ORDER : 1. This is an application under S. 491, Criminal P. C. on behalf of the petitioner Kashinath Gupta, who is at present under detention in Central Jail Lashkar, in accordance with an order passed by the District Magistrate Gwalior on 18-8-1950 under S. 3 (1), (a), (ii), Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV [4] of 1950). In the order of detention which is in Hindi Mr. Namdeorao Patil, the District Magistrate of Gwalior has averred that he is satisfied with respect to the petitioner that it is necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 2. In the application it has been stated that Kashinath Gupta was arrested on 19-8-1950 at 4 A. M. under S. 151, Criminal P. C. by the Sub-Inspector of police Gwalior; that when the police authorities refused to release him on bail, the petitioner applied to the City Magistrate, Lashkar, for being released on bail which was granted. But subsequently the police refused to release him on bail and served him on 19-8-1950 at 7 P. M., with an order of detention purported to have been passed by the District Magistrate on 18-8-1950. It is then stated that the order of detention is mala fide passed for the purpose of preventing the applicant from being released on bail; that the grounds of detention furnished to the petitioner are vague and indefinite and the District Magistrate was not satisfied at the time the petitioner was arrested that it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him for acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The applicant has supported the application by filing an affidavit in which he mentions that the grounds of detention supplied to him are utterly vague and it is impossible for him to make any representation on those grounds and that at no time he in any manner urged the students or the labourers to resort to strike and violence or to break the law. 3. 3. In the return against the application and the affidavit in support of it, sworn by the District Magistrate, it has been admitted that the petitioner was arrested on 19-8-1950 at 4 a. M. under S. 151, Criminal P. C. But the District Magistrate further states that the order of detention was passed by him on 18-8-1950 and it was served on the applicant on 19-8-1950 at 5-30 a. M. The District Magistrate also said in his affidavit that it was not true that the order of detention was mala fide and that it was also not true that the order was passed without satisfying himself as to whether it was necessary to detain the applicant with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The statement contained in the grounds of detention have been repeated in the affidavit sworn by the District Magistrate. 4. Mr. Dey, the learned counsel for the applicant first contends that even though the order of detention bore the date 18-8-1950, when it was served on the 19th upon the petitioner, it was an antedated order which had not been passed on 18th August, and that it was passed after the applicant had been arrested in the early morning on the 19th. It is argued that the applicant's detention under the order was illegal as he could not have been detained after having been arrested under S. 151, Criminal P. C. and further that the very fact that the applicant was first arrested under S. 151, Criminal P. C. and later on ordered to be detained under the Preventive Detention Act in spite of an order of the City Magistrate directing the police authorities to release him on bail, in itself, shows that the order of detention was passed mala fide without the state of satisfaction required under S. 3 of the Act, and with an ulterior motive of preventing the applicant from being released on bail. As to this contention it must first be observed that S. 151, Criminal P. C., authorises a police officer to arrest a person designing to commit a cognizable offence. The detention under the Act (iv [4] of 1950) is wholly for a different purpose, namely, to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the matters mentioned in S. 3 (1) of the Act. The detention under the Act (iv [4] of 1950) is wholly for a different purpose, namely, to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the matters mentioned in S. 3 (1) of the Act. The arrest of a person under S. 151 or under some other provisions of ordinary law does not preclude the exercise of the powers under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Nor is the mere fact that the person was first arrested under the ordinary law and later ordered to be detained, in itself, sufficient to prove that the order of detention was mala fide. There must be other circumstances or evidence to show that the detaining authority acted mala fide. A similar view has been taken with reference to Local Public Safety Acts in Moolchand v. Emperor, A. i. R. (35) 1948 all. 281: (49 Cr. l. J. 352) Dasappa v. Dist. Magistrate, South Kanara, a. I. R. (36) 1949 Mad. 712: (51 Cr. l. J. 133) and A. i. R. (37) 1950 Mad. 162. In the present case the District Magistrate has stated in his affidavit that he did as a matter of fact pass the order of detention on 18th August. Now, as the question as to when the order of detention was actually passed is not a matter within the knowledge of the applicant, we must accept the statement in the affidavit of the District Magistrate that the order was passed on 18th August. The District Magistrate has also stated in the return against the application, that the order was served on the petitioner on 19-8-1950 at 5.30 A. M. i. e. nearly an hour after he was arrested under S. 151 and that subsequently an order granting bail to the applicant; was made by the Magistrate. If this is true, it appears to us strange how the Sub-Inspector who arrested the applicant under S. 151, Criminal P. C., was unaware of the order of detention until he himself served it upon the petitioner, and why the fact of the detention was not brought to the notice of the Magistrate who granted the bail. This circumstance no dout create? some suspicion as to whether the satisfaction as required under S. 3 of the Act of the District Magistrate was real. This circumstance no dout create? some suspicion as to whether the satisfaction as required under S. 3 of the Act of the District Magistrate was real. It is true that mere suspicion is not enough to discharge the heavy burden which lies on the detenu to show that the order of detention was passed mala fide. But, as will be shown hereafter, the applicant has succeeded in showing that the order was mala fide. 5. The nest condition of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the grounds of detention furnished to the detenu are vague and indefinite; that they themselves indicate that the District Magistrate did not satisfy himself with respect to the applicant that his detention was necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; and that on those grounds the petitioner cannot legally be detained in the interests of the maintenance of public order. It is, therefore, urged that the order of detention and the continuance of the detention thereunder are illegal. 6. In our opinion this objection of the detenu is well-founded. We have already today indicated in our order in the petition of Anand Behari Mishra v. State, Cr. Misc. No. 57 of 50; (a. i. R. (38) 1951 M. b. 51) that it is not competent to the Court to enquire into the sufficiency of the materials and the reasonableness of the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order; but that the grounds can be scrutinised to see whether the detaining authority had the state of satisfaction necessary to make an order under S. 3, Preventive Detention Act 1950. It has also been pointed out in that case that if the grounds of detention are vague and indefinite making it impossible for the detenu to make any representation, and thus indicating that the detaining authority had not the condition of the mind required under S. 3 of the Act, then the order of detention and the continuance of detention under that order are illegal, 7. The grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner are as follows: 8. The grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner are as follows: 8. It would appear from the grounds reproduced above that in grounds 1 and 4 it is nearly stated that the applicant had been planning to excite in the students and the labourers bad feelings towards Government and had been suggesting to them to take out a funeral procession of an effigy of the Chief Minister. Now, merely exciting or attempting to excite in others disaffection and bad feelings towards the Government cannot be regarded as justifying ground for detention, unless it is such as to undermine the maintenance of public order, in the interests of which the applicant has been detained. But in these two grounds there is nothing to show that the petitioner was engaged in activities per se prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. There is no reference at all to the nature of the petitioner's activities subversive of public order. In ground 2 it is mentioned that the petitioner instigated the students to violate the ban imposed by the District Magistrate and thus break the law. It is unnecessary to emphasise the fact that the powers under such an Act as the Preventive Detention Act are for the purpose of preventive detention and they are not punitive in their nature. A person cannot be detained under the Act for what he has already done but in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the matters mentioned in S. 3 (1) of the Act, (see Baji Rao v. Emperor, a. i. R. (33) 1946 Bom. 32: (47 Bom. L. b. 675)). 9. The learned Government Advocate rightly and frankly conceded that ground 2 cannot by itself be a justifying ground for detention; he however said that the material contained in this ground and ground 3 is of rationally probative value, on which the District Magistrate could base his satisfaction. But in our view ground 3 is also utterly vague. Therein, it is mentioned that as a result of the applicant's the workers of J. C. Mill and Motilal Agrawal Mills struck work, took out a procession and raided the Congress office. The word according to the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Dictionary, which we regard as quite authoritative, means 'inspiration'. But in our view ground 3 is also utterly vague. Therein, it is mentioned that as a result of the applicant's the workers of J. C. Mill and Motilal Agrawal Mills struck work, took out a procession and raided the Congress office. The word according to the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Dictionary, which we regard as quite authoritative, means 'inspiration'. There is no indication in the ground as to whether the labourers were inspired to do these acts by any acts or speeches of the applicant or whether they derived inspiration to do these acts from the mere .personality of the applicant. It is stated in ground 3 that on 10-8-50 the applicant along with other students took away dead bodies from the hospital and committed an illegal Act. Here again, if the applicant in removing the dead bodies from the hospital did commit any illegal act and an offence, that would be a ground for prosecuting him under the ordinary law; it cannot afford a ground for preventive detention. 10. Ground 5 is unintelligible and ungrammatical. It says: This ground is meaningless and exhibits gross carelessness on the part of the District Magistrate. There is no reference in the ground to the activities of the applicant or for the matter of that, that of any other person. The learned Government Advocate said that there is some typing mistake in ground 5. We are unable to accept this explanation as we find that in this ground the word has been corrected by the District Magistrate in his own hand. In our view this error or mistake in ground 5 which shows that the District Magistrate did not apply due care and attention to the matter of the applicant's detention is fatal to the order of the detention. We cannot do better than quote here the observations of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Purushottam Das Tirkumdas v. Emperor, A. I. R. (33) 1946 Bom. 333: (48 Cr. We cannot do better than quote here the observations of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Purushottam Das Tirkumdas v. Emperor, A. I. R. (33) 1946 Bom. 333: (48 Cr. L. J. 24): "The difficult position in which a detenu is placed in such circumstances, therefore makes it incumbent on the authority directing the detention to apply all possible care and attention to the materials placed before it before making the order of detention; and even a slight error of evidence of carelessness would tend to show that the necessary amount of care and attention had not been bestowed in the examination and consideration of such materials by such authority." 11. Ground 6 is no ground at all. It merely says that the tendencies, plana and activities of the applicant which are shown by the above facts are continuing. 12. On a careful scrutiny of the above grounds we think that they are indefinite and vague. With those grounds it is clearly not possible for the applicant to make any representation. The grounds also show that the District Magistrate had not the state of satisfaction which he professed to have when he made the order of detention. As the statutory requirement of satisfaction has not been fulfilled, the detention of the applicant is not justified. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner also took the objection that the order of detention is bad in that it does not specify the period for which the applicant has been detained. In the grounds of detention furnished to the applicant it was mentioned that the detention of the applicant is for a period of one month. The question raised is of considerable importance and not free from difficulty. In the view we have taken of the contention of the applicant about the absence of the required state of mind of the District Magistrate when he made the order of detention, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the question of specifying the period of detention in the order of detention, especially when we have not had the benefit of a considered and reasoned argument on the point from the applicant. 14. For the above reasons, this application; is accepted and we direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.