JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - This appeal is brought by the Defendant from the decree of the lower appellate court dated March 1, 1946 upholding the decree of the trial court in a suit for possession and damages. The Plaintiff Respondent brought the suit upon the allegation that he was the hereditary tenant of the land in suit under a patta of the year 1352 F and that the Defendant Appellant had wrongfully dispossessed him in July, 1944. He claimed possession as well as damages. The defence was a denial of the Plaintiff's case. It was pleaded that the patta was invalid as the Defendant was in possession of the land on the date on which it was granted to the Plaintiff and that the land lord having accepted nazrana from the Defendant has allowed him to retain possession. Counsel for the Defendant on the date of the pleadings stated as follows: Defendant was ejected from the land in suit by zamindar about a year ago and the Defendant paid Rs. 50/- a nazrana to zamindar after February 1944 and the zamindar orally permitted the Defendant to cultivate the land in suit. 2. Upon the pleadings the only material issue framed by the court was whether the Plaintiff was a tenant of the land in suit as alleged. The other issue related to the relief. It is noted in the proceedings that the Defendant's counsel did not press any other pleas nor did he claim any other issues. The issue about the tenancy was referred to the Revenue court. That court answered the issue in favour of the Plaintiff. This finding was accepted by the Civil court which decreed the suit for possession and damages to the extent of Rs. 52/-. This finding was accepted by the lower appellate court in appeal and the decree of the trial court was upheld. The lower appellate court also observed that according to the Defendant's own admission the estate had come into possession of the land in suit after rejecting the Defendant and that the patta granted by the estate after the Defendant's ejectment to the Plaintiff was perfectly valid. 3. The finding about the tenancy is one of fact which cannot be assailed in second appeal. 3. The finding about the tenancy is one of fact which cannot be assailed in second appeal. It is, however, contended that the finding is erroneous in law in that the patta was granted to the Plaintiff at a time when the estate was not possession but the Defendant was in possession of the land. Reference is made the statement of the Plaintiff's Mukhtaras P. W. 1. The Mukhtar merely said that he was not in a position to say whether the estate was in possession of the land when the patta was granted but the Defendant in addition to the statement of the counsel on the date of the pleadings which has been referred to above stated on oath that he was ejected from the land in suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, that he instituted a suit u/s 183 against the landlord's estate but his suit was dismissed by two courts. It is obvious from these admissions that the grant of the patta by the estate to the Plaintiff was made at a time when the estate was in possession of the land and the Defendant had been ejected there from. Under the circumstances the validity of the patta is not open to any doubt. 4. The Defendant in his evidence also stated that after his ejectment from the land he had paid nazrana to the estate and when he demanded a receipt therefore the landlord assured him that a patta would be issued to him in due course. On the strength of this statement it is sought to be argued that the landlord was not entitled to execute a patta in favour of the Plaintiff. No plea in this form was raised in the trial court and no issue was asked for on this point. Indeed Defendant's counsel abandoned all pleas and pressed for no other is use except the issue of Plaintiff's tenancy. Once it is found that the Defendant was duly ejected by the landlord from the land it is Obvious that his action in granting a patta of the land in favour of the Plaintiff was perfectly valid. Indeed Defendant's counsel abandoned all pleas and pressed for no other is use except the issue of Plaintiff's tenancy. Once it is found that the Defendant was duly ejected by the landlord from the land it is Obvious that his action in granting a patta of the land in favour of the Plaintiff was perfectly valid. The Defendant may or may not have any remedy against the landlord for accepting a nazrana from him in consideration of issuing a patta to him but that cannot be any reason for doubting the validity of the patta executed by the landlord in favour of the Plaintiff. The concurrent finding of the two courts below being a finding of fact and being fully justified by the materials on the record it is obvious that there is no force in this appeal. It is however, urged for the Defendant for the first time in this Court that under the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act as amended in June 1917, the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court. It may be mentioned that the suit was brought by a hereditary tenant against a trespasser in the Civil Court relating to agricultural land on October 4, 1944. The suit was decided on August 3, 1945 by the trial court and on March 1, 1946 by the lower appellate court. A second appeal was filed in this Court on April 5, 1946, and while this appeal was pending, the U. P. Tenancy 'Amendment Act of 1947 was passed on June 14, 1947. According to the view taken by the Full Bench in Ori Lal v. Ganesha 1947 0.W.N. 42, such a suit was rightly filed in the Civil Court notwithstanding the amendment to Section 180 of the Tenancy Act. The two later decisions reported in Basdeo Singh v. Bhura Singh A.I.R 1941 Oudh 436 decided on December 23, 1948, and Sahdeo Pande v. Kala Paude 1950 Don. Law Rep. Allah. 51 decided February 7, 1949 support this view and are authorities for the proposition that Section 31 of U. P. Act X of 1947 cannot have retrospective operation so as to affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the suit if it was pending on the date when the amendment Act came into force. Learned Counsel refers to a decision in Pheru Vs. Learned Counsel refers to a decision in Pheru Vs. Bhagavana, AIR 1950 All 96 , as laying down a contrary proposition. He also refers to a single judge decision in Khanzam an Khan v. Maqbool 1950 A.L.J. 43 as supporting his contention I am of opinion that neither of these case lays down any proposition which is contrary to or inconsistent with the view taken in Basdeo Singh Vs. Bharat Singh, AIR 1949 All 542 and Sahdeo Pande v. Kalia Pande 1950 Don. Law Rep. Allah. 51. In Pheru Vs. Bhagavana, AIR 1950 All 96 the learned Judges were dealing with a reference made by the Munsif in a case which had been filed u/s 108 of the Tenancy Act in the Revenue Court by an occupancy tenant against a trespasser who happened to be also the landlord The plaint was returned by the Revenue court on the ground that no suit lay u/s 183 against one of the land lords and that the suit against a trespasser was cognizable only by the Civil Court. When the suit was filed before the Munsif he referred the matter to the High Court. That suit was filed in 1945 and the decision of the learned Judges was given on July 25, 1949. It was observed that if the Defendant could be considered a landlord as defined in the Tenancy, Act, the suit would lie in the Revenue Court u/s 183 but if he was not found to be a landlord, he could be sued under the amended Section 180. After quoting that Section the learned Judges observed: It is therefore; clear that the Plaintiff could sue the Defendant, one of the landlords u/s 180, U. P. Tenancy Act, even if he could not sue him u/s 183 of that Act. 5. It was ordered that the plaint should be returned for presentation to the Revenue Court The observation quoted above is strongly relied upon as suggesting that although the suit filed long before the amendment of Section 160, yet the provisions of that section were applied to the case and the suit against a trespasser was ordered to be filed in the Revenue Court. In answer to this contention it would be sufficient to say that the learned Judges were not dealing with effect of Section 31 of the Amendment Act upon the case. In answer to this contention it would be sufficient to say that the learned Judges were not dealing with effect of Section 31 of the Amendment Act upon the case. The suit had been filed in the Revenue Court and had not been decided. It was consequently pending and according to the law as it stood at the time of the passing of the order it was perfectly legitimate to rule that the Defendant could be sued either u/s 183 of u/s 180 as the case may be. It must be remembered that the present suit was filed in the Civil Court and cannot be said to have been pending within the meaning of Section 31 of the Amendment Act which clearly refers only to proceedings suits, appeals and revisions pending under the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1989 and not to proceedings pending in the Civil Court under the ordinary law. The case of Khanz man Khan and others related to a suit instituted in the Revenue Court in 1943 before the amendment Act was passed. The question arose whether the period of limitation of 3 years prescribed for a suit u/s 180 under the tenancy Act of 1939 should be substituted by a period of 2 years reduced under the Amendment Act of 1947. By force of Section 31 which gave retrospective effect to Section 180, the period was rightly reduced. That case has therefore, no application to the present case. I am therefore satisfied that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. 6. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.