Judgment.- This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Calicut dismissing his suit on a preliminary point namely that a proper statutory notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code has not been given by the plaintiff before the suit was instituted. There are four defendants to the suit. The first is the South Indian Railway. The second is the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway. The third is the Great Indian Peninsular Railway and the fourth is the Governor-General in Council, New Delhi. The plaintiff’s case was that he despatched from Calicut to self at Kalapipal, a station in the G.I.P. Railway, 34 bags of dry coconuts, 11 bags of moist coconuts and 77 bags of copra balls by invoice dated 17th July, 1944. He charged the railway system with wilful default and negligence and misconduct as the goods were wrongfully diverted and otherwise unduly delayed in the course of transit. It was only after continued enquiries regarding the delay at the other end that the goods were traced and finally sent to the destination in October, 1944. The goods had become deteriorated and became unmarketable. The District Commercial Inspector, Jhansi, certified the condition of the goods and assessed the claim for damages at Rs. 1,918. The plaintiff’s agent took delivery under protest reserving his claim for full and adequate damages. He claimed Rs. 5,059 as the proper amount of damages sustained by him. In paragraph 9 of the plaint it was stated that he had sent various letters to the defendants complaining of the delay and claiming damages and that finally the defendants evaded and refused to make good the damages. He issued on 29th March, 1945, a registered notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. Along with the plaint he filed the copy of the notice sent by him and also the acknowledgments of delivery by the various addressees signed by them. All the defendants separately filed written statements and in each of them we find an objection being taken to the legal validity of the notice under section 80. The ground of objection was that proper statutory notice was not served on the Governor-General in Council who owns the railways. All the defendants separately filed written statements and in each of them we find an objection being taken to the legal validity of the notice under section 80. The ground of objection was that proper statutory notice was not served on the Governor-General in Council who owns the railways. The written statements disclosed that the goods were misdespatched to Mysore and after some delay they were traced and finally they were rebooked to Kalapipal. Sometime before the trial an additional written statement was filed on behalf of all the defendants wherein it was stated that section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was not complied with as the plaint did not use the words “sent, delivered and left” with reference to the notice under section 80. Various issues were framed but as stated before the validity of the notice was treated as a preliminary point of law and the lower Court was asked to try that issue first. It accordingly took it up for trial and in the end dismissed the suit as stated above. Two grounds are urged in the judgment of the Court below for its conclusion that the notice is bad. The first is that there is no allegation in the plaint that the notice was delivered or left at the office of the Central Government and that the mandatory provision of section 80 are not complied with. Section 80 says: “That the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.” The second ground was that the notice does not state that the Governor-General in Council will be sued and did not claim any relief against the Governor-General in Council. The points for determination are whether the notice is bad because the plaint did not contain an averment that it was delivered or left with the Secretary to Government; (2) whether the notice is bad because no relief was claimed against the Governor-General in Council nor was it intimated that he will be sued. As regards point number 1, want of a proper averment in the plaint, it may be noted that along with the plaint the acknowledgments of the delivery of registered letters were filed. Paragraph 9 of the plaint referred to the despatch of the registered notice under section 80 and the non-receipt of a reply. As regards point number 1, want of a proper averment in the plaint, it may be noted that along with the plaint the acknowledgments of the delivery of registered letters were filed. Paragraph 9 of the plaint referred to the despatch of the registered notice under section 80 and the non-receipt of a reply. In this circumstance it seems to me a highly technical view that the plaint should be dismissed on the ground that the express words that the notice was delivered or left with the Secretary for Railways are not found in the plaint. If that was the only point I would allow an amendment to get over the objection. The learned advocate for the respondents agreed that an amendment would get over the technical argument. In view of that he did not insist on an amendment but was content to support the judgment on other points. Point number 1 therefore must be found in favour of the plaintiff in the circumstance. Point No. 2.-The more serious objection to the notice that was pressed before me was the absence of a reference to the Governor-General in Council in the notice issued. The copy of the notice is Ex. P-1 (the original has not been produced by the defendants). Ex. P-1 after setting out the despatch of goods and the non-delivery in time and their late arrival and the deterioration of the goods and the loss sustained by the plaintiff ends with this paragraph: “Please therefore take notice that unless you make good the loss I have sustained by reason of your gross negligence I intend instituting a suit against your railway for such loss as mentioned above.” The letter, was amongst others, addressed to Secretary for Railways, Central Government, New Delhi. Similar notices were sent to various persons including the agents of the three railways. The lower Court had placed reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Governor-General in Council v. Krishnaswami Pillai1, and also the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India2. It is well settled that the section is mandatory. At the same time it is equally well settled that the Court should not be hypercritical in examining the language used but should interpret the same in a free and liberal spirit. It is well settled that the section is mandatory. At the same time it is equally well settled that the Court should not be hypercritical in examining the language used but should interpret the same in a free and liberal spirit. In my opinion the decision in the M.L.J, case1 is distinguishable because the registered notice there stated that the Secretary of State for India in Council will be sued. Actually it is a different person that should be the defendant and that was the defendant. In such circumstance the notice was regarded as bad. In the present case there is no such reference to a wrong person as the person who was going to be sued. It is no doubt true that it is not expressly stated that the proposed suit would be against the Governor-General in Council. On the other hand, it is stated generally that the suit will be against your Railway and the notice was addressed to Secretary to Railways, Central Government, New Delhi. Any person who receives this notice and reads it will understand that this is a claim against the Government and the suit would be against the owners of the Railway, the Governor-General in Council. It could not have been the intention, nor could it have been understood, as a suit which is contemplated against the individual official, the Secretary for Railways. In fact the language used is “the suit will be against your railway” and not “against you.” I think a fair reading of this notice may well be taken as an intimation which will satisfy the requirements of sections 79 and 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. In fact section 79 says thai: actually in the suit the defendant must be the Governor-General in Council. In the present suit he is the 4th defendant. Section 79, therefore, is strictly and literally complied with. Section 80 requires that the notice should state the cause of action, the name, description of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims. It is somewhat significant that the name of the proposed defendant need not be stated although of course it is expected that the person against whom the relief is sought would be particularised. I had occasion to decide the same question in a batch of C.R.Ps., C.R.P.No. 753 of 1948, etc., Subramaniam v. Union of India3. It is somewhat significant that the name of the proposed defendant need not be stated although of course it is expected that the person against whom the relief is sought would be particularised. I had occasion to decide the same question in a batch of C.R.Ps., C.R.P.No. 753 of 1948, etc., Subramaniam v. Union of India3. I held therein that a notice in somewhat similar terms which merely stated that the suit would be filed for recovery of the amount claimed and was despatched by registered notice to the Secretary to Governor-General in Council, Department of Railways and stated that it was a notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was a good notice. The matter has been argued before me again. I do not however, see any reason to change my view. I hold accordingly that the notice is not bad on this ground either. Lastly Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar sought to raise a new point in support of the judgment of the lower Court. He contended that the notice was certainly bad because it merely stated that loss had been incurred and that unless the loss is made good a suit will be filed. No particulars of the loss were indicated nor the amount. He stressed the need for definite information on the point in the notice itself so that the Government may be apprised of the magnitude of the claim and the matter be dealt with at the appropriate level having regard to the magnitude of the claim among other things. I see some force in this argument. But in the present case notwithstanding the fact that the defendants raised an additional statement setting an objection to the notice on other grounds, they never raised this point. I do not see any justice in allowing them to raise a further point now particularly when I find that in the written statement it is admitted that the goods were misdespatched to Mysore where they were lying unclaimed and it was only after some considerable delay that the mistake was found out and the goods were despatched to the proper place. I do not see any reason why the plaintiff should be made to suffer for this delay which may be due either to the negligence or an accident on the part of the railway officials. I do not see any reason why the plaintiff should be made to suffer for this delay which may be due either to the negligence or an accident on the part of the railway officials. Having regard to this aspect of the matter I do not see why I should allow an indulgence in favour of the railway to the possible detriment of the plaintiff. I therefore decline to entertain this point. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the case will be sent back to the lower Court for trial of other issues. Costs to abide. Court-fee to be refunded. K.S. ----- Appeal allowed.