JUDGMENT P.L. Bhargava. J. 1. The applicant. Babu Singh, was prosecuted for an offence punishable u/s 500 of the Indian 'Penal Code. He was tried by a Special Magistrate, first class, at Mainpuri, who found him guilty. He was, accordingly, convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 5l/- or in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. He preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge of Mainpuri; but it has been dismissed. Now. he has filed this revision. 2. The facts found by the courts below are these: Kishan Lal, the complainant, had served a notice upon the applicant, Babu Singh, in which he had demanded payment of the price of certain ornaments, said to have been purchased by the applicant on the occasion of his brother's marriage. 3. The applicant sent a reply to the notice mentioned above. In his reply he denied that he had purchased any ornaments, and characterized the demand as false. He further alleged that the false claim had been put forward because the complainant along with his friend, Lajja Ram, had attempted to outrage the modesty of or to commit rape upon a sweeper woman, whose husband had, at his (applicant's) instance, lodged a report against him (complainant) and also because he was suspected of having committed the murder of Babu Earn Mahabrahmin. The reply was sent by post in a registered cover addressed to the complainant. The imputation made against the complainant was false and actuated by ill-will and previous enmity; and the applicant had not taken care to verify the truth of the allegations made by him against, the complainant. The applicant was not entitled to the benefits of any of the exception mentioned in Section 499 of the , Indian Penal Code. 4. On the authority of a Pull Bench decision of this Court reported in Queen Empress v. Taki Husain ILR 7 Allh. 205, it has been contended on behalf of the applicant that the reply sent by him was not made or published so as to constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code The learned Assistant Government Advocate has, on the other hand, tried to distinguish the Pull Bench case and relied upon a later decision of this Court in Khima Nand v. Emperor A.W.R. (H.C.) 77 : A.L.J 128. I have examined both these cases and find that the present case is fully covered by the Pull Bench decision ; and in the latter case all that the learned Judge had said was that the rule laid down in the Pull Bench case was inapplicable to the facts of the case before him. 5. The facts of the Pull Bench case were that the house of one Taki Husain, was searched by the police without a warrant for stolen property. Thereupon, he had sent a notice, by post in a registered cover to the Inspector of police, Basawan Singh and in the notice false and malicious imputation was made against his integrity. Taki Hussin was, therefore, prosecuted for an offence punishable u/s 500 I. P. 0. The Magistrate, who tried the case, convicted the applicant; and the conviction was upheld in appeal by the Sessions Judge. The question which arose for decision in that case and which was referred to the Pull Bench was as follows :- Assuming, for the purposes of argument that the matter contained in the notice' sent by the applicant to Basawan Singh was defamatory in the sense of Explanation 4 to S 499 of the Indian Penal Code. and that none of the Exceptions prowled under that Section can be established, then was the action of the applicant in sending the notice in a closed cover by post to Basawan Singh such a making or publishing of the defamatory matter as to constitute an offence within the terms of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code ? 6. The question referred to the Pull Bench was answered in the negative by a majority of four to one. The majority view was based upon the interpretation of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. After quoting the section. Mahmood J. pointed out that the most important word in the section were "intending to hum or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person. 'Special stress was laid upon the word "harm", because it was pointed out the words ''makes or publishes were governed by the meaning which must be attached to the word "harm". 'Special stress was laid upon the word "harm", because it was pointed out the words ''makes or publishes were governed by the meaning which must be attached to the word "harm". The word "harm" was interpreted with reference to explanation 4 which provides : No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation unless that imputation, directly or indirectly, in the estimation of the others lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the "body of that person is in a loathsome state or in a state generally considered as disgraceful. The interpretation put upon the Words harm and imputations on a persons character made and expressed to others", was to lower him in their estimation, and it was pointed out that "anything which lowers him merely in his own, estimation certainly does not constitute defamation . 7. In this view of the matter, it Was held that the sending of a communication in a registered cover' "was not such a making' or 'publication' as could 'harm' the prosecutor in the sense given to that Word in the explanation 4 of the Section." This view found favour with the other learned Judges except Duthoit J., who was of the opinion, that Taki Husain had made the false imputation in the notice; the posting of the notice amounted to* publication; and by sending the notice he intended of harm the reputation of the complainant. 8. In Khima Nand v. Emperor (2) the Magistrate, who tried the case, had discharged the accused on the ground that there was no offence of defamation where the defamatory statement was made in a communication addressed to the person defamed. When the matter was taken to the District Magistrate, he held that rule did not apply inasmuch as the defamatory statement was written on a post card. The view taken by the District Magistrate was challenged in a revision before this Court and reliance was placed upon the Pull Bench decision referred to above. When the matter was taken to the District Magistrate, he held that rule did not apply inasmuch as the defamatory statement was written on a post card. The view taken by the District Magistrate was challenged in a revision before this Court and reliance was placed upon the Pull Bench decision referred to above. It was held by this Court that no general rule of the kind relied upon by the trial court was laid in the Full Bench case; and that the only rule that was laid down in that case was that there could be no offence of defamation unless the defamatory statement was published or communicated to a third party, that is to a party other than the person defamed. 9. The rule laid down in the Pull Bench case, and referred to in Khima Nand's case, fully applies to the present case where it has been found by the courts below that the communication containing the imputation was sent by the applicant to the complainant by post in a registered cover addressed to the complainant Himself. The court below has, no doubt, held that the imputation was false and actuated by ill-will, and enmity ; but in view of the principle laid down in the Full Bench ease, when the imputation was communicated to the complainant himself, and it was not communicated to a third person otherwise published, no offence within the meaning of Section 499. I. P. 0., was committed. 10. Learned Assistant Government Advocate has contended that when the reply was sent by the applicant by post, there was the risk of the letter falling into the hands of and its being read by other persons. But, the applicant having taken the necessary precaution of sending the letter by post in a registered cover he could not be held responsible for the consequences resulting from any carelessness on the part of the complainant. He has also contended that the question of want of sanction was never raised on behalf of the applicant "But, in order to make out the offence with which the applicant was charged, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of that offence. He has also contended that the question of want of sanction was never raised on behalf of the applicant "But, in order to make out the offence with which the applicant was charged, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of that offence. It was no doubt, proved that the applicant had made an imputation in writing ; but it was also necessary for the prosecution to prove that he had made the imputation with the intention of harming or with the knowledge or having reason to believe that it would harm the reputation of the complainant. As there is nothing on the record to show that the imputation was communicated to any third party or otherwise Published or that it was made in such a manner that it was directly or indirectly likely to lower the complainant in the estimation of others it is not possible to hold that the imputation was made with the intention of causing "harm" to the reputation of the complainant within the meaning of Section 499 I.P.C. 11. Consequently, in this case the prosecution had failed to prove all the ingredients of the offence u/s 499 I.P.C. and the conviction of the applicant cannot be sustained. The application is, therefore allowed, the conviction of and the sentence imposed upon the applicant are set aside and he is acquitted. The fine, if paid, will be refunded.