Govinda Menon, J.-This is a reference by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of East Tanjore at Mayuram, under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, wherein the learned Judge after differing from the unanimous verdict of guilty by the jury wants the Court to accept his opinion that the accused is not guilty of any offence whatever. In his letter of Reference, the learned Judge has given reasons for making the reference and a perusal of the same shows that he does not agree with the opinion of the jury regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In paragraph 4, the learned Judge says that it is very doubtful whether P.W.1 knew prior to his giving the complaint on 9th January, 1949, that it was the accused who committed the robbery. He goes on to state that it is also doubtful if P.W.2 who professes to be an eye witness was there on that afternoon. Dealing with the testimony of P.Ws.3 and 4, the learned Judge was inclined to conclude that their evidence cannot be accepted. In short, the reasoning of the learned Judge for differing from the jury and making the reference is that he would have come to a different conclusion on the evidence from that arrived at by the jury. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ramanugraha Singh v. King-Emperor1, have authoritatively laid down the principles and rules that ought to guide and govern a Sessions Judge in making a reference under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when he disagrees with the verdict of the jury. Their Lordships also state what the powers of the High Court are on such references. At page 607 of the report the following observations of Sir John Beaumont may be recapitulated: " The Legislature no doubt realised that the introduction of trial by jury in the mofussil would be experimental, and might lead to miscarriages of justice through jurors, in their ignorance and inexperience, returning erroneous verdicts. Their Lordships think that the section was intended to guard against this danger, and not to enable the Sessions Judge and the High Court to deprive jurors, acting properly within their powers of the right to determine the facts conferred upon them by the code. Their Lordships think that the section was intended to guard against this danger, and not to enable the Sessions Judge and the High Court to deprive jurors, acting properly within their powers of the right to determine the facts conferred upon them by the code. If the jury have reached a conclusion upon the evidence which a reasonable body of men might reach, it is not necessary for the ends of justice that the Sessions Judge should refer the case to the High Court merely because he himself would have reached a different conclusion upon the facts, since he is not the Tribunal to determine the facts. He must go further than that and be of opinion that the verdict is one which no reasonable body of men could have reached upon the evidence. The powers of the High Court in dealing with the reference are contained in sub-section (3). It may exercise any of the powers which it might exercise upon an appeal, and this includes the power to call fresh evidence conferred by section 428. The Court must consider the whole case and give due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and jury, and then acquit or convict the accused. In their Lordships’ view the paramount consideration in the High Court must be whether the ends of justice require that the verdict of the jury should be set aside. In general, if the evidence is such that it can properly support a verdict either of guilty or not guilty, according to the view taken of it by the trial Court, and if the jury take one of the evidence and the Judge thinks that they should have taken the other, the view of the jury must prevail, since they are the Judges of fact. In such a case a reference is not justified, and it is only by accepting their view that the High Court can give due weight to the opinion of the jury. If, however, the High Court considers that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, then the reference was justified and the ends of justice require that the verdict be disregarded. " In Thiagaraja Bhagavathar v. King-Emperor1, the Privy Council has again reiterated the self same principle. If, however, the High Court considers that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, then the reference was justified and the ends of justice require that the verdict be disregarded. " In Thiagaraja Bhagavathar v. King-Emperor1, the Privy Council has again reiterated the self same principle. We may also remark that it was on the self same basis that this Court had been proceeding ever since the Full Bench decision in Veerappa Goundan, In re2. Applying the principle enunciated above, we have to find out whether on the evidence taken as a whole, the conclusion arrived at by the jury is such that no reasonable body of men could have arrived at the decision. We have been taken through evidence by the learned Public Prosecutor as well as by the learned counsel for the defence; and we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that there is a thorough absence of evidence which should have prevented the jury from coming to the conclusion it did in this case. Though P.W.1 in his cross-examination has made certain statements contrary to what he has stated in his examination-in-chief, a perusal of his deposition as a whole would leave one with the impression that if certain conditions are posited then his evidence is entitled to credence. Considering the fact that he is an old man and the physical handicaps to which he had been subjected to, we are not surprised that in the stress of cross-examination he has made certain statements which did not fit in with that he has stated in his examination-in-chief, but such lapses from what he stated in the examination-in-cheif cannot make his deposition thoroughly unaccept-able.There is also the evidence of the few other witnesses especially that of P.W.2 who speak to the fact of the accused having committed the offence in question. The earliest information Exhibit P-1 given by P.W.1 supports the statement of the witness in the Court. Such being the case, it cannot be said that if a body of men come to the conclusion that what was spoken to by P.Ws.1 and 2 is the truth, then such an inference is one that no reasonable man could have arrived at. Such being the case, it cannot be said that if a body of men come to the conclusion that what was spoken to by P.Ws.1 and 2 is the truth, then such an inference is one that no reasonable man could have arrived at. It may be that the decision may be erroneous looked at from the point of view of persons who are critically inclined but men of ordinary commonsense like the members of the jury are entitled to take the view which they deemed best on the evidence. In these circumstances we do not agree with the learned Judge that the case is one in which it can be said that the opinion expressed by the jury is perverse on the evidence. We therefore are of opinion after having carefully perused the entire evidence in the case, that P.W.1 had been robbed by the accused. But it seems to us that so far as the use of a dangerous weapon is concerned, the evidence is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that in committing the robbery a dangerous weapon was used. The only offence with which the accused could be convicted is therefore under section 392, Indian Penal Code. We therefore agree with the jury’s verdict and convict the accused of an offence under section 392, Indian Penal Code. Considering the fact that the appellant is only a young man of 23 years and that no injury was caused to the complainant we feel that the interests of justice would be satisfied if a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months is imposed upon him and we accordingly sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for six months under section 392, Indian Penal Code. V.S. -------- Reference not accepted. Accused convicted under S. 392.