Judgment :- 1. The question raised in this Second Appeal is whether there is no time limit for an application for delivery of possession of immovable property purchased at a sale held by a Civil Court in execution of a certificate issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under S. 59(a) of the Travancore Co-operative Societies Act, 1121. In execution of the certificate the District Munsiff of Padmanabhapuram sold two items of immovable properties on 17.11.1118 as separate lots. As regards the first item defendant 2 who was the owner thereof filed an application under 0.21 R. 87 Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the sale and that was eventually dismissed on 29.11.1122 when the sale of that item was confirmed. As regards the second item there was no petition by its owner defendant 1 and that sale was therefore confirmed on 17.12.1118. The application for delivery with respect to both items was made only on 3.4.1122. Since by that date more than 3 years had elapsed after the confirmation of the sale of the second item the District Munsiff refused to allow delivery with respect to it while delivery was allowed as regards the other. On appeal by the decree-holder-purchaser the Munsiff's decision was confirmed. This second appeal is preferred against that appellate decision of the District Court. 2. In supporting the appeal the appellant's learned Advocate dealt at length on the meaning of the words "in the same manner as a decree of such court" occurring in Sub-s. (a) of S. 59 of the Travancore Co-operative Societies Act and contended that those words did not attract the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to an execution by a Civil Court of a certificate issued under that sub-section. The argument was that as there was no period of limitation prescribed by the Co-operative Societies Act or the rules framed thereunder for the execution of a certificate issued by the Registrar the decree-holder could make an application at any time he chooses. The argument is in our opinion not only unsound but also irrelevant for our present purpose. The argument was that as there was no period of limitation prescribed by the Co-operative Societies Act or the rules framed thereunder for the execution of a certificate issued by the Registrar the decree-holder could make an application at any time he chooses. The argument is in our opinion not only unsound but also irrelevant for our present purpose. It has been settled by a long line of decisions that the words "in the same manner as a decree of such court" or words similar to them make all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act applicable to the execution by a Civil Court of the decision of an outside authority than the Court. See Pathanamthitta Co-operative Taluk Bank v. Parvathi Amma (27 T.L.J. 238), Trippunithura Peoples' Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Kunhan Thirupad (25 Cochin L.R. 724), Kunhumuhammed v. Eriyed Edavilangu Co-operative Society Ltd. (36 Cochin L.R. 918), Subba Rao v. Calicut Co-operative Urban Bank (A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 635) and the decisions referred to in these cases. The argument is irrelevant for we are not here concerned with the execution of a certificate of the Registrar but with the enforcement of a sale certificate by the Court itself. 3. All that we are therefore called upon to decide here is whether the court having issued a certificate to the auction-purchaser law prescribes no time limit for its enforcement by an application to the court. If the purchaser has a right to seek the aid of the Court to put him in possession of the property it is idle to contend that the law of limitation will not apply to him. It will be against both reason and convenience to hold that the Court has no power to enforce a certificate issued by it under circumstance similar to the present. When the machinery of the court is put in motion to give effect to the certificate by means of an application to the Court-a procedure which in our opinion the purchaser is entitled to adopt-that application is necessarily an application under the Civil Procedure Code and must be governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Petitioner cannot be heard to say that his application is not amenable to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act. 4. The Petitioner cannot be heard to say that his application is not amenable to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act. 4. Art.164 of the Travancore Limitation Act provides a period of three years for an application by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession from the time the sale becomes absolute. Art.165 is the residuary article which provides a period of three years from the time the right to apply accrues for applications for which no period of limitation is provided by the Act or S. 41 of the Civil Procedure Code. If the view the Madras High Court took in 1940 Mad. 635 that by reason of a similar provision in the rules framed under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act the decision of the Registrar when it is filed in a Civil Court becomes in effect a decree of the Civil Court be accepted, Art. 164 would as if it were in terms apply. The Madras view was followed in 36 Coch L.R. 918. But if it is considered not necessary or expedient to go so far, Art. 163 would clearly apply. But which ever article applies, it makes no difference in this case, as computation of limitation has to be made from the date of the confirmation of the sale. The right to apply would only accrue from that date. The lower courts have therefore decided the case rightly. 5. Before concluding reference may also be made to two reported decisions bearing on the point. In Krishna Rao v. Bhaskaranpuram Co-operative Society A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 634) a sale certificate granted by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was sought to be enforced in a Civil Court by means of an application to obtain delivery of possession. Though the rules authorizing the Civil Court to enforce the certificate prescribed no period of limitation for its enforcement the court held that the right to apply accrued on the date of confirmation of the sale and the application for delivery of possession made beyond three years of such date was held to be barred. The article applied was Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act corresponding to Art. 165 of the Travancore Limitation Act. The article applied was Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act corresponding to Art. 165 of the Travancore Limitation Act. In Muhammad Amin Sahib v. S. Aiyar (1949 M.W.N. 727) a Civil Courts decree was executed through the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and it resulted in the sale of certain immovable properties in respect of which the Registrar issued a sale certificate to the purchaser. The purchaser's application to the Civil Court for delivery of possession was held to be governed by Art. 180 of the Indian Limitation Act (Travancore Act 164). There Art. 180 applied in terms because the sale was held in execution of a decree. The Second Appeal fails in the result and it will stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.