Judgment.- The question involved in this Civil Revision Petition is very simple, namely, whether when a plaintiff files a petition to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit regarding the same subject-matter, under Order 23, rule 1(2), Civil Procedure Code, the Court has got the right to dismiss the petition telling him that he might withdraw the suit if he wants but that it will not give him permission to file a fresh suit regarding the same subject-matter. The lower Court is said to have dismissed the suit (O.S.No. 95 of 1944) later on, but we are not concerned in this Civil Revision Petition with this alleged later order of dismissal, which is not filed here, on a subsequent unconditional withdrawal or non-prosecution of the suit. I have absolutely no doubt that the lower Court had the right and jurisdiction to pass an order it did. The law regarding the withdrawal of a suit under Order 23, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, is well settled. Order 23, rule 1(1) gives the plaintiff the liberty to withdraw from a suit unconditionally on finding it unsustainable, or for any other reason. No leave or order is necessary for this. See Lakshman v. Muthayya1 and Mahant v. Parshotamdas2. The plaintiff need not assign any reason for such an unconditional withdrawal. Order 23, rule 1(2), Civil Procedure Code, contemplates a withdrawal from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Here the plaintiff must ask for leave and must make out a case within clause (a) or (b). The Court has no jurisdiction to allow such withdrawal with liberty unless the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, under clause (a) or unless there are “other sufficient grounds” for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit regarding the same subject-matter under clause (b). See Harshamukhi v. Sarat Chandra Ata3 and Raj v. Ram4. An application to withdraw a suit with liberty to file a fresh suit regarding the same subject-matter must be either allowed or refused in toto. If liberty is refused, the suit should not be dismissed at once but retained for trial in the usual course. See Marudachala v. Chinna 5. The Court cannot divide the petition into two, and accept the withdrawal and refuse the liberty in the same order. If liberty is refused, the suit should not be dismissed at once but retained for trial in the usual course. See Marudachala v. Chinna 5. The Court cannot divide the petition into two, and accept the withdrawal and refuse the liberty in the same order. It is bound to give the facts and reasons when giving the liberty to file a fresh suit regarding the same subject-matter. See Shamanandan Prasad v. Mulchand6, Sukumar v. Chairman, District Board of Gaya7 and Reasuddin v. Mirsajid8, Abdul v. Mohammed9 and Subhasini v. Ashutosh 10 . “Other sufficient grounds” in clause (b) has been interpreted to mean “grounds ejusdem generis” to those mentioned in clause (a) “or at least analogous to them.” See Mabulla v. Hemargini 11 , Nagamma v. Lakshminarasu12, Sukumar v. Chairman, District Board, Gaya7 and Ram Rao v. Babu Appanna 13. In the present case, the petitioner, the first plaintiff, had asked for permission to withdraw his suit, O.S.No. 95 of 1944 for possession of properties as the nearest reversioner to one Seshayya, whose widow Alivelu died on 30th November, 1941, against the alleged adopted son of Seshayya, the first defendant and others. The grounds alleged by him in this I.A.No. 1374 of 1945 for withdrawal with liberty, were that his vakil, Mr. P. Chalapati Rao, had taken a portion of his the (petitioner’s) properties in advance in the name of his relative the second plaintiff for conducting the suit, and had then filed a genealogical table which would not support the petitioner’s case and has also refused to amend the plaint and the genealogical table suitably. The first defendant had attacked the genealogical table as false and mythical, and had contested the petitioner’s claim to be the nearest reversioner, besides asserting the truth and validity of his own adoption. The suit was filed in 1944. This I.A. was filed on 9th November, 1945, after giving up his vakil and revoking his vakalat. On 9th November, 1945, itself the lower Court passed the order as below: “The petitioner may withdraw the suit if he wants. This is not a case for which permission can be given to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Petition is dismissed.” This is the order covered by this Civil Revision Petition. The later order dismissing the suit has not been filed in this Civil Revision Petition. This is not a case for which permission can be given to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Petition is dismissed.” This is the order covered by this Civil Revision Petition. The later order dismissing the suit has not been filed in this Civil Revision Petition. So the reason for dismissing the suit cannot be definitely ascertained. Nor are we concerned with its correctness in this Civil Revision Petition. I cannot see any merits in this Civil Revision Petition. Insufficient evidence, or a false genealogical table, or even the fraud of plaintiff’s vakil, will not come under clause (a) or (b) of Order 23, rule 1(2), Civil Procedure Code, being neither a formal defect, nor falling under “other sufficient grounds”. See Bikaji v. Ananti1 and Ramarao v. Babu Appanna 2. So, the lower Court was right in refusing permission to file a fresh suit and dismissing the interlocutory application, in totu remarking that the petitioner might withdraw his suit unconditionally if he wanted. It was an order perfectly within its jurisdiction, and was not tainted by any illegality, nor was there any failure of justice. No doubt, it did not give reasons for refusing permission to file a fresh suit, as Mr. Kotayya, for the petitioner, complained. But there is nothing in law forcing a Court to give reasons when refusing permission though it must give reasons when granting permission. It seems to me that, as in a discharge order under section 253(1), Criminal Procedure Code, no reasons are required to be given by law for refusing permission to file a fresh suit, though it is desirable to give reasons in order to let the party and the superior Courts know the reasons. Here the thing was so obvious (a facility could not be given to invent a new genealogical table), that the lower Court perhaps thought that no reasons need be given. The Privy Council ruling in Venkatagiri v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras3 , will make an interference in revision in the circumstances of this case impossible. Mr. Kotayya relied on the ruling in Gurprit Singh v. Punjab Government4. The facts were different there. On the facts, it was held there that the lower Court’s order refusing permission to file a fresh suit was wrong. Here, that cannot be said at all. Mr. Kotayya relied on the ruling in Gurprit Singh v. Punjab Government4. The facts were different there. On the facts, it was held there that the lower Court’s order refusing permission to file a fresh suit was wrong. Here, that cannot be said at all. In that ease, it was found as a matter of fact that there was a failure on the part of the lower Court to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. That is not so here. Each case has, of course, to be decided on the facts of that case. The general observations in Gurprit Singh v. Punjab Government4, cannot prevail against the wording of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or the Privy Council ruling in Venkatagiri v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras 3 . This petition, therefore, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed, but, in the peculiar circumstances, without costs as it is the lower Court’s failure to give reason which has led to the filing of this Civil Revision Petition. Of course, I give no finding at all about the legality or otherwise of the subsequent dismissal of the suit O.S.No. 95 of 1944 itself, as that order of dismissal has not been filed in this case and is not the subject-matter of this Civil Revision Petition. K. S. ----- Petition dismissed.