Judgment Rai, J. 1. This appeal is by the heirs of one Parmanand Singh, who along with others,, had filed a title suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Gaya, for a declaration that the order dated 14-9-1939, as finally confirmed by the appellate order dated 10-9-1940, reducing the rentals of the holdings in suit is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction and not binding upon the plaintiffs. 2. The plaintiffs claimed the relief on various grounds including the one that all the landlords had not been impleaded in the proceedings under Sec.112A, Bihar Tenancy Act, before the Revenue Courts, and, as such, the orders passed in those proceedings were ultra vires and without jurisdiction. 3. The defence put forward by the tenants-defendants was, that those of the landlords who had been impleaded in the proceedings-would be deemed to have represented all the landlords, and, as such, the orders passed by Revenue Courts cannot be attacked in the pre-sent suit as being one without jurisdiction. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit. But, on appeal by the tenants-defendants, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was modified. The appellate Court has held that the order of the Revenue Courts reducing the rent of the holdings would not bind Mt. Jit Kuer, or her heirs and legal representatives, but it was binding upon the present appellants who are the heirs of Parmanand Singh, deceased, the original plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the appellants have come up. in second appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. Lakshmansaran Sinha, the learned counsel for the appellants, has contended that as all the landlords had not been impleaded in the proceedings taken under Sec.112A, Bihar Tenancy Act, the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to reduce the rent of the holdings. The petition filed by the tenants for reducing of rent has been exhibited in this case, and is Ex. 3 on the record. In that petition under the heading "Name and residence of landlord" the following persons were named: "Sheorachcha Singh ogairah, Babu Rajendra Prasad Singh and Kishundeba Singh." The column recites the various addresses of the landlords named therein. The petition filed by the tenants for reducing of rent has been exhibited in this case, and is Ex. 3 on the record. In that petition under the heading "Name and residence of landlord" the following persons were named: "Sheorachcha Singh ogairah, Babu Rajendra Prasad Singh and Kishundeba Singh." The column recites the various addresses of the landlords named therein. Now, both the Courts have proceeded on the assumption that Jit Kuer, one of the landlords, and Parmanand Singh, another co-sharer landlord, had not been impleaded in the petition that was filed under Sec.112A, Bihar Tenancy Act. It was contended on behalf of the respondents by Mr. De that Sheoracheha Singh would be deemed to have represented the interest of Mt. Jit Kuer and that Bishundeva Singh would be deemed to have represented the interest of Parmanand Singh. The lower appellate Court, while dealing with this point, has come to the conclusion that Bishundeva Singh being the elder brother and karta of the family will be deemed to have represented the interest of Parmanand Singh also in the proceedings, and, hence, Parmanand Singh would be bound by the orders passed by the Revenue Court. As regards Mt. Jit Kuer, the lower appellate Court has taken the view that she was not represented in the proceedings, and she or her heirs and legal representatives would not be bound by the orders passed in the rent reduction proceedings. 6. Mr. Lakshmansaran Sinha next contended that the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court to decide the question of reduction of rent had been conferred by statute, and that jurisdiction can be exercised only if the case comes within the four corners of the powers that had been conferred on the Revenue Courts by the said statute. He contended that the right of the entire body of landlords to realise rent at a particular rate cannot be interfered with unless a proceeding is taken under Sec.112A after impleading all of them as parties to those proceedings and after serving them with notice as enjoined by the rules framed under the Bihar Tenancy Act concerning the rent reduction proceedings. In support of his proposition he relied upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court, namely, Raja Surajpal V/s. Ramgati, 26 Pat. 353 : (A.I.R. (35) 1948 Pat. 239) and Basdeonarain V/s. Karumahton, 26 Pat. 592 : (A.I.R. (35) 1948 Pat. 153). In support of his proposition he relied upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court, namely, Raja Surajpal V/s. Ramgati, 26 Pat. 353 : (A.I.R. (35) 1948 Pat. 239) and Basdeonarain V/s. Karumahton, 26 Pat. 592 : (A.I.R. (35) 1948 Pat. 153). In the former case, Imam J. held : "As to the second point, it is clear that in the rent reduction proceedings under Sec.112A, Bihar Tenancy-Act, only defendant I was made a party and the other landlords of the holding were not made parties. No notices were issued to them. The decision was given in their absence. It is quite clear that in these circumstances the order reducing the rent was without jurisdiction." His Lordship thereafter dealt with various rules framed under the Bihar Tenancy Act enjoining a particular procedure to be followed regarding service of the notice. In the other case of Basdeonarain V/s. Karumahton, 26 Pat. 592 : (A.I.R. (35) 1948 Pat. 153) the same view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court. A similar question arose for consideration before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Jagdishwar Dayal Singh V/s. Dwarka Singh, 12 Pat. 626 : (A.I.R. (20) 1933 P.C. 122). There, the question in controversy was whether a sale held under Sec.208, Chota-Nagpur Tenancy Act, was within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner. In that case what had happened was that one of the tenure-holders had not been impleaded either in the rent suit or in the execution proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner, and in his absence the tenure was sold under Sec.208, Chota-Nagpur Tenancy Act. In that case what had happened was that one of the tenure-holders had not been impleaded either in the rent suit or in the execution proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner, and in his absence the tenure was sold under Sec.208, Chota-Nagpur Tenancy Act. Sec.208, Chota-Nagpur Tenancy Act, ran as follows : "When a decree passed by the Deputy Commissioner under this Act is for an arrear of rent due in respect of a tenure or holding, the decree-holder may apply for the sale of such tenure or holding, and the tenure or holding may thereupon be brought to sale, in execution of the decree, according to the provisions for the sale of under-tenures contained in the Bengal Rent Recovery Act, 1865 and all the provisions of that Act, except Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 thereof, shall, as far as may be, apply to such sale." Now, dealing with the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee were of opinion that when a statutory jurisdiction is conferred on a Revenue Court, the jurisdiction must be exercised within the statutory powers conferred. This pronouncement of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee can be relied upon to decide the controversy in the present action also. The Revenue Court had been conferred statutory jurisdiction to decide the question of reduction of rent within particular limits. Sec.112A and the other relevant sections of the Bihar Tenancy Act read with the rules framed under that Act governing such eases make it mandatory that the orders can be passed in the presence of all the parties interested in the holdings; and when it is found that all the landlords had not been impleaded in the proceedings, the order passed by the Revenue Court would become without jurisdiction. 7 Mr. De, appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, contended that it had not been established that Jit Kuer was recorded in Register D. But from the pleadings as well as from the admitted ease of the parties before the two Courts below, it was clear that Mt. Jit Kuer was one of the landlords who had not been impleaded in the proceedings under Sec.112A. It is now too late to suggest that it may be that Mt. Jit Kuer was not recorded in Register D. Besides, the lower appellate Court also has held that Mt. Jit Kuer was one of the landlords who had not been impleaded in the proceedings under Sec.112A. It is now too late to suggest that it may be that Mt. Jit Kuer was not recorded in Register D. Besides, the lower appellate Court also has held that Mt. Jit Kuer, her heirs and legal representatives would not be bound by the orders passed by the Revenue Courts as she was not represented in the proceedings. This part of the judgment of the lower appellate Court has not been challenged before us either by way of cross-objection or by way of appeal. It is, therefore, now settled for the purposes of this second appeal that Mt. Jit Kuer was one of the landlords who had not been impleaded in the proceedings under Sec.112A, Bihar Tenancy Act. 8. Mr. De further contended that this objection of non-joinder of all the co-sharer land- lords interested in the holdings had not been taken before the Revenue. Courts and the present plaintiff was debarred from taking the same by virtue of constructive res judicata as contemplated by Expln. IV to Sec.11, Civil P.C. He relied on the Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Ran Bijoy Prasad Singh V/s. Ramagya Kuer, A.I.R. (33) 1946 Pat. 354 : (226 I.C. 363 F.B.). But there the facts were different. In that case what had happened was that on 8-11-1939, on the application of the tenants under Sec.112A, Bihar Tenancy Act, the Rent Reduction Officer had reduced the rent of khata No. 415/1 to Its. 14 and that of khata No. 416 to Rs. 17-11-0. On a further application of those very tenants the Rent Reduction Officer reduced the rent of khata No. 415/1 to Rs. 7-10-0 and that of khata No. 416 to Rs. 9-11-0 by order dated 29-11-1939. It was held in that case that the second order was passed on a petition for rehearing the matter as the first order had been passed ex parte. In the Full Bench case, however, their Lordships further considered the legality of the second order of the Rent Reduction Officer on the basis that the landlord should have raised objection at the time of the second order that a few days before there had already been a reduction and a second reduction was not permissible. In the Full Bench case, however, their Lordships further considered the legality of the second order of the Rent Reduction Officer on the basis that the landlord should have raised objection at the time of the second order that a few days before there had already been a reduction and a second reduction was not permissible. He having not raised such objection at the time of the second order could not be permitted to say that the second order was wrong. The present suit as framed could not have been tried by the Revenue Court, and, as such, the present suit is not barred by res judicata either constructively or directly. 9. Mr. De further referred to the case of Dwarka Nath V/s. Dhanoo Gope, 26 P.L.T. 297: (A.I.R. (32) 1945 Pat. 320), but there the facts were different. All the landlords interested in the holding had been impleaded as parties to the proceeding under Sec.112A, Bihar Tenancy Act. There was some irregularity regarding service of notice and the point that was urged there was that the person on whom notices were served, had no written authority to accept notice on behalf of the landlord, and, as such, it was contended in that case that the order of the Revenue Court was without jurisdiction. But in the present case all the landlords had not even been impleaded in the proceeding, and, as such, that case has no application to the facts and circumstances in the present case. 10. Mr. Lakshmansaran Sinha further raised the point that during the pendency of the appeal-before the lower appellate Court, Parmanand Singh died and in his place the appellants before the lower appellate Court, substituted the widow and the two minor sons of Parmanand Singh as party-respondents to the appeal. The guardians name in the substitution petition did not appear, but in spite of his non-appearance no other guardian was appointed by the Court to look after the interest of the minors, and, as such, the minors will not be deemed to be parties to the appeal. Mr. De in reply contended that the mother of the minors had also been made a party-respondent and she would be deemed to have protected the interest of the minors. Mr. De in reply contended that the mother of the minors had also been made a party-respondent and she would be deemed to have protected the interest of the minors. But it appears that the mother also had not entered appearance, and it cannot be said that the mother will be deemed to have protected the interest of the minors in the appeal without oven entering appearance in the appeal. But it is not necessary to proceed with this matter further because on merits, in my judgment, the appeal should be allowed. 11. Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court restored. The plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to their costs in all the Courts. Sinha, J. 12 I agree.