JUDGMENT Kidwai, J. - This application arises out of a suit by Khannu and Ram Dularey, opposite-parties No. 1 and 2 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow, praying for injunction, damages and possession of six plots of agricultural land situated in patti Talib Ali of village Bhadewan which is now included in the city of Lucknow. 2. The plaintiffs alleged that they were the proprietors of five plot and under-proprietors of one plot and they further alleged that the defendants had dug sand from four of the plots in suit and that defendant No- I had by force taken possession of three plots, including two from which sand had been dug, and given them into the possession of defendant No. 5. The relief that was claimed as, therefore, a relief restraining that defendants from digging any more sand from the plots in suit and also for restoration of possession of the said plots. The defence was that the defendant No. 1 was also a co-sharer in the plots' in suit and that he Was in exclusive possession of the plots from which the sand had been dug. It was further pleaded by defendant No. 5 that the suit relating to possession of agricultural land did not lie in the Civil Court. 3. The trial Court framed issues on all the questions involved in the suit and decided them all. It also framed an issue on the question of jurisdiction and held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It accordingly directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. 4. The plaintiffs wept up in appeal and the learned District Judge reversed the finding of the Civil Judge on the question of jurisdiction. The question that arose before him was as to whether he should consider the findings given by the trial Court on all the issues. He held that this would not be proper because the findings of the trial Court on the question of jurisdiction colour its decision on the rest of the issues and the parties agreed before him that, if he reversed the finding on the question Of jurisdiction, the ease would have to be remanded for trial de novo. He accordingly passed the order remanding the case for trial de novo. 5. One of the defendants Inder Dutt Tewari has came up in revision. He accordingly passed the order remanding the case for trial de novo. 5. One of the defendants Inder Dutt Tewari has came up in revision. The plaintiffs and the remaining defendants have been impleaded as opposite-parties. The learned Advocate for the applicant has raised five questions :- (1) that the suit as it was originally instituted was not within the jurisdiction of the, Civil Court; (2) that in any case it was partly not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the relief's which could have been granted by the revenue Court should have been separated and the plaintiffs should have been asked to amend their plaint accordingly ; (3) that, by reason of the retrospective operation of the U.P. Tenancy Amendment Act X of 1947. the present revision should be decided in accordance with the amended Tenancy Act and consequently it Should be held that it is the revenue Court alone that has jurisdiction to dispose of the question of possession. (4) that in any case the lower appellate Court, having reversed the finding on the question of jurisdiction, it ought to have proceeded to decide the appeal in respect of the remaining issues also; and (5) that the learned District Judge having transferred the case to Mr. Har Charan Dayal, the suit should be disposed of by that Judge and not by any other Judge. 6. As to the first question, namely Whether the suit was originally tribal by the Civil Court or by the Revenue Court. D.N. Rege Solicitor through Gopal Lal Mukhtaram v. Mohammad Haidar 1946 A W R 403 is a Full Bench decision of the erstwhile Allahabad High Court in which the question has been fully discussed and the principles which are to apply have been laid down in that case. 7. The learned Judges composing the Fall Bench have decided that there can be no doubt that- The distinction between an ordinary suit against a trespasser in a Civil Court and a suit u/s 180, of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, is that the plaintiff in the first case alleges that the defendant is setting up a title against his proprietary interest, whereas in the second case the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is setting up a title to hold the land as a tenant. We do not think that section 180 applies at all to cases in which the defendant has never given the plaintiff reason to think that he is setting up a claim to be the proprietor of the land and conversely that a suit in a Civil Court does not lie when the defendant has given the plaintiff reason to think that he is claiming an interest as a tenant. 8. Having regard to this principle and to the pleadings in the present case there can be no doubt that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants related to proprietary rights and that none of the defendants asserted that they were in possession only under a claim of tenancy The Civil Court therefore, had clearly jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 9. It is further to be remembered that the suit was not only for possession but it was a suit for possession and an injunction to restrain the defendants from digging sand from the plots in suit. The relief for injunction could only be granted by the Civil Court and not by the Revenue Court With regard, therefore to one of the relief's claimed and which according to the claim of the plaintiff was the principal relief, jurisdiction was that of the Civil Court, It may be that further relief's were claimed arising out of the same cause of action. With regard to the same property against the same defendant which were within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court but that by itself would not have, under the Amended Tenancy Act, ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the whole suit. Before the amendment, therefore, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 10. With regard to the second point this is not a case to which the decision upon which reliance was placed, namely, Mohammad Mehdi v. Janki Das, 1943 O.W N. 101 can apply. If possession of some of the plots had been claimed and an injunction and damages had been claimed with regard to other plots then that ruling may have applied. In the present case, however, this is not so. With regard to two at least of the plots both injunction and possession were claimed. If possession of some of the plots had been claimed and an injunction and damages had been claimed with regard to other plots then that ruling may have applied. In the present case, however, this is not so. With regard to two at least of the plots both injunction and possession were claimed. Further as I have already pointed out with regard to the remaining three points also the defendants did not allege that they were claiming tenancy rights but they claimed the rights of proprietors. In view of the decision in D. N. Kega, Solicitor through Gopal Lal Mukhtaram v. Mohammad Haider, (1) even the relief for possession in such circumstances lay in the Civil Court and not in the Revenue Court. 11. Retrospective effect has not been given to the U.P. Tenancy Act except to the extent provided by section 31 of Act X of 1947. Section 31 only provides for retrospective effect to be given to the provisions of the Act in case a suit or an appeal or a revision is pending in any Court under the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The present suit is not such a suit. The very fact that it was filed in the Civil Court indicates that it was not a suit pending under the Tenancy Act because in such suites only the Revenue Courts has jurisdiction and not the Civil court. This has been made clear in Ram Oudh v. Deokali 1950 A W R 514 and in the decision in Second Civil Appeal No. 728 of 1947 which was decided by me on October 27, 1950. No retrospective effect can, therefore, be given to Section 3l of the U.P. Tenancy Act so as to make decisions given by the Civil Court under the law as it existed at the time that the decision was given null and void as being without jurisdiction. 12. As to the question as to whether the learned District Judge can himself have disposed of the appeal, his judgment shows that it was by agreement of the parties that the case was remanded for trial de novo. 12. As to the question as to whether the learned District Judge can himself have disposed of the appeal, his judgment shows that it was by agreement of the parties that the case was remanded for trial de novo. In these circumstances, although he may well have proceeded to dispose of the appeal himself, he did not act either illegally or with any irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in remanding the case for trial de novo and his order cannot be set aside on that ground. 13. It was pointed out that the learned District Judge transferred the case to the court, of Mr. Har Charan Dayal for disposal. It was further pointed out that Mr. Harchran Dayal is not trying the suit and that, therefore, the judge who is actually trying the suit should be directed not to try it and the case should be sent to Mr. Harcharan Dayal for disposal. This is not a matter which concerns the merits of the revision application. If Mr. Harcharan Dayal is in a position to try the suit and the matter is brought to the notice of the District Judge I have no doubt that he will take necessary action. I may, however, point out that the suit was not transferred to Mr. Harcharan Dayal by name but was transferred to his court which indicates that his successor in-office may as well try the case. This, however, is a matter which is within the competence of the learned District Judge on an application being made to him for this purpose. 14. The result is that this Application in revision fails and is dismissed with costs.