This is an appeal under the provisions of S. 147, Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, directed against an order passed by the P. R. A. to the D. C., Cachar, on 1-2-1949, by which he ordered the name of Konoj Kumari Das, a daughter of Rash Beharj Das, to be en­tered in the Mutation Register as a 'Shebait'. (2) It is contended by Mr. Chaudhuri on be­half of the appellants that the appellants, as far back as 22-7-44, succeeded in having their names entered in the Mutation Register as 'Shebaits' of the identical property, and that the learned P. R. A. or the D. C. had no jurisdiction to inter­fere in the order by which the names of the appellants were entered in the Mutation Register on 22-7-1944. He further contends that the ap­plication made by Konoj Kumari Das on 15-6-48 should not have been entertained by the learn­ed D. C. relying upon S. 53 A of the Regulation. This contention is manifestly erroneous. Sec­tion 53 A does not refer to actions of the D. C. upon applications; it refers to actions of the D. C. upon information received otherwise than upon an application. That, however, is not the subs­tance of the matter. As the order of the P. R. A. was a very short one, a report was called for from the D .C. who has set out the facts clearly and referred to a decree passed in T. S. No. ti of 1938 instituted by the step-mother of the res­pondent against the appellants for settling a scheme as to the 'debottar' estate in dispute. That suit was decreed in favour of the respon­dent's step mother on 5-12-38, by which the res­pondent's step-mother was appointed 'shebait' of the 'debottar' property, and the 2 appellants who were defendants 2 and 4 in the suit for settling the scheme, were held to be 'pujaris'. An appeal against the decision in that suit was preferred by the 2 appellants, including the respondent, but it was dismissed on 30-3-39. (3) Shortly after the respondent's step-mother obtained a decree in her favour, she made an application on 17-3-42 praying that she be releas­ed from the 'shebaitship' of the 'debottar' pro­perty. An appeal against the decision in that suit was preferred by the 2 appellants, including the respondent, but it was dismissed on 30-3-39. (3) Shortly after the respondent's step-mother obtained a decree in her favour, she made an application on 17-3-42 praying that she be releas­ed from the 'shebaitship' of the 'debottar' pro­perty. What happened upon this application of the respondent's step-mother is not clear from the record, but what is not disputed is the fact that shortly after making this application,, the respondent's step-mother went to Benares; during her absence, on 18-5-44 the 2 appellants made an application which was registered as Revenue Pet. No. 125 of 1943-44, in which they stated that their names should be entered in the Muta­tion Register as 'shebaits'. That was clearly a misleading statement. The 2 appellants were parties to the decree obtained by the respondent's step-mother in 1938; they knew that they were not the 'shebaits', but only 'pujaris'. In spite, of that decree, which they suppressed, they des­crI Red themselves as 'shebaits', and on the strength of that assertion they obtained an 'ex parte' order in their favour, by which their names were entered in the Mutation Register. (4) The question now arises - whether the learned D. C. was competent to vacate an order passed by his predecessor in 1944 by which the names of the 2 appellants were entered in the Mutation Register. Mr. Ghose for the respon­dent contends that the learned D. C. had juris­diction to pass an order cancelling the names of the 2 appellants from the Mutation Register and entering the name of the respondent in virtue of a note appended to S. 151, Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. His next contention is that assuming that the note cannot be regarded as empowering the D. C. to vary an order made by his predecessor, in summary proceedings under S. 53, Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, the D. C. could under R. 181 of the Assam Land Revenue Manual treat the application of the res­pondent as an application to set aside an 'ex parte' order made by his predecessor on 22-7-44. The difficulty, however, in applying R. 181 of the rules framed under the Regulation is that the application for setting aside the ex parte' decree was not made by the step-mother of the res­pondent, but by the respondent. The difficulty, however, in applying R. 181 of the rules framed under the Regulation is that the application for setting aside the ex parte' decree was not made by the step-mother of the res­pondent, but by the respondent. If the terms of O. 9, Civil P. C. can be invoked, it is mani­fest that before the order could be set aside, the step-mother of the respondent had to show suffi­cient cause for her non-appearance. It is not disputed that the respondent did not make an application for setting aside the 'ex parte" decree on the ground that her step-mother was prevented by sufficint cause from appearing - assuming that an application by her would be competent. I cannot, therefore, see how the order of the D. C. vacating the order of his predecessor made on 22-7-44 can be regarded as an order made under R. 181 read with O. 9, Civil P. C. (5) For the purposes of disposing of this ap­peal, I will assume that the D. C. could not re­vise the order of his predecessor made on 22-7-1944 under the provisions of S. 151, Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. I will also assume that the learned D. C. on the facts of this case, could not act under the provisions of R. 181 of the rules framed under the Regulation, read with O. 9, Civil P. C. But it seems to me that on the facts of this case, the learned D. C. was justi­fied in invoking his inherent powers to set aside the order dated 22-7-1944 - an order which, in my opinion, was obtained by the appellants by suppression of a very material fact, namely the decree in the suit of 1938. An order obtained by the appellants in these circumstances - which amount to a species of fraud, - can be vacated by the Court which was misled into passing such an order under the provisions of S. 151, Civil P. C. In my opinion, the learned D. C., in the exercise of his powers under S. 151, Civil P. C. - having regard to the facts which I have stated - was justified in vacating the order obtained by the appellants on 22-7-1944. (6) I would accordingly dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs, as all the advocates in revenue appeal have agreed that no costs should be awarded - whether they appear for appel­lants or the respondents. G. M J. Appeal dismissed.