Judgment :- 1. Defendants 6 and 7 are the appellants. The short point for determination in this second appeal is whether under the partition deed, Ext. A, which was executed by the members of the family of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 5, a charge has been created over properties bearing survey numbers 58 and 62 which form the subject matter of this second Appeal. The facts may be briefly stated. In the partition deed, Ext. A, which was executed by the members of the tarwad of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 5, it was expressly recited that there were two debts to be discharged. One was a decree debt under the decree in O.S. No. 120 of 1101. That was a suit filed by a member of the Bar, Mr. T.K. Velu Pillai, for fees due to him for conducting a tarwad suit, O.S. No. 29 of 1089. The plaintiff in the suit from which this second appeal arises had put forward a claim for Rs. 640 as the total amount expended by him out of his own separate funds in connection with this litigation. The other members of the tarwad had admitted the correctness of this amount due to the plaintiff. They had also induced Mr. T.K. Velu Pillai to give up a portion of the amount due to him under the decree in O.S. No. 120 of 1101. In the family partition deed, there was a clause inserted to the effect that the properties bearing survey numbers 58 and 62 were to be sold by defendants 1 to 5 and converted into cash. Out of the sale proceeds the decree debt was to be discharged and the debt due to the plaintiff was also to be paid. A total sum of Rs. 1500 was set apart for discharging both these obligations. There was another debt due to the plaintiff which does not form the subject matter of this second appeal. In accordance with this clause in the partition deed, the properties were sold to the 6th defendant. Defendants 2 to 5 joined in this transfer but it was subsequently ratified by the first defendant who did not sign as one of the vendors in the sale deed, Ext. In accordance with this clause in the partition deed, the properties were sold to the 6th defendant. Defendants 2 to 5 joined in this transfer but it was subsequently ratified by the first defendant who did not sign as one of the vendors in the sale deed, Ext. V. The 6th defendant was directed to discharge the two obligations, namely to pay off the decree debt and to pay the plaintiff with the amount retained in his hands. When he ascertained the amount payable for satisfying the decree, it was found that the whole amount entrusted to him had to be paid for that purpose. He paid the amount and got the decree struck off, full satisfaction having been entered. But there was no balance left in his hands for discharging the obligation in favour of the plaintiff. The 6th defendant assigned his rights in the properties purchased by him under Ext. V to the 7th defendant pending the litigation. Therefore the 7th defendant has not got any higher rights than the 6th defendant, although he has joined in this second appeal. The question turns upon the nature of the liability created by the partition deed, Ext. A. If by the partition deed a charge was created over the two items which were purchased by the 6th defendant from defendants 1 to 5, then the plaintiff will be entitled to enforce that charge and it would not be open to the appellants to say that owing to the whole amount entrusted to him having been utilised for discharging the decree debt, there is nothing left in his hands for paying the plaintiff. Therefore, the determination of the suit depended mainly upon the question as to whether a charge was created over survey Nos. 58 and 62 by the relevant clause in Ext. A which directed a sale of these two items of properties. 2. Both the courts below have arrived at the conclusion that a charge has been created and they have decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 3. On behalf of defendants 6 and 7 who are the appellants in this second appeal, their learned counsel argues that this view taken by the courts below is erroneous and on a perusal of the partition deed, Ext. 3. On behalf of defendants 6 and 7 who are the appellants in this second appeal, their learned counsel argues that this view taken by the courts below is erroneous and on a perusal of the partition deed, Ext. A, it would be clear that no charge was created over the two items of properties which form the subject matter of this litigation. 4. To appreciate the contentions of the parties it is necessary to read the relevant clause of Ext. A which refers to these two items of properties. It is Cl. VI : According to this clause, we have no doubt that the specific direction given was that the property should be converted into cash. Defendants 1 to 5 were authorised to convey the property after fixing a proper value for it. After conveying the properties and receiving the sale proceeds, that is to say, after converting the properties into cash, the duty was cast upon defendants 1 to 5 to pay off the two debts, namely, the decree debt in O.S. No. 120 of 1101 and the debt due to the plaintiff to the extent of Rs. 640. The learned counsel for the appellants argues that reading the document as a whole and appreciating the wording of Cl. 6 in the light of the ideas conveyed by the document, it is not correct to hold that these two items, survey numbers 58 and 62, were considered by the parties as security for the discharge of the pecuniary obligations mentioned in Cl. 6. On a careful scrutiny of the entire document and the words used by the parties in Cl. 6, we are inclined to accept this contention as well founded. If the property was only designated as the property which should be used for discharging the two obligations there may be some point in the contention of the respondent's learned counsel that there was an intention to create a security. But that was not the idea conveyed by Cl. 6. The specific direction that the properties should be converted into cash first will cut at the root of the contention that a security was intended to be created. After selling the properties and realising the sale proceeds, the cash realised was directed to be utilised in a particular manner. But that was not the idea conveyed by Cl. 6. The specific direction that the properties should be converted into cash first will cut at the root of the contention that a security was intended to be created. After selling the properties and realising the sale proceeds, the cash realised was directed to be utilised in a particular manner. If a charge was created on the property, it would have been extremely difficult for the vendors to convey a clear title to any purchaser. People would have been reluctant to come forward and agree to purchase the properties saddled with such an obligation. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to a number of decided cases for the purpose of illustrating the circumstances in which a charge can properly be presumed to have been created. He has referred to Janardan v. Anant (I.L.R. 32 Bombay 386), Aditya Prasad v. Ram Ratan Lal (A.I.R. 1930 Privy Council 176). Bhola Nath v. Sarbamangala Debi (A.I.R. 1940 Calcutta 93), Abdul Karim v. Vavakunju (1 T.L.J. 183), Maria v. Chackko (22 T.L.J. 441 and Devasia v. Ouseph 24 T.L.J. 395). We have carefully gone through these decisions and we are not satisfied that there is anything in these decided cases which support the contention of the respondent's learned counsel with regard to the proper construction of Cl. 6 of Ext. A. The summary of every decision on this point can be safely stated to be that the answer to the question whether a charge was created by a document or not, will depend upon the intention of the parties as evidenced by the words used by them, in that document. Did they contemplate that some property mentioned in the document should be regarded as security for the payment of a sum of money? If such an intention can be gathered from the document taken as a whole and in the relevant clause relied upon by the parties concerned, then it may be easy to say that a charge has been created. But here far from mentioning the property as property out of which the debt should be discharged, there is the express direction that in the first instance the property should be converted into cash. That distinguishes the present case from all the cases that are cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. But here far from mentioning the property as property out of which the debt should be discharged, there is the express direction that in the first instance the property should be converted into cash. That distinguishes the present case from all the cases that are cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. The majority of these cases were cases in which a liability was directed to be discharged out of the income of the property, for example if maintenance payable to a member of the family is directed to be paid from out of the income from a particular item of property, it may disclose an intention to create a charge. But in the present case the wording of C1.6 satisfied us that there was no intention of saddling the property with such an obligation. On the other hand, the primary idea was that cash should be realised by selling the property. The direction for using the amount realised by sale of the property cannot be interpreted as conveying the idea that the property was saddled with a charge. 6. Another interesting argument was addressed by the respondent's learned counsel. He wanted to rely upon the vendor's lien which defendants 1 to 5, according to him, were entitled to in respect of unpaid purchase money and in respect of that lien, he wanted to contend that a charge can be enforced by the plaintiff. There was no such contention urged in the courts below so far as we are able to see. Moreover, if there is unpaid purchase money in the hands of the 6th defendant who was the vendor under Ext. V, it would be open to the plaintiff to resort to appropriate proceedings for enforcing his right against such vendor's lien. So far as we are able to see, there is no finding that there is such a lien which is capable of being enforced or that there is unpaid purchase money in the hands of the 6th defendant subject to such lien. It is open to the plaintiff to resort to appropriate proceedings to enforce his right in case there is any such lien. 7. If a charge has been created by Cl. VI, then the plaintiff would certainly have been entitled to proceed against the property. But in view of our finding that there is no such charge created by Ext. It is open to the plaintiff to resort to appropriate proceedings to enforce his right in case there is any such lien. 7. If a charge has been created by Cl. VI, then the plaintiff would certainly have been entitled to proceed against the property. But in view of our finding that there is no such charge created by Ext. V we are unable to recognise any right in the plaintiff in respect of this particular item of Rs. 640 which forms the subject matter of the controversy in this second appeal. The second appeal is pressed only in respect of Rs. 640. The court below have recognised the plaintiff's right to another item of Rs. 150. The correctness of that finding is not questioned in this second appeal. 8. In the result, the second appeal must be allowed with proportionate costs in respect of this item of Rs. 640. The personal decree against defendants 1 to 5 in respect of this sum of Rs. 640 and interest thereon is not in any way interfered with in this second appeal. It is only the finding that in respect of this item there is a charge created on the property purchased by the 6th defendant and conveyed by him to the 7th defendant, that is pressed in this second appeal and it is only on that point that the second appeal is allowed here. The second appeal with regard to the balance is dismissed with proportionate costs. Appeal partly allowed.