JUDGMENT Sapru, J. - This is a defendant's appeal. The plaintiff respondent Pandit Amar Nath Sharma is the owner of a garage attached to a house situate in mohalla Johnstonganj in the Allahabad city. A contract of tenancy on an annual basis was entered into between him and the defendant, where by the garags was given on an annual rent of Rs. 204/- to the defendant appellant for working an electric flour-mill. According to the terms of the contract, the tenancy was to begin from January 1, and to end on December 31, of every year. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant has been extremely negligent in working the flour-mill with the result that his building has sustained damage, His further case is that there is a real apprehension that if the defendant is allowed to continue the working of the mill in the garage, the building itself will collapse. It is on 'these allegations that the suit for ejectment and damages was brought by the plaintiff on April l8, 1947. 2. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the ground that it was not correct to assert that he had caused any damage to the garage in dispute, that the allegation that there was any apprehension of the building collapsing was without any foundation and that, in any case, the notice given to him was not legal. The defendant denied that any damage had been done to the garage in question. 3. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit, It came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not been able to establish that there was any real apprehension of danger to the building in dispute by the working of the flour-mill On the question of damages, the view of the learned Munsif was that that issue should be fought out in separate suit. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff went in appeal to the lower appellate court. The learned Civil Judge reversed the findings of the trial court and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The defendant has now come up in appeal to this court. 5. In considering the points which have been raised in this case, it has to be borne in mind that the suit was instituted after the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, had been on the statute book by the U.P. legislature. The defendant has now come up in appeal to this court. 5. In considering the points which have been raised in this case, it has to be borne in mind that the suit was instituted after the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, had been on the statute book by the U.P. legislature. The object of that Act was to provide for the continuance, during a limited period, of powers to control the letting and rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom. u/s 3 of that Act it was not open to a land-lord to institute a suit in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation with out the permission of the District Magistrate. It goes without saying that the permission of the District Magistrate referred to in Section 3 means prior permission. The point which has been raised before me by learned counsel for the respondent is that this suit was instituted by the land-lord without the prior, permission of the District Magistrate and that it is not the type of suit which is contemplated by Section 3 (b) Section 3 (b) authorizes a landlord to bring a suit against a tenant who has willfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. The short point, therefore, in the case is whether Section 3 (b) covers the present case. If the tenant had willfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation, then undoubtedly it was open to the landlord to bring a suit for ejectment without the permission of the District Magistrate. If Section 3 (b) is not held to apply, the land-lord would be entitled to eject the tenant as there is no doubt that proper notice within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given in this case. 6. In order to decide whether this case is covered |by Section 3 (b) or not, it is necessary to set out the findings of the learned Civil Judge. 6. In order to decide whether this case is covered |by Section 3 (b) or not, it is necessary to set out the findings of the learned Civil Judge. What the learned Civil Judge has done is to find that there are sufficient circumstances to infer that the working of the mill in future will cause damage to the building there is a likelihood that, if the mill is allowed to Work for a sufficiently long time, the building will collapse and the plaintiff will sustain great loss. The learned Civil Judge has further found that the evidence in the case supports the case of the plaintiff that the continuation of the flour-mill is prejudicial to the building in dispute and there is a great likelihood that it will lead to a collapse at the building. I feel that on these findings the learned Civil Judge was not justified in reversing the judgment of the trial court. It strikes me that the learned Civil Judge had not paid sufficient attention to the language of clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act. A suit can be brought by the landlord against the tenant for eviction upon either one of two grounds, namely (1) that the tenant has willfully caused or (2) permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. There *is no finding that the tenant has willfully caused substantial damage to the accommodation. I take the word ''willfully to mean purposely; deliberately" (vide shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. II, page 2427) It cannot be said that in running a flour-mill in the garage the tenant is doing something which is contrary to the agreement which had been entered into between him and the plaintiff. The premises in question were deliberately taken for the purpose of working a flour mill and the landlord entered into that agreement with open eyes. 7. The question may be asked whether the case is not covered by the second part of Section 3 (b) namely, permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. In the first place, there is no finding by the learned Civil Judge that any substantial damage has been caused to the accommodation as a result of the working of the mill. In the first place, there is no finding by the learned Civil Judge that any substantial damage has been caused to the accommodation as a result of the working of the mill. In the fecond place, the words "permitted to be caused" imply some deliberate act with the tenant's assent connivance or acquiescence on the part of some one other than the tenant actually causing substantial damage to the accommodation. The finding of the learned Civil Judge is that allowing the flour-mill to work will be prejudicial to the building in dispute. I cannot look upon that as a finding that the tenant had caused or had permitted to be caused substantial damage to the building he had rented on hire. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that there is material in the evidence to show that as a result of the working of the mill cracks have appeared in the building. He has referred to the fact that the commissioner who was deputed to visit the mill gave his opinion that he had noticed that the northern wall had begun to shake, the door-loaves had begun to rattle and the hotel keepers and lodgers were feeling inconvenienced. I can hardly look upon all this evidence as evidence, in a case in which the land-lord with open eyes agreed to give his garage on rent of the fact that the tenant has permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. That is the condition on which the prior sanction of the District Magistrate to the finding of an eviction suit in the Civil Court could be dispensed with. That is the condition which has not been fulfilled in this case. For that reason the view of the learned Civil Judge was, in my opinion clearly erroneous. 9. The result is that I allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs. The stay order is discharged. 10. Leave to appeal to a Division Bench is granted.