JUDGEMENT : Chaturvedi, J. The point referred to us is, "Whether a Full Bench decision reported in 1949 M.B. Law Reporter p. 81 is correct?" In that decision it was held that the decisions of the former Indore State High Court are binding on Madhya Bharat High Court, Sanghi, J. (who has since then retired) felt embarrassed by this decision and was of opinion that "the decision is so clearly wrong that if allowed to stand, it will create confusion and cause much embarrassment to the Judges of this Court." He therefore, desired that the question should be considered by a larger Full Bench, so this matter has been placed before this Bench. 2. Mr. Niwaskar has raised a preliminary objection stating that Sanghi, J., was not competent to make this reference and to criticise the Full Bench decision as he was bound by it. 3. According to S. 29(b), Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act Samvat 2005 (Act 8 of 1949), a case of special or novel character of involving any important point of law or custom having the force of law or of the consideration of any document, set down before a single Judge for hearing, may be referred at his instance, or at the instance of the Division Bench to a Full Bench to be nominated by the Chief Justice. Considering this provision in our High Court Act I have no hesitation in holding that Sanghi, J., could entertain a doubt upon the aforesaid Full Bench ruling and could write to the Chief Justice for reconsideration of the ruling by a larger Full Bench. In all such matters it is discretionary for the Chief Justice to form a Special Bench to reconsider the decision of a previous Full Bench. In Enat-Ullah v. Kowsher Ali, 54 Cal 266, the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court was confronted with a request from the Division Bench which felt some doubt about the correctness of a Full Bench decision in Lalla Nowbat Lalla v. Lalla Jewan Lall, 4 Cal 831. In Enat-Ullah v. Kowsher Ali, 54 Cal 266, the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court was confronted with a request from the Division Bench which felt some doubt about the correctness of a Full Bench decision in Lalla Nowbat Lalla v. Lalla Jewan Lall, 4 Cal 831. Before referring the matter to a Special Bench Sanderson, C.J., made the following note : "I have made enquiries, and I understand that in a case in which a Division Court doubts the correctness of a Full Bench decision, by which the Division Court is bound, and the Division Court considers that the matter should be considered by a Bench, specially constituted, it has been the practice for the Division Court to bring the matter to the notice of the Chief Justice and to consult him as to the propriety of a Bench being specially constituted to consider the matter. A decision of a Full Bench is binding on all Division Courts, unless it is subsequently reversed by a Bench specially constituted or by a rule laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and it is obvious that it might lead to serious results if a Division Court, whenever it felt inclined to differ from a decision of a Full Bench, could refer the matter to a Special Bench and the Chief Justice was compelled to form such Special Bench whether he thought it necessary or not. In this case, I think that there are sufficient reasons why the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Lalla Nowbul Lalla v. Lalla Jewan Lall, should be further considered, and that a Special Bench should be appointed when it is possible, having regard to the other work in the Court." 4. This note gives the correct statement of the rule of practice as to when the case should be referred to the Full Bench. Whether the reference is made by a Single Judge or the Division Bench is immaterial. This also shows that the matter is entirely within the discretion of the Chief Justice and once he has exercised that discretion it is not open to any judge or any litigant to question the propriety of his orders. Of course, the learned Judge on the Single Bench was not authorised to criticise the Full Bench decision which was binding on him. Of course, the learned Judge on the Single Bench was not authorised to criticise the Full Bench decision which was binding on him. In a ease in Allahabad High Court a learned Judge (Niamat Ullah, J.) also expressed his opinion that the view of the Full Bench in Shabir Husain v. Chandoo Lal, 1931 All LJ 865 : AIR 1931 All 567 (FB) was not correct so far as the liability of a custodian as a surety is concerned. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Gendamal v. Sukh Darshan Lal, AIR 1936 All 555 took objection to the criticism of the Full Bench decision by a Single Judge and observed : "It is open to a Single Judge of this Court to entertain a doubt on any question of law, but he is bound to follow the Full Bench ruling and the operative portion of his order must be in strict accordance with the ruling of the Full Bench and should in no way deviate from it." 5. This has my respectful concurrence and a severe criticism of the Full Bench decision by Sanghi, J., in his order of reference is certainly open to objection. He could have expressed his doubts on the decision but the learned Judge was not authorised to state that the decision of the Full Bench was erroneous. 6. Mr. Newaskar has then tried to raise a doubt whether this Bench, as a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is competent to overrule the Full Bench decision in Dagdu Madhav v. Tulsiram, 1949 Madh B LR 81. This point has not been fully argued by Mr. Newaskar but he placed reliance on Ningappa Ramappa v. Emperor, AIR 1941 Bom 408, where on p. 409, Beaumont, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as follows : "There can be no doubt that a Full Bench can overrule a Division Bench, that a Full Bench must consist of three or more Judges; but it would seem anomalous to hold that a later Full Bench can overrule an earlier Full Bench merely because the later Bench consists of more Judges than the earlier. If that were the rule, it would mean that a Bench of 7 Judges by a majority of four to three, could overrule a unanimous decision of a Bench of six Judges, though all the Judges were of co-ordinate jurisdiction." 7. If that were the rule, it would mean that a Bench of 7 Judges by a majority of four to three, could overrule a unanimous decision of a Bench of six Judges, though all the Judges were of co-ordinate jurisdiction." 7. The learned Chief Justice in the above case was dealing with a question which had been considered in 1894 in Queen Empress v. Mugappa, 18 Bom 377. The Full Bench of Bombay High Court consisting of four Judges, (Sargent, C.J., Telang, Candy and Fulton, JJ.) had in this case arrived at certain conclusion. This Full Bench decision was reconsidered in 1921 in Emperor v. Purshottam Ishar, 45 Bom 834 (FB) by another Full Bench of five Judges (Macleod, C.J., Shah, Pratt, Fawcett and Setalvad, JJ.); and four judges came to the conclusion that 18 Bom 377 was wrongly decided. Shah, J., however, dissented from this proposition and agreed with the views of 18 Bom The net result was that 18 Bom 377 was overruled; but apparently the opinion of the four Judges prevailed over the opinion of five Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction. This circumstance was mainly responsible for the doubt expressed by Beaumount, C.J., in Ningappa Ramappa v. Emperor, AIR 1941 Bom 408. It is true that there is very little authority on the powers of Full and Special Benches of the High Court but the anomaly referred to by the learned Chief Justice can also be apparent when four or five Judges, each on Single Bench, take separately one view, and the Division Bench takes a different view altogether; or when three or four Division Benches take one view but this view is overruled by a Full Bench of three Judges. The rule of practice, however, laid down by every High Court and now very well settled is that a Single Judge is bound by a Division Bench ruling and the Division Bench is bound by a ruling of the Full Bench, irrespective of the fact whether it is a unanimous decision or only a majority decision : vide Deep Chand v. Sheo Prasad, AIR 1929 All 593 . Similarly a practice had grown up and is very well established that a former ruling of Full Bench of less number of Judges can be 'disregarded' by a subsequent majority opinion of the Full Bench consisting of more number of Judges. Similarly a practice had grown up and is very well established that a former ruling of Full Bench of less number of Judges can be 'disregarded' by a subsequent majority opinion of the Full Bench consisting of more number of Judges. Where there is no express statutory provision, the practice of the Court tends to become the law of the Court. Cursus curias est lex curiae. It is, therefore, not desirable to depart from the long course of judicial comity and upset what has been regarded all over India as a settled rule of practice for over fifty years. "There is no statute or common law rule by which one Court is bound to abide by the decision of another of equal rank;" writes Odgers in his work in his 'On The Common Law' (Edn. 3 Vol. 1 pp. 64-65), "it does so simply from what may be called the comity among Judges. In the same way there is no common law or statutory rule to oblige a Court to bow to its own decisions; it does so on the ground of judicial comity. This so-called comity has, however, been formulated into rules which, though unwritten, are habitually followed by our Courts." 8. The previous ruling of a Full Bench of three Judges can therefore be re-considered by this Bench consisting of five Judges and we can see whether it should be followed or not. I am however doubtful whether this Bench can, in the strict sense of the term, overrule the former Full Bench ruling, but this does not imply that we cannot examine the matter or that it is not competent to us to take a contrary view, if we are convinced that the decision is erroneous. In London County Council v. Schewzik, (1905) 2 KB 695 at p. 700, Lord Alverstone, C.J., observed that : "the Court of Appeal have recently recognised that it is desirable in the public interest, and in order that people may know it with certainty what their position is, that Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction should follow their decisions unless there are strong grounds which enable the Courts to say that the previous decisions ought not to be followed." Salmond in his Jurisprudence (Edn. 10, Art. 61, pp. 10, Art. 61, pp. 188-189) dealing with 'the effect of disregarding a precedent' observes : "The disregard of a 'precedent' assumes two distinct forms; for, the Court to which it is cited may either overrule it, or merely refuse to follow it. Overruling is an act of superior jurisdiction. A precedent overruled is definitely and formally deprived of all authority. It becomes null and void, like a repealed statute, and a new principle is authoritatively substituted for the old. A refusal to follow a precedent, on the other hand, is an act of co-ordinate, not of superior, jurisdiction. Two Courts of equal authority have no power to overrule each other's decisions. Where a precedent is merely not followed, the result is not that the later authority is substituted for the earlier, but that the two stand side by side conflicting with each other. The legal antimony thus produced must be solved by the act of a higher authority, which will in due time decide between the competing precedents, formally overruling one of them and sanctioning the other as good law. In the meantime the matter remains at large, and the law uncertain." 9. So far as Full Bench decisions are concerned, in India, the practice has been that till a Superior Court sanctions one as a good law and overrules the other, the High Court concerned and the inferior Courts under that High Court are bound by the later ruling of a Full Bench consisting of more Judges. To this practice we also desire to adhere. 10. Now Salmond in his Jurisprudence (Edn. 10, p. 188) mentions, inter alia, the following circumstances which tend to lessen the authority of a precedent : (a) Where the question passes sub-silentio without argument at the bar, (b) Where the reasoning is defective, and (c) Where its result is embarrassing or unjust. 11. With very great respect to the learned Judges, who decided the case, all the above three circumstances fully apply to the Full Bench decision reported in Dagdu v. Tulsiram, 1949 Madh B L R 81. There was no argument at the bar and the learned counsel for the parties had conceded in this case that the Indore State High Court was not a Court of inferior status to that of the High Court of Madhya Bharat and the former must be looked upon as a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. There was no argument at the bar and the learned counsel for the parties had conceded in this case that the Indore State High Court was not a Court of inferior status to that of the High Court of Madhya Bharat and the former must be looked upon as a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Again they relied on Ma Mya v. Ma Thein, AIR 1927 Rang 4 and did not dispute the correctness of the decision (pp. 84-85) or, correctness of the application of the principle to this case. 12. In my opinion this led to the defective reasoning in that case. It was presumably overlooked that it was not a case of increase by acquisition of territory of the geographical limits of former Indore State that led to the formation of the present State of Madhya Bharat. Again it was not the Indore State High Court that had developed into the Madhya Bharat High Court. By no stretch of imagination Madhya Bharat High Court can be looked upon as successor to Indore High Court or any High Court of any Covenanting States. It was in fact a voluntary merger of twenty-two smaller units, some of them, of course, with distinct progressive outlook, but all with autocratic rule, to form a larger unit of Madhya Bharat in order to fall in line with other sister States of India with democratic institutions. It is true that these smaller units had integrated to form the new Madhya Bharat State; but it is not true that the High Courts of Covenanting States had also integrated to form the present Madhya Bharat High Court. In fact the High Courts in Covenanting States were altogether abolished and an independent High Court with power and stability and fresh outlook had come into existence, Consequently High Courts of former Covenanting States cannot be regarded as of equal rank with the present Madhya Bharat High Court. It is not a case where a High Court had succeeded either a Chief Court or a Court of Judicial Commissioner and so the ratio decidendi in Ma Mya v. Ma Thein, AIR 1927 Rang 4, Gurbhaj v. Lachhman, 6 Lah 87; Sherkhan v. Muzaffar Khan, 1 Lah 25 : 55 Ind Cas 359 (Sic.) or Lachhman Singh v. Naman, AIR 1929 Lah 174, cannot be made applicable to the case before us. The relation between the Court of appeal and the Court of Exchequer Chamber in England is also not in any way genuinely applicable to the relation of Madhya Bharat High Court and the former High Court of Indore State. Clearly the case Dagdu Madhav v. Tulsiram, 1949 Madh B LR 81, was decided on fundamentally wrong principles and cannot be taken to be good law. Sanghi, J., had referred to his own embarrassment in the case in which Indore High Court ruling was cited before him and which according to the decision in 1949 Madh B LR 81 was binding on him but which had dissented from the view held even by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. What should the Courts do in such circumstances? Again, if Indore High Court ruling is binding on this Court, the rulings of Gwalior, Ratlam, Dhar, Dewas or Jaora High Courts will also be binding and the difficulty and embarrassment of this Court will find no limit if on a certain question three or four different views may be available and all may be taken to be binding. If 1949 Madh B LR 81, is construed to mean that Indore High Court rulings are binding on cases coming from Indore District only, in that case Gwalior High Court ruling will be impliedly held to be binding on cases coming atleast from the northern five districts, and other territory which belonged to Gwalior State; Ratlam High Court rulings on cases coming from Ratlam District, and so on and so forth. That the binding nature of different High Courts in Covenanting States should depend upon the different localities is a proposition fraught with danger and may ultimately lead to gross injustice in many cases. Any insistence on the principle of stare decisis, either district-wise or on territorial basis, is bound to lead to absurd results. 13. After taking into consideration all these circumstances I come to the conclusion that the Full Bench decision in Dagdu v. Tulsiram, 1949 Madh B LR 81 should be disregarded and that the decisions of former Indore High Court should not be held binding on this Court or on the Courts subordinate to it. In my opinion this reference should be answered accordingly. 14. In my opinion this reference should be answered accordingly. 14. If rulings of any High Court of Covenanting States are cited before the Subordinate Courts, and if any guidance is needed, they should be asked to consider them on their own merits; where there is no ruling of this Court or of the Supreme Court, and if a ruling of a High Court in India differs from a ruling of a High Court in a Covenanting State the Subordinate Courts should follow that ruling which, in their own judgment, appears to be the better ruling, but it does not imply that they are bound to follow a ruling of any High Court, if in the exercise of their own reason and judgment they come to a different conclusion. 15. The question whether the decisions of Madhya Bharat High Court delivered before 26-1-1950 are binding on this Court or not does not arise in this reference and I do not think it will be proper to express any opinion on this point. 16. Kaul, C.J. :- I have read the judgment dictated by Chaturvedi, J., with which I generally agree and will add only a few words of my own. 17. Under S. 29 of our High Court of Judicature Act a case coming before a single Judge if it involves a point of law, may be referred by him to a Division Bench or at his instance it may be referred to a Full Bench nominated by the Chief Justice. Whenever this is done it is for the Division Bench or the Full Bench to which a reference is made to decide the case. If a case is referred by a single Judge because he doubts the correctness of a previous decision given by a Division Bench or a Full Bench it will be the duty of the Full Bench to which the case is referred to express an opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the previous decision. Under the circumstances it is difficult to understand the reason for the course adopted by the Full Bench in Dagdu Mahadev v. Tulsiram, 1949 Madh B LR 81. Under the circumstances it is difficult to understand the reason for the course adopted by the Full Bench in Dagdu Mahadev v. Tulsiram, 1949 Madh B LR 81. Instead of expressing any opinion on the correctness of the decision given in Second Appeal No. 143 of 1946 of Indore High Court concerning which a doubt was expressed by Sanghi, J., the learned Judges composing the Full Bench held that the Full Bench decision of the Indore High Court just referred to was binding on the single Judge who made the reference and returned the case to him for decision in accordance with the law. They appear to be of opinion that it was not open to Sanghi, J., to make the reference. I regret I am unable to agree with this view. Clause 27 of Ordinance 2 of 1948 which was then in force but has since been repealed and replaced by Act 8 of 1949 is clear. It runs thus : "(a) Any case, civil or Criminal of a special or novel character or involving any important point of law or custom having the force of law or of the constructions of the document, set down before a single Judge for hearing, may be referred by him at any time daring the hearing or by the Chief Justice at any time to a bench nominated by the Chief Justice and a case so referred shall be heard and decided by the bench to which it is referred. (b) Any such case as is mentioned in cl. (a) may be referred at the instance of single Judge or a bench to a Full Bench to be nominated by the Chief Justice. (c) A Full Bench shall consist of three or more Judges of the High Court. When a case is heard by a bench of three or more Judges and they are not in agreement as regards the decision, the decision shall be in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Judges. A Judge who does not agree with the majority shall, however, record his decision and the reasons therefor." The clause has been bodily reproduced in the High Court of Judicature Act 8 of 1949 as S. 29. Whatever be the case in other High Courts so far as Madhya Bharat High Court is concerned the matter was governed by cl. A Judge who does not agree with the majority shall, however, record his decision and the reasons therefor." The clause has been bodily reproduced in the High Court of Judicature Act 8 of 1949 as S. 29. Whatever be the case in other High Courts so far as Madhya Bharat High Court is concerned the matter was governed by cl. 27 of ordinance 2 of 1948 which empowered a single Judge to make a reference to a Division Bench or a Full Bench. I am, therefore, of opinion that if the view taken by the Full Bench was that Sanghi, J., could not make the reference it was erroneous. The question being covered by an express legislative provision is not open to argument. 18. The Full Bench further held : I. That the High Court of Judicature at Indore was not a Court of inferior status to that of High Court of Madhya Bharat and, therefore, the Indore High Court must be looked upon as a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction; II. That the decisions of Indore High Court being of a tribunal of co-ordinate jurisdiction should be held to be binding authority in the same manner as the decisions of the Madhya Bharat High Court as established under Ordinance 2 of 1948 ; and III. That such decisions must be followed by all subordinate Courts in respect of matters decided therein. 19. With the greatest respect I may point out that the view taken by the Full Bench is vitiated in as much as it ignored the all important fact that the Indore High Court and the Madhya Bharat High Court were not two Courts in the same State. Prior to 22-4-1948 Indore, Gwalior and other States in Malwa which now form Madhya Bharat were independent or semi-independent States. They owed no allegiance to one another nor were they bound to one another by any other ties. Every one of these States had its own Ruler and its own judicial system. The High Courts in these States had different constitutions and each such Court derived its authority from an entirely different source. They were as independent of each other as for instance the Courts established in different States of Central and Western Europe - France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, etc., etc. The High Courts in these States had different constitutions and each such Court derived its authority from an entirely different source. They were as independent of each other as for instance the Courts established in different States of Central and Western Europe - France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, etc., etc. So long as these States existed as independent political entities there could for obvious reasons be no question of a Court in one State being considered a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in another State for the purpose of determining whether the decisions of one Court were binding on the other. In all the cases to which reference has been made the question was considered in relation to Courts in the same State. It has never been contended that the decisions of a Court in France have any authority in Courts in England or Belgium. It is true that if the laws in force in two States are the same, the judgments delivered by a Court in one State may be considered by a Court in another State, but this would not be for the reason that the judgment has any binding authority in the latter Court. If they are referred to, it is in order to see how the question has been determined in a foreign Court. It has no more binding authority than the opinion expressed by a writer in a treaties on law dealing with the same subject. 20. It may be pointed out that the formation of Madhya Bharat cannot be regarded only as a change in the Constitution of each of the Covenanting States as a result of political evolution. As a result of the covenant entered into on 22-4-1948 by the Rulers of these States by which they agreed to integrate their territories in one State with a common Executive, Legislature and Judiciary the former States ceased to exist as such. The inauguration of the United State of Madhya Bharat on 28-5-1948 brought into existance an altogether new political entity wholly different in-character, status and political incidents. It is clear that in such circumstances the High Courts in any of the Covenanting States cannot be said to be Courts of co-ordinatate jurisdiction with the High Court of Madhya Bharat. The inauguration of the United State of Madhya Bharat on 28-5-1948 brought into existance an altogether new political entity wholly different in-character, status and political incidents. It is clear that in such circumstances the High Courts in any of the Covenanting States cannot be said to be Courts of co-ordinatate jurisdiction with the High Court of Madhya Bharat. For the reasons stated the Full Bench decision of Rangoon High Court in Ma Mya v. Ma Thein, AIR 1927 Rang 4 cannot be of any assistance in determining the matter before us. 21. Reference was made in the Full Bench decision in Dagdu Madhav v. Tulsiram, 1949 Mad B LR 81 to cl. 3 of Ordinance I of 1948 as also to cl. 5 of Ordinance II of 1948 which ran as follows : Clause 3 of Ordinance I of 1948 : "When the administration of any Covenanting State has been taken over by the Raj Pramukh as aforesaid, or when any State has been merged in the State of Madhya Bharat as aforesaid, all laws, Ordinances, Acts, Rules, Regulations, etc., having the force of law in the said State shall continue to remain in force until repealed or amended under the provisions of the next succeeding section, and shall be construed as if references in them to the Ruler or Government of the State were references to the Raj Pramukh or the Government of the United State respectively." Clause 5 of Ordinance II of 1948 : "(a) The High Court shall apply the laws and the usages prevailing in any State forming part of the United State to Civil, Criminal and other proceedings in that State till such time as a duly constituted authority modifies them. (b) In enforcing these laws and usages, the High Court may be guided by the principles of law and equity, practice and procedure embodied in the analogous laws and usages prevailing in the Indian Union as interpreted by the several High Courts and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as well as the Federal Court of India." 22. (b) In enforcing these laws and usages, the High Court may be guided by the principles of law and equity, practice and procedure embodied in the analogous laws and usages prevailing in the Indian Union as interpreted by the several High Courts and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as well as the Federal Court of India." 22. The Full Bench, if I may say so without disrespect, rightly held that the term "Laws and usages" as used in these two clauses "cannot be held strictly speaking to cover judicial decisions.' But their Lordships went further and held that in view of the circumstances in which the United State came into existence it cannot be believed that there can be any intention to deprive judicial decisions of the highest tribunal in the Covenanting States of their validity or force by the mere establishment of a common High Court. The last mentioned proposition, it appears to me, ignores the basic principle on which the authority of judicial decisions rests. A decision given by the High Court in any State has binding authority on the Courts subordinate to that High Court, because of the relation, superior and subordinate that subsists between the High Court and those Courts. As regards other Courts of equal rank in the same State it has no binding authority except for the respect which its sound exposition of the law and the logical reasoning on which its conclusions are founded may command. In our own country we have a High Court in each State. Though the decisions of one High Court are accorded the greatest respect in other High Courts they are not binding either on the High Courts or the Subordinate Courts in other States. 23. To give effect to the decision arrived at by the Full Bench and to carry it to its logical conclusion might, as pointed out by Chaturvedi, J., in his judgment, lead to anomalies and difficulties which it would not be easy to get over. If the decisions of Indore High Court are held binding on Madhya Bharat High Court there appear to be no good grounds why the same effect should not be given to the decisions of other High Courts of more than a score of Covenanting States which integrated to constitute Madhya Bharat. If the decisions of Indore High Court are held binding on Madhya Bharat High Court there appear to be no good grounds why the same effect should not be given to the decisions of other High Courts of more than a score of Covenanting States which integrated to constitute Madhya Bharat. I am unable to read any such intention into the provisions of the ordinances to which reference has been made above, or in any of the sections of Act 8 of 1949. The decisions of Indore High Court are certainly entitled to the greatest respect but I am unable to hold that they are binding either on Madhya Bharat High Court or on the Courts subordinate to it. They have the same authority in the Courts in this State as the decisions of the Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Allahabad or Patna High Courts. 24. I would therefore answer the two questions referred by Sanghi, J., thus : 1. The decision reported in 'DAGDU MADHAV v. TULSIRAM', 1949 Madh B LR 81 does not lay down correct law; and 2. The decisions of Indore High Court or of any of the High Courts functioning in the Covenanting States, though entitled to respectful consideration, are not binding on any Courts in Madhya Bharat. 25. SHINDE, J. :- I am in entire agreement. 26. KHAN, J. :- I concur. 27. DIXIT, J. :- I agree and I have nothing to add to the observations of my Lord the Chief Justice. I agree to the answers preferred to the reference. 28. BY THE COURT :- Our answer to the reference made by the learned Judge is as follows : 1 The decision reported in 'DAGDU MADHAV v. TULSIRAM', 1949 Madh B LR 81 does not lay down correct law, and 2. The decisions of Indore High Court or of any of the High Courts functioning in the Covenanting States, though entitled to respectful consideration, are not binding on any Courts in Madhya Bharat. 29. The case shall go back to the single Judge without answer to the reference. Reference answered accordingly.