JUDGMENT : This appear arises out of two consolidated cross suits. On 13-3-1950 the respondent Champalal as a trustee of certain property left by Dhanraj deceased, instituted a suit in the court of Civil Judge First Class Lashkar for the recovery of Rs. 2000/- together with interest thereon at the rate of six annas per cent per month said to have been advanced on 14-2-1945 to Kalyandas, the father of the appellant Parasram, by Dhanraj. In his defence, Parasram admitted the loan. He, however, resisted the suit on the plea that the amount was borrowed by pledging six Habib bars of gold weighing thirty tolas; that he asked Champalal to allow him to redeem the gold and also gave him a notice on 13-3-1950 for the return of the gold or the payment of its value and that when no reply was received from Champalal, he instituted a suit on 24-3-1950 in the Court of Civil Judge First Class Lashkar against Champalal for the return of the gold or in the alternative for payment of its value. In the cross suit filed by Parasram, Champalal denied the pledge transaction. Both these suits were consolidated. The learned trial Judge found the pledge transaction established by the evidence on record and accordingly he rejected Champalals claim for the recovery of Rs. 2000/- together with interest thereon and gave to Parasram a decree against Champalal for Rs. 1052/9/- with interest thereon from 22-3-1950 at the rate of 6% per annum till the date of payment. The amount decreed in favour of Parasram represented the value of the pledged gold bars less the amount due from Parasram to Champalal. In appeal the learned District Judge of Gawlior held that Parasram had failed to prove that the amount of Rs. 2000/- was borrowed by a pledge of any gold bars. He accordingly decreed Champalals claim for the recovery of Rs. 2000/- with interest from Parasram. Parasram has now appealed to this Court. 2. The only point for decision that arises in this appeal is whether the admitted loan of Rs. 2000/-was against a pledge of six habib bars of gold weighing thirty tolas. He accordingly decreed Champalals claim for the recovery of Rs. 2000/- with interest from Parasram. Parasram has now appealed to this Court. 2. The only point for decision that arises in this appeal is whether the admitted loan of Rs. 2000/-was against a pledge of six habib bars of gold weighing thirty tolas. The appellant sought to prove the fact that his father Kalyandas pawned these gold bars with Dhanraj by (1) the statements of Sidharaj and Manmal, who deposed that it was in their presence that the gold bars had been pledged by Kalyandas with Dhanraj; (2) by the evidence of Parasram who stated that he was present at the time when his father pledged the gold bars and that his father made an entry Ex. P. 6 in his account books, which entry mentioned that the amount of Rs. 2000/- was borrowed after pledging six gold bars weighing thirty tolas; (3) by an admission said to have been made by Champalal to the witnesses Ramkumar and Kanhaialal s/o Hiralal about the existence of a memo given by Kalyandas to Dhanraj about the pledge of the gold bars. The learned Civil Judge accepted this evidence produced by Parasram and found it corroborated by an entry Ex. P. 1 in Dhanrajs account book about the loan transaction which mentioned that a memo had been taken. The learned District Judge rejected the evidence of Siddharaj and Manmal dubbing them as chance witnesses. He did not place any reliance on the account books of the appellants father Kalyandas, which according to him were not maintained regularly or systematically. He also rejected the testimony of Parasram that he was present at the time of this transaction on the ground that his presence was not supported by any other witness. As to the admission of Champalal before Ramkumar and Kalyandas, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that their statements did not show that Champalal admitted before them the existence of a memo by Kalyandas to Dhanraj embodying the pledge transaction and that even if Champalal made any such admission it could not be used as evidence when Champalal was not questioned about the admission and given an opportunity to explain it. The learned District Judge applied S. 145, Evidence Act and held that the admission was not admissible in evidence inasmuch as Champalal was not confronted with it in cross-examination. 3. Mr. The learned District Judge applied S. 145, Evidence Act and held that the admission was not admissible in evidence inasmuch as Champalal was not confronted with it in cross-examination. 3. Mr. Patankar first urged that the learned District Judge rejected the evidence of Siddharaj and Manmal on altogether untenable grounds. There is no force in this contention. (After discussion of the evidence his Lordship proceeded :) In my opinion the learned District Judge was right in rejecting the evidence of Siddharaj and Manmal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant was, however, on a firm ground in his further contention that the account books of the appellants father Kalyandas containing the entry Ex. P. 6 about the pledge transaction and the evidence of Parasram were rejected by the learned District Judge on totally inadequate grounds. The learned District Judge thought that the account books could not be said to be properly maintained, for the reason that the first two pages in the account books were blank, that the books did not bear the signature of any Court and that the accounts had not been made up daily taut only monthly. I fail to see how all these factors made the account books irregular or unsystematic. In all account books the first one or two pages are generally left blank for heading and Puja. I do not know from where the learned District Judge derived the proposition that an account book cannot be called regular unless it bears the signature or seal of any court. The law does not prescribe any particular form of books of account or their authentication. All that is necessary is that the book should be such a regular and usual account book as explains itself and as appears on its face to create a liability in an account with the party against whom it is offered. No doubt an account book kept in the form of daily entries of debits and credits is far more satisfactory. But it is not essential that the accounts should be made up daily. An account book containing entries made in time of all transactions would be regular one even if it is made up every month, (see Gorelal v. Pannalal, 1949 Madh BLR 371 (A). In my opinion the learned District Judge clearly erred in excluding from evidence the entry Ex. P. 6 in the account books kept by Kalyandas. An account book containing entries made in time of all transactions would be regular one even if it is made up every month, (see Gorelal v. Pannalal, 1949 Madh BLR 371 (A). In my opinion the learned District Judge clearly erred in excluding from evidence the entry Ex. P. 6 in the account books kept by Kalyandas. The entry speaks of the fact that Kalyandas borrowed Rs. 2000/- from Dhanraj by pledging six bars of habib gold weighing thirty tolas. It has been proved by the evidence of Parasram who said it was in the handwriting of his father. Parasram further said that he was present when the bars were pawned. There is nothing in the statement of Parasram to raise any doubt about his presence at the time of the pledge transaction. The learned District Judge was not justified in disbelieving this statement of. Parasram on the ground that Siddaraj and Manmal did not depose to his presence at the time of the pledge of the gold bars. It is plain that if the statements of Siddharaj and Manmal that they themselves were present at the material time are rejected, as the learned District Judge did, then clearly what they stated about the presence or absence of other persons at the time of the transaction was valueless and could not be used for contradicting a witness who said in positive terms that he was present. Quite apart from this, according to Manmal, Parasram was also present when the gold bars were pledged. Siddharaj did not say that Parasram was not present. What he said was that at the time of the pledging of the bars, Kalyandas, Dhanraj and Babulal were also present and that he did not remember who others were there. There is thus no reason to discard the statement of Parasram that it was in his presence that six bars of gold were pawned by his father Kalyandas with Dhanraj and that his father made the entry Ex. P. 6 in his account books. If this statement of Parasram is accepted, as I think it must be, then the tact of Rs. 2000/- having been borrowed by Kalyandas by pledging six bars of Habib gold with Dhanraj is clearly established. 5. P. 6 in his account books. If this statement of Parasram is accepted, as I think it must be, then the tact of Rs. 2000/- having been borrowed by Kalyandas by pledging six bars of Habib gold with Dhanraj is clearly established. 5. Coming now to the admission of Champalal before the witnesses Ramkumar and Kanhaiyalal to the effect that he was in possession of a n emo of the pledge transaction written by Kalyandas, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the admission was established by the evidence of Kanhaiyalal and Ramkumar that Champalal who gave evidence long after Ramkumar and Kanhaiyalal had been examined in the case, made no statement inconsistent or contradictory to that admission; that being so, the question of contradicting him by confronting him with the admission could not arise and the admission could be used in evidence even though it was not put to Champalal. Learned counsel relied on Firm Malikdas Raj Faqir Chand v. Firm Piara Lal Aya Ram AIR 1946 Lah 65 (FB) (B). There is considerable force in this contention. While it is true that Ramkumars evidence does not show that Champalal made any such admission before him, Kanhaiyalals statement is clearly to the effect that Champalal admitted before him the possession of a memo noting the pledge transaction. The evidence of Ramkumar is only this; that once Kalyandas and Champalal approached him to bring about a settlement of the dispute between them and that thereafter Champalal never came to him and showed any papers or account books. Ramkumar admitted in his cross-examination that there was no talk in his presence about Champalal having admitted any pledge. The witness said " According to Kanhaiyalal when Champalal and Parasram asked him to settle the matter, he told Champalal to bring the account books as well as the memo given by Kalyandas about the pledging of the gold bars and that thereupon Champalal replied that he would bring these papers. Kanhaiyalal added that Champalal did not turn up again. No question whatever was put to Kanhaiyalal in cross-examination with the result that his evidence stands unchallenged. Now Kanhaiyalals statement that Champalal agreed to bring and show to him the account books and the memo of the pledge in the writing of Kalyandas, clearly involves an admission on the part of Champalal about his being in possession of the memo. No question whatever was put to Kanhaiyalal in cross-examination with the result that his evidence stands unchallenged. Now Kanhaiyalals statement that Champalal agreed to bring and show to him the account books and the memo of the pledge in the writing of Kalyandas, clearly involves an admission on the part of Champalal about his being in possession of the memo. If he was not in possession of the memo and if he did not know that there was such a memo in the papers left by Dhanraj, Champalal would have said that he was not in possession of the memo or that he would search for it and if available, then he would bring it. Kanhaiyalal was examined on 3-9-1951. Champalal gave his evidence on 11-10-1952. In his evidence Champalal said nothing about the talk and the admission to which Kanhaiyalal deposed. On this point no question was put to Champalal either in examination-in-chief or cross-examination. The question then arises, whether the admission which according to Kanhaiyalal was made before him by Champalal can be used in evidence against Champalal when it was not put to him. I think it can be used. Section 145, Evidence Act under which the learned District Judge ruled out the admission has no applicability here for the simple reason that the admission made by Champalal was oral and not in writing. Section 145 only applies when it is intended to contradict the witness by a previous inconsistent statement of his in writing or reduced into writing. There is, no doubt, considerable authority for the proposition that the procedure which should be observed in the cross-examination of a witness whose credit is intended to be impeached by confronting him with his former inconsistent oral statement is the same as where it is intended to impeach him by a former inconsistent statement made in writing or reduced into writing. But here the question of contradicting Champalal by confronting him with the admission made by him before Kanhaiyalal did not and could not arise, when Champalal, while giving evidence, did not make any statement inconsistent or contradictory to that admission. The admission was proved against Champalal by the evidence of Kanhaiyalal and it must be taken that Champalals attention was drawn to it when the other party proved the admission by the evidence of Kanhaiyalal. The admission was proved against Champalal by the evidence of Kanhaiyalal and it must be taken that Champalals attention was drawn to it when the other party proved the admission by the evidence of Kanhaiyalal. The admission having been established, it lay on Champalal to explain it and if he did not say anything about it in his examination-in-chief, then there was no obligation on the opposite party to confront him with the admission. The admission could, therefore, be used as legal evidence against Champalal even though it was not put to him. This view is amply supported by the decision of Mahajan, J., in AIR 1946 Lah 65 (B). In that case the learned Judge first pointed out that under S. 21, Evidence Act admissions of a party which are not self-serving, on a point at issue are valuable and relevant pieces of evidence in support of that issue and unless there is anything else in the Evidence Act or any other statute which enjoins that admissions in any particular contingency would not be used as legal evidence or that they would not be used without complying with certain formalities, it cannot be held that they are inadmissible in evidence. He then emphasised the fact that S. 145, Evidence Act deals with the cross-examination of a witness and has no reference to a case where a person making the previous statement has not appeared as a witness and given evidence as such, and that it is only in cases where the party goes into the witness box and makes a statement inconsistent with the previous statement, that a duty is cast by the provisions of S. 145 on his opponent to confront him with his statement inconsistent with the statement made in Court. The learned Judge further observed that if an admission is proved against a party and his attention has been drawn to it - and it must be taken that his attention was drawn when in his face the other party has proved that admission - then it is the duty of the party as a party to that case to explain that admission and if, he does not go into the witness box or having appeared in the witness box he makes no statement inconsistent or contrary to that admission and on denial of that admission is not involved in the statement made by the party in the witness box, the law casts no duty on the opposite party to confront him with his previous admission or admissions. Such a case is outside the ambit of S. 145 Evidence Act and the admission can be used as legal evidence against toe party even though it was not put to him. It was also said that where a party has gone into the witness box and made a statement inconsistent with the admission or tile statements made in the witness box involve the denial of the previous admission, then it cannot be used as legal evidence in the case against that party, unless his attention was drawn to that statement during cross-examination and he was confronted with the specific portions of that statement which were sought to be used as admissions. Applying these principles here it is clear that Champaials admission to Kanhaiyalal about the existence of the memo referred to above is legal evidence against Champalal even though Champalal was not confronted with that admission. That admission corroborates the statement of Parasram that when his father Kalyandas borrowed Rs. 2000/- from Dhanraj by pledging six bars of gold weighing thirty tolas, he gave a memo of the pledge transaction to Dhanraj. 6. In my judgment Parasrams statement, supported as it is by Kanhaiyalal, sufficiently establishes the fact that the loan transaction in suit was against a pledge of six bars of gold weighing thirty tolas. The effect of this evidence is in no way displaced by Champaials testimony, who had no personal knowledge of the loan transaction and who was not in a position to say whether Kalyandas did or did not pledge any gold bars with Dhanraj. Indeed the entry Ex. The effect of this evidence is in no way displaced by Champaials testimony, who had no personal knowledge of the loan transaction and who was not in a position to say whether Kalyandas did or did not pledge any gold bars with Dhanraj. Indeed the entry Ex. P-1 in the account books of Dhanraj on which Champalal relied in support of his claim also goes to show that Rs. 2000/- were advanced by Dhanraj to Kalyandas against some pledge. The entry makes a reference to a memo having been written and it is in evidence that whenever money is borrowed by pawning something, the pawnor gives a memo to the pawnee. It was suggested by learned counsel for the respondent that the memo might be one noting simply the loan transaction, having no reference whatever to any pledge. I do not agree. The memo must have some special significance when it was specifically mentioned in the entry Ex. P-1. Otherwise it is difficult to see for what purpose it was written out. If the parties intended that the loan transaction should be reduced to some writing, then that object could have been carried out by taking the signature of Kalyandas below the entry Ex. P-1. In the face of the evidence on record that a memo is given to the lender whenever money is borrowed against a pledge, it cannot be held that the words in entry Ex. P-1 referred to a memo noting the loan transaction itself without any reference to any pledge. 7. In my opinion on the "evidence on record, the appellant has been able to establish the fact that his father Kalyandas borrowed Rs. 2000/- from Dhanraj by pledging six bars of gold weighing thirty tolas. That being so, the appellant is clearly entitled to receive the difference between the price of the gold bars and the amount due from him to Dhanraj on account of the loan transaction, when the respondent Champalal is not in possession of the pledged gold bars. Before me there was no dispute between the parties as to the value of the gold bars found by the trial Judge. 8. For these reasons the decision of the learned District Judge Gwalior is set aside and the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge First Class, Gwalior is restored with costs throughout.