ORDER : 1. This appln. in revn. ia by the pltf. against the order of the Dist. J. Gwalior dated 28-8-1950. The pltf. filed a suit for pre-emption against the defts. In the course of the trial evidence was adduced by the pltf. with regard to issues 2, 3 and 4, the burden of proof of which lay upon him. That evidence was closed on 18-11-1937. The deft, produced his evidence in rebuttal on the same issues and that also was closed on 24-2-1938. In the meantime the house in dispute was sold to one Ganeshilal Phulchand who was impleaded as a party. A new issue was, therefore, framed which runs as follows : "Whether the pltf. is owner of the house on the basis of which the right of pre-emption is claimed?." 2. In the course of recording Ganeshilal's evidence in rebuttal on this issue the counsel for the deft, raised an objection that the pltf. cannot ask a question in cross-examination which relates to the issue, evidence on which had already been closed. This objection was upheld by the learned Dist J. Against this order the pltf. filed this revn. 3. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the non - Appct. is that no revn. can be entertained against an interlocutory order. Although he raised this objection he did not attempt to support his argument by citing any case law. The learned counsel for the petnr. has countered this argument by stating that the revn. can be entertained by the H. C. even against an interlocutory Order provided conditions laid down in S. 115, Civil P. C. are satisfied. In support of this argument he refer, red me to Bir Babu v. Raghubar Babu, A. I. r. (34) 1947 Pat. 469 : (26 Pat. 393) and Narayan Sonajee v. Seshrao Vithoba, a. i. R. (35) 1948 Nag 258 : (I. L. r. (1948) Nag. 16 F. b.). In the case of Bir Babu v. Raghubar Babu, A. i. r. (34) 1947 Pat. 469 : (26 Pat 393), the question was whether the onus of proving certain issues was rightly placed or not. Their Lordships of the Patna H. C. held that the correct placing of the onus of proof is a vital point of procedure and an incorrect placing of onus may, therefore, amount to material irregularity. 469 : (26 Pat 393), the question was whether the onus of proving certain issues was rightly placed or not. Their Lordships of the Patna H. C. held that the correct placing of the onus of proof is a vital point of procedure and an incorrect placing of onus may, therefore, amount to material irregularity. As a general proposition they also laid down that ordinarily an interlocutory order is not capable of revn. particularly when their is another remedy available to the injured party, but where the order complained against is such as is calculated to cause irreparable loss to the injured party and there is no right of appeal and no remedy available to the party the order may be revised if the conditions laid down in cls. (a), (b) or (c) of S. 115, Civil P. C. are satisfied (vide Bir Babu v. Raghubar Babu, A. I. R. (34) 1947 Pat. 469 : (26 Pat. 393). Another important case cited by the learned counsel for the petnr. is Narayan Sonajee v. Seshrao, A. I. R. (35) 1948 Nag. 258 : (I. L. R. (1948) Nag. 16 F. b.). Their Lordships of the Nagpur H. C. constituting the F. B. after reviewing a number of cases from various H. Cs. have held that revn. can be entertained against an interlocutory order. In view of these decisions, there is no doubt that this Ct. has power to entertain a revn. against an interlocutory order. 4. The question for determination in this case is whether a party can, in cross-examination, ask a question relating to the issues on which both the parties have tendered their evidence. The learned Dist. J. has given the following reasons for upholding the objections of the counsel for the deft.: This reasoning clearly indicates that the learned Dist. J., appears to think that it would be reopening the case if questions were to be asked with regard to issues 2, 3 and 4. I have not been able to follow this argument. Issues 2, 3 and 4 as stated above have not yet been decided. But the parties certainly have tendered their evidence both in proof and in rebuttal. Hence, the question of re-opening the case does not arise at all. It is not a question of adducing additional evidence. What has been disallowed (both by the Dist. Ct. Issues 2, 3 and 4 as stated above have not yet been decided. But the parties certainly have tendered their evidence both in proof and in rebuttal. Hence, the question of re-opening the case does not arise at all. It is not a question of adducing additional evidence. What has been disallowed (both by the Dist. Ct. and the H. C.) is production of additional evidence in support of issues 2, 3 and 4. But asking a question in cross-examination with regard to issue on which evidence had already been tendered is not producing additional evidence. When a party produces evidence in support of an issue the other party has a right to adduce evidence in rebuttal. When the other party produces evidence in support or in rebuttal the party beginning has a right to cross-examine witnesses on all the issues, in accordance with S. 188, Evidence Act. If asking such questions in the cross-examination is tantamount to producing additional evidence, it would not have been allowed after the evidence has been tendered. But there is no such restriction on a party on the ground that his evidence has already been tendered. This clearly shows that the right of asking question in cross-examination is quite distinct from the right of producing evidence. 5. Section 138, Evidence Act, reads as follows: "Witness shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined. The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief." 6. In his learned commentary, Mr. Monir states as follows: "As in English law, so under the Act, the cross-examination need not be confined to the matters to which the witness has testified in his examination-in-chief, but extends to the whole case. Therefore, if a party calls a witness to prove the simplest fact connected with his case, the other party is at liberty not only to cross-examine him on every issue but also to put leading questions to establish his own case." (Vide Monir's Law of Evidence, 3rd Edn. at p. 1107.) Woodroffe's Law of Evidence also supports this view. (Vide Woodroffe's Law of Evidence 9th Edn., p. 982). Taylor's Law of Evidence also (contains ?) similar remarks (Vide Taylor's Law of Evidence 12th Edn. Vol. at p. 1107.) Woodroffe's Law of Evidence also supports this view. (Vide Woodroffe's Law of Evidence 9th Edn., p. 982). Taylor's Law of Evidence also (contains ?) similar remarks (Vide Taylor's Law of Evidence 12th Edn. Vol. 2, para 1432, p. 913). This proposition has been fully expounded by their Lordships of the Calcutta H. Ct. in the case of Amritlal Hazara v. Emperor, Vide 42 Cal. 957 at p. 1022 : (a. i. R. (3) 1916 Cal. 188 : 16 Cr. L. J. 497). It is clear, therefore, that in the cross-examination a party can ask questions on every issue to establish its case. There is no rule of procedure which deprives a party of its right to cross-examine a witness in respect of the whole case on the ground that evidence with regard to some issues has already been tendered. The questions however must be such as relate to the relevant facts. 7. This being the position in law, the view taken by the learned Dist. J., is incorrect. The pltf. has a right to ask questions in cross-examination in respect of the whole case. 8. In the view that I take this revn. must be accepted. The revn. is allowed with costs and the order of the Dist, J. dated 28-8-1950 is set aside.