Judgment :- 1. These are petitions filed by two persons for the issue of the high writ of certiorari to quash certain proceedings taken by Government under the Public Safety Measures Ordinance, Ordinance No. 5 of 1125. Sirkar to whom notice was issued on both petitions has filed an affidavit explaining the circumstances under which the proceedings were taken. The facts are as follows: 2. The petitioner in O.P. No. 2 is the person in possession of 70 cents of poramboke land which is said to be comprised in S. No. 10258 in the Colachel Pakuthy. The petitioner in O.P. No. 3 is the person in possession of 34 cents of poramboke land in the same survey number. Both have been served with notices to surrender the land as the same have been ordered to be requisitioned by Government under the Ordinance above mentioned. It would appear from the Government order and also from an affidavit filed in this Court that the requisitions were made in furtherance of a housing scheme for the homeless and destitute in the coastal areas involving an outlay of two lakhs of rupees. In the Government's opinion these lands are required for purposes specified in S.19 of the Ordinance, namely, for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The order is impeached on the ground that the opinion was not based on proper grounds and secondly that there was nothing to indicate that Government in pursuance to that opinion had passed the order of requisition. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on P.V. Rao v. Khushaldas (A.I.R. 1949 Born. 277) where a requisition order was sought to be averted. It was held that the decision was judicial or quasi-judicial in nature and liable to be called in question and quashed or corrected under prerogative writs in the nature of certiorari. The Counsel for the petitioners contended that the provisions of S.19 of the Ordinance in question are similar to the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisitioning Ordinance under discussion in the above case. The Counsel for the petitioners contended that the provisions of S.19 of the Ordinance in question are similar to the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisitioning Ordinance under discussion in the above case. This is not correct, for we find that whereas the Bombay Ordinance provides for the requisition of land for "a public purpose if it is necessary or expedient to do so" and on the fact it was found that a public purpose was not intended to be served, the Ordinance in question is differently worded and the purpose is admittedly a public purpose. We think that the question is not very material in this case an in our view the opinion of Government does not appear to be open to any objection on the merits as there is no purpose so essential for the life of a community as a housing scheme for the homeless. The learned Chief Justice who dealt with the difference in the phraseology between the Ordinance under which the certiorari proceedings were started and a subsequent enactment of the same kind pointed out as follows: "It would be perhaps interesting to note that Government have subsequently taken to themselves wider powers under a subsequent legislation that has been passed with regard to requisition of land. Now, it is no longer necessary that the land should be requisitioned for a public purpose. It can be requisitioned for any purpose. This means that before Government can requisition and they have no longer to determine as an objective fact the purpose for which land has got to be requisitioned; not only the necessity and expediency is left to their discretion, but it seems even the purpose for which land is to be requisitioned". 4. This is exactly what has happened under S. 19, Public Safety Measures Ordinance of 1125. It merely provided that if in the opinion of Government it is necessary or expedient to do for securing the maintenance of public order etc. Government may requisition. The discretion is absolute and no further question can arise upon it. This view is further strengthened by another important decision. It merely provided that if in the opinion of Government it is necessary or expedient to do for securing the maintenance of public order etc. Government may requisition. The discretion is absolute and no further question can arise upon it. This view is further strengthened by another important decision. In Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (L.R.1942 A. C. 206) the House of Lords was of the view that orders passed under Regulation 18 B of the Defence Regulations by authorities competent to pass orders were executive orders in the discretion of the executive and that a court of Law cannot inquire whether in fact the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds for his belief. Lord Atkin emphasising the expression occurring in the Regulations viz., "has reasonable cause to believe" dissented from the majority judgment. The learned judge, however, indicated as his opinion that if the words were "that if the Secretary of State is of opinion" or that "it appears to the Secretary of State etc." then it would be construed as giving unlimited discretion to the Secretary of State in which case the Courts of law would not be entitled to look into the sufficiency or reasonableness of the order. The words used in S.19 in the Ordinance have been advisedly used on the lines indicated in Lord Atkin's judgment. This provision, it may be noted here, is different from similar provisions contained in the Defence of India and Travancore Rules previously in force which followed the Defence Regulations. We therefore, hold that there is no substance in the application and that it should be dismissed with costs to the Sirkar. 5. One contention vehemently raised before us related to the form of the order. It was contended that an order passed by Government should be passed by the Rajpramukh himself and that it would be dispensed with only under rules, if any, framed by the Rajpramukh under the appropriate provision of law passed in that behalf. The learned Government Pleader assured us that such rules were framed by the Rajpramukh but that they were secret documents which would not be published for the information of the public. The learned Government Pleader assured us that such rules were framed by the Rajpramukh but that they were secret documents which would not be published for the information of the public. On this assurance we are accepting the published order though it would have been better had the Government published at least such part of the rules as would enable the public to say in any particular case whether a particular order was Government order. However, this order is assured to be passed by those who are competent to pass orders on behalf of Government and a copy issued by an Assistant Secretary to Government is produced as a true copy of such order. Our attention has been drawn to similar rules passed for the conduct of business by Government elsewhere freely discussed in reported decisions and we cannot say whether the same practice cannot be followed here also, so as to avoid doubts and uncertainties in the public mind. As, however this question does not affect the subject-matter of the petition on the merits, we would make no other observations on the point. 6. Both petitions are dismissed with costs to the Sirkar, the same being assessed at Rs. 25 in each case. Petitions dismissed.