Judgment Fazl Ali, J. :- I have read the judgment prepared by my brother, Mahajan J. and 70 generally agree with his conclusions and reasonings, but having regard to the importance of the points raised, I wish to add a short judgment of my own. 2. There are really three questions to be decided in this appeal, and they are as follows: (i) Whether the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 (XL [40] of 1948) is ultra vires the Legislature of the State of Bombay ; (2) Whether in any event S. 4 of the above Act is ultra vires the Stale Legislature; and (3) Whether the Bombay High Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. 3. The first and the third questions have been answered by the High Court in favour of the appellant, and the second question has been answered in favour of the respondents. In this Court, the appellant attacked the judgment of the High Court in so far as it concerns the second question, whereas the first respondent attacked it in so far as it concerns the first and the third questions. 4. The Bombay City Civil Court Act purports to create an additional Civil Court for Greater Bombay having jurisdiction to try, receive and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding a certain value, subject to certain exceptions which need not be referred to here. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the Act is ultra vires the Legislature of the State of Bombay, because it confers jurisdiction on the new Court not only in respect of matters which the Provincial Legislature is competent to legislate upon under List II, Sch. I to the Government of India Act, 1935, but also in regard to matters in respect of which only the Central or Federal Legislature can legislate under List I (such as, for instance, promissory notes, which is one of the subjects mentioned in Entry 28 of List I). To understand this argument, it is necessary to refer to Entry 53 of List I entries 1 and 2 of List II and also Entry 15 of List III. These entries ran as follows : Entry 53, List II Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List . To understand this argument, it is necessary to refer to Entry 53 of List I entries 1 and 2 of List II and also Entry 15 of List III. These entries ran as follows : Entry 53, List II Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List . ." Entries 1 and 2, List II : "1 . . . the administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all Courts except the Federal Court. . . ." "2. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this Act. . " Entry 15, List III ; Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List." 5. The respondents contention may appear at the first sight to be a plausible one, but, in my opinion, it is not well-founded in law. For the purpose of correctly deciding the question raised, we must first try to understand the meaning of the following items in Entry I of List II, "administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all Courts except the Federal Court. A reference to the three Legislative Lists shows that "administration of justice" is entirely a provincial subject on which only the Provincial Legislature can legislate. The same remark applies to "constitution and organization of all Courts except the Federal Court. The expression "administration of justice" has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well as criminal justice, and in my opinion Entry 1 in List II, which I have quoted, is a complete and self-contained entry. In this entry no reference is made to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts, because the expressions "administration of justice and "constitution and organization of Courts, " which have been used therein without any qualification or limitation, are wide enough to include the power and jurisdiction of Courts, for how can justice be administered if Courts have no power and jurisdiction to administer it, and how can Courts function without any power or jurisdiction. Once this fact is clearly grasped, it followed that, by virtue of the words used in Entry 1 of List II, the Provincial Legislature can invest the Courts constituted by it with power and jurisdiction to try every cause or matter that can be dealt with by a Court of civil or criminal jurisdiction, and that the expression "administration of justice must necessarily include the power to try suits and proceedings of a civil as well as criminal nature, irrespective of who the parties to the suit or proceedings or what its subject-matter may be. This power must necessarily include the power of defining, enlarging, altering, amending and diminishing the jurisdiction of the Courts and defining their jurisdiction territorially and pecuniarily. 6. The question then arises as to the exact meaning of Entry 2 of List II and Entry 53 of List I, which are said to militate against the above construction. These entries, in my opinion, confer special powers on Provincial and Central Legislatures, as opposed to the general power conferred on the Provincial Legislature by Entry 1 of List II, the special powers being the logical consequence or concomitant of the power of the two Legislatures to legislate with regard to the matters included in their respective Legislative Lists. The effect of these entries is that while legislating with regard to the matters in their respective Legislative Lists, the two Legislatures are competent 71 also to make provisions in the several Acts enacted by them, concerning the jurisdiction and powers of Courts in regard to the subject-matter of the Acts, because otherwise the legislation may not be quite complete or effective. The words used in Entry 2 of List II and Entry 53 of List I are wide enough to empower the two Legislatures to legislate negatively as well as affirmatively, with regard to the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of the matters within their respective legislative ambits. In other words, they can exclude or bar the jurisdiction of the Courts in regard to those matters, and they can also confer special jurisdiction on certain Courts. They can also, apart from the general power which the Courts usually exercise, confer power on the Courts to pass certain special orders, instances of which I shall give later. In other words, they can exclude or bar the jurisdiction of the Courts in regard to those matters, and they can also confer special jurisdiction on certain Courts. They can also, apart from the general power which the Courts usually exercise, confer power on the Courts to pass certain special orders, instances of which I shall give later. In this connection, reference may be made to S. 9, Civil P. C., which provides that "the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." 7. This section obviously postulates among other things the barring of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts by Legislatures with respect to particular classes of suits of a civil nature, and the statute-book abounds in instances in which the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is barred under Acts passed by the Central and Provincial Legislatures. There are also many Acts providing that any suit or proceeding concerning the subject- matters of those Acts shall be triable by the Court or Courts specified therein. Such provisions are to be found in a number of Acts enacted both prior to and alter the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, and there can be no doubt that the British Parliament while enacting that Act was fully aware of the existing legislative practice obtaining in this country as well as of the fact that the provisions in questions were sometimes necessary and therefore it empowered the Central and Provincial Legislatures to make them under Entry 53 of List I and Entry 2 of List II, respectively. This, in my opinion, is the true meaning of these entries, and it also explains why a separate entry was necessary enabling the two Legislatures to legislate with regard to the power and jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of the subject-matters mentioned in the three Legislative Lists. But for an express provision like that made in the entries referred to above, the two Legislatures might not have been able to confer special jurisdiction on the Courts in regard to the matters set out in the Legislative Lists, nor could they have been able to bar the jurisdiction of the ordinary Court in regard to them, however necessary or desirable such a course might have appeared to them. 8. 8. It should be noted that the words used in these entries are: -Jurisdiction and power. "Power" is comprehensive word, which includes all the procedural and substantive powers which may be exercised by a Court, but the full significance of the use of the word in the context can be grasped only by reading a large number of local and special Acts in which power has been given to Courts to pass certain special and unusual orders. For example, S. 13, Aircraft Act, 1934, provides that : "Where any person is convicted of an offence punishable under any rule made under clauses.... the Court by which he is convicted may direct that the aircraft or article or substance, as the case may be, in respect of which the offence has been committed, shall be forfeited to His Majesty." 9. Reference may also be made to S. 24, Arms Act, 1878, which provides that "When any person is convicted of an offence punishable under this Act, committed by him in respect of any arms ammunition or military stores, it shall be in the discretion of the convicting Court or Magistrate further to direct that the whole or any portion of such arms, ammunition or military stores, and any vessel-...... ......:shall be confiseated." (See also S. 10, Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 ( I [1] of 1944) and S. 13, Food Adulteration Act, 1919 (Bengal Act VI [6] of 1919), which are in similar terms, and the various Acts relating to money-lenders and money-lending which confer special power on the Courts of reopening several kinds of transactions for the relief of debtors.) 10. It seems to me that the word "power" was added to the word "jurisdiction", in Entry 53 of List I, Entry 9 of List II, and Entry 15 of List III, in order to enable the two Legislatures to grant special powers like those I have mentioned to the Courts which are to deal with the subject-matter of any special legislation. 11. A reference to the Acts passed after the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, will show that special provisions with regard to the jurisdiction of Courts have been made even after the passing of that Act, in a large number of Central and local Acts. 11. A reference to the Acts passed after the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, will show that special provisions with regard to the jurisdiction of Courts have been made even after the passing of that Act, in a large number of Central and local Acts. Confining ourselves to the Acts passed by the Bombay Legislature, since we are concerned here with one of such Acts, we find that in the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 1938 (XIX [191 of 1938), S. 3 empowers the following Courts to exercise powers under the Act,-(a) the High Court, (b) a Court of Session, (c) a District Magistrate, (d) a Sub-divisional Magistrate, (e) a salaried Magistrate. .. . . . : . " 72 Similarly, in the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, S. 23 provides that "no offence under this-Act....shall be tried by a Court other than that of a Presidency Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the First Class or a Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf." Section 11, Bombay Cotton Control Act, 1942, provides that "no criminal Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the Second Class shall try any offence under this Act." Section 19, Bombay Sales of Motor Spirit Taxation Act, 1946, and S. 5, Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act, 1947, are provisions which exclude the jurisdiction of Courts under certain circumstances. Similar instances may be multiplied from the Acts of the Central Legislature and other Provincial Legislatures, but, in my opinion, the instances I have quoted are sufficient to show (1) that the practice which prevailed before the Government of India Act has continued even after its enactment, and (2) that the words" jurisdiction and powers have been consistently construed to bear the meaning which I have attributed to them. 12. The interpretation which is sought to be put on the entries by the respondent is, in my opinion, open to the following objections : (1) It involves the curtailment of the meaning of the expression "administration of justice" in such a way as to rob it of its primary content-the jurisdiction and power of the Court, without which justice cannot be administered. (2) It makes it necessary to read Entry 2 of List II as part of Entry I of the same List, though it has been separately numbered as an independent entry. (2) It makes it necessary to read Entry 2 of List II as part of Entry I of the same List, though it has been separately numbered as an independent entry. This is opposed to the scheme followed in the three Legislative Lists, which seems to be that each particular entry should relate to a separate subject or group of cognate subjects, each subject or group of subjects being independent of the others (subject only to incidental overlapping). The construction suggested by the respondents makes it necessary to assume that though according to their line of reasoning the words "jurisdiction and powers of Courts," etc. occurring in Entry 2 of List II should have been put in Entry 1 of the same List, being intimately connected with the subject of "administration of justice and the constitution and organizition of Courts", it was without any apparent reason numbered separately and made an independent entry. (3) The suggested construction would exclude from the jurisdiction of the Provincial Courts a large number of matters which normally come before Courts exercising civil or criminal jurisdiction, and, if it is accepted, the Courts will not be able to function in the fullest sense unless both the Provincial and Central Legislatures have by piecemeal legislation or otherwise exhausted their power of legislating on all the subjects comprised in Lists II and I respectively. Even after they have exhausted such power, the Courts will not be able to deal with important matters, such as contracts, transfer of property, arbitration wills and succession, criminal law, etc., which are subjects mentioned in List III, until one of the two Legislatures has legislated in regard to those subjects, which raises two important questions:-(i) Which of the two Legislatures has to do it first ; and (9) How is the conflict to be avoided ? 13. That the construction put by the respondents will lead to anomalous results which could not have been within the contemplation of the British Parliament while enacting the Government of India Act, 1935, may be illustrated by one or two examples. 13. That the construction put by the respondents will lead to anomalous results which could not have been within the contemplation of the British Parliament while enacting the Government of India Act, 1935, may be illustrated by one or two examples. Reference might here be made to Entry 96 of List I, which deals with "carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air." It should be supposed that if any of the goods carried by air are lost and a suit is instituted in regard to them, the suit will be triable by the Court having jurisdiction over the matter under the Civil Procedure Code, subject to any special legislation on the subject by the Central Legislature, in spite of the fact that the carriage of goods and passengers by sea or by air is a subject mentioned in List. I. But, on the view propounded before us by the respondent, the Provincial civil Courts will not be competent to try such a suit, unless they are empowered to do so by the Central Legislature. In order to show to what absurd result this doctrine may be pushed, and in order to avoid the criticism of taking for granted what is in controversy, we may take a very extreme example, because the soundness of the respondents contention can be tested only by trying to find out what would happen if we were to stretch it to the utmost limit to which it can be stretched. Entry 13 in List I is : "the Banaras Hindu University and the Aligarh Muslim University." Under Entry 53 of List I, the Central Legislature has power to legislate in regard to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts in respect of the subject-matter of Entry 13- It may, therefore, be supposed, having regard to the wide language used in Entry 13, that it is open to the Central Legislature to enact that suits in which these Universities are concerned as plaintiff or as defendant, will be triable only by the particular Court mentioned in the enactment concerned and that no other Court shall have jurisdiction in regard to such suits. It is difficult to think that until such a legislation is made, a Court 73 which would otherwise be the proper Court, has no jurisdiction to try any suit in which one of these Universities is a party, no matter what the subject- matter of the suit may be. I am certain that the framers of the Government of India Act did not contemplate such a result. 14. We all know that at the date when the Government of India Act, 1935, was passed, there were in existence in the different Provinces a large number of Courts of law and the administration of justice throughout the Provinces was in the hands of these provincial Courts. The civil Courts in the Provinces used to try all suits and proceedings of a civil nature which are triable under S. 9, Civil P. C., and the criminal Court, used to try all criminal cases which are triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The jurisdiction and power of the Courts were not confined to cases in regard to the subjects stated in List II, nor were they debarred from dealing with cases relating to matters which have been assigned to List I. The jurisdiction of the Courts depended in civil cases on a "cause of action" giving rise to a civil liability, and in criminal cases on the commission of an offence, and on the provisions made in the two Codes of Procedure as to the venue of the trial and other relevant matters. It seems to me that the Government of India Act.1935, did not contemplate any drastic change in the existing system of administration of justice, but what it contemplated was that that system should continue subject to future legislation by the proper Legislature, Central or Provincial, barring the jurisdiction of Courts, or conferring jurisdiction or power on special Courts, with regard to the matters included in the appropriate Legislative Lists, should there be any occasion for such special legislation. Under the Government of India Act. 1935, every Province became more or less an autonomous unit with a complete machinery for administering justice to the fullest extent. Under the Government of India Act. 1935, every Province became more or less an autonomous unit with a complete machinery for administering justice to the fullest extent. In my opinion, there is nothing in the Act of 1935 to show that there was any intention on the part of its framers to affect the machinery so drastically as to confine it to the administration of a mere partial or truncated kind of justice relating only to matters specified in List II. 15. Mr. Setalvad, the learned Attorney-General, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, in supporting the impugned Act, argued before us that for the purpose of deciding this appeal, we might also refer to Entry 4 of List III. His contention was that the impugned Act having had the assent of the Governor-General, it would be permissible to see what powers the Provincial Legislature could exercise under Lists II and III taken together. If the course which he suggests is adopted, then the subjects on which the Provincial Legislature can legislate would be : (1) administration of justice; (2 ) constitution and organization of Courts; and (3) civil procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the date of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935. One of the matters included in the Civil Procedure Code is the jurisdiction of Courts. Section 9 of the Code provides, as I have already stated, that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. There are also provisions in the Code dealing with the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts. The three entries will thus cover exactly the field which is covered by item 14 of S. 92 of the Canadian Constitution which comprises the following matters : "Administration of justice in the Provinces including constitution, maintenance and organization of provincial Courts both of civil and criminal jurisdiction including procedure in civil matters in those Courts. " It has been held in Canada that the words referred to above include the power and jurisdiction of Courts, and, under that item, the Provincial Legislature can confer the widest power on the Courts. " It has been held in Canada that the words referred to above include the power and jurisdiction of Courts, and, under that item, the Provincial Legislature can confer the widest power on the Courts. It seems to me that the approach suggested by the learned Attorney-General is useful for testing whether Entry 2 of List II was intended to be treated as the sole and only basis of the power of the Provincial Legislature to confer jurisdiction on the provincial Courts and whether it was really the intention of the British Parliament to empower the Provincial Legislature to confer jurisdiction of only such a limited character as can be conferred on the provincial Courts under Entry 2 of List II, if that entry is treated as a self-sufficient entry. In my opinion, the correct view is to hold that it is not necessary to call into aid either Entry 4 of List III or any of the provisions of the Canadian Constitution in this case, and that the words "administration of justice; constitution and organization of Courts" are by themselves sufficient to empower the Provincial Legislature to invest a new Court with all the power which has been conferred upon it by the impugned Act. It is of course open to the Central Legislature to bar the jurisdiction of the new Court by a special enactment with regard to any of the matters in List I, but so long as such jurisdiction is not barred, the Court will have jurisdiction to try all suits and proceedings of a civil nature as enacted in the Act in question. I-think that if the Provincial Legislature had merely enhanced 74 the pecuniary jurisdiction of any of the existing civil Courts, there could have been no objection to that course. Why then should there be any objection when, instead of investing one of the existing Courts with power to try suits and proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding a certain amount, the Legislature has created a new Court and invested it with the some power. 16. Perhaps, it will be simpler to deal at this stage with the third question, namely, whether the Bombay City Civil Court has jurisdiction to try a suit based on a promissory note. 16. Perhaps, it will be simpler to deal at this stage with the third question, namely, whether the Bombay City Civil Court has jurisdiction to try a suit based on a promissory note. So far as this point is concerned, the respondent bases his contention on Entries 28 and 53 of List I. Entry 28 relates to "cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other like instruments. Entry 53, as already stated, relates to "jurisdiction and powers of Courts with respect to any of the matters in List I." It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the effect of these two entries, when they are read together, is that no Court can try a suit relating to a promissory note, unless it is invested with the jurisdiction to try such a suit by the Central Legislature by virtue of the power given by Entry 53 of List I. The question so raised is covered by the answer to the first question, and I shall only add that the answer already given to that question finds some support in the case of Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce, Ltd., Khulna, (1947) F. C. R. 28, in which the arguments of the respondents before the Privy Council proceeded on the same lines as the arguments of the respondents before us. The question raised in that case was as to the validity of the Bengal Money-lenders Act, 1940, which limited the amount recoverable by a money-lender on his loans and interests on them, and prohibited the payments of sums larger than those permitted by the Act. The validity of the Act was questioned by the respondent Bank in certain suits brought by them to recover loans and interests alleged to be due on promissory notes executed by the appellants-borrowers as well as in suits brought by the debtors claiming relief under the Act. The argument put forward on behalf of the Bank was that the Bengal Legislature by the impugned Act had attempted to legislate on subjects expressly forbidden to it and expressly and exclusively reserved for the Federal Legislature, that is to say, in relation to promissory notes and banking, which are reserved for the Federal Legislature exclusively. The argument put forward on behalf of the Bank was that the Bengal Legislature by the impugned Act had attempted to legislate on subjects expressly forbidden to it and expressly and exclusively reserved for the Federal Legislature, that is to say, in relation to promissory notes and banking, which are reserved for the Federal Legislature exclusively. Under Entries 28 and 38 respectively of List I. On the other hand, the arguments put forward on behalf of the appellants was that the impugned Act was in pith and substance legislation dealing with money-lending and that in so far as it dealt with promissory notes or banking that was only incidental or ancillary to the effective use of the admitted legislative powers of the Provincial Legislature to deal with money-lending. This argument of the appellants was substantially accepted by the Privy Council. 17. The Second point raised on behalf of the respondent relates to the validity of S.4 of the Act, which runs as follows : "Subject to the exceptions specified in S. 3, the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, invest the City Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature, arising within the Greater Bombay and of such value not exceeding Rs. 25,000 as may be specified in the notification." 18. It is contended that this section is invalid, because the Provincial Legislature has thereby delegated its legislative powers to the Provincial Government which it cannot do. This contention does not appear to me to be sound. The section itself shows that the Provincial Legislature having exercised its judgment and determined that the new Court should be invested with jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings of a civil nature of a value not exceeding Rs. 25,000, left it to the Provincial Government to determine when the Court should be invested with this larger jurisdiction, for which the limit had been fixed. It is clear that if and when the new Court has to be invested with the larger jurisdiction, that jurisdiction would be due to other authority than the Provincial Legislature itself and the Court would exercise that jurisdiction by virtue of the Act itself. It is clear that if and when the new Court has to be invested with the larger jurisdiction, that jurisdiction would be due to other authority than the Provincial Legislature itself and the Court would exercise that jurisdiction by virtue of the Act itself. As several of my learned colleagues have printed out, the case of Queen v. Burah, (1878) 3 A. C. 889 the authority of which was not questioned before us, fully covers the contention raised, and the impugned provision is an instance of what the Privy Council has designated as conditional legislation, and does not really delegate any legislative power but merely prescribes as to how effect is to be given to what the Legislature has already decided. As the Privy Council has pointed out, legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers or on the exercise of a limited discretion entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing, and in many instances it may be highly convenient and desirable. Examples of such legislation abound in England, America and other countries. As some of the American Judges have remarked "there are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law making power and must, therefore, be the subject 75 of enquiry and determination outside the halls of legislation" (Field v. Clark : 143, U. S. R. 649). Mr. Setalvad, the learned Attorney General, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, contended that in this country even delegated legislation is permissible, but I do not consider it necessary to go into that question, because the principle enunciated in Queen v. Burah, (3 A. C. 889: 4 Cal. 172 P. C.) is sufficient to dispose of the contention raised here. I think that the present case stands well outside what was laid down by the Federal Court in Jatendranath Gupta v. Province of Bihar, (50 Cr. L. J. 897) as two of my colleagues who were parties to the majority decision in that case have pointed out. 19. In the result, this appeal is allowed. 20. I think that the present case stands well outside what was laid down by the Federal Court in Jatendranath Gupta v. Province of Bihar, (50 Cr. L. J. 897) as two of my colleagues who were parties to the majority decision in that case have pointed out. 19. In the result, this appeal is allowed. 20. Patanjali Sastri, J. :- This appeal raises the important question of the constitutional validity of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and though I concur in the conclusion reached by the majority of my learned brothers I wish to state precisely the reasons which lead me to that conclusion. 21. Respondent 1 brought the suit in the High Court at Bombay on its original side for recovery of Rs. 11,704 from respondent 2 on promissory notes. Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the High Court to try suits cognisable by the City Civil Court was barred under S. 12 of the Act and the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of the latter Court had been enhanced from Rs. 10,000 to Rs.25,000 by a notification issued by the Provincial Government under S. 4 of the Act, it was stated in the plaint that the High Court had jurisdiction to try the suit because the Act as well as the said notification was ultra vires and void. In view of the constitutional issues thus raised, the State of Bombay, the appellant herein, was on its own motion, made a party defendant. 22. The High Court (Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J.) held (1) that the Act was intra vires, but(2) that S. 4 which authorised the Provincial Government to enhance the jurisdiction of the City Court up to the limit of Rupees 25,000 amounted to a delegation of legislative power, and, as such, was void and inoperative, with the result that the suit, which exceeded Rs.10,000 in value and was not cognisable by the City Court apart from the impeached notification, was held to have been properly laid in the High Court. Both these findings have been challenged before us as erroneous, the first by respondent 1 and the second by the appellant. 23. Both these findings have been challenged before us as erroneous, the first by respondent 1 and the second by the appellant. 23. On the first point, learned counsel for respondent 1 urged that S. 100, Government of India Act, 1935, read with Entries 53 of List I, 2 of List II and 15 of List III, the relevant parts of which are in identical terms, namely, "jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court with respect to any of the matters in this List," conferred power on Legislatures in British India to make laws with respect to jurisdiction of Courts only in relation to matters falling within their respective legislative fields, and that, therefore, the expressions "administration of justice" and "constitution and organisation of Courts" in Entry I List II although they might be wide enough, if that Entry stood alone, to include the topic of jurisdiction and power of Courts," should not be construed in that comprehensive sense as such construction would give no effect to the limiting words in Entry 2 which would then become meaningless. Indeed, if those expressions in Entry 1 included the power to legislate with respect to jurisdiction also, there would be no need for Entry 2, while, on the other hand, without including such power, they would still have ample content, as various other matters relating to administration of justice and constitution of Courts would have to be provided for. The scheme disclosed by the three separate entries in identical terms in three lists was said to be this : The Provincial Legislatures were to have the power of constituting Courts and providing for administration of justice, but the power to invest the Courts with jurisdiction was to rest with the Federal Legislature in respect of the matters mentioned in List I and with the Provincial Legislature in respect of the matters mentioned in List II, while both the Federal and the Provincial Legislatures were to have such power with respect to the matters mentioned in List III subject to the provisions of S. 107. It was, therefore, submitted that the Act, in so far as it purported to provide by S. 3 that the City Civil Court established thereunder "shall have jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding Rs.10,000 in value and arising within Greater Bombay" (with certain exceptions not material here) was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature, constituting as it did a direct invasion of the Federal field marked out by Entry 53 of List I. As all the three Entries dealt with the same topic of jurisdiction and powers of Courts, there was no room, it was said, for the application of the doctrine of incidental encroachment. 24. The argument is not without force. The Bombay High Court in Mulchand v. Roman, 51 Bom. L .B. 86, which was followed by the learned Judges in 76 the present case, and the Attorney-General who adopted the same line before us, invoked the doctrine of pith and substance in answer to the argument on behal The expression "general" must always be understood as being opposed to what is "special" or exclusive. If the Central Legislature vests any particular jurisdiction upon a Court in respect to a Central matter, that matter would cease to be a general matter and consequently the Court having general jurisdiction would no longer deal with that, but the general jurisdiction of such Courts would not be affected thereby. The contents of general jurisdiction are always indeterminate and are not susceptible of any specific enumeration. In this view, I do not think that it would be at all necessary to invoke 'the pith and substance' doctrine in avoiding the possibility of incidental encroachment by the Provincial Legislature upon Central subjects in regard to conferring jurisdiction upon Courts. If the expression 'jurisdiction' in Entry 53 of List I means and refers to special jurisdiction only, there cannot be even an incidental encroachment upon such special jurisdiction by reason of the conferring of general jurisdiction upon Courts by the Provincial Legislature under Entry 1 of List II. As I have said already what is 'special' or made so, will automatically cease to be in the category of what is 'general' and no question of a conflict would at all arise. 70. As I have said already what is 'special' or made so, will automatically cease to be in the category of what is 'general' and no question of a conflict would at all arise. 70. It may be pointed out in this connection that in the Canadian Constitution also, the general scheme is to carry on administration of justice throughout Canada through the medium of provincial Courts. Subject to the residuary power reserved to the Dominion Parliament under S. 101, North America Act, the Constitution has assigned to the provinces the exclusive power in relation to administration of justice including the maintenance, constitution and organisation of Courts. There is no limitation in any provincial Court along the line of division that exists between matters within the legislative competence of the Dominion Parliament and of the Provincial Legislative Assemblies: vide Clement's Canadian Constitution, p. 526. There is indeed no such thing as Entry 53 in List I of the Indian Act in the Canadian Constitution, but there are judicial pronouncements to the effect that the Dominion Parliament can impose jurisdiction on provincial Courts over Dominion subjects: vide Lefroy's Canada's Federal System, p. 541. It may be that the British Parliament in framing the legislative topics in the Government of India Act of 1935 in regard to administration of justice and jurisdiction of Courts wanted to adopt the Canadian model with such modifications as they considered necessary. It is, however, immaterial to speculate on these matters. For the reasons given above, I am of the, opinion that the decision of the Bombay High Court in Mulchand v. Raman, 51 Bom. L. R. 86 is correct, and the contention of Mr. Seervai should fail. 90 71. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. 72. Das, J. :- I agree that this appeal should be allowed. In view of the importance of the questions raised in this appeal, I consider it right to state my reasons for coming to that conclusion. 73. The salient facts, as to which there is no dispute, are as follows: On 10-5-1948 the Provincial Legislature of Bombay passed Act XL [40] of 1948, called the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948. In view of the importance of the questions raised in this appeal, I consider it right to state my reasons for coming to that conclusion. 73. The salient facts, as to which there is no dispute, are as follows: On 10-5-1948 the Provincial Legislature of Bombay passed Act XL [40] of 1948, called the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948. It was passed with a view "to establish an additional Civil Court for Greater Bombay." The provisions of that Act which will be relevant for the purposes of the present appeal may now be set out : "1. (2) It shall come into force on such date as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf. 3. The Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish for the Greater Bombay a Court, to be called the Bombay City Civil Court. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, such Court shall have jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding ten thousand rupees in value, and arising within the Greater Bombay, except suits or proceedings which are cognizable- (a) by the High Court as a Court of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty or as a Colonial Court of Admiralty, or as a Court having testamentary, intestate or matrimonial jurisdiction, or (b) by the High Court for the relief of insolvent debtors, or (c) by the High Court under any special law other than the Letters Patent, or (d) by the small cause Court: Provided that the Provincial Government may, from time to time, after consultation with the High Court, by a like notification, extend the jurisdiction of the City Court to any suits or proceedings of the nature specified in cls. (a) and (b). 4. Subject to the exceptions specified in S. 3, the Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, invest the City Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the Greater Bombay and of such value not exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees as may be specified in the notification. 12. 12. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings cognizable by the City Court: Provided that the High Court may, for any special reason, and at any stage, remove for trial by itself any suit or proceeding from the City Court." 74. The Act received the assent of the Governor-General about the same time. It came into force on 16-8-1948, by a notification issued by the Provincial Government and published in the Official Gazette. Simultaneously with the passing of the above Act the Bombay Legislature also enacted Act XLI [41] of 1948 called the Bombay High Court Letters Patent Amendment Act, 1948. By S. 3 of that Act, cl. 12, Letters Patent, was amended by adding the following words: "Except that the said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Bombay or the Bombay City Civil Court." 75. Shortly after the passing of the above Acts, the validity of the Bombay City civil Court Act (XL [40] of 1948) was challenged in Mulchand v. Raman, A. I. R. (36) 1949 Bom. 197, a suit on promissory notes filed in the original side of the High Court. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C. J. and Bhagwati J.), on 2-9-1948 held that the Act was well within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature and was not ultra vires. Leave was given to the plaintiff in that suit under S. 205, Government of India Act, 1935, to appeal to the Federal Court but no such appeal appears to have been filed. 76. On 10-1-1950 the Provincial Government issued the following Notifn. No. 1346/5 in the Official Gazette : ''In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 4, Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XL [40] of 1948), the Government of Bombay is pleased to invest, with effect from and on the date of this notification, the City Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of civil nature not exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees in value, and arising within the Greater Bombay subject, however, to the exceptions specified in S. 3 of the said Act," 77. On 6-2-1950 respondent 1 Narottamdas Jethabhai presented a plaint before the Prothonotary of the Bombay High Court for recovery of Rs. On 6-2-1950 respondent 1 Narottamdas Jethabhai presented a plaint before the Prothonotary of the Bombay High Court for recovery of Rs. 11,704-5-4 with further interest due by respondent 2 Aloysious Pinto Phillips upon three several promissory notes. In pars. 4 of this plaint it was expressly pleaded that the High Court had jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of that suit because (1) the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, was ultra vires and (2) at least S. 4 of that Act and the notification issued thereunder were ultra vires. Having some doubts as to whether in view of the notification issued by the Provincial Government under S. 4 of the Act the plaint could be admitted in the High Court, the Prothonotary placed the matter under the rules of the Court before Bhagwati J. who was then the Judge in Chamber. By his judgment delivered on 23-2-1950, Bhagwati J., held that S. 4 of the Act and the notification issued thereunder were ultra vires and void and that the High Court, therefore, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaint was accordingly received and admitted. 78. Respondent 1 thereupon took out a summons under the rules of the Court for leave to sign judgment against respondent 2. The State of Bombay was, on its own application, added as a party to the suit. The matter was put up 91 before a Division Bench (Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J.) for trial of the following issues : "(1) Whether Act XL [40] of 1948 is ultra vires of the Legislature of the State of Bombay. (2) Whether S. 4 of Act XL [40] of 1948 is in any event ultra vires of the Legislature of the State of Bombay. (3) Whether the Government of Bombay Notfn. No. 2346/5 dated 20-1-1950 is ultra vires, void and inoperative in law. (4) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit." 79. The larger point involved in issue 1 having been concluded by the earlier decision of the Division Bench in Mulchanad v. Raman, A.I.R. (36) 1949 Bom. 1971 (Supra) that issue was answered in the negative without any argument but leave was reserved to respondent 1 to contest the correctness of that earlier decision in this Court. The larger point involved in issue 1 having been concluded by the earlier decision of the Division Bench in Mulchanad v. Raman, A.I.R. (36) 1949 Bom. 1971 (Supra) that issue was answered in the negative without any argument but leave was reserved to respondent 1 to contest the correctness of that earlier decision in this Court. The Division Bench in agreement with Bhagwati J. held that by S. 4 of the Act the Provincial Legislature did not itself legislate but delegated the power of legislation to the Provincial Government which it had no power to do and, therefore, S. 4 and along with it the Notfn. No. 9346/5 issued thereunder were ultra vires, void and inoperative. Accordingly they answered issues (2), (3) and (4) in the affirmative and sent the summons for judgment back to the learned Judge taking miscellaneous matters to dispose it of on merits. The State of Bombay has now come up before us in appeal from this decision of the High Court. 80. The Advocate-General of Madras has intervened in support of this appeal and for maintaining the validity of the Madras City Civil Court Act (VII [7] of 1892) S. 3A of which inserted in 1935 by way of amendment is in identical terms with S. 4, Bombay Act, except that the amount of the value was fixed at Rs. 10,000 in S. 3A of the Madras Act instead of Rs. 25,000 fixed in S. 4 of the Bombay Act. 81. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegation of legislative power has been well known ever since the decision of the Privy Council in R. V. Burah, 51. A, 178 and the other Privy Council cases cited in the judgments of the High Court. It is firmly established that conditional legislation is not only permissible but is indeed in many cases convenient and necessary. The difficulty which confronts the Courts is in ascertaining whether a particular provision of a Statute constitutes a conditional legislation as explained in the decisions of the Privy Council. In the present case the High Court, on a construction of S. 4, Bombay City Civil Court Act, came to the conclusion that it was not an instance of conditional legislation at all. In the present case the High Court, on a construction of S. 4, Bombay City Civil Court Act, came to the conclusion that it was not an instance of conditional legislation at all. The use of the word ''invest" in S. 4 was considered by the High Court to be very significant and the difference between the language in S. 3 and that in S. 4 appeared to them to be very marked and striking. According to the High Court while by S. 3 the Legislature itself set up a Court with a particular pecuniary jurisdiction, under S. 4 the Legislature itself did not invest the Court with any higher jurisdiction but left it to the Provincial Government to exercise the function which the Government of India Act laid down should be exercised by the Provincial Legislature. The learned Chief Justice expressed the view that the Legislature never applied its mind to the question as to whether the new Court which it was setting up should have a jurisdiction higher than that of Rs. 10,000 and that S. 4 was not a section which merely directed the Provincial Government to carry out the policy laid down by the Legislature, but that it was a section which conferred upon the Provincial Government the power to error jurisdiction upon the Court. Then after referring to R. v. Burah, 5 I. A. 178 (supra) and several other cases and purporting to apply the tests laid down in the decisions to the Act the learned Chief Justice concluded that the Legislature in the exercise of its legislative power had set up a Civil Court with a limited jurisdiction under S. 3 of the Act, that it had not set up a Court with a jurisdiction higher than ten thousand rupees and that having set up a Court of limited jurisdiction it had given to the Provincial Government under S. 4 the power to confer upon that Court a higher jurisdiction up to twenty-five thousand rupees. This power, which was conferred upon the Provincial Government was, according to the Chief Justice, a power which could only have been exercised by the Legislature itself. I am unable to accept the aforementioned construction of Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. 82. This power, which was conferred upon the Provincial Government was, according to the Chief Justice, a power which could only have been exercised by the Legislature itself. I am unable to accept the aforementioned construction of Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. 82. As I have already said, the High Court founded their conclusions principally on the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in R. v. Burah, 5 I, A. 178, (supra) and certain other Privy Council cases. It will be useful, therefore, to analyse the Privy Council decision in B. V. Burah, 5 I. A, 178 1. In 1869 the Indian Legislature passed an Act (XXII [22] of 1869) purporting, first, to remove a district called Garo Hills, from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal jurisdiction and from the law prescribed for such Courts by Regulations and Acts and, secondly, to vest the administration of civil and criminal justice, within the same territory, in such officers as the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal might, for the purpose of tribunal of first 92 instance, or of reference and appeal, from time to time appoint. The Act was to come into operation on such day as the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal should, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, direct. The 8th section authorised the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal by notification in the Calcutta Gazette to extend to the said territory, any law or any portion of any law then in force in other territories subject to his government or which may thereafter be enacted by the Council of the Governor-General or of himself. The 9th section of that Act provided : "The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills, as for the time being forms part of British India. Every such notification shall specify the boundaries of the territories to which it applies." 83. On 14-10-1871 the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred on him by S. 9 extending the provisions of that Act to the territory known as the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and criminal justice. On 14-10-1871 the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred on him by S. 9 extending the provisions of that Act to the territory known as the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and criminal justice. The respondent Burah and another person having been convicted by the Deputy Commissioner of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills of murder and sentenced to death, which was later on commuted to transportation for life, they from jail sent a petition of appeal against their conviction. The provisions of Act XXII [22] of 1869 having been extended, by notification under S. 9, to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, the High Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, unless S. 9 and the notification were ultra vires and void. The majority of the Judges of the Full Bench constituted for considering the question took the view that S. 9 was really not legislation but was an instance of delegation of legislative power. The Crown obtained special leave to appeal to the Privy Council. In summarising the effect of the provisions of Ss. 1 to 8 of that Act on Garo Hills Lord Selborne who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council observed at p. 194 that the Governor-General in Council had determined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under new Courts and offices to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change should take place, that the Legislature had determined that, so far a certain change should take place, but that it was expedient to leave the time and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor and also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories. subject to the same Government were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this district also, but that as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor. subject to the same Government were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this district also, but that as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor. His Lordship then proceeded to state the true meaning and effect of the provisions of S. 9 : "This having been done as to the Garo Hills, what was done as to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills ? The Legislature decided that it was fit and proper that the adjoining district of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills should also be removed from the jurisdiction of the existing Courts, and brought under the same provisions with the Garo Hills, not necessarily and at all events, but it and when the Lieutenant-Governor should think it desirable to do so ; and that it was also possible that it might be expedient that not all, but some only, of those provisions should be applied to that adjoining district. And accordingly the Legislature entrusted for these purposes also a discretionary power to the Lieutenant-Governor. " 84. Finally, his Lordship Concluded at page 195 : " Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council. Their whole operation is, directly and immediately, under and by virtue of this Act XXII [22] of 1869 itself. The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers ; and the result at that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an imperial or in a provincial Legislature, they may, in their Lordships' judgment, be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally. Legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing ; and, in, many circumstances, it may be highly convenient." 85. Legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing ; and, in, many circumstances, it may be highly convenient." 85. If the reasoning underlying the observations of the Bombay High Court were correct then on those very reasoning it could be held in Burah's case, (5 I. A. 178 : 4 Cal, 179. P. C.) that while in enacting SS. 1 to 8 the Legislature had applied its mind and laid down its policy as to the exclusion of the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the Courts the Legislature did not apply its mind and did not lay down any policy as to the exclusion of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills from the jurisdiction of the Courts but had left it to the Lieutenant. Governor to do what it alone could do. This construction quite clearly did not find favour 93 with the Privy Council. The Privy Council by construction spelt out of the very language of S. 9 that the Legislature itself had decided that it, was fit and proper that the Khasi and Jaintia Hills should also be removed from the jurisdiction of the existing Courts and brought under the same provisions as applied to the Garo Hills, not necessarily and at all events but if and when the Lieutenant-Governor should think it desirable to do so and accordingly entrusted a discretionary power to the Lieutenant-Governor- Adopting the same method of construction and adopting the language of Lord Selborne it may well be said that enacting S. 3 the Legislature itself has determined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation, to establish an additional Court of civil jurisdiction with jurisdiction to entertain suits and other proceedings arising within the Greater Bombay of the value up to Rs.10,000 leaving it, by S. 1 (2) to the Provincial Government to say at what time that change should take place. Likewise, it may be said that in enacting S. 4 the Legislature itself has decided that it is and proper to extend the pecuniary jurisdiction of the new Court, not necessarily and at all events or all at once but if and when the Provincial Government should think it desirable to do so and accordingly entrusted a discretionary power to the Provincial Government. It is entirely wrong to say that the Legislature has not applied its mind or laid down any policy. Indeed, the very fact that the extension of pecuniary jurisdiction should not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees, that the extension should be subject to the exceptions specified in S. 3 clearly indicate that the Legislature itself has decided that the extension of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the new Court should be made, not necessarily or at all events or all at any one time but when the Provincial Government may consider it desirable to do so and while entrusting a discretionary power with the Provincial Government to determine the time for investing such extended jurisdiction on the new Court, the Legislature itself has also prescribed the limits of such extension. The efficacy of the Act of extension of jurisdiction is, therefore, not due to any other legislative authority than that of the Legislature itself. The expression "invest" does not appear to me to have any special significance. It only implies or indicates the result of the fulfilment of the condition which the Legislature itself laid down. To use the language of Lord Selborne the extension of jurisdiction is directly and immediately under and by virtue of this very Act itself. Here there is no effacement of the Legislature, no abdication of the legislative power. On the contrary, the proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to the possible necessity for the extension of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the new Court and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to such extension and that the condition having been fulfilled by the issue of the notification by the Provincial Government the legislation has now become absolute. In my judgment the construction put upon Ss. 3 and 4 by the High Court was erroneous and cannot be supported either on principle or on authority. When properly construed in the light of the observations and decision of the Privy Council in B. V. Burah, (51. A. 178 : 4 Ca1. 179 P. C) (supra) as indicated above s. 4 does not amount to a delegation of legislative power at all but constitutes what is known and called a conditional legislations. 86. Reliance was placed by the High Court on the decision of the Federal Court of India in Jatindra Nath v. Province of Bihar, A. I. R. (36) 1949 F. C. 175. 86. Reliance was placed by the High Court on the decision of the Federal Court of India in Jatindra Nath v. Province of Bihar, A. I. R. (36) 1949 F. C. 175. in support of their conclusions. That case was concerned with the question of the validity of the proviso to S. 1 (3), Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act (v [5] of 1947). Section 1 (3) provided that the Act should remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement. The relevant part of the proviso was in the following terms : "Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification." 87. Three of the learned Judges held that the proviso and the notification thereunder were ultra vires and void. They laid particular emphasis on the power given to the Provincial Government to make any modification in the Act when extending its life as indicating that it was a delegation of legislative power. Another learned Judge did not decide this point but agreed to set aside the order of detention on another ground not material for our present purpose and the remaining learned Judge took a different view of the effect of the proviso and held that it was a conditional legislation within the meaning of the decision in R. v. Burah, 5 1. A.178 (supra). I do not find it necessary, for the purpose of the present appeal, to express any view as to the correctness of the decision of the Federal Court in that case. Assuming, but without deciding, that the entrustment with the Provincial Government of the power to extend the 94 life of an Act with such modifications as the Provincial Government in its unfettered discretion thought fit to make was nothing but a delegation of legislative powers, there is no such power of modification given to the Provincial Government by S. 4, Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, and, therefore, that decision of the Federal Court can have no application to the case before us. 88. 88. The learned Attorney-General wants to go further and contend that under the Government of India Act, 1935, it was permissible for the Legislatures, Central or Provincial, while acting within their respective legislative fields, to delegate their legislative powers. In the view I have expressed above, namely, that S. 4, Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, does not involve any delegation of 1egislative power, I do not consider it necessary, on this occasion, to go into that question and I reserve my right to consider and decide that question including the question of the correctness of the decision of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case, A. I. R. (36)1949 F. C. 175 (supra) on that point as and when occasion may arise in future. 89. Learned counsel for respondent 1 then raises before us the larger question as to whether the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1918, as a whole was or was not within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature of Bombay. Legislative powers were by S. 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, distributed amongst the Federal and the Provincial Legislatures. Under that section the Federal Legislature had, and the Provincial legislature had not, power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to that Act. Likewise, the Provincial Legislature had, and the Federal Legislature had not, power to make laws for the Province with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List it in that Schedule. It will be noticed that the section, while affirmatively giving legislative power with respect to certain matters to one Legislature, expressly excluded the legislative power of the other Legislature with respect to those matters. Lastly, S.100 gave concurrent power of legislation to the Federal as well as to the Provincial Legislature with respect to matters enumerated in List III in that Schedule. Section 107 of that Act made provision for resolving the inconsistency, if any, between a Provincial law and a Federal law or the existing Indian law with respect to any of the matters in the Concurrent List (i. e., List III). Section 107 of that Act made provision for resolving the inconsistency, if any, between a Provincial law and a Federal law or the existing Indian law with respect to any of the matters in the Concurrent List (i. e., List III). Turning now to the three Lists we find several entries relating to Courts, the relevant portions of which are as follows : List I. Entry 53: Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list . . . . List II. Entry I : . . . the administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Federal Court, and fees taken therein ;.. . . . Entry 2: Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list; procedure in Rent Revenue Courts. List III. Part I. Entry 2 : Criminal Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the date of the passing of this Act. Entry 4 : Civil Procedure, including 'the law of Limitation and all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the date of the passing of this. Act ; . . .. Entry 15. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts,' except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list. 90. Learned Attorney General urges that Entry 1 in List II clearly indicates that administration of justice had been expressly made a provincial subject and that it was only the Provincial Legislature which could make laws with respect to administration of justice. The next steps in the argument are that there could be no administration of justice unless Courts were constituted and organised, that the constitution and organisation of Courts would be meaningless enterprises for the Provincial Legislatures to indulge in, unless the Courts so constituted and organised were vitalised by being invested with jurisdiction and powers to receive, try and determine suits and other proceedings. The argument, therefore, is that Entry 1 in List II by itself gave power to the Provincial Legislature not only to constitute and organise Courts but also to confer jurisdiction and powers on them. The argument, therefore, is that Entry 1 in List II by itself gave power to the Provincial Legislature not only to constitute and organise Courts but also to confer jurisdiction and powers on them. The learned Attorney-General relies on Jagtiani's case, A. I. R. (36) 1949 F. C. 175 (supra) and points out that under Entry 1 administration of justice was entirely a provincial responsibility and the Provincial Legislature was authorised to make laws with respect to administration of justice. Administration of justice, so the argument proceeds, is inseparable from Courts and Courts without jurisdiction is an incomprehensible notion. The conclusion sought to be established, therefore, is that under Entry 1 alone of List II the Provincial Legislature had power to make a law, not manly constituting a new Court but, investing such new Court with general jurisdiction and powers to receive, try and determine all suits and other proceedings. If Entry 1 in List II stood alone and Entry 53 in List I, Entry 2 in List II and Entry15 in List III were not in Sch. 7 the argument 95 would have been unanswerable. In s. 92, British North America Act, 1867, there was no separate provision authorising the making of laws with respect to jurisdiction and powers of Courts and, therefore, the authority to make laws with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts had of necessity to be found in and spelt out of the words "administration of justice" occurring in S. 92 (14) of that Act. There is, however, no such pressing or compelling necessity for giving such wide and all embracing meaning to the words "administration of justice" in Entry 1 of List II. The expression "administration of justice'' may be an expression of wide import and may ordinarily, and in the absence of anything indicating any contrary intention, cover and include within its ambit several things as component parts of it, namely, the constitution and organisation of Courts, jurisdiction and powers of the Courts and the laws to be administered by the Courts. But the legislative practice in England as well as in India has been to deal with these topics separately in legislative enactments, see for example Indian High Courts Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vic., c.104) Ss.2 and 19; Government of India Act, 1935, Ss. But the legislative practice in England as well as in India has been to deal with these topics separately in legislative enactments, see for example Indian High Courts Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vic., c.104) Ss.2 and 19; Government of India Act, 1935, Ss. 220 and 223, the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court, 1865, and also the different Civil Courts Acts. Of these, one topic, namely, "constitution and organisation of Courts" had been expressly included in Entry 1 of List II, in addition to administration of justice", a fact of some significance which must be noted although I do not say that the inclusion of the words ''constitution and organisation of all Courts'' in Entry 1 of List II by itself and in the absence of anything else cut down the generality of the meaning of the expression ''administration of justice" which preceded those words, for such a construction may militate against the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Meghraj v. Allah Rakhia, 74 I A. 12 at p. 10. Further, Entry I in List II would have been wholly unnecessary if the expression " administration of justice', in Entry 1 in List II were to be given the wide meaning contended for by the learned Attorney-General, for if under Entry 1 in List II the Provincial Lagislature had plenary powers to make laws conferring on, or taking away from, Courts, existing or newly constituted, jurisdiction and powers of the widest description, such power wo 42. I have not been able to follow how these observations concerning the Bihar statute could be relied upon by the High Court in support of its decision in respect to the invalidity of S. 4, Bombay City Civil Court Act. The two provisions are not analogous in any manner whatsoever and that being so, no support can be derived by the respondent from this decision. 43. In the concluding portion of his judgment under appeal the learned Chief Justice observed as follows : "Now applying once more these tests to the City Civil Court Act, we find that the Legislature in the exercise of its legislative power has set up a civil Court with a limited jurisdiction under S. 5 (3 ?) of the Act. It has not set up a Court with jurisdiction higher than ten thousand rupees. It has not set up a Court with jurisdiction higher than ten thousand rupees. Having set up a Court of limited jurisdiction it has given to the Provincial Government under S. 4 the power to confer upon that Court a higher jurisdiction up to twenty-five thousand rupees. Now this power which is conferred upon the Provincial Government is a power which could only have been exercised by the Legislature itself." 44. It seems to me that the above observations are based on a construction of Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act which these sections cannot legitimately bear. As already observed, the Legislature set up a Civil Court for Greater Bombay and decided, that to start with, it will have pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs. 10,000. It also decided at the same time that it would also have jurisdiction up to Rs.25,000 as soon as circumstances necessitate it. The Provincial Government was constituted the judge of those circumstances. What the limit of that jurisdiction was to be was in unmistakable terms enacted in S. 4 of the Act. It was not left to the will of the Provincial Government to confer on that Court any pecuniary jurisdiction that it liked to confer upon it. It would be by force of the legislative power of S. 4 that the City Civil Court will be vested with enhanced jurisdiction but that vesting cannot take place till a notification is issued by the Provincial Government. It is conditional on that event only. 45. For the reasons given above, in my judgment, the High Court was in error in holding that S.4, City Civil Court Act, was void and ultra vires the Provincial Legislature.In this view the notification issued under S. 4 must be held to be effective. That being so, it is unnecessary to go into the question raised by the learned Attorney-General that assuming that S. 4 of the Act was delegation of legislative power, it was still valid. 46. The next question to decide is whether the Act is ultra vires the Bombay Legislature. In order to appreciate Mr. Seervai's contention on this point it is necessary to set out some of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 relevant to the enquiry. These are contained in S. 100 and in Sch. 46. The next question to decide is whether the Act is ultra vires the Bombay Legislature. In order to appreciate Mr. Seervai's contention on this point it is necessary to set out some of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 relevant to the enquiry. These are contained in S. 100 and in Sch. 7 in entries 28 and 53 of List I, entries 1 and 2 of List II, and entries 4 and 15 of List III. They are in these terms : Section 100. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding sub-sections, the Federal Legislature has, and a Provincial Legislature has not, power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in Sch. 7 to this Act (hereinafter called the "Federal Legislative List.") (2) Notwithstanding anything in the next succeeding sub-section, the Federal Legislature, and, subject to the preceding sub-section, a Provincial Legislature also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the "Concurrent Legislative List.") 82 (3) Subject to the two preceding sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature has, and the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule(hereinafter called the "Provincial Legislative List.") (4) The Federal Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List except for a Province or any part thereof. List I. 28 Cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other like instruments. 53. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list and to such extent as is expressly authorized by Part IX of this Act, the enlargement of the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and the conferring thereon of supplemental powers. List II. 1. Public order (but not including the use of His Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid of the civil power); the administration of justice; constitution and organization of all Courts, except the Federal Court, and fees taken therein; preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order; persons subject to such detention. 2. List II. 1. Public order (but not including the use of His Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid of the civil power); the administration of justice; constitution and organization of all Courts, except the Federal Court, and fees taken therein; preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order; persons subject to such detention. 2. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court with respect to any of the matters in this list, procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts. List III. 4. Civil Procedure, including the law of Limitation and all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the date of the passing of this Act; the recovery in a Governor's Province or a Chief Commissioner's Province of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands, including arrears of land revenue and sums recoverable as such arising outside that Province. 15. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list. 47. Mr. Seervai contends that S.3 of the impugned Act is void because it directly trenches on the exclusive legislative powers of the Centre conferred on it by List I of Sch. 7 inasmuch as it confers jurisdiction on the new Court in respect to all cases of a civil nature. 47. Mr. Seervai contends that S.3 of the impugned Act is void because it directly trenches on the exclusive legislative powers of the Centre conferred on it by List I of Sch. 7 inasmuch as it confers jurisdiction on the new Court in respect to all cases of a civil nature. The expression "all cases of a civil nature" presumably brings within the ambit of the Act suits in respect to subjects contained in List I. He urged that the three similar entries in the three lists, namely, entry 53 in List I, entry 2 in List II and entry 15 in List III indicated that in respect to the subjects covered by the three fields of legislation demarcated for the two Legislatures the Parliament empowered each of them respectively to make laws in respect to jurisdiction and power of Courts and that in view of the provisions of S. 100, Constitution Act, the Provincial Legislature had no power to make any law conferring jurisdiction on Courts in respect to subjects covered by List I. In other words, the Federal Legislature alone could legislate on the jurisdiction and powers of a Court in regard to the subjects in List I. Similarly, in respect of Subjects contained in the Provincial List, jurisdiction and power of Courts could only be determined by a law enacted by the Provincial Legislature and that in respect of items contained in List III, both Legislatures could make laws on the subject of jurisdiction and powers of Courts. It was said that the exceptions and the proviso to S. 3, City Civil Court Act, in clear terms disclosed that jurisdiction in respect to the subjects on which the Provincial Legislature had no competence, to legislate, was also conferred on the new Court. Section 12 of the Act by which the High Court was deprived of all jurisdiction on matters that fell within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was assailed on similar grounds. In regard to the legislative power conferred under Entry 1 of List II on the Provincial Legislature it was contended that this wide power stood limited by the three entries above mentioned and that under it legislation could only be made to the extent of establishing and organizing Courts but no legislation under it was permissible in respect to the powers of those Courts. 48. 48. The learned Attorney General, on the other hand, contends that the Act is intra vires the Bombay Legislature under Entry 1 of List II and under Entries 4 and 15 of List III, it having received the assent of the Governor General. It was urged that the Provincial Legislature had exclusive legislative power on the subject of administration of justice and constitution and organization of all Courts and that this power necessarily included the power to make a law in respect to the jurisdiction of Courts established and constituted by it and that the impugned legislation in pith and substance being on the subject of administration of justice, it could not be held ultra vires even if it trenched on the field of legislation of the Federal Legislature. In regard to Entry 53 of List I, Entry 2 of List II and Entry 15 of List III of the Schedule, it was said that these conferred legislative power on the respective Legislatures to confer special jurisdiction on established Courts in respect of particular subjects only if it was considered necessary to do so. In other words, the argument was that the Provincial Government could create a Court of general jurisdiction legislating under Entry 1 of List II and that it was then open to both the Central and the Provincial Legislatures to confer special jurisdiction on Courts in respect to particular matters that were covered by the respective lists. In my opinion, the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the Act is intra vires the Bombay Legislature under Entry 1 of List II is sound and I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Chief Justice of Bombay on this point in Mulchand Kundanmal v. Raman Hiralal, 51 Bom. L. R. 86. 83 The learned Chief Justice when dealing with this point said as follows : "If, therefore, the Act deals with administration of justice and constitutes a Court for that purpose and confers ordinary civil jurisdiction upon it, in my opinion, the legislation clearly falls within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature and is covered by item 1 of List II of Sch. 7. That item expressly confers upon the Provincial Legislature the power to legislate with regard to the administration of justice and the constitution and organization of all Courts except the Federal Court. 7. That item expressly confers upon the Provincial Legislature the power to legislate with regard to the administration of justice and the constitution and organization of all Courts except the Federal Court. It is difficult to imagine how a Court can be constituted without any jurisdiction, and if Parliament has made the administration of justice exclusively upon the Provincial Legislature the power to constitute and organize all Courts, it must follow, that the power is given to the Provincial Legislature to confer the ordinary civil jurisdiction upon the Courts to carry on with their work. Item 2 of List II deals with jurisdiction and power of all Courts except the Federal Court with respect to any of the matters in this list, and Mr. Mistree's argument is that item 1 is limited and conditioned by item 2 and what he contends is that the only power that the Provincial Legislature has is undoubtedly to create Courts, but to confer upon them only such jurisdiction as relates to items comprised in List II. I am unable to accept that contention or that interpretation of List II in Sch. 7. Each item in List II is an independent item, supplementary of each other, and not limited by each other in any way. Item 1 having given the general power to the Provincial Legislature with regard to all matters of administration of justice and with regard to the constitution and organization of all Courts, further gives the power to the Legislature to confer special jurisdiction, if needs be, and special power, if needs be, to these Courts with regard to any of the items mentioned in List II. It is impossible to read item 2 as curtailing and restricting the very wide power with regard to administration of justice given to the Provincial Legislature under item 1. Similarly, in List I the Federal Legislature has been given the power under item 53 to confer jurisdiction and power upon any Court with regard to matters falling under any of the items in that list, and, therefore, it would be competent to the Federal Legislature to confer any special jurisdiction or power which it thought proper upon any Court with regard to suits on promissory notes or matters arising under the Negotiable Instruments Act . . . . . ." It seems to me that the legislative power conferred on the Provincial Legislature by item 1 of List II has been conferred by use of language which is of the widest amplitude (administration of justice and constitution and organization of all Courts). It was not denied that the phrase employed would include within its ambit legislative power in respect to jurisdiction and power of Courts established for the purpose of administration of justice. Moreover, the words appear to be sufficient to confer upon the Provincial Legislature the right to regulate and provide for the whole machinery connected with the administration of justice in the Province. Legislation on the subject of administration of justice and constitution of Courts of justice would be ineffective and incomplete unless and until the Courts established under it were clothed with the jurisdiction and power to hear and decide causes. It is difficult to visualise a statute dealing with administration of justice and subject of constitution and organization of Courts without a definition of the jurisdiction and powers of those Courts as without such definition such a statute would be like a body without a soul. To enact it would be an idle formality. By its own force it would not have power to clothe a Court with any power or jurisdiction whatsoever. It would have to look to an outside authority and to another statute to become effective. Such an enactment is, so far as I know, unknown to legislative practice and history. The Parliament by making administration of justice a provincial subject could not be considered to have conferred power of legislation on the Provincial Legislature of an ineffective and useless nature. Following the line of argument taken by Mr. Mistree before the High Court of Bombay, Mr. Seervai strenuously contended that the only legislative power conferred on the Provincial Legislature by Entry 1 of List II was in respect to the establishment of a Court and its constitution and that no legislative power was given to it to make a law in respect to jurisdiction and power of the Court established by it. 49. Seervai strenuously contended that the only legislative power conferred on the Provincial Legislature by Entry 1 of List II was in respect to the establishment of a Court and its constitution and that no legislative power was given to it to make a law in respect to jurisdiction and power of the Court established by it. 49. The argument, logically analyzed, comes to this : that such a statute will contain the name of the Court, the number of its Judges, the method of their appointment, the salaries to be drawn by them and it will then stop short at that stage and will not include any provision defining the powers of the tribunal or its other jurisdiction and that the Court so constituted could acquire jurisdiction only when a law was made relating to its jurisdiction and powers by the Federal Legislature under Entry 63 of List I, by the Provincial Legislature under Entry 2 of List II and by either Legislature under Entry 15 of List III. The learned counsel contended that this peculiar result was the natural consequence of a federal constitution with divided powers, and that Entries 53, 2 and 15 of the three respective lists limit and curtail the wide power conferred on the Provincial Legislature by item 1 of List II. It is difficult to accede to this contention because it would amount to holding that though the Provincial Legislature under item 2 of List II has been given the widest power of legislation in the matter of administration of justice and constitution and organization of Courts and though that field has been demarcated for it as its exclusive field of legislation, yet all that it can do acting within that field 84 is merely to establish a Court without any competency to function and that it can only become an effective instrument for administering justice by laws enacted elsewhere or under powers conferred under other items of the different lists. I am unable to read items 53, 2 and 15 of the three respective lists as imposing limitations on legislative power conferred on the province by item 1 of List II. Such a construction of the Act would not only do violence to the plain language of item 1 of List II but would be contrary to its scheme, under which administration of justice was made a provincial subject. Such a construction of the Act would not only do violence to the plain language of item 1 of List II but would be contrary to its scheme, under which administration of justice was made a provincial subject. It is significant that no other Legislature has been given the power to bring into existence a Court. A Court without powers and jurisdiction would be an anomaly as it would not be able to discharge the function of administration of justice and the statute establishing such a Court could not be said to be a law on the subject of administration of justice. It is a fundamental principle of the construction of a constitution that everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the grant of power. Everything necessary for the effective execution of power of legislation must, therefore, be taken to be conferred by the constitution with that power. It may be observed that in exercise of legislative power under item 1 of List II a Provincial Legislature can alter the constitution of the existing Courts, can abolish them, re-organize them and can establish new Courts. If the construction contended for by Mr. Seervai is accepted, then the existing Courts re-established or re-organised by the Provincial Legislature would not be able to function till legislation under item 53 of List I, under item 2 of List II or item 15 of List III also simultaneously was made. I do not think that such a result was in the contemplation of Parliament. 50. Mr. Seervai with some force argued that if full effect is given to the comprehensive phraseology employed in item 1 of List II, then it would result in making the provisions of item 2 of List II, of item 53 of List I and item 15 of List III nugatory, in other words, if the Provincial Legislature could bring into existence a Court of general jurisdiction which could hear all causes on subjects concerning which legislative power was divided in the three lists, then the conferment of legislative power on the Federal Legislature under item 53 of List I, on the Provincial Legislature under item 2 of List II and on both the Legislatures under item 15 of List III was purposeless. In my opinion, this argument is not a valid one and the premises on which it is based are not sound. In my opinion, this argument is not a valid one and the premises on which it is based are not sound. The three lists of subjects contained in Sch. 7 have not been drawn up with any scientific precision and the various items in them overlap. The point kept in view in drawing up the lists was to see that all possible power of legislation was included within their ambit. By making administration of justice a provincial subject and by conferring on the Provincial Legislature power to legislate on this subject and also on the subject of constitution and organisation of Courts, Parliament conferred on that Legislature an effective power which included within its ambit the law making power on the subjects of jurisdiction of Courts. The Provincial Legislature could, therefore, bring into existence a Court with general jurisdiction to administer justice on all matters coming before it within certain territorial and pecuniary limits, subject of course to the condition that such general, jurisdiction may be expressly or impliedly taken away by the provisions of other laws. The Parliament having divided the field of legislation between the two Legislatures, naturally thought that as a corollary or a necessary consequence of this division of legislative power it was necessary to provide by way of a complementary provision a legislative power specifically on the two Legislatures in respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts on subjects which were within their exclusive legislative field. If a Legislature could exclusively legislate in respect to particular subjects, as a necessary consequence it should also have the power to legislate in respect to jurisdiction and power of the Court dealing with that subject. It is this power that has been conferred by Entries 53, 2 and 15 above mentioned on the two Legislatures. Entries 42 and 99 of List I, Entries 37 and 42 of List II and Entries 25 and 36 of List III are of a similar consequential character. The respective Legislatures are, therefore, competent to confer special powers on Courts and can create special jurisdictions acting under those powers in respect to their divided fields of legislation. Instances of conferment of powers and jurisdiction on Courts to hear cases on particular subjects were well known to Parliament. The respective Legislatures are, therefore, competent to confer special powers on Courts and can create special jurisdictions acting under those powers in respect to their divided fields of legislation. Instances of conferment of powers and jurisdiction on Courts to hear cases on particular subjects were well known to Parliament. Such powers had been conferred on different Courts in respect of testamentary and intestate jurisdiction, admiralty jurisdiction, under the Indian Companies Act, under the Succession Act, Guardians and Wards Act and under the various Rent Acts and Acts dealing with relief of indebtedness. In view of the division of powers in respect to different subjects, power was given under item 53 of List I, item 2 of List II and item 15 of List III to the different Legislatures when dealing with those subjects also to legislate question of jurisdiction and powers of the 85 Courts. This conferment of legislative power to create special jurisdiction in respect to particular subjects does not in any way curtail the legislative power conferred on the Provincial Legislature under item 1 of List II. As soon as special legislative power under item 53 of List I, under item I of List II and item 15 of List III is exercised, the causes that arise in respect to those subjects would then only be heard in jurisdictions created by those statutes and not in the Courts of general jurisdiction entrusted with the normal administration of justice. In the language of S. 9, Civil P. C., jurisdiction of the general Courts will then become barred by those statutes. 51. I am, therefore, of the opinion that under item 1 of List II the Provincial Legislature has complete competence not only to establish Courts for the administration of justice but to confer on them jurisdiction to hear all causes of a civil nature, and that this power is not curtailed or limited by power of legislation conferred on the two Legislatures under items 53, 2 and 15 of the three lists. On the other hand, these three items confer on the respective Legislatures power to legislate when dealing with particular subjects within their exclusive legislative fields to make laws in respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts that will be competent to hear causes relating to those subjects; in other words, this is a power of creating special jurisdiction only. On the other hand, these three items confer on the respective Legislatures power to legislate when dealing with particular subjects within their exclusive legislative fields to make laws in respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts that will be competent to hear causes relating to those subjects; in other words, this is a power of creating special jurisdiction only. This interpretation of the entries in the lists is not only in accordance with the scheme of the statute but it harmonizes the different entries in the lists and does not make any of them nugatory and ineffective. The interpretation contended for by Mr. Seervai would reduce the power of the Provincial Legislature under item 1 to almost nothingness. 52. The crux of the case is whether item 1 of List II should be given a limited construction which makes it nugatory or whether a limited construction is to be placed on items 53, 2 and 15 of the three lists. I have no hesitation in holding that both in the light of principles of construction of statutes and principles of legislation, the course to adopt is the one that I have indicated above. 53. Finally, it was contended that S. 12 of the Act in any case was a void piece of legislation as it deprived the High Court of its jurisdiction even in respect to subjects contained in List I of Sch. 7. In view of the construction that I have placed on item 1 of List II this argument has no force. If the Legislature has power to bring into existence a Court and confer jurisdiction and power on it, a fortiori it has power to take away the jurisdiction and power that already exist in other Courts. Moreover, the Bombay City Civil Court Act in S. 3 has accepted from the jurisdiction of the new Court all cases which the High Court can hear under any special law. Special law has been defined as a law applicable to a particular subject. If under List 1 of Sch. 7 the Federal Legislature by any law determines that a case has to be heard by the High Court, D. 5 will not affect the jurisdiction of that Court in any manner whatsoever. 54. Special law has been defined as a law applicable to a particular subject. If under List 1 of Sch. 7 the Federal Legislature by any law determines that a case has to be heard by the High Court, D. 5 will not affect the jurisdiction of that Court in any manner whatsoever. 54. The result, therefore, is that the Bombay City Civil Court Act is a statute which is wholly within the legislative field of the Province under item 1 of List II and its validity cannot be affected even if it incidentally trenches on other fields of legislation. It is not a statute dealing with any of the subjects mentioned in List I and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Provincial Legislature has in any way usurped the power demarcated for the Centre. In view of this conclusion I think it unnecessary to pronounce any opinion on the other points raised by the learned Attorney-General. 55. For the reasons given above I allow the appeal preferred by the Government of Bombay and set aside the decision of the High Court holding that S. 4, City Civil Court Act (XL [40] of 1948) is void, in the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal. 56. Mukherjea J. : - In my opinion this appeal should be allowed and I concur substantially in the line of reasoning adopted by my learned brother Mahajan J., in his judgment. Having regard to the constitutional importance of the question raised in this case, I would desire to add some observations of my own. 57. There are really two questions which require consideration in this appeal. The first is whether S. 4, Bombay City Civil Court Act (1948) is void and inoperative by reason of its amounting to a delegation of legislative powers by the Provincial Legislature to the Provincial Government of Bombay. The Bombay High Court has answered this question in the affirmative and it is entirely upon this ground that the judgment appealed against is based. The propriety of this decision has been challenged by the learned Attorney-General who appeared on behalf of the State of Bombay in support of this appeal. On the other hand, Mr. The Bombay High Court has answered this question in the affirmative and it is entirely upon this ground that the judgment appealed against is based. The propriety of this decision has been challenged by the learned Attorney-General who appeared on behalf of the State of Bombay in support of this appeal. On the other hand, Mr. Seervai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, has not only attempted to repel the contention advanced by the learned Attorney-General, but has sought to support the judgment appealed against on another and a more comprehensive ground which, if accepted, would make the entire Bombay City Civil Court 86 Act a void piece of legislation, as being on encroachment by the Provincial Legislature upon the field of legislation reserved for the Centre under List I of Sch. 7, Government of India Act, 1935. 58. As regards the first point, I agree that the contention of the appellant is sound and must prevail. I have no hesitation in holding that the Legislature in empowering the Provincial Government to invest the City Court, by notification, with jurisdiction of such value not exceeding Rs. 25,000 as may be specified in the notification, has not delegated its legislative authority to the Provincial Government. The provision relates only to the enforcement of the policy which the Legislature itself has laid down. The law was full and complete when it left the legislative chamber permitting the Provincial Government to increase the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Court up to a certain amount which was specified in the Statute itself. What the Provincial Government is to do is not to make any law; it has to execute the will of the Legislature by determining the time at which and the extent to which, within the limits fixed by the Legislature, the jurisdiction of the Court should be extended. This is a species of conditional legislation which comes directly within the principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Queen v. Burah, 5 I. A. 178 where the taking effect of a particular provision of law is made to depend upon determination of certain facts and conditions by an outside authority. 59. This is a species of conditional legislation which comes directly within the principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Queen v. Burah, 5 I. A. 178 where the taking effect of a particular provision of law is made to depend upon determination of certain facts and conditions by an outside authority. 59. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in coming to their decision on the point seem to have been influenced to some extent by the pronouncement of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar, 1949 E.C. R. 596 And the learned counsel for the respondents naturally placed reliance upon it. I was myself a party to the majority decision in that case and expressed my views in a separate judgment I do not think that there is anything in my judgment which lends support to the contention which the respondents have put forward. I stated expressly in course of my judgment on the authority of the well known American decision in Locke's appeal, 13 American Rep. 716, that a Legislative may not delegate its powers to make law, but "it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend"; and that the inhibition against delegation does not extend to legislation which is complete in itself, though its operation is made to depend upon contingencies the ascertainment of which is left to an external body. 60. The subject-matter of dispute in the Bihar case was the validity of a proviso engrafted upon S. 1, sub-s. (3), Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act. The sub-section laid down that the Act would remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement. The proviso then added "that the Provincial Government may, by notification on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification." Mr. The proviso then added "that the Provincial Government may, by notification on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification." Mr. Seervai would have been probably right in invoking the decision in that case as an authority in his favour if the proviso simply empowered the Provincial Government, upon compliance with the conditions prescribed therein, to extend the duration of the Act for a further period of the year, the maximum period being fixed by the Legislature itself. The proviso, however, went further and authorised the Provincial Government to decide at the end of the year not merely whether this Act should be continued for another year but whether the Act itself was to be modified in any way or not. It was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the Province of Bihar that to authorise another body to modify a Statute amounts to inverting that body with legislative powers. What the learned counsel contended for, was that the power of modification was severable from the power of extending the duration of the Statute and the invalidity of one part of the proviso should not affect its other part. To this contention my answer was that the two provisions were inter-related in such a manner in the Statute that one could not be severed from the other. Obviously, the facts of this case are quite different, and all that I need say with regard to my pronouncement in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case, (1949 F. C. B. 5961, 50 Cr.- L. J. 897) is that the principle upon which that case was decided is not applicable, and cannot be attracted, to the present case. 61. I may state here that a question in the broad form as to whether a Provincial Legislature exercising its legislative powers within the limits prescribed by the Imperial Parliament in the Government of India. Act, 1935, could dalegate its legislative functions in any manner to an outside authority as it thought proper, was neither raised nor decided in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case, (1949 F.C.B. 596. Act, 1935, could dalegate its legislative functions in any manner to an outside authority as it thought proper, was neither raised nor decided in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case, (1949 F.C.B. 596. The learned Attorney-General has not very properly invited any final decision on that point in the present case and 87 I would refrain from expressing any opinion upon it. 62. The second point appears to be of some complexity and it was decided by the Bombay High Court adversely to the respondents on the basis of an earlier pronouncement of the same Court in Mulchand v. Raman, 51 Bom. L. R. 86. The arguments of Mr. Seervai are really directed at assailing the correctness of this earlier decision which the learned Judges held to be binding on them in the present case. The contention of Mr. Seervai, in substance, is that the Bombay City Civil Court Act, which is a piece of provincial legislation, is ultra vires the Legislature inasmuch as it purports to endow the City Court, which it brings into existence, with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of 'all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature' with certain exceptions that are specified in the different Sub-Sections of S. 3. What is said is that the expression "all suits of a civil nature" is wide enough to include suits in respect to matters specified in List I of sch. 7 of the Constitution Act with regard to which the Central Legislature alone is competent to confer jurisdiction on Courts under Entry 53 of the said List. It is argued that so far as the Provincial Legislature is concerned, it may empower all Courts (except the Federal Court) with jurisdiction in respect