Judgment :- 1. This is an application for the amendment of a decree. In O.S. No. 98 of 1116 on the file of the Nagercoil District Court the present petitioner sought to obtain a declaration as to her title to the suit properties therein and recover them with mesne profits from the possession of her deceased sister's husband who was the sole defendant to the suit. The parties are Nanjanad Vellalas. The suit was contested and the trial court ultimately passed a preliminary decree entitling the petitioner herein to recover a half-share of the properties with mesne profits thereof from the date of the death of her sister Ponnamma. She died on 6.4.1115. The suit was instituted on 27.12.1116. The preliminary decree was passed on 29.4.1122. The petitioner was dissatisfied with the decree refusing her relief with respect to the remaining half-share. She therefore preferred an appeal to the High Court in A.S. No. 434 of 1122. The appeal was found to be groundless and it was dismissed with costs. Pending the suit a receiver was appointed to take possession of the properties and to manage them. This was in 1119. The trial court fixed the rate of annual mesne profits on the basis of the average yield the receiver realised from the properties till the date of the passing of the preliminary decree. Though the decretal portion of the judgment did not specify the period during which the rate of mesne profits so fixed should have operation, in an earlier paragraph the Court had clearly stated that the plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits from the date Ponnamma died till the date the receiver took charge. The decree was drawn up ignoring the time-limit. It states that the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits at the rate fixed by the Court till she recovers possession of her half-share in the properties. Her complaint is that the decree is not in conformity with the judgment when it proceeds to state that she can realise mesne profits at the rate fixed not only until the receiver took charge but till she recovers possession. According to her from the date the receiver took possession of the properties the net profits realised by the receiver is to be shared in equal halves by her and the defendant. 2. According to her from the date the receiver took possession of the properties the net profits realised by the receiver is to be shared in equal halves by her and the defendant. 2. The defendant who is the counter-petitioner to this petition opposed the petition, but he has himself complained that the decree is not in conformity with the judgement in certain other respects. Before we proceed to examine how far and to what extent the decree is in variance with the judgment, we shall first dispose of a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the counter-petitioner to the effect that the proper Court to amend the decree is the lower court and not the High Court. The argument is that the amendment sought for by the petitioner is with respect to that portion of the claim which was decreed by the trial court for which there was no appeal and hence it is not for the High Court to direct the amendment to be made. We are afraid we cannot accept the argument. The decision in Keramatulla Meah v. Keamatulla Meah 57 Indian Cases 710 relied on by the counter-petitioner's learned advocate does not contain any reasoning or reference to any authorities. If we may say so with respect, the judgement contains only a bald statement that the amendment sought for related to a matter which was outside the scope of the appeal preferred to the High Court and that the learned judges were therefore disposed to accept the contention of the opposite party that the trial court was the proper forum to make the amendment. The case, no doubt, related to a suit for recovery of a certain share in immovable properties and the appeal was with respect to the portion of the plaintiff's claim the trial Court refused to recognise. The statement of the facts of the case does not however show that any claim for mesne profits was involved in that suit either in the trial court or in appeal. Here the appeal related not only to the other half-share in the properties but also to mesne profits in respect thereof. 3. Further, it is settled law that the jurisdiction of a trial court to amend its decree is ousted when that decree is confirmed by the appellate court. See Varki v. Ettikela 1.T.L. J. 90; 28 T.L.R. 168; Thrassya v. Varied; 13 Coch. 3. Further, it is settled law that the jurisdiction of a trial court to amend its decree is ousted when that decree is confirmed by the appellate court. See Varki v. Ettikela 1.T.L. J. 90; 28 T.L.R. 168; Thrassya v. Varied; 13 Coch. L.R. 221; Joseph v. Variath 14 Coch. L.R. 302 and the decisions referred to in those cases. We are not unaware that the Cochin Chief Court, as it then was, had in Akileswara Ayyar v. Gopalakrishna Pattar 14 Coch. L.R. 361 followed the decision in 57 Indian Cases 710 cited before us. That Cochin case is clearly distinguishable in that there the defendant who sought amendment of the decree was not a party in the appeal and the appeal related solely to a dispute between the plaintiff and another defendant. The Travancore and the Cochin cases cited earlier refer to and rely on a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Pichuvayyangar v. Seshayyangar, I.L.R. 18 Mad. 214 where the question arose as to which court had jurisdiction to amend the decree relating to a matter which did not form subject of an appeal from the original decree. The decision of the Full Bench was to the effect that the jurisdiction of the trial court to amend the decree was ousted by the confirmation of its decree by the appellate court. The head-note to that case which contains a full statement of the facts may usefully be quoted here. "In a suit for land with mesne profits the District Munsiff delivered judgment for the plaintiff and recorded therein a finding that he was entitled to mesne profits as from a certain date, it having previously been arranged that the amount, if any, awarded for mesne profits should be determined in execution. In the decree no mention was made of the date from which the mesne profits were to be calculated, but it was stated merely that the amount was to be determined in execution. The case went on appeal before the District Judge, who modified the decree in certain particulars unconnected with mesne profits. With a view to execution, the plaintiff applied to the Court of First Instance to bring the decree into conformity with the judgment. The case went on appeal before the District Judge, who modified the decree in certain particulars unconnected with mesne profits. With a view to execution, the plaintiff applied to the Court of First Instance to bring the decree into conformity with the judgment. The court having made an order accordingly, it was objected in the High Court on revision that the order was made without jurisdiction." The question referred to the Full Bench was:- "Whether the jurisdiction of the District Munsiff to amend the decree under S. 206 was ousted by the confirmation of his decree by the District Court on appeal and the answer given was:- "We are of opinion that when there has been an appeal against the decree of the District Munsiff and a decree has been passed thereon, the District Munsiff has no longer any power to amend his decree. We therefore answer the question in the affirmative". 4. In that case the appellate court interfered with the decision of the lower Court in certain respects though unconnected with mesne profits. Even when an appeal is dismissed in its entirety, as it happened in this case, the lower Court's decision stands confirmed in all respects by the appellate decree. The decision in 28 T.L.R. 168 referred to earlier is a decision more in point. There as in this case the appeal related only to a portion of the decree passed by the Munsiff and the amendment of the decree sought for related only to the unappealed portion. Future pattom allowed by the trial Court was omitted to be included in the decree. The appeal related only to the award of costs and the rate fixed for the price of paddy. The award of future pattom was not taken in the appeal. The learned Judge Viraraghava Iyengar, J. as he then was, who disposed of the matter held that that circumstance did not affect the rule that where there has been an appeal against the decree of the trial Court and a decree has been passed there the trial Court has no longer any power to amend its decree and the only Court that has jurisdiction in the matter is the appellate Court. It was urged before us that decision was a Single Judge's decision and therefore not binding on us. It was urged before us that decision was a Single Judge's decision and therefore not binding on us. That may no doubt be so but we see absolutely no reason to differ from the view the learned judge took in that case. The proposition broadly enunciated by the Madras Full Bench decision in I.L.R.. 18 Mad. 214 quoted above has invariably been followed by Courts in Travancore and Cochin and we think it too late now to seek to go back upon it. Apart from the fact that the matter involves a question of jurisdiction it is important that in a matter affecting procedure there should be a settled rule. A practice one come into vogue cannot lightly be upset. The preliminary objection is without substance and is hence overruled. 5. The amendment, as stated earlier, sought for by the petitioner is that the decree should be made to express the Court's intention that the datum line for the rate of mesne profits fixed by the Court to operate is the date when receiver took charge of the properties. We have said that though the decretal portion of the judgment is not clear the learned judge had in an earlier paragraph (Para. 11) stated that he was fixing the profits only for the period ending with the receiver's assumption of charge. The position is perfectly understandable and also sound. This amendment has therefore to be allowed and we decide accordingly. Though the petition mentions that the decree is in variance with the judgement also in other respects, the petitioner's learned Advocate did not press for any other amendment. 6. The counter-petitioner's learned Advocate pointed out that the judgment only stated that the rate of mesne profits is fixed with reference to the average yield the receiver obtained from the property and that the judgment had not fixed any rate for commuting paddy into money. The objection is valid and the decree needs correction in this respect as well. The lower court will fix the commutation rate for paddy for the period 27.12.1116 to the date receiver assumed charge on the basis of the market rate during the harvest seasons. This the lower court can do in the course of the proceeding to pass the final decree. Consequential amendment will be made to the preliminary decree. 7. The lower court will fix the commutation rate for paddy for the period 27.12.1116 to the date receiver assumed charge on the basis of the market rate during the harvest seasons. This the lower court can do in the course of the proceeding to pass the final decree. Consequential amendment will be made to the preliminary decree. 7. Another objection raised on behalf of the counter-petitioner regarding the decree as drawn up is that with respect to mesne profits up to the date of the suit the plaintiff cannot be allowed to realise anything more than what she had asked for in the plaint, on which alone court-fee was paid. For the period commencing from 6.4.1115 and ending with 27.12.1116 the plaintiff had claimed 4074 fanams as mesne profits for the entire property. It is now found that she is entitled only to a half-share and though the judgment is not very clear in this respect we cannot construe it as purporting to give the plaintiff more than what she had herself asked for. The decree should be so amended as to make it clear the rate fixed by the Court below has and can have operation only from the date of the institution of the suit till the date the receiver took possession of the properties. For the prior period the plaintiff can have only one-half of the 4074 fanams she claimed. 8. In the result we direct that the decree be amended in the following respects: (i) for the period up to the institution of the suit the plaintiff can get only half of 4074 fanams i.e., 2037 fanams towards mesne profits; (ii) from the date of the institution of the suit till the receiver came into possession the rate of mesne profits shall be as fixed in the preliminary judgment, but the commutation rate will be fixed by the lower court in the proceeding to pass the final decree; (iii) for the period subsequent to the receiver assuming charge, plaintiff will get one-half the net profits realised by the receiver. The petition will stand disposed of accordingly. Petition allowed.