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1950 DIGILAW 69 (GAU)

Mohan Lal Agarwalla v. State

1950-12-13

RAM LABHAYA, THADANI

body1950
RAM LABHAYA J: Mohan Lal Agarwalla, the petnr, was convicted under S. 7 (i), Essen­tial Supplies (Temporary powers) Act, 1946 for contravention of S. 3, Assam Food Grains Con­trol Order, 1947. He was sentenced to R. I. for 1 year & also to a fine of Rs. l.000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was ordered to undergo R. I. for another 6 months. The paddy seized from his house was confiscated. (2) In appeal, the conviction was confirmed but the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to 6 months. The rest of the sentence was al­lowed to stand. (3) The petnr has assailed the correctness of the conviction by a revision petn of this Ct. (4) According to the prosecution, Nirmal Chandra Bora, Home Guard, found about 100 maunds of paddy stored in the godown of the petnr at Jhanji Garamur. The paddy was in 82 bags. The petnr had no licence. The paddy was seized & the matter reported to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sibasagar. The Sub-Divisional Officer gave sanction for the prose­cution & the case was sent up for trial. The petnr was charged under S. 7 (i), Essential Sup­plies (Temporary powers) Act, 1946 for the vio­lation of the provisions of S. 3, Assam Food: Grains Control Order, 1947. (5) The accused pleaded not guilty. His de­fence was that he was a patnr in the firm-known as Messrs. Chiranjilal-Basantilal. On the dissolution of the firm & his separation from it about 2 years before the recovery of the paddy from his godown, he got 100 maunds of paddy as his share. He stored it in his godown for his consumption. His act, there­fore, did not contravene any provision of the Assam Food Grains Control Order. (6) The learned counsel for the petnr urged that there was no valid sanction in this case. He argues that the Sub-Divisional Officer, who gave the sanction, had no authority for giving it. His contention is that sanction for the prose­cution could be given by the Director as pro­vided by S. 38, Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947. He concedes that the expression 'Director' as used in S. 38 would include any other officer duly authorised in that behalf either by the Director or by the Provincial Govt. But he urges that the Sub-Divisional Officer was not so authorised. He concedes that the expression 'Director' as used in S. 38 would include any other officer duly authorised in that behalf either by the Director or by the Provincial Govt. But he urges that the Sub-Divisional Officer was not so authorised. He has further urged that the conviction cannot stand on facts as no evidence was led from the prosecution side for proving that the paddy recovered weighed more than 50 mds. (7) The learned Got. Advocate has urged that the Sub-Divisional Officer had been authorised to sanction prosecution under S. 38. He has referred us to Notfn No. D S (1)7237/47/210 dated 18-6-1948. According to this notfn all officers who were D. Cs. or Dist Mags according to the definition of these expressions as given in S. 2 (3) (b) were authorised to sanction prosecutions under S. 38. (8) The learned counsel for the petnr has not relied on the correct Notfn. It is common ground that the recovery of the paddy from the petnr came to be made when the first Assam Food Grains Control Order promulgated by Notfn No. SDB 248/47/1 dated 3-10-1947 was in force. The trial is, therefore, to be regu­lated by this Order. The notfn, on which the learned counsel for the petnr relied, was issued under a subsequent Food Grains Control Order. The notfns with which we are concerned in this case are No. DS (1)/237/47/210 & DS (D/237/ 47/212 dated 18-8-1948. According to the first notfn, all Dist Mags as defined in S. 2 (3) (ta), Assam Food Grains Control Order were autho­rised to exercise powers under S. 38 for prose­cutions in respect of contraventions of Ss. 6 .& 7 of the said Order within their respective jurisdictions. Under the second notfn the Director of Supply declared every Dist Mag as defined in S. 2 (3) (b) of the said order 'Direc­tor' -for the purposes of Ss. 6 & 7 of the said Order within his jurisdiction. Assuming, that by virtue of these notfns the Sub-Divisional Officers were 'Directors' & were specifically authorised to sanction prosecutions under S. 38 their powers to sanction proceedings were limited to contraventions of Ss. 6 & 7 only. In this view the Sub-Divisional Officer, who granted sanction in this case, could grant sanction only for contraventions of Ss. 6 & 7, Assam Food-grains Control Order. 6 & 7 only. In this view the Sub-Divisional Officer, who granted sanction in this case, could grant sanction only for contraventions of Ss. 6 & 7, Assam Food-grains Control Order. (9) The accused has been tried & convicted for contravention of S. 3 of the Order. The learned Govt Advocate conceded that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no authority to sanction the prosecution of the petnr for the contraven­tion of S. 3. The sanction does not show under which section of the Order the prosecution was permitted. The trial of the accused under S. 3, however, was without jurisdiction, for the sanction from the Sub-Divisional Officer if intended to cover S. 3, would be beyond his powers. If he did not intend to give sanction for prosecution under S. 3 of the Order, the trial would be without any sanction. In both the cases the trial of the accused under S. 3 was not founded on any valid sanction. It follows, therefore, that it was without jurisdiction. (10) The learned Govt Advocate has urged that the conviction may be altered to one for a contravention of S. 6, Assam Foodgrains Con­trol Order. He points out that the facts dis­close an offence under S. 6. The sanctioning authority could sanction prosecution under S. 6. The order by which prosecution was sanc­tioned does not mention that it was for the contravention of S. 3 or S. 6. The sanction may thus be construed for a contravention of S. 6. The charge framed against the accused which relates in express terms to a contravention of S. 3, was a mere irregularity which caused no prejudice. He argues that this irregularity in the charge should not be fatal to the proceed­ing & is curable under Ss. 225 & 537, Cr. F. C. He has relied on 26 Cal 863' in support of his contention. (11) We do not think this contention can be accepted. The sections of the Cr. P. C. & the authority relied on do not cover this case. Irre­gularities in a trial by a competent Ct acting within the limits of its jurisdiction may in cer­tain circumstances be cured. But where the trial is wholly without jurisdiction, the proceed­ings are a nullity & no question of altering the conviction so as to make it a conviction for an offence which facts may disclose, would arise. Irre­gularities in a trial by a competent Ct acting within the limits of its jurisdiction may in cer­tain circumstances be cured. But where the trial is wholly without jurisdiction, the proceed­ings are a nullity & no question of altering the conviction so as to make it a conviction for an offence which facts may disclose, would arise. The result, therefore, is that the conviction can­not be allowed to stand. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to go into the ques­tion as to whether the facts disclose any offence. (12) The result is that the petn of revision is allowed & the conviction & sentence are quashed. The petnr shall be released forthwith. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded. (13) THADANI C. J : I agree. D.H. Revision allowed.