Ram Labhaya J.-This petition of revision is directed against an order of the Munsiff, Barpeta, dated 28-3-1950 by which he disallowed petitioner's application for amendment of his plaint. Plaintiff had shown defendants 6 and 6 as minors in the plaint. In the written statement the defendants pleaded that Nos. 5 and 6 out of them were minors and were not properly represented. The plaintiff then applied for permission to amend the plaint in order to rectify the error. He also applied for the appointment of a guardian for defendants S and 6. The learned Munsiff disallowed the application on the ground that by their misdescription as adults defendants 5 and 6 had acquired an important right which would be lost to them if amendment were allowed. [2] A preliminary objection has been raised to the competency of the revision petition on behalf of the respondents. It is urged that the order of the learned Munsiff amounts to a decree and was appealable. A revision petition, therefore, it is argued, is not maintainable. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the respondents had relied on Nand Kumar v. Pashupati Ghosh, A.I.B. (28) 1941 Pat. 885; Shair Ali v. Jagmohan Bam, A. I. R. (18) 1931 ALL. 333 and Oangadhara Bamarao v. Mahtpatt Suryarao, 42 Mad. 219. [3] In Nand Kumar v. Pashupati Ghosh, A. I. R. (28) 1941 Pat. 385, the suit was found to be not maintainable against certain defendants and their names were ordered to be struck off from the list of defendants. [4] In Shair Ali v. Jagmohan Bam, A.I.R. (18) 1931 ALL, 333, it was found that the plaint dis­closed no cause of action against defendant 2. His name, therefore, was ordered to be struck off from the array of the parties. [5] In Gangadhara Bamarao v. Mahipati Suryarao, 42 Mad. 219, also the name of a defen­dant was struck off from the list of the parties on the ground that the plaint disclosed no cause of action against him. It was further ordered that the suit be dismissed as against him. [6] In all these cases the orders were held as amounting to decrees. But these cases are easily distinguishable from the present case. The learned Munsiff merely disallowed the application for amendment on the ground that defendants 5 and 6 would be deprived of some valuable rights that they had acquired. [6] In all these cases the orders were held as amounting to decrees. But these cases are easily distinguishable from the present case. The learned Munsiff merely disallowed the application for amendment on the ground that defendants 5 and 6 would be deprived of some valuable rights that they had acquired. He did not dismiss the suit against them; nor did he find that the suit was not maintainable as against them. Their names were not struck off either the order does not embody any determination on the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. The defendants are parties, even now. The order of the learned Munsiff indicates that a final order dismissing the suit against defendants 5 and 6 would have followed at the conclusion of the trial of the suit as against other defendants. This case, therefore, is not covered by any of the authorities relied on by the learned counsel. He himself agrees that, these cases are not to the point. The order in! the present case cannot, therefore, be treated as a decree. The preliminary objection, in these» circumstances, must fail and is disallowed. [7] On the merits, the learned counsel has made no serious effort to support the order. Defendants 5 and 6, though minors, were' shown as adults. They were included in the list of defen­dants when the suit was instituted. They were thus parties from the time the plaint was presented, The mistake in their description does not justify the view that they were not parties at all to the suit and rectification of the mistake as to their description would amount to their being impleaded on the date of rectification. Section 22, Limitation Act, has no application to cases where a defendant, though a minor, is described as an adult: vide Abdul Aziz v. Sk Amir, A. I. R. (28) 1941 Nag. 130. It merely covers the case of a defendant who is impleaded or substituted after the institution of the suit. The amendment sought for, therefore, could not have the effect of depriving the defendants of any right as they had acquired no right under the Limitation Act. 130. It merely covers the case of a defendant who is impleaded or substituted after the institution of the suit. The amendment sought for, therefore, could not have the effect of depriving the defendants of any right as they had acquired no right under the Limitation Act. In fact, provision is made for such cases in O. 32, B. 8, Civil P. C., which provides that where the defendant is a minor, the Court, on being satisfied of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be guardian for the suit for such minor. It further provides that an order for the appoint­ment of a guardian for the suit may be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the minor or by the plaintiff. The plea of minority was raised on behalf of the defendants. The plaintiff did not contest this position and agreed that the defendants be represented by a guardian and applied to be permitted to make consequential changes in the heading of the plaint. [8] We think the learned Judge has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him on a ground which has no legal basis. The order, to say the least, is vitiated by a materially irregular exercise of jurisdiction and ought not to be allowed to v stand. The petition of revision is, therefore, allowed and it is ordered that the amendment prayed for shall be allowed to be made. The peti­tioner shall have his costs of this petition. Hearing fee Hs. 16. [9] Thadani C. J.-I agree. Revision allowed.