The Chief Justice.-On 9th April, 1948, the Government of Madras by G.O. No.1791, Development, made a reference under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the Industrial Tribunal having its place of sitting at Coimbatore, of an industrial dispute, which had arisen between the workers and managements of hotels in the whole of the Coimbatore district in respect of certain matters, for adjudication. The Notification did not mention the hotels by name; nor did it specify the matters in respect of which an industrial dispute had arisen. The introductory part of the Government Order referred to a report from the Commissioner of Labour, but no further light is thrown on the matter, because that report is stated to be only to the effect that an industrial dispute had arisen between the workers and managements of the hotels in the whole of the Coimbatore district in respect of certain matters and that the parties to the dispute were unable to arrive at an amicable settlement. The industrial tribunal sent notices inter alia to the hotel owners’ sangam, Coimbatore, and the Coimbatore district hotel workers’ union. On 10th August, 1948 the workers’ union addressed a letter to the Tribunal praying for time to prepare their demands. On 14th August, 1948 the union filed a preliminary statement setting out the history of the alleged dispute and the demands to be adjudicated upon. The hotel owners’ sangam, Coimbatore, filed a counter statement attacking the validity of the reference, the representative character of the workers’ union, and denying that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry. Apparently because of the decision of this Court in Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao (Engineer), Ltd.1, the Government considered it advisable to issue a fresh reference. How and on what material they acted will be set out later. Apparently because of the decision of this Court in Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao (Engineer), Ltd.1, the Government considered it advisable to issue a fresh reference. How and on what material they acted will be set out later. On 15th March, 1949 the Government issued another notification which runs thus: “Whereas industrial disputes have arisen between the workers and managements of the hotels in Coimbatore district mentioned in Annexure I to this order in respect of matters mentioned in Annexure II to this order: And whereas in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor of Madras it is necessary to refer the said disputes for adjudication: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947), and in supersession of the orders issued in Development Department’s Notification, No. 363, dated the 9th April, 1948, published on page 322 of Part I of the Fort St. George Gazette, dated the 20th April, 1948, His Excellency the Governor of Madras hereby directs that the said industrial disputes be referred for adjudication to the industrial tribunal having its place of sitting at Coimbatore. 2. The Commissioner of Labour is requested to send copies of this order to the managements and workers’ unions concerned. (By order of His Excellency the Governor).......” Annexure No.1 contained a list of 85 hotels situated in Erode, Coimbatore, Pollachi, Udumalpet, Tiruppur and Puliampatti divided into three classes, A, B and C, and Annexure II contained 11 items of matters in dispute, namely, 1. Wages. 7. Holidays. 2. Dearness allowance. 8. Medical facilities. 3. Bonus. 9. Rest room. 4. Provident fund. 10. Appointment through employment exchange. 5. Gratuity. 11. Dismissal 6. House rent. Thereupon the prior reference was treated as closed, and there were fresh statements filed before the Tribunal by the Hotel-owners’ sangam and the Hotel-workers’ Union. The Tribunal, after an enquiry, passed its award on 17th March, 1950, which contained the following provisions: (1) the basic wages of all the hotel workers were to be revised from 1st January, 1949 as stated in paragraph 22 of the award. The hotels were divided into three classes, namely, Class A comprising hotels with a daily turnover of Rs. The Tribunal, after an enquiry, passed its award on 17th March, 1950, which contained the following provisions: (1) the basic wages of all the hotel workers were to be revised from 1st January, 1949 as stated in paragraph 22 of the award. The hotels were divided into three classes, namely, Class A comprising hotels with a daily turnover of Rs. 250 and more, Class B of hotels with a daily turnover of Rs.100 and more but less than Rs.250, and class C of hotels with a daily turnover of less than Rs.100. The employees were divided into four classes namely, skilled A, skilled B, unskilled A and unskilled B and different rates of wages were fixed for each class, (2) a wife and children’s allowance was to be paid to all married workers as from 1st January, 1949, namely, every married worker was to get an allowance in the three classes of hotels of Rs. 10, and, further, in class A hotels only, there was to be an allowance of Rs. 5 for each child (for two children), (3) bonus was to be paid to the workers according to the length of their service as specified in paragraph 24 of the award. The arrears of wages, allowance and bonus should be paid in three equal monthly instalments, the first instalment becoming payable in three weeks from the publication of the award. The method of classification was indicated. By Order No. 1390, (Development), dated 6th April, 1950 the Government declared the award to be binding on the managements of the hotels in Coimbatore district and the workers employed therein and that the award shall remain in force for a period of one year. The award was also duly published in the Fort St. George Gazette. This application is by the proprietors of 18 hotels in Coimbatore to quash the reference and the award as being ultra vires and illegal. Mr.K. Bhashyam Aiyangar, who appeared for the applicants, challenged the validity of the reference on several grounds. He also contended that, in view of the events which led up to the second reference, the particular Industrial Tribunal should not have adjudicated on the dispute. He also urged that the award went beyond the reference in certain particulars. Mr.K. Bhashyam Aiyangar, who appeared for the applicants, challenged the validity of the reference on several grounds. He also contended that, in view of the events which led up to the second reference, the particular Industrial Tribunal should not have adjudicated on the dispute. He also urged that the award went beyond the reference in certain particulars. The first ground on which he contended that the reference was invalid was that an omnibus reference of alleged industrial disputes between several managements and the workers employed by them is not contemplated and warranted by the provisions of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Closely related to this contention is the other contention that the reference is vague and general in that it does not specify the nature of the disputes between the employers and the workmen in each hotel. Section 10 (1) of the Act runs thus:- "If any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government may, by order in writing; (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the. appropriate. Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced". Learned counsel relied on the words "any industrial dispute" and the words "refer the dispute" in support of his contentions. In Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao (Engineer), Ltd.1, there was a general reference of industrial disputes which had arisen between the workers and managements of certain engineering firms and type foundries and of industrial disputes which were apprehended in the rest of the engineering firms and type foundries in respect of certain matters. There was no reference to any specific disputes between any group of workers and managements; nor was there any specification of the firms in which disputes between the management and workers existed. There was no reference to any specific disputes between any group of workers and managements; nor was there any specification of the firms in which disputes between the management and workers existed. Such a reference was held to be invalid on the ground that the result of such a reference may be to foster disputes where there were none and also on the ground that before making a reference under section 10 (1) the Government must have reason to believe that in a particular business a definite dispute is known to exist or is apprehended. The learned Judges observed: " . . before concluding that a dispute is apprehended, the Government must necessarily have known that certain demands were being made by workers in a particular firm and that the management of that firm were not inclined to comply with those demands and that an industrial dispute was therefore likely to arise....... . . . . when a notification is issued and a reference made to a Tribunal, the Government must have in mind some dispute that has actually happened or one that is likely to arise from circumstances known to the Government". The learned Judges were also of the opinion that the nature of the dispute between the management and the workers must be set out just as it would be set out if a reference were made to an arbitration in an ordinary civil dispute. There should be sufficient specification for the Tribunal to know what the matter was into which it was necessary to enquire. They said, "If that is not done, the Government is inviting workers and managements to put forward claims which have never been in dispute and which were not in the contemplation of the Government when they issued the notification. It seems to us from the general purport of the Act that a responsibility lies upon the Government of considering the existence and the nature of a dispute and to exercise their mind and decide whether it is necessary to refer that dispute to a Tribunal for an award". In The Calicut Hoseries, Calicut, In re1, one of us followed this ruling and held that a reference of certain disputes between certain hosiery factories in the Province of Madras and the workmen employed therein was illegal. In The Calicut Hoseries, Calicut, In re1, one of us followed this ruling and held that a reference of certain disputes between certain hosiery factories in the Province of Madras and the workmen employed therein was illegal. In The Kandan Textiles, Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras2, though the reference was not a general reference in respect of several managements, the Division Bench of which one of us was a party agreed with the observations of the learned Judges in Ramayya Pantulu v. Rutty and Rao (Engineer), Ltd.3, cited above. In Lakshmanan Chettiar, In re,4 another Division Bench of which one of us was a party held a similar reference to be invalid. There can be no doubt that the first reference by Government on 9th April, 1948 was a totally incompetent reference according to the decisions above mentioned, but the second reference was an improvement on the first in that it gave a list of 85 hotels and a list of items of dispute. The question is whether this fact takes it out of the scope of these decisions. If the Government had before them material to conclude that in respect of each of the 85 hotels there were disputes as regards each of the 11 items mentioned in Annexure II to the reference between the management and the workers, we do not think that a single reference would be incompetent. It will be a case of joinder of several references into one comprehensive reference to the same Tribunal. Even if separate references had been made in respect of each firm to the same Tribunal, obviously all the references would have been heard and disposed of together as certain common points would arise for determination. Reference was made by the learned Advocate-General to the decision of the Federal Court in India Paper Pulp Co., Ltd. v. India Paper Pulp Workers’ Union and another5, and it was contended that the decisions above mentioned should not be followed as they were inconsistent with the decision of the Federal Court. The reference in that case was not a general reference, but reference of an industrial dispute which had arisen between a company and certain discharged workmen whose names were mentioned in a list annexed and who were represented by the Workers’ Union. The reference in that case was not a general reference, but reference of an industrial dispute which had arisen between a company and certain discharged workmen whose names were mentioned in a list annexed and who were represented by the Workers’ Union. That decision therefore was not even remotely concerned with the question whether a general omnibus reference of a series of disputes between several firms and their workmen was valid. But if was said that the decision is authority: for the position that the particular dispute referred to the Tribunal need not be mentioned in the reference. We have again carefully considered the ruling and we are convinced that it is not an authority for the position that there could be a reference by the Government under section 10 (1) of the Act without specifying the dispute referred. A Division Bench consisting of Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., had occasion to deal with the effect of this decision in a recent judgment (not yet reported) in Crl.M.P.No. 1278 of 1950 and they came to the conclusion that the trend of decisions of this Court had not been overruled by their Lordships of the Federal Court. We do not propose to deal elaborately with this question as we are in entire agreement with the reasoning in that judgment. We wish, however, to add that a reference to the report of the arguments of the counsel for the appellants in that case as found in the authorised Federal Court Reports (Vol. XI) at page 349 makes it quite clear that the contention pressed before the Federal Court was a wholly technical one and not substantial. The argument was that as the order meaning thereby the operative words of the order, excluding the preamble, only purported to appoint a Tribunal and did not refer any dispute to that Tribunal, there was no valid reference. The preamble portion of the order in clearest terms referred to the nature of the dispute and the parties to the dispute, but it was contended that this was only the preamble and it was not the operative part of the order. The preamble portion of the order in clearest terms referred to the nature of the dispute and the parties to the dispute, but it was contended that this was only the preamble and it was not the operative part of the order. It is this contention of the appellants that is summarised thus by the learned Chief Justice of India at page 355: “On behalf of the appellants it was contended that there was no jurisdiction in the Industrial Tribunal to decide anything because, firstly, no dispute was referred to the Tribunal. This is admittedly a technical defence and is based on the wording of the order of the Government of West Bengal dated the 3rd January, 1948. In this connection it was pointed out that the order of the 3rd January, 1948, of the Government of West Bengal did not mention any industrial dispute. Secondly, the order, as worded, was only an order of appointment and there were no words of reference to the Tribunal. It was argued that the words ‘and it is expedient that the said dispute should be referred to a Tribunal’ did not constitute a reference; they were in the preamble and did not form an operative part of the order”. After remarking that the order was far from satisfactory, and was not carefully drafted, the learned Chief Justice held that it was sufficient if the existence of a dispute and the fact that the dispute was referred to the Tribunal are clear from the order, and the Court has to read the order as a whole and determine whether in effect the order makes such a reference. It will therefore be seen that the decision of the Federal Court has no bearing whatever on the questions arising before us in this application, nor on the questions decided in the four cases in this Court mentioned above. The first reference therefore must be held to be an invalid reference. Otherwise it is very doubtful if the Government would have the power to supersede that reference and make a fresh reference in respect of the same subject-matter. As the first reference is invalid, the position is as if there had been no such reference and the second reference was in effect the first and only reference. Otherwise it is very doubtful if the Government would have the power to supersede that reference and make a fresh reference in respect of the same subject-matter. As the first reference is invalid, the position is as if there had been no such reference and the second reference was in effect the first and only reference. The question which now falls for decision is whether the reference of the 15th March, 1949 is bad for any reason. It is not certainly such a general and indefinite reference as the references which came up for consideration in Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao (Engineer), Ltd.1, the Calicut Hoiseries, Calicut, In re2., Lakshmanan Chettiar, In re.3 and Crl.M.P.No. 1278 of 1950. In those references the names of the firms were not mentioned; nor was there a list of the disputes between the employments and the workers. That is not the case with the reference in question. It does give a list of the hotels and it does give a list of the disputes. What Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar Contends is that there cannot be a wholesale clubbing of several hotels and mention of every conceivable kind of dispute as if in respect of each of the hotels in regard to every one of the items mentioned in Annexure II there were disputes between the employment and the workers. We do not agree with Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar that there is anything inherently wrong in such a clubbing if there is substantial justification for such a course. Supposing there are disputes in several hotels between the management and the workmen as to the number of hours of work, we see no reason why there should not be a single reference of this dispute which is common to several hotels and the workmen employed therein. The question therefore resolves itself to an examination of the facts of this case to ascertain if there was material on which the Government could have come to the conclusion that in respect of all the 85 hotels mentioned in Annexure I there were disputes between the employments and the workmen in regard to every one of the matters mentioned in Annexure II. Even if there be some material on which the Government could have reasonably come to a conclusion, it is not for this Court to substitute its opinion for that of the Government. Even if there be some material on which the Government could have reasonably come to a conclusion, it is not for this Court to substitute its opinion for that of the Government. But if it is manifest that the Government did not or could not have material to come to that conclusion, then obviously the reference would be bad. In this connection we may quote from one of the earlier decisions of this Court in Kandan Textiles, Ltd. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal, Madras1, the following passage, “Obviously, the Government before it makes an order under this provision must be satisfied that the industrial dispute which is being referred for adjudication exists or is apprehended and the Government should have material before it to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended ....... It is incumbent upon the Government to apply its mind to the relevant material placed before it before deciding that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and making an order under section 10(1) of the Act”. As to what happened before the Government made the second reference there is practically no dispute, as it can be gathered from the files sent up to us by the Industrial Tribunal. Soon after the judgment of the Division Bench in Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao (Engineer), Ltd.2, the Government decided to issue fresh orders in the case of all pending consolidated references in respect of disputes existing or apprehended in certain firms of a particular description. In their Memorandum dated 28th January, 1949 they wanted the Industrial Tribunal, Coimbatore, to send immediately, if possible, a list of units or firms concerned in which disputes exist or are apprehended and which should be named in the new orders and also indicate the issues common to all such firms which should be adjudicated and which should be mentioned in the new orders. This information was called for regarding the disputes between the workers and managements of the hotels in the whole of the Coimbatore district. This information was called for regarding the disputes between the workers and managements of the hotels in the whole of the Coimbatore district. The Industrial Tribunal replied to the Government immediately that he had got from the local Labour Officer lists containing a total of about 1,020 hotels, that he had also received a statement of demands on behalf of the Hotel-workers’ Union and the reply thereto from the Hotel-owners’ Sangam, that it was not possible just then to state in which of these hotels there were disputes existing or were apprehended, and that there must be quite a large number of small concerns in which probably there was no dispute, and that he was asking representatives of the Workers’ Union and the Hotel-owners’ Sangam to find out from them which were the hotels in which there Were disputes existing and in what hotels disputes were apprehended. The Industrial Tribunal was evidently of opinion that enquiries should have to commence de novo, because all that had been done so far must be deemed to have been done without jurisdiction in view of the judgment of the High Court and also because a long time had elapsed since the first reference and there might be change of conditions in some cases. On 3rd February, 1949 the Industrial Tribunal addressed a letter to the Secretary, Hotel-owners’ Sangam, Coimbatore, asking him to meet him at his office at 8-30 a.m. on 15th February 1949 as he wanted to ascertain the particulars of the hotels in which disputes were actually existing or were apprehended and the points on which there were disputes. He appears to have addressed a similar letter to the Secretary of the Coimbatore District Hotel-workers’ Union. On the 15th, nothing happened, and the matter was adjourned to the 22nd on which date the Secretary of the Workers’ Union furnished lists of hotels. The Secretary of the Sangam did not file any list. The lists filed on behalf of the Workers’ Union included hotels from different parts of the district. On the 15th, nothing happened, and the matter was adjourned to the 22nd on which date the Secretary of the Workers’ Union furnished lists of hotels. The Secretary of the Sangam did not file any list. The lists filed on behalf of the Workers’ Union included hotels from different parts of the district. Thereupon, on 2nd March, 1949, the Industrial Tribunal addressed a communication to the Government in which he stated that the Coimbatore District Hotel-workers’ Union had given him a list but the representative of the Hotel-owners’ Sangam had not furnished any list of his own, and that it would be enough to include the hotels mentioned in the accompanying list in the Notification to be published by Government. He also gave a list of 11 points in dispute. He also sent a copy of the demands given to him by the Workers’ Union. The list of hotels given by the Workers’ union was also sent as an enclosure to this letter. On receipt of this communication the Government passed the order of 15th March, 1949 making the reference. The list of the hotels in Annexure I is the list supplied to the Industrial Tribunal by the Workers’ Union, and the points in dispute set out in Annexure II are the points mentioned by the Industrial Tribunal in his letter of the 2nd March. At the outset we cannot help expressing our surprise at the procedure followed by the Government. One would have thought that in the normal course of things the Government would have called for full information which they desired to obtain from their officers in the Labour Department and not from a Judicial Tribunal like the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal in its turn who could not be expected to go about making enquiries from each hotel proprietor all over the district contented himself with issuing notices to the Secretaries of the Workers’ Union and the Hotel-owners’ Sangam, Coimbatore. The Workers’ Union supplied a list, but the Hotel-owners’ Sangam did not supply any list. The Industrial Tribunal did not himself verify correctness of the list supplied by the Workers’ Union in the sense that on enquiry he found that there was a dispute which had arisen between the management and the workers in each of the hotels mentioned in the list. The Industrial Tribunal did not himself verify correctness of the list supplied by the Workers’ Union in the sense that on enquiry he found that there was a dispute which had arisen between the management and the workers in each of the hotels mentioned in the list. There is no need to speculate on this matter, because the Industrial Tribunal explains his conduct at length in his award. This is what he says, “A number of general references had been made by Government and one of these was taken to the High Court in Kutty and Rao’s case1, and the High Court held that such references were invalid in law .... Government naturally asked the Tribunals to furnish the information required for the issue of a fresh order of reference in compliance with the decision of the High Court in Kutty and Rao’s case1.I called upon both the parties to file lists of hotels in which disputes were admitted or alleged to exist. The Union filed a list but the Secretary of the Sangam did not. He could have said that no disputes existed in any hotel or that the list submitted by the Union was not correct. But he did nothing and when the Sangam knew that a list had been filed by the Union and they did not choose to contradict what was stated in the list, I assumed that they agreed that the list was correct and so I supplied the information to Government on which this reference is based”. It is therefore clear that the reference made by the Government on 15th March, 1949, was entirely based on information supplied by one of the contesting parties, namely, the Workers’ Union. There was no attempt to verify the lists. The Government never applied their mind to the truth or otherwise of the assertion on behalf of one of the parties. How utterly unreliable was the information supplied to the Government, on the basis of which alone they made the reference, became clear at the enquiry. Here again we shall give an extract from the award, “I asked the parties to state definitely whether there were disputes or not in the hotels specified in the Annexure I to the Government notification. Both parties produced statements signed by the workers, one set to say that there were no disputes and another set that there were disputes. Here again we shall give an extract from the award, “I asked the parties to state definitely whether there were disputes or not in the hotels specified in the Annexure I to the Government notification. Both parties produced statements signed by the workers, one set to say that there were no disputes and another set that there were disputes. The Union agreed that out of the 85 hotels mentioned in the Annexure, they were not in a position to prove that disputes existed in 41 and so these 41 may be excluded from the scope of the enquiry.” Further on we find the following: “At the time of the argument, therefore, Sri Balagangadhara Menon, who appeared for the workers, said that the hotels in Pollachi and Erode may be left out of the scope of the enquiry because he had no satisfactory evidence that demands were served on the proprietors in those places. So at present only 25 hotels in Coimbatore remain and even out of these Venkatesa Lodge (A class, item 1), Subramania Vilas (B Class item 8), and Hotel Vasantham (B Class, item 5) have to be eliminated. The other 22 hotels to whom the award applies are shown in the annexure to this award”. We cannot help remarking that the issue of the notification and the scope of the enquiry appear to have been determined by the Workers’ Union rather than by the Government or by the Industrial Tribunal. It is obvious from the above statement of facts that the Government in making the reference, though it purported to act under section 10 (1) of the Act, were really making the reference on the application of the workers only. Now a special provision has been made in regard to a reference on such application by one of the parties to a dispute and that is section 10 (2), but the Government could not have made a valid reference under this provision unless they were satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of the particular party. It was conceded before us by learned counsel appearing for the Workers’ Union that he could not say that the Workers’ Union represented the majority of the workers in the hotels in the district. It was conceded before us by learned counsel appearing for the Workers’ Union that he could not say that the Workers’ Union represented the majority of the workers in the hotels in the district. In fact we do not have any information as to how many workers in the several hotels mentioned in Annexure I of the reference are members of the Union. The Government must be therefore held to have done something which they could not have done directly in an indirect way. The reference in question was not made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government of the existence or apprehension of an Industrial dispute, but merely on the representation of one of the interested parties and that too on unverified information which subsequently proved to be substantially incorrect, because out of 85 hotels over 60 hotels were omitted from the enquiry. The new sub-section (2-A to Section 10) inserted by the Industrial Disputes (Madras Amendment Act, 1949) (Act XII of 1949) is based on the principle laid down in the several decisions of this court above mentioned that there should not be a wholesale reference in respect of several concerns without a specification of particular disputes in particular establishments. The new sub-section runs thus: “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 1 and a where a Tribunal has been constituted under this Act for the adjudication of disputes in any specified industry or industries and a dispute exists or is apprehended in any such industry, the employer or the majority of workmen concerned may refer the dispute to that Tribunal.” If this procedure had been followed, what would have happened is this. There would have been a Tribunal constituted for the adjudication of disputes in the hotel industry. Then, if a dispute arises or is apprehended in any hotel or if there is a general collective dispute between the workers on the one hand and the employers on the other, either the employers or a majority of the workmen would have straightaway referred that particular dispute to the Tribunal. On behalf of the Workers’ Union Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar relied upon certain resolutions passed at a Conference of Hotel-workers on 26th October, 1947 which according to him were forwarded to the Hotel-owners’ Sangam. On behalf of the Workers’ Union Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar relied upon certain resolutions passed at a Conference of Hotel-workers on 26th October, 1947 which according to him were forwarded to the Hotel-owners’ Sangam. Assuming this was so, we do not think that by a mere communication of resolutions passed at a conference it can be said that an industrial dispute has arisen or is apprehended calling for an adjudication by a Tribunal. It may be that if the workmen in a particular hotel actually make demands on the management concerned in accordance with these resolutions, an amicable settlement may be arrived at, or it may be that the dispute may have to be adjudicated upon. There is no evidence in this case and it is not suggested that there were disputes in each of the 85 hotels mentioned in Annexure I to the Government Order. The learned Counsel pressed before us the argument which evidently found favour with the Tribunal that the essence of the matter was that there was evidence of a collective demand and a collective bargaining and not whether individual workers asked the proprietor for this or that relief. The Industrial Tribunal found that, though there was a conference of hotel-workers, it was not proved that demands were served on individual hotel-owners. If so, we fail to see how it can be said that there was a dispute, because a dispute implies a demand and a refusal. We are therefore compelled to hold that the reference dated 15th March, 1949 was incompetent and invalid. In this view, it is not necessary to pronounce finally on a very attractive contention raised by Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar for the petitioners, namely, that before the Government could make a reference under section 10 (1) of the Act, the procedure indicated in section 12 of the Act should be followed. Section 12 provides that where any individual dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. If a settlement of the dispute is arrived at, then he shall send a report to the Government together with a Memorandum of the Settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. If a settlement of the dispute is arrived at, then he shall send a report to the Government together with a Memorandum of the Settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer has to send to the Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him and the circumstances relating to the dispute together with full statement of facts and circumstances and the reasons on account of which a settlement could not be arrived at. If on a consideration of the report the Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board or Tribunal, it may make such reference. The argument of the learned counsel was that such a report from the conciliation officer is a condition precedent for the Government to take power to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act. Admittedly there was no such report in this case. Though there is much to be said in support of this procedure on grounds of policy, we are of opinion that the language of the enactment does not support the contention. Under section 12, in the case of disputes in non-utility concerns the conciliation officer may take steps but may not. The position then would be that, in spite of the existence of a real dispute, the Government would be powerless to make a reference under section 10 (1). If the intention of the Legislature had been that before the Government could make a reference under section 10(1), the conciliation procedure should be compulsorily resorted to, then the provisions would have run differently. The conciliation officer would then have been compelled to make attempts to settle the matter and send his report within a prescribed time and it would have been specifically mentioned in section 10 (1) that the Government may, after considering the report of the conciliation officer make a reference. In the absence of such provisions, we cannot place any restriction on the power undoubtedly conferred on the Government under section 10 (1) of the Act to make a reference whenever in its opinion there is a dispute or an apprehension of a dispute. Nor is it necessary to deal with the other contention of Mr. In the absence of such provisions, we cannot place any restriction on the power undoubtedly conferred on the Government under section 10 (1) of the Act to make a reference whenever in its opinion there is a dispute or an apprehension of a dispute. Nor is it necessary to deal with the other contention of Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar for the petitioners, that the Government acted illegally in making the reference to the very same Tribunal which had reported to the Government about the alleged existence of disputes, as such a course was opposed to the principles of natural justice. A different Tribunal must have been constituted, because the present Tribunal was practically the complainant and the informant and therefore could not act as the adjudicator. In the award there is a reference to this argument and the following opinion of the Tribunal: “I do not think that the supply of information as regards the parties arrayed before the Tribunal or to be arrayed would in any sense amount to prejudging the case.” We are inclined to agree with the Industrial Tribunal on this point. It is also unnecessary to deal with the minor contention on behalf of the petitioners that the award exceeded the terms of the reference in two or three particulars, e.g., in providing for a marriage allowance and an allowance for children. As we have held that the reference itself was bad, it follows that the award is equally invalid. Both are accordingly quashed. K.S. ----- Reference and award quashed.