Judgment.- This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal raises an interesting question of law, namely, whether, under Order XXI, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, a decree for the dismantling of a wall, and the delivery of a plot on which the wall stands, to the decree-holder, can be adjusted after the decree is passed, and the adjustment pleaded in bar of execution, though such an adjustment has not been certified to the Court, and whether in such a case the mere award of a sum of money as costs in the decree would prevent such an arrangement being gone into or would enable the judgment-debtor to escape execution for the costs also till the arrangement is gone into. The facts are briefly these:- The appellant here, Seetharamayya, got a decree for possession of a small strip of land from the respondent, Pattayya, in O.S.No. 736 of 1944, and the defendant was asked to give delivery after dismantling the wall standing on that strip of land, and directed to construct a wall on his own land beyond that strip if he liked. The judgment-debtor did not dismantle the wall and deliver the strip of land. So execution was taken up by the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor obstructed when the amin went with the warrant, according to the decree-holder; but, according to the judgment-debtor what happened was that on sighting the amin, the judgment-debtor got four panchayatdars from different villages together and they effected an amicable settlement between him and the decree-holder, under which the judgment-debtor agreed to pay Rs.150 towards the costs of the suit to the decree-holder, and Rs. 150 for the strip of land on which the wall stood, and the decree-holder agreed to execute a sale deed in respect of that strip of land in favour of the judgment-debtor, and actually wrote out a sale deed, and kept it with him without registering it. The appellant denies that there was any such agreement, as alleged by the judgment-debtor, and says what happened was this. The judgment-debtor, having obstructed peaceful delivery, it was necessary to obtain police aid. Meanwhile, the decree-holder’s wife fell sick, and the decree-holder had to attend to her urgently instead of applying to the Court at once for police aid for the demolition of this wall and the recovery of the strip of land. The judgment-debtor, having obstructed peaceful delivery, it was necessary to obtain police aid. Meanwhile, the decree-holder’s wife fell sick, and the decree-holder had to attend to her urgently instead of applying to the Court at once for police aid for the demolition of this wall and the recovery of the strip of land. According to him, he filed C.M.P.No. 376 of 1947 as soon as his wife was well, and wanted execution to be proceeded with with police aid. The judgment-debtor pleaded this arrangement before the Additional District Munsif, Vijayawada, who heard C.M.P.No. 376 of 1947. The learned District Munsif held that the adjustment pleaded had not been certified within the prescribed time. He also observed, very cryptically and without any discussion, that there were no merits in the counter, and allowed the execution petition to proceed. The judgment-debtor appealed to the Sub-Court, Vijayawada. The learned Subordinate Judge held that, under the ruling in Narayanaswami v. Rangaswami1, an arrangement like this not certified by Court, could not be pleaded regarding decrees where money is payable but could be pleaded in other decrees and should be gone into and a decision given, as, under the Privy Council decision in Oudh Commercial Bank, Ltd., Fyzabad v. Thakurain Bind Basni Kuar2, the parties were at liberty to contract as they liked regarding the terms of a decree, and such adjustments could be gone into under section 47, Civil Procedure Code. So, he set aside the order of the District Munsif and directed a full enquiry into the alleged arrangement and adjustment set up by the judgment-debtor, allowing both sides to let in all relevant oral and documentary evidence they liked to adduce, and directing the appeal costs to abide the result of the remanded Execution Petition. The decree-holder has filed this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal against that order of remand. I have perused the entire records, and heard the learned counsel on both sides. Mr. Rajeswara Rao, for the appellant, has raised three main contentions. The first is that the learned Subordinate Judge himself, having relied on the ruling in Narayanaswami v. Rangaswami1 and having held that an adjustment not certified by Court regarding a decree where money is payable under the decree cannot be gone into, erred in directing an enquiry into this arrangement regarding a decree where there was a substantial sum of money, namely, Rs. 145 payable under the decree as costs. I cannot agree. It seems to me that the ruling relied on by Mr. Rajeswara Rao for this position will not help him. No doubt, he is quite . right in relying on the position that where the decree proper provides for payment of money, as well as other reliefs, an adjustment of such a complex decree could not be recognised, unless certified to the Court within the time allowed under Order 21, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. In other words, supposing there is a decree for recovery of possession of immoveable properties and for a sum of money as mesne profits, or arrears of rent, or damages, the ruling in Narayanaswami v. Rangaswami1 will certainly preclude an enquiry into an arrangement not certified to Court within the prescribed time under Order 21, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. But it seems to be quite unsustainable to contend that costs, which are a feature of almost every decree whether in cases of immoveable property or pure money decrees or even guardianship petitions, matrimonial petitions, etc., can be held to be a portion of the complex decree proper, as contemplated in the ruling relied on by him. One simple test will be this. Can any one sue another for costs alone before the suit is decided, though it is true that in every plaint one of the reliefs usually claimed is costs; so I take it that the ruling relied on by him will apply only to cases where money is claimed as a relief in the suit and not merely costs allowed in the decree as an adjunct to such reliefs. It is significant to note that our Court has not taken as wide a view regarding Order 21, rule 2, like the Bombay, Calcutta, Nagpur and Patna High Courts, and applied it to every kind of decree, and has specifically restricted its application to complex decrees containing a decree for money as part of the decree and, of course, also to the costs portion of other decrees where costs are allowed. If Mr. If Mr. Rajeswara Rao’s contention were accepted the decision in Narayanaswami v. Rangaswami1 (which follows a long catena of decisions as in Sankaran v. Samara 2, Abdul v. Bathula3 and Ramakrishna v. Balakrishna4) will be creating a distinction without a difference which I am loath to believe is what the learned Judges intended. So, though in the Privy Council ruling in Oudh Commercial Bank, Ltd., Fyzabad v. Tkakarain Bind Basni Kuar5 it was held generally ( see page 662) that an uncertified adjustment could not be recognised, I overrule this contention in the circumstances of this case. There is greater point in his next contention, namely, in execution, that, even so, costs, once decreed, become money payable under a decree and, therefore, under Order XXI, rules 2 and 4, payment or adjustment of money payable even as regards costs in a decree shall not be recognised by any Court executing a decree unless it has been certified within the time prescribed, as it is “money payable under a decree of any kind”. He said that Order 21, rules 2 and 4, applied to a partial discharge also. The learned counsel for the opposite side has no satisfactory reply to this contention, and I accept it as correct. The ruling in Ammaniamma v. Mudappa6, by a Bench of this Court, makes it clear. In that view, the lower Court’s order would have to be modified by giving the decree-holder full liberty to proceed with the execution petition as regards costs, leaving the other matter, namely, the alleged arrangement regarding the plot of land and the wall, to be gone into by the learned District Munsiff at the remanded hearing. Though the judgment-debtor contended that he agreed to pay Rs. 150 to the decree-holder for costs, that was not an adjustment proper, since Rs. 145 had been awarded as costs in the decree itself, and the balance of Rs. 5 represented only the interest payable. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtor said that his client was always ready to pay the costs. Mr. Rajeswara Rao’s contention that once costs are awarded, a money decree would become part of the complex decree does not appeal to me. Then there will be very few decrees which will ever be covered by adjustments or arrangements, as, in almost every decree, regarding immoveable property, etc., there will be an order of costs. Mr. Rajeswara Rao’s contention that once costs are awarded, a money decree would become part of the complex decree does not appeal to me. Then there will be very few decrees which will ever be covered by adjustments or arrangements, as, in almost every decree, regarding immoveable property, etc., there will be an order of costs. But that need not stand in the way of my recognising the force of this contention and allowing execution to proceed for costs. The third contention of Mr. Rajeswara Rao was that the arrangement set up by the judgment-debtor regarding the land and the wall was too ludicrous and incredible to deserve any remand for consideration. I cannot agree. This is not the stage where we can go into the alleged incredible nature of an arrangement. No evidence has been let in, and it will be improper for any Court to hold an arrangement to be incredible before considering the evidence regarding it. Even a lunatic can be pronounced to be so by a Court only after hearing him. In the result, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is modified by allowing the execution petition to proceed regarding costs alone, and is confirmed regarding the remand to the District Munsif for an enquiry into the arrangement set up about the strip of land and wall. In the circumstances, I direct the respondent to pay half the advocate’s fees of the appellant in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and his full printing charges and bear his own costs himself. K.C. ----- Order modified.