JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. 1. The applicant Krishnaji Mehrunkar was convicted by the District Magistrate, Indore City, under S.5, Public Safety Order (Indore) of 1947 and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.500. In the appeal the learned Additional Sessions Judge maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to a fine of Rs.300. The petitioner, therefore, applied to this Court for revising the order of the Sessions Judge. When the application came on for hearing before my learned brother Rege J., the validity of the Public Safety Order was impugned by the applicant on the ground that it was ultra vires of the Holker State Cabinet. The learned Judge considered that the objection raised appeared to be of great constitutional importance and the application should be heard by a Bench rather than by him sitting singly. He, therefore, recorded his opinion and directed that the papers may be placed before the Chief Justice for orders. Accordingly, this Special Bench was constituted by my Lord the Chief Justice to hear this reference. 2. The sole question for determination in this reference is whether the Indore Public Safety Order of 1947 was valid, and infra vires the Holker State Cabinet. The Cabinet of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja Holker purported to make and promulgate the Public Safety Order under a power conferred on it by Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.42 dated 29-11-1943. That order provided as follows: "In modification of Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.25 dated 22-05-1930, His Highness the Maharaja has been pleased to order that during his absence from the State, the Cabinet may exercise powers of disposal in any urgent case under any of the reserved subjects when His Highness' Orders cannot be obtained, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Huzoor Shree Shenker Orders No.22 dated 21-11-1943 and No.23 dated 23-11-1943, in time." The Huzoor Shree Shankar Orders Nos. 22 and 23 of 1943 laid down that: "The Cabinet will exercise the powers of His Highness' Government in all matters except the following reserved subjects which should be submitted to His Highness with the opinion of the Cabinet." The reserved subjects enumerated therein included "Passing of new Acts and important amendments." The Public Safety Order was made and promulgated by the Holker State Cabinet by Resolution No.1412 dated 19-09-1947.The order provided that it shall come into force in such areas and on such date or dates, as the Government may by notification in the Gazette appoint. The Order came into force in Indore City on 04-02-1948, 3. Mr. Bhalerao, learned counsel for the applicant urged that the power of legislation conferred on the Cabinet by Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.42 dated 29-11-1943 was subject to three restrictions.This power could be exercised by the Cabinet only if, firstly His Highness the Maharaja Holkar was absent from the State; secondly if there was an emergency calling for urgent legislation and lastly if the orders of His Highness could not be obtained in time. On the basis of a notification dated 17-11-1947 with regard to the appointment of Mr. N.C. Mehta as Prime Minister issued under the signature of His Highness and published in the Holker Government Gazette of 24-09-1947 and other notifications issued under His Highness' signature in the month of September 1947, and stressing the long interval between the making and promulgation of the Public Safety Order and the date on which the order came into operation in Indore City, it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no "urgency" or "emergency" such as had been contemplated by the Shree Shankar Order No.42 of 29-11-1943 and that His Highness the Maharaja Holkar being in India, if not in Indore, his orders could have been obtained in time for the promulgation of the order. 4. The learned Advocate General contended that in the absence of any definite allegation that His Highness the Maharaja Holkar was in the State on 19-09-1947 and in the absence of any evidence on the point he was not called upon to meet any objection on that score. 4. The learned Advocate General contended that in the absence of any definite allegation that His Highness the Maharaja Holkar was in the State on 19-09-1947 and in the absence of any evidence on the point he was not called upon to meet any objection on that score. He argued that the act of the Holkar Cabinet in coming to the conclusion that a state of emergency calling for the immediate promulgation of the Public Safety Order existed and that for that purpose the orders of His Highness the Maharaja Holkar could not be obtained in time is an act beyond the cognizance of the Court; and that the Cabinet was the sole judge of whether such circumstances existed as to render it necessary for it to exercise the legislative powers and promulgate the Public Safety Order. 5. The precise issue raised in this reference is, I think, whether the Court can go into the question whether the promulgation of the Public Safety Order by the Holkar State Cabinet on 19-09-1947 was an urgent matter in which His Highness' Orders could not be obtained in time. For this purpose it is necessary to consider the language of the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.42 of 29-11-1943. This order is the constitutional instrument which conferred on the cabinet the powers inter alia of legislation. It is an accepted rule of the construction of such orders of the sovereign and other like constitutional instruments that the order must be construed according to the natural and plain meaning of the words of the order and, that, if there is a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, a construction which will carry into effect the plain intention of the authority responsible for the order rather than one which will defeat that intention should be preferred. 6. On a plain and natural construction of the words of the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943, it is clear that the power conferred on the Cabinet was limited to the duration of the absence from the State, of His Highness, and was to take action and dispose of any urgent matter, including a matter of urgent legislation, when His Highness' Orders with regard to that matter could not be obtained in time. It seems to me that the words 'when His Highness' Orders cannot be obtained in time' which occur in the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943 are only expositive of the preceding words in the order, namely 'urgent case.' These words do not impose any additional restriction on the powers, conferred on the Cabinet, independent of the absence of His Highness from the State and of the urgency of a matter. The word 'when' itself cannot be taken to mean ''on the condition that." It only describes that a state of things which if His Highness is absent from the State, logically follows from the meaning of the word 'urgent'. According to the plain dictionary meaning of the word 'urgent' a matter is urgent when it calls for immediate action. If, therefore, His Highness is absent from the State and if the matter is urgent the position would necessarily be one in which His Highness' orders cannot, following the inexpeditious procedure prescribed in the Shree Shankar Orders of 21-11-1943 and 23-11-1943, be obtained in time i.e., for immediate action. Any other construction of the words 'when His Highness' orders cannot be obtained . . . . in time' would appear to make subordinate the urgency of matter to the uncertain factor of the probability of obtaining Hie Highness' orders and defeat the intention of the order of 29-11-1943 which is to enable the Government of the State being carried on effectively during the absence from the State of the Ruler. I am, therefore, inclined to take the view that power conferred on the Holkar State Cabinet under the Hunor Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943 was circumscribed by two conditions only viz.; (i) that of the absence from the State of the Maharaja and (ii) that of the urgency of the matter; and if these two conditions were fulfilled with regard to any matter, then the matter would necessarily be one in which His Highness' orders could not be obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the previous orders in time. 7. Now, the condition about the absence of the Ruler from the State is an objective condition precedent of fact capable of determination by a Court of law like any other positive fact. 7. Now, the condition about the absence of the Ruler from the State is an objective condition precedent of fact capable of determination by a Court of law like any other positive fact. But the condition with regard to the urgency of a matter is a subjective condition incapable of being determined by a party other than the one who has to take action in the matter. For there is no impersonal standard of urgency and it would be impossible for a third party or a Court of law to say that the Cabinet had arrived at an erroneous conclusion about the urgency of the matter or that its conclusion was incorrect or unwarranted, unless the third party or the Court were also to place itself in the position of the Cabinet and were put in possession of all the information and knowledge both of facts and of policy or public interest which the Cabinet had. As the order of 29-11-1943 vested the administrative plenary discretion in the Cabinet, it was for the Cabinet to decide whether a particular matter was urgent; it alone could have had the material for exercising the discretion. It is relevant to state that the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943 conferred power on the Cabinet composing of the Ministers of the State, who were charged with the grave responsibility of carrying on effectively the administration of the State, who were answerable to the Maharaja for their conduct in office and who had access to exclusive sources of information, A wide discretion and latitude must, therefore, legitimately be inferred to have been conferred on the Cabinet in the exercise of its powers and a Court of law will, I think, not be justified in reviewing the decision of the Cabinet about the urgency of any matter. 8. The position is very similar to that of an emergency which entitled the Governor-General to make and promulgate ordinances under S.72, Government of India Act, 1919. 8. The position is very similar to that of an emergency which entitled the Governor-General to make and promulgate ordinances under S.72, Government of India Act, 1919. This section authorised the Governor-General to make and promulgate ordinances in cases of emergency and for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof, It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bhagat Singh v. Emperor, AIR (18) 1931 P.C. 1: (32 Cr.L.J. 727) that whether an emergency existed at the time an ordinance was made and promulgated was a matter of which the Governor-General was the sole judge. Lord Dunedin said: "The petitioners ask this Board to find that a state of emergency did not exist. That raises directly the question who is to be the judge of whether a state of emergency exists. A state of emergency is something that does not permit of any exact definition. It connotes a state of matters calling for the drastic action which is to be judged as such by some one. It is more than obvious that that some one must be the Governor-General and he alone. Any other view would render utterly inept the whole provision. Emergency demands immediate action, and that action is prescribed to be taken by the Governor- General. It is he alone who can promulgate the ordinance. Yet, if the view urged by the petitioners is right the judgment of the Governor-General could be upse, either (a) by this Board declaring that once the ordinance was challenged in proceedings by way of habeas corpus the Crown ought to prove affirmatively before a Court that a state of emergency existed, or (b) by a finding of this Board-after a contentious and protracted enquiry-that no state of emergency existed, and that the ordinance with all that followed on it was illegal." 9. This decision was followed by the Privy Council in a subsequent case, Emperor v. Benorilal, AIR (32) 1945 P.C. 48: (46 Cr.L.J. 589). It was observed in this case that para. 72 of Sch. This decision was followed by the Privy Council in a subsequent case, Emperor v. Benorilal, AIR (32) 1945 P.C. 48: (46 Cr.L.J. 589). It was observed in this case that para. 72 of Sch. 9, Government of India Act, 1935 "does not require the Governor-General to state that there is an emergency, or what the emergency is either in the text of the ordinance or at all, and assuming that he acts bona fide and in accordance with his statutory powers, it cannot rest with the Court to challenge his view that emergency exists." In my view, these cases apply with equal force in the present instance where the Cabinet was empowered to enact legislation in case of urgency. The Privy Council decision reported in Emperor v. Benorilal, AIR (32) 1945 P.C. 48: (46 Cr.L.J. 589), also furnishes an answer to the contention of the applicant that the fact that the Public Safety Order was brought into force several months after its promulgation is in itself an indication that the matter of the promulgation of the order on 19-9-1947 was not urgent. In that case the validity of Special Criminal Courts Ordinance No.2 of 1942 promulgated by the Governor-General was attacked inter alia on the ground that Sub-S.(3) of S.1of the Ordinance which empowered the Provincial Government to bring into force the Ordinance in the Province on bing satisfied of the existence of an emergency in the Province, showed that in fact no emergency had arisen when the Governor-General promulgated the Ordinance and that the Governor-General did not consider that an emergency existed. In rejecting this contention their Lordships of the Privy Council referred with approval to the observations of Beaumont C.J., in reference to a similar objection in Shreekant v. Emperor, AIR (30) 1943 Bom. 169: (44 Cr.L.J. 616 FB). Sir John Beaumont remarked in the Bombay case: "The Governor-General has said that an emergency exists; and to say that there cannot be an emergency unless it is necessary instantly to bring the terms of the Ordinance into operation, is to suggest that there can be no emergency with which the Governor-General can deal before it arises. Sir John Beaumont remarked in the Bombay case: "The Governor-General has said that an emergency exists; and to say that there cannot be an emergency unless it is necessary instantly to bring the terms of the Ordinance into operation, is to suggest that there can be no emergency with which the Governor-General can deal before it arises. It suggests that the Governor-General can never exercise any foresight in the protection of the State." The Privy Council in Emperor v. Benorilal, AIR (32) 1945 P.C. 48: (46 Cr.L.J. 589) took judicial notice of the disturbed conditions in India in 1942 on account of the declaration of war with Japan, bombing of Rangoon etc. and expressed the opinion that such facts might, if necessary, properly be considered in determining whether an emergency had arisen. I think here also, we can justifiably take judicial cognizance of the fact that after 15-08-1947 and for some time, before the promulgation of the Public Order and thereafter also, conditions in India were disturbed. If in this "disturbed period the Holkar State Cabinet thought it necessary to issue the Public Safety Order and arm the Government with powers which they could bring into operation as and when they thought fit, it cannot be maintained that the promulgation of the Order on 09-09-1917 was not an urgent matter, 10. The decision of the Privy Council reported in Emperor v. Benorilal, AIR (32) 1945 P.C. 48: (46 Cr.L.J. 589) is sought to be distinguished on the ground that there the Privy Council was considering the validity of an Ordinance which the Governor-General was fully empowered to make and promulgate in cases of emergency; while in the present case the Huzur Shree Shankar Order No.42 dated 29-11-1943, did not give full powers for emergency legislation to the Cabinet but limited it by the conditions stated in the order. I do not think this is a valid difference. As I have indicated above, during the absence of the Maharaja Holkar from the State, the power given by the Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943 to the Cabinet was an absolute power, although the Order made it clear that it was to be exercised in cases of urgency wherein His Highness' orders could not be obtained in time. 11. As I have indicated above, during the absence of the Maharaja Holkar from the State, the power given by the Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943 to the Cabinet was an absolute power, although the Order made it clear that it was to be exercised in cases of urgency wherein His Highness' orders could not be obtained in time. 11. Apart from all the considerations stated above, it would appear that so far as the circumstance of urgency and the concomitant circumstance of the impracticability of obtaining His Highness' orders are concerned, a Court of law is precluded from enquiring into these circumstances under Huzur Shree Shankar Order No.247 dated 18-09-1930. This order was published in the form of Legal Department's Notification No.24 dated 18-09-1930 in the Holkar State Gazette dated 22-09-1930. This order was published in the form of Legal Department's Notification No.24 dated 18-09-1930 in the Holkar State Gazette dated 22-09-1930. It laid down: "Once a law or order, having the force of law is passed by the Government and duly promulgated, it is beyond the province of a Court of law to enquire and determine whether the law or order in question was necessary and whether any urgency or emergency existed justifying the passage of such law or the issue of such order…….The very fact that the Cabinet, exercising the powers of His Highness' Government, have deemed it necessary to pass a law, or issue an order having the force of law is a sufficient proof of the existence of the urgency or necessity justifying such law or order, it any such proof were needed, and so far as the Court is concerned the said law or order is valid and binding." It seems that the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.25 of 22-05-1930 was in terms similar to the Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943, and when in 1930 a Subordinate Court in Indore held that an Order passed by the Holkar State Cabinet in exercise of the powers conferred by the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.25 of 22-05-1930, to be invalid as there was no proof of urgency of the issue of the order and of the fact of His Highness' orders not being obtainable in time the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.247 of 18-09-1930 was issued (vide Criminal Appeal No.60 of 1930 Indore High Court), It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that that Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.247 of 18-09-1930, has the force of law and that it must govern the interpretation of the subsequent Huzoor Shree Shankar Order of 29-11-1943. In view of the Huzoor Shree Shankar Order No.247 of 18-09-1930, saying that the Cabinet opinion on the points referred to above is to be taken as final, it is not open to the applicant to contend that the matter of the promulgation of the Public Safety Order was not urgent or that His Highness' orders could have been obtained for the issue of the order. 12. 12. For the above reasons, in my opinion, as the validity of the Public Safety Order rests neither upon proof of an urgency of a mattes nor upon the proof of His highness' orders not being obtainable in time but upon the judgment of the Cabinet that immediate action of this character was necessary, and as the fact of the absence of His Highness from the State has not been challenged, there is no basis for the contention that the Public Safety Order was not valid and effective and was ultra vires the Holkar State Cabinet, 13. Shinde, C.J. I agree. 14. Rege, J.I have the advantage of perusing the elaborate opinion of my learned brother Dixit J. but with the utmost respect I find unable to agree on a fundamental proposition. 15. The promulgation of a law connotes (i) a power vested or assumed to make a law and (ii) the exercise of such power, and when the power is not in dispute the need for the law and the propriety or wisdom in the exercise of the power is for the legislature to determine and not Courts of law. It is, however, competent for the Courts to examine whether the authority purporting to exercise the power was properly vested with it, and this is the more so where the power is not inherent but delegated. 16. My learned brother Dixit has correctly stated the proposition when he says that "the power conferred on the Holkar State Cabinet lunder Holkar State Sicca Order of 29-11-1943 was circumscribed by two conditions only viz.: (1) That of the absence from the State of the Maharaja and (2) that of the urgency of the matter." I would aid, however, that the condition had a further limit viz. the inability to obtain His Highness' Orders in accordance with the procedure laid down in Holkar State Sicca Orders No.22 of 21-11-1943 and No.23 of 23-11-1943 in time. the inability to obtain His Highness' Orders in accordance with the procedure laid down in Holkar State Sicca Orders No.22 of 21-11-1943 and No.23 of 23-11-1943 in time. I do not think, this limitation can, under the canons of construction of Statutes be considered, as my learned brother thinks "only expositive of the preceding words viz., "urgent case." I think with respect that where the intention of the Huzur order to arm the Cabinet with Sovereign powers, the object could have been achieved better by merely stating that during the absence of His Highness from the State, the Cabinet may exercise powers of disposal in all urgent cases under any of the 'Reserved subjects', and it was unnecessary to explain the word urgent by the addition of the words "when His Highness' orders cannot be obtained . . . in time". In my view His Highness did not intend to shed his responsibility, but wanted with a full realisation of the gravity of the political situation then to elegate powers conditionally and the conditions had therefore to exist before the Cabinet could assume to itself jurisdiction to legislate. 17. I consider it unnecessary to repeat the reasons given by me in the order of reference to support the view taken and after an anxious consideration in the light of my learned brothers' opinion, I cannot induce myself to change the view.