RAM LAEHAYA J.: This is an application under Art. 134 (c) of the Constitution of India for a certificate to the effect that the case which was disposed of by a final order of this Court dated 21-8-1950 is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. (2) In the exercise of its revisional jurisdic­tion, criminal proceedings initiated on a complaint by the present petitioner in the Court of a Magis­trate at Gauhati (in Assam) were quashed at the instance of one of the three accused (Hiralal Patni) in the case. We came to the conclusion that the dispute arose out of a contract. The par­ties were at issue on several complicated ques­tions of fact and law, the decision of which in­volved a very elaborate and prolonged inquiry, it was found that the Civil Court was the pro­per forum for the decision Of these questions. The case was regarded as one of an exceptional nature and this in review (sic) was apparent from a bare recital of the two conflicting ver­sions in the case. It was further found that the complaint did not disclose any criminal offence either under S. 417, Pena Code, or under Ss, 6 and 7, Merchandise Marks Act. An explicit state­ment that the three accused were personally liable for applying or getting applied false marks did not appear in the complaint or the state­ment that followed. There was no allegation that the contract was entered into personally by the three accused and they had any criminal intent to cheat or defraud at that time, several factors pointing to the absence of good faith on the part of the complainant in instituting the plaint were also noticed and the proceedings pending in the Court of the Magistrate were quashed against all the three accused. (3) A certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court has been prayed for on several grounds contained in the petition. At the hearing, the learned ad­vocate crystallised these grounds into one contention. He urged that the order of this Court quashing the proceedings, which had hardly begun, was vitiated by an error of Jaw. At the hearing, the learned ad­vocate crystallised these grounds into one contention. He urged that the order of this Court quashing the proceedings, which had hardly begun, was vitiated by an error of Jaw. He argued that the complainant should have been permitted to adduce evidence in support of the allegations made by him in the complaint and the quashing of the proceedings before such an opportunity was afforded to him was not in consonance with law. In support of this contention he relied on "Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor', AIR (20) 1933 Sind 169: (34 Cr L J 1049) and 'Amirbux v. Emperor', AIR (21) 1934 Sind 183: (36 Cr L J 331). No other point was pressed in. support of the prayer for a certificate. (4) We have first to discover what may be described as an objective test or a standard for deter­mining whether a particular case is a fit one for appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court under Art, 134 (c) of the Constitution of India. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, and even before, an aggrieved party in a criminal proceeding had no right of appeal to the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not a Court of appeal in criminal cases, but wherever there was substantial or grave injustice by reason of disregard of the principals of natural Justice or by the infringement of the recognised forms of legal process, their Lordships of the Privy Council interfered in the exercise of the prerogative of His Majesty the King Emperor. (5) As early as 1887, Lord Watson in delivering the Judgment of the Privy Council in 'In re Abradham Mallory Dillet', (1887) 12 A. C. 459: (56 L. T. 315) observed that "Her Majesty will not review, or interfere with, the course of criminal proceedings unless it is shown that by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial or grave Injustice has been done." The principle enunciated was adhered to in substance till 1946. It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases bearing on the point. It would be enough for the purposes of this case to refer to three important cases stating the rule of practice teat their Lordships of the Privy Council always kept in view. It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases bearing on the point. It would be enough for the purposes of this case to refer to three important cases stating the rule of practice teat their Lordships of the Privy Council always kept in view. In 'Taba Singh v. Emperor', AIR (12) 1925 P. C. 59: {26 Cr L J 391), the Board refused to accept or share the responsibility for the administration of criminal justice in India unless there was some violation of the principles of natural justice or some disregard of legal principles. In 1932, Lord Dunedin in deliver­ing the judgment of their Lordships in 'Mohindar Singh v. Emperor', A I R (19) 1932 P. C. 234: {84 Or L J 18) gave a very emphatic expression to the principle. He observed that "there must be something so irregular, or so outrageous as to shake the very basis of justice". In 1946, Lord Porter, relying on the observations of Lord Waston in 'In re, Abraham Mallory Dillet', (1887) 13 A C 459: (56 L T 615), observed in 'Malak Khan v. Emperor', A I R (33) 1946 P. C. 16: (47 Or. L J 489). "That the Privy Council would not review or 'interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it was shown that by a disregard of forms of legal process or otherwise substantial or grave injustice had been done. When neither of these are present, the Privy Council will not interfere on the ground that the evidence was wrongly valued or was not sufficient to justify the conclusion reached". (6) It is clear the exercise of His Majesty's prerogative was limited to cases where grave or substantial injustice had occurred by reason of disregard of the recognised principles of natu­ral Justice or the forms of legal process. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not alter the position. (6) It is clear the exercise of His Majesty's prerogative was limited to cases where grave or substantial injustice had occurred by reason of disregard of the recognised principles of natu­ral Justice or the forms of legal process. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not alter the position. In 'Kapildeo Singh v. King', A I R (37) i860 P C 80: (51 Cr L J 1057) Mahajan J., in delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the Federal Court in an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court at Patna affirming the convictions of the appellant under S. 147, Penal Code, found it necessary to remark that though the Federal Court was not bound by Privy Council practice and precedents, It did not depart from the principles which had been laid down by it defining the limits within which interference with the course of criminal justice dispensed in the subordinate Courts is warranted. This case was first of its kind admitted by the Federal Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction and it was disposed of on 24-1-1950. On 26-1-1950, the Constitution of India by which the Supreme Court was created came into force. Articles 131-136 deal with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Article 131 confers original juris­diction on the Supreme Court. Article 132 In­vests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdic­tion in certain cases. An appeal under this Arti­cle would lie to the Supreme Court from a judg­ment, decree or final order of a High Court In the territory of India, whether in a Civil, cri­minal or other proceedings, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial ques­tion of law as to the interpretation of the Cons­titution. It is open to the Supreme Court to grant special leave where the High Court has refused to give such a certificate. Article 133 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeal from High Courts In civil matters. Article 134 defines the limits of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in crimi­nal matters. It is open to the Supreme Court to grant special leave where the High Court has refused to give such a certificate. Article 133 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeal from High Courts In civil matters. Article 134 defines the limits of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in crimi­nal matters. An appeal would lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sen­tence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India, (a) if the High Court has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death, or (b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any Court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused per­son and sentenced him to death, or (c) the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, provided that an appeal under Cl. (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made under Cl. (1) of Art. 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require. Parliament has got the authority to enlarge the criminal appellate Juris­diction of the Supreme Court under Art. 134, Cl. (2). It is apparent that the appellate jurisdic­tion of the Supreme Court in criminal matters has been enlarged by Cls. (a) and (b) of Art. 134 though to a very limited extent. In all other criminal matters, the right of appeal to the Su­preme Court has not been conceded to the parties. In other words, the Supreme Court is not HI Court of appeal in matters not covered by Cls. (a) I and (b) of Art. 134 or possibly Art. 132, Clause! (c), therefore, would cover cases in which the aggrieved party is not entitled to appeal as or right and in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and afterwards the Federal Court of India exercised criminal appellate jurisdiction. The situation so far as this clause is concerned would thus appear to be the same as it was be­fore the Constitution came into force. (7) Under Art. 136, the Supreme Court may in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. (7) Under Art. 136, the Supreme Court may in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. Article 136 is not limited to criminal proceed­ings. But Art. 134, which invests the High Court with power to certify a case as a fit one for appeal is limited in its application to judgment, final order or sentence in criminal proceedings. So far as criminal matters are concerned, the. position is that a High Court may certify that! a case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme! Court and the Supreme Court may In its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding. It follows, therefore, that the test or the standard which would guide the High Courts, in determining whether a certifi­cate under Art. 134, Cl. (c) should be granted or not ought to be the same which the Supreme Court may apply in exercising its discretion when asked to grant special leave. The standard in the two Courts cannot be different for the appel­late Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which is to be exercised after a certificate from a High Court or after special leave under Art. 136, is the same. It would not be proper, therefore, for a High Court to refuse to certify a case in which the Supreme Court may consider it proper to allow special leave. Conversely, a High Court may not certify a case as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court where special leave to ap­peal would be refused by the Supreme Court. The test under both the Articles must necessarily be the same. This line of reasoning finds sup­port from the case reported in 'Ramanuja Ayyan-gar v. Emperor', AIR. (22) 1935 Mad 793: (37 Cr L J 64 S B). As stated above, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not a Court of criminal appeal. It, however, granted leave in certain cases. Some High Courts, in India in­cluding the Madras High Court had also the power to certify a criminal matter as fit for ap­peal to the Privy Council. As stated above, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not a Court of criminal appeal. It, however, granted leave in certain cases. Some High Courts, in India in­cluding the Madras High Court had also the power to certify a criminal matter as fit for ap­peal to the Privy Council. In 'Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Emperor', AIR (22) 1935 Mad 793 :(37 CrLJ 64 S B), a special Bench of the Court laid it down that before granting a certificate under the Let­ters Patent, they had to satisfy themselves whe­ther the case fell within the limits prescrI Red by the Privy Council for the entertainment of ap-Ipeals in criminal matters. The case is clearly •analogous and justifies the view that the test Ifor the High Courts under Art. 134 (c) and for Jthe Supreme Court under Art. 136 ought to be the same. (8) The question as to what should be the standard of fitness for purposes of Art. 134, Cl. (c), came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court reported in 'Arjuna Misra v. The Indian Union', AIR (37) 1950 Orissa 235: (ILR (1950) Cut 305). The learned Chief Justice after considering the Privy Council cases enunciating the limits within which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in­terfered with the course of criminal justice ad­ministered in. India observes as follows: "In my opinion, the scope of an appeal to the Supreme Court against a final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding has not at all been widened. That Court will have to interfere with convictions by local trI Runals within the same bounds of limitations and restraints laid down by the Privy Council and the fitness has to be judg­ed by the standard that that trI Runal laid before it in granting special leave to appeal. The only change that the Constitution has introduced is to endow the State High Courts with powers to certify or in other words, to grant leave to apppeal." (9) With great respect to the learned Chief Justice, it may be stated that the scope of appeal to the Supreme Court against a final order or sentence in criminal proceedings has been widened though to a very limited extent. The observation of the learned Judge would seem to relate to the scope of appeal under Cl. The observation of the learned Judge would seem to relate to the scope of appeal under Cl. (c) of Art. 134 and so far as this clause is concerned, the position remains the same and therefore the pronouncements pi their Lordships of the Privy Council should still con­tinue to form useful guides to the High Courts in the exercise of their powers under Art. 134, Cl. (c). These pronouncements have ceased to be binding. They have not, however, outlived their utility for that reason. (10) Articles dealing with the appellate juris­diction of the Supreme Court came to be considered in 'Pritam Singh v. State', AIR (37) 1950 S C 169: (51 Cr L J 1270). Fazl All, J. in. delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the-Supreme Court observed as follows: "Generally speaking, Supreme Court will not grant special Leave to appeal in criminal cases, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appedlea against". (11) It was further recognised that though the Supreme Court was not bound to follow "too rigidly the principles laid down by the Privy Council in granting special leave in cri­minal cases, yet some of those principles were useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of the Court in grant­ing special leave." As the standard both for the High Court and the Supreme Court must be the same, the gene­ral rule laid down in this case would also be the test for determining whether a particular case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134, Cl. (c). This test which covers not only criminal cases taut all cases in which special leave may be applied for under Art. 136, is not less stringent than the one the Judicial Committee had before them for granting special leave in criminal cases. It is necessary, accord­ing to this test, that the case must have ex­ceptional and special circumstances. There should be substantial and grave injustice and that it should have features of sufficient gravity to war­rant a review of the decision. Judged by the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, this petition cannot succeed. There should be substantial and grave injustice and that it should have features of sufficient gravity to war­rant a review of the decision. Judged by the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, this petition cannot succeed. (12) The only point that has been urged is that the decision is contrary to law inasmuch as It ignores or is in defiance of the rule of practice laid down in 'Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor'. AIR (2,0) 1933 Sind 169: (34 Cr L J 1049) and 'Amirbux v. Emperor', AIR (21) 1934 Sind 183: (36 Cr L J 331). (13) In 'Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor', AIR: (20) 1933 Sind 169: (34 Cr L J 1049), it was held that the High Court, as a rule, will allow pro­ceedings to go on and take their course in lower Courts and will not interfere with a pending proceeding even though irregularly conducted, un­less there is exceptional ground for interference. Generally speaking, a High Court would not in­vestigate whether pending proceedings were of a-criminal or a civil nature if the inquiry involved-lengthy arguments. But a safe and practical test is whether a bare statement of the facts of the case without any elaborate argument would suffice to presuade the High Court that the case is a fit case for interference. The learned Judges in this case did not lay down any rule of law-The power of the High Court to interfere in Re­vision with the course of pending proceedings in criminal Court in suitable cases is undoubted, but according to the rule laid down in the Sind case a High Court may not embark on any elabo­rate inquiry into the nature of pending proceed­ings in order to determine whether they are of a criminal or a civil nature. But where a bare statement of the facts is enough to come to a conclusion on the point, the High Court may determine the point. This rule was fully kept in veiw by us. Our conclusion was that a bare statement of the facts of the case or rather of the two rival versions showed clearly that the • dispute was more appropriate for decision by a civil Court. The rule laid down in the Sind case was, in point of fact, applied to the facts 6f this case. Our conclusion was that a bare statement of the facts of the case or rather of the two rival versions showed clearly that the • dispute was more appropriate for decision by a civil Court. The rule laid down in the Sind case was, in point of fact, applied to the facts 6f this case. It is, therefore, wrong to urge that the decision is contrary to law. The principle of the Sind case was not ignored or departed from. No rule of law militating against this decision, was laid down. The statement of the law con­tained in 'Hariram Onkar v. Mt. Radha Jalram', AIR (30) 1943 Nag 327: (45 CrL J 175), relied on by the learned counsel at the hearing of the revi­sion petition was also accepted. Accoiding to the Nagpur case, the proceedings can only be quashed when no offence whatever is disclosed or when the prosecution is bound on the face of it, to fail, or for some other cause equally powerful. We found that in the peculiar circumstances of the case our interference was justified. The findings arrived at in the case were (1) that the dispute was of a civil nature and the decision of the complicated question arising out of it involved elaborate and prolonged Inquiry and (2) that the complaint did not disclose any offence against the three accused personally. These findings would bring the case both within the purview of 'Hariram Onkar v. Mt. Radha Jairam', AIR (30) 1943 Nag 327: (45 Cr L J 175) as well as 'Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor', AIR (20) 1933 Sind 169: (34 Cr L J 1049). The rule of practice enunciated in these cases was not deviated from though the conclusion that the Court arrived at was that the case was a fit one for interference and that the proceedings deserved to be quash­ed. What the learned counsel now therefore must be having at the back of his mind probably is that the rule of practice relied on by him has not been correctly applied to the facts of the case or that the view of this Covirt on facts is erro­neous. He cannot say that any question of law has been wrongly decided or there has been any error of law. There was no question of law, much less a substantial question of law involved in the case. He cannot say that any question of law has been wrongly decided or there has been any error of law. There was no question of law, much less a substantial question of law involved in the case. Any difficulty that may exist in the application of the law would not make the matter a question of law or a substantial question of law. ,(14) In Amirbux v. Emperor', AIR (21) 1934 Sind 183: (36 Cr L J 331), the revision petition was directed against an order of the District Magistrate by which he directed further inquiry into the case of a person who in his view had been improperly discharged. The learned Judges declined to interfere at that stage of the case and observed that interference would be justi­fied if on the face of the proceedings there was some clear injustice requiring immediate redress. The question whether the proceedings were of a civil or of a criminal nature did not arise in the case; nor was there any contention that the com­plaint did not disclose any offence. This case has got no bearing on the matter before us. (15) It is clear that the case does not fulfil any of the requirements of the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the appellant has not made any effort to show that these requirements exist. He has not urged that there are any exceptional or special circumstances. There is no basis for the view that substantial and grave injustice has been done, and no features of sufficient gravity to justify the grant of a certificate have, been indicated to us. (16) The petition must fail and is dismissed. (17) THADANI C. J.: I agree. I am content to say that my interpretation of Cl. (c) of Art. 134 of the Constitution is this: The High Court will not ordinarily certify that the case is a fit one (or appeal to the Supreme Court unless it thinks the final order passed by it is unfit to remain or has doubts as to its fitness to remain, whe­ther on facts or in law, without a certificate as prescrI Red by Cl. (c) of Art. 134. I have no reason to think that our order in this particular case falls within such a category. D. H. Petition dismissed.