application was within time as it was filed within one year from the date of the receipt of the assessment order by him. The only question on the merits which falls for decision is whether the one year has to be computed from the date when the order was signed by the Income-tax Officer, or the date when it was communicated to the petitioner, or the date, if there be any, on which the petitioner had the opportunity of coming to know of the order. The learned advocate for the petitioner relied on a catena of decisions of this Court of which it is sufficient to refer to two, namely, Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu1 and Swaminathan v. Letchmanan2 which support his contention that the date of the order does not mean the date when the officer passed the order but the date when such order was either communicated to the party or the date when it was pronounced or published in such a manner that the party must be deemed to have had notice of it or the date of such pronouncement or publication. The learned Judges in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu1, were no doubt faced with the difficulty of straining the language which prima facie does not import a date different from the date when the order is actually passed. The learned Judges in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu1, were no doubt faced with the difficulty of straining the language which prima facie does not import a date different from the date when the order is actually passed. In Firm of Mohan Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa 3 , a Bench of the Patna High Court, without referring to the decisions of this Court, arrived at a conclusion which undoubtedly is supported by the prima facie meaning of the language used in the statute. We see no reason to disregard the consistent course of authority in this Court on this point. Mr. Rama Rao Sahib, learned counsel for the Income-tax Department, contended that the rule laid down in the two Madras decisions above cited is not an invariable and inflexible rule applying to the provisions relating to appeals and revisions made in every enactment, and that each such provision in a particular enactment should be construed having regard to the general scheme of that enactment and taking into account the history of legislation in respect of the subject-matter of that enactment.‘He placed strong reliance on the fact that there had been amendments of the Income-tax Act and with regard to certain rights of appeal the amendments had specifically provided that time should be computed from the date of the receipt of the order sought to be appealed against, but there was no such amendment introduced in section 33-A. It is not for us to consider why the language of section 33-A(2) was not altered. The only question which we have to decide is whether there is anything in the reasoning of the learned Judges in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu1 and Swaminathan v. Letchmanan2, which makes the application of the rule laid down by them dependent on the provisions of a particular statute. We think there is none. We think there is none. On the other hand, we consider that the rule laid down by the learned Judges in the above two decisions-and we are taking the same view-is based upon a salutary and just principle, namely, that if a person is given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order. We do not agree with Mr. Rama Rao Sahib on the length of the period prescribed for filing an appeal or a revision petition or a suit has any bearing on the question. In Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu1 the period was one year. In Swaminathan v. Letchmanan 2 the period was thirty days. Mr. Rama Rao Sahib further contended that the provisions in sub-section (2) of section 33-A is really not a provision prescribing a time limit for the exercise of the right of the party aggrieved but it imposes a limit to the exercise of revisional powers by the Commissioner and therefore time must be computed from the date when the order was actually passed. Plausible though this argument may be, so far as sub-section (1) of section 33-A is concerned, we are of opinion that it is not sound so far as the right given to the party aggrieved under sub-section (2) is concerned. In a case falling under sub-section (1) the Commissioner acts of his own motion. There is no question of the aggrieved party invoking his jurisdiction. There can be no occasion to apply the rule enunciated in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu1. It may be said that the Commissioner’s power to call for the record ceases with the lapse of one year from the date of the order by the subordinate authority. But in a case falling under subsection (2) the party aggrieved has got to take the steps of applying for revision and he is allowed one year from the date of the order. The provision is, therefore, certainly in the nature of a time limit for the application for revision. Mr. But in a case falling under subsection (2) the party aggrieved has got to take the steps of applying for revision and he is allowed one year from the date of the order. The provision is, therefore, certainly in the nature of a time limit for the application for revision. Mr. Rama Rao Sahib raised two objections to the maintainability of the application. One objection was that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued in respect of any proceedings under the Indian Income-tax Act because the Act is a complete Code in itself providing for adequate remedies for aggrieved assessees. It is quite true that the Income-tax Act does contain several provisions for appeals and revisions and reference. If the petitioner had sought to obtain from this Court any relief which he would have been entitled to obtain under any of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, then certainly we would have no hesitation in holding that this Court would not exercise its power to issue prerogative writs to give such relief to an assessee. But this application is not made to obtain any of the reliefs which the assessee might obtain under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. This application is only to direct the Commissioner to entertain an application provided by the Act itself on the ground that he has been improperly denied that right. The relief which he seeks at our hands is only a direction to the Commissioner to entertain and dispose of the application according to law. This relief the petitioner cannot obtain under any of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. We therefore see no substance in this objection. The other objection is based on the long delay in making the application. The order of the Commissioner rejecting the petitioner’s application for revision was made on 5th April, 1949, while the application for the issue of a writ of mandamus was made about a year after that date. We have held that though there is no period of limitation as such prescribed for application for the issue of prerogative writs, long delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs. In this case, however, we think there are circumstances which should make us take a more lenient view. We have held that though there is no period of limitation as such prescribed for application for the issue of prerogative writs, long delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs. In this case, however, we think there are circumstances which should make us take a more lenient view. Though wrongly advised, the applicant appears to have sought some remedy from the Central Board of Revenue, of course, unsuccessfully. Having regard to this fact, we do not consider that the delay should prevent the party from obtaining the relief to which we have found he is entitled. We think that disallowance of the costs of the petition would amply provide for the justice of the case. As the Commissioner of Income-tax has on a wrong construction of section 33-A (2) of the Act refused to entertain the application made by the party for a revision of the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer, a writ of mandamus will issue to him to take the application on file and dispose of it in accordance with law. As already observed, there will be no order as to costs. K.S. ----- Petition allowed.