JUDGMENT : Ray, C.J. - The Petitioners in this case are Defendants 1, 2 and 3 in a suit for declaration that the purchase of a revenue paying Estate in respect of which both the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 were registered as co-proprietors, by the latter in the benami name of Defendant No. 3 was, under the circumstances of the case, to ensure to the benefit jointly of the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The Plaintiff therefore prayed that after this declaration the Court may pass such other appropriate order of reconveyance or the like in order to give appropriate relief to the Plaintiff. 2. The relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 was straddled. The latter was claiming to have been adopted by the Plaintiff's deceased younger brother and by virtue of that status, as an adopted son, was claiming 8 annas interest in the entire family property including the revenue paying estate in dispute of which the Plaintiff and the deceased brother of his were owners as coparceners at the time of the latter's death. 3. Over this question as to the factum as well as the validity of adoption, the parties have been litigating for sometime past, and the litigation in fact is not yet over. It has to be stated, however, that on the point of adoption the Defendant No. 2 has succeeded in two Courts and the special appeal is pending in the High Court. By virtue of the concurrent findings of the two Courts, Defendant No. 2 has notwithstanding the opposition of the Plaintiff got himself recorded as co-proprietor in respect of this revenue paying estate as well as other such estates in the register of the Collector. 4. It is clear that as a co-proprietor, on the basis of that registration, he was liable to pay the revenue in order to save the estate from being sold by the Collector under the Revenue Sale Law of the Province. Evidence was in abundance in the case to the effect that Defendant No. 2 was not only registered as a proprietor but was successfully exploiting the situation for collecting rents from the tenants. Evidence was in abundance in the case to the effect that Defendant No. 2 was not only registered as a proprietor but was successfully exploiting the situation for collecting rents from the tenants. It may be stated here, that according to the law of Agricultural Tenancy as well as the law relating to the registration of revenue paying and revenue free estates, nobody is entitled to claim to recover rents from the tenants either as a proprietor or as a tenure holder unless he is recorded as such in the records of the Collector or of the proprietor of the tenure as the case may be. Under the circumstances it was not dispute before us that as between the Collector and himself the Defendant No. 2 was under the liability to pay the revenue. Besides, under the special procedure provided in the Revenue Sale Law with regard to bringing the property to sale in the event of revenue falling due and becoming arrears, Defendant No. 2 was entitled to being served with notices and that at various stages of the proceeding. 5. It is true that the Plaintiff would not admit Defendant No. 2 to be a cosharer not only in respect of this estate but also in respect of any other property belonging to the family. In view of the pending litigation he could not avowedly do so. 6. In the particular case the Plaintiff's case was that, in view of the position that the Defendant No. 2 was occupying and which was of his own seeking, he took upon himself such obligations as a co-sharer would be under and that taking advantage of his position as such or to be more correct availing himself of his position as such collected the rents from the tenants and thereby deprived the Plaintiff from" coming into possession of the entire resources with which the revenue was to be paid, committed default, and that knowing that a default had been committed, he, instead of fulfilling his obligation of paying up the revenue not only for himself but also the entire revenue, allowed the property to be sold. It was definitely urged by the Plaintiff that it was a sharp practice, rather, a fraudulent conduct on his part to get the property purchased in the name of Defendant No. 3. It was definitely urged by the Plaintiff that it was a sharp practice, rather, a fraudulent conduct on his part to get the property purchased in the name of Defendant No. 3. Under the equitable doctrine governing the fiduciary relationship in which the co-sharers stand in relation to preservation of the common or joint property on payment of either rent or revenue or any other public charges, he was not entitled to use his own wrong as a shield. This was, in substance, the Plaintiff's case. 7. Defendant No. 1 is the father of Defendant No. 2. The former is an Advocate of this Court and is a gentleman of some influence. It is obvious that he was looking after the interest of Defendant No. 2 in all the litigations centering round this disputed question of adoption. It is evident from the evidence on record that he was in all relevant interests identifying himself with Defendant No. 2. This Hon'ble Court came to the finding that Defendant No. 3 had no subsisting interest in the property and that he was a mere name-lender. 8. It was also found that Defendant No. 2 was asserting the purchase to have been made on his behalf and for his benefit and had been asking the tenants not to pay rents to anybody else meaning the Plaintiff as well. Under the circumstances there was no difficulty for the Hon'ble Judges to come to the conclusion that he did not fulfil the obligation that lay upon him in the fiduciary capacity which he was occupying as a co-sharer and that his purchase was an act of trust on the part of the other co-sharer, namely, the Plaintiff. He was therefore declared to hold the estate in trust for the Plaintiff to the extent of the share for which the Plaintiff stood recorded. Accordingly he was directed to reconvey the Plaintiff's share to him. 9. It is contended by the Petitioners, that the question involved in this case is a matter of general importance and is also of unusual difficulty. Accordingly he was directed to reconvey the Plaintiff's share to him. 9. It is contended by the Petitioners, that the question involved in this case is a matter of general importance and is also of unusual difficulty. On the face of it, as they say, the fact that two learned Judges of this Court differed and the case had to be referred to a third Judge is proof sufficient that the question of law involved is not only a substantial question but is a question not free from difficulty and of general and public importance too. 10. There is no doubt that this case does not fulfil the valuation test of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Besides the question involved may be a question of law, but it is difficult to agree that it is such a substantial question of law that the public will have to suffer in case the point is not set at rest by a decision of the Supreme Court. It is settled, for at least more than a century, that the relative position, as between parties co-sharers, is as it has been defined by the learned third Judge of this Court in his final judgment. The only feature that it is pointed out distinguishes the present from ordinary run of cases of trust position as between cosharers is that the Plaintiff was not acknowledging Defendant No. 2 as a co-sharer and would rather repel that claim of his. Under the circumstances, it is urged, there could be no position of trust to be assumed as subsisting between the two. The position of trust in such cases is not to be deduced from the factual relationship between the parties, but from the legal status that each occupies in relation to the other in respect of any property and necessarily in relation to the corresponding rights and obligations inter-se. Under the circumstances of this case that the Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 2 were fighting as to the status of Defendant No. 2 as an adopted son necessarily involving his claim to part ownership of this property, as well as other, does not, in my opinion, make any difference. I do not think that the question of law involved is one which is not free from difficulty. I do not think that the question of law involved is one which is not free from difficulty. Besides, it has been laid down as a settled principle of law that mere involution of substantial question of law will not be sufficient to certify the fitness of an appeal u/s 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter will be of either public or private importance or the question of law involved will be such that its final settlement by the highest authority will benefit the public in a potentially large number of cases. 11. Under the circumstances we do not consider that this is a fit case which will be certified by this Court for the purpose of appeal to the Supreme Court. The petition for leave is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case and, particularly, in view of the relationship between the parties we award no costs to the opposite parties. Each party should bear his own cost. Narasimham, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed