This appeal arises out of a suit for khas possession of the land in dispute. The suit was decreed in the trial Ct. On appeal Toy the defts the decree of the trial Ct was re­versed & the suit dismissed on the ground that no valid notice of ejectment had been given to the defts. The pltf has assailed the correct­ness of the appellate decree by a second appeal to this Ct. (2) Pltf's case is that deft 1, who is a pleader's clerk, used to do his work in connection with his cases pending in Cts, & he used to utilise his services as petn-writer. In order to re­munerate him for the work that he was doing, pltf agreed to give him the land in dispute for cultivation. He was not to pay any rent for the land. It was to remain in his possession in lieu of services that he was to render to the pltf. In pursuance of this arrangement the land was delivered to the deft free of rent for purposes of cultivation. Sometime after the deft had remained in possession of the land, pltf in­formed him that he will have his work done by other petn-writers & that he shall deliver back the land to him in the month of Magh. He also sent to the deft a registered notice demanding delivery of possession within 7 days. (3) Deft resisted the suit on several grounds & pleaded 'inter alia' that no legal & proper notice had been served on him. The learned Munsiff, who heard the suit, found that the deft had failed to establish his pleas that he had acquired occupancy rights. He further found that deft was not a tenant on his own admission. He had withheld payment of rent for about 3 years. He was, therefore, not a tenant who could be regarded as entitled to notice before ejectment. The learned Sub­ordinate Judge was of the view that deft was a tenant under the pltf. Instead of paying cash rent, he was rendering services. The relation of the landlord & tenant, therefore, existed bet­ween them which could not be determined ex­cept according to law. In his view the tenancy could not be terminated without a valid notice. He further found that the notice served on the deft did not correctly describe the land. Instead of paying cash rent, he was rendering services. The relation of the landlord & tenant, therefore, existed bet­ween them which could not be determined ex­cept according to law. In his view the tenancy could not be terminated without a valid notice. He further found that the notice served on the deft did not correctly describe the land. It was also a notice allowing only 7 days time to the deft to quit. He found that it was not a valid notice even though T. P. Act did not apply to the case. It is apparent that he has not applied the Assam (Temporarily Set­tled Districts) Tenancy Act to the case & has decided it on general principles. (4) In this appeal, the learned counsel for the pltf has contended that deft was not a tenant at all & therefore no question of any notice arose either under the Tenancy Act or under the general principles of law. The basis of his argument is that where land is given in lieu of services to be rendered^ it is an ar­rangement which cannot be regarded as amounting to a tenancy. (5) I have had considerable difficulty in fol­lowing the argument. It is obvious that, even according to pltf's own showing, deft was hold­ing the land under the pitf. Instead of paying rent in cash or kind, he was rendering ser­vices. Under the T. P. Act rent can be paid in cash, kind or in services. Even if the pro­visions of the T. P. Act do not apply, the prin­ciple underlying S. 105, T. P. Act which defines rent would be applicable. On general prin­ciples therefore, it could not be said that where services are 'rendered in lieu of rent, no tenancy comes into existence. The learned counsel has not been able to produce any authority in sup­port of his contention that merely because a person holds land under any other person in lieu of service, he is not a tenant. On general prin­ciples therefore, it could not be said that where services are 'rendered in lieu of rent, no tenancy comes into existence. The learned counsel has not been able to produce any authority in sup­port of his contention that merely because a person holds land under any other person in lieu of service, he is not a tenant. Even in the Assam (Temporarily Settled Districts) Tenancy Act a tenant is defined in the follow­ing terms: "Tenant" means a person who holds land under another person, and is, or but for a spe­cial contract - express or implied - would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that other person." (6) There is a proviso attached to the defini­tion which has no appln to the facts of the present case. According to this definition, the deft would be a tenant on pltf's own showing. It is not necessary that deft should pay rent Rent under this Act Is payment in money or kind or partly in money and partly in kind. But the definition of the word 'tenant' does not require that tenant must pay rent. All that it requires is that he should be actually liable to pay rent or would be liable but for a special contract - express or implied. If there is a special contract which enables him to avoid payment of rent in cash or kind, he would still be covered by the expression tenant. There is thus no reason why deft may not be regarded as a tenant. (7) The next question is whether as a tenant he is entitled to any notice of ejectment. The learned counsel for the applt contends that provisions of T. P. Act do not apply. Similarly, the case is not covered by the provisions relat­ing to notice contained in the Assam (Tempo­rarily Settled Districts) Tenancy Act. No notice, in these circumstances, was necessary & in any case reasonable notice had been given. (8) Even this contention cannot be accepted. If the deft is treated as a tenant, his eviction without reasonable notice is inconceivable. This principle was recognised in 'Damodar Prasad v. Lachimi Prasad', AIR (15) 1928 Pat 354: (7 Pat 493). In that case there was an agricultural lease. Section 106, T. P. Act, did not apply to the lease. The relationship between the parties was not covered by any other Act. This principle was recognised in 'Damodar Prasad v. Lachimi Prasad', AIR (15) 1928 Pat 354: (7 Pat 493). In that case there was an agricultural lease. Section 106, T. P. Act, did not apply to the lease. The relationship between the parties was not covered by any other Act. It was held that a reasonable notice was necessary before the tenant or the lessee could be evicted. I am in respectful agreement with this view, & I hold that even if S. 33, Assam Tenancy Act is not applicable to the case, the requirement of a reasonable notice cannot be dispensed with. In this view of the matter it would not be necessary to decide whether S. 33, Assam Tenancy Act applies to the case or not. Section 33 in terms applies to non-occupancy raiyats. (9) The only question that now remains to be decided is whether notice, in the circums­tances of this case, was reasonable. The lower Appellate Ct found that it was not. According to 'Damodar Prasad v. Lachimi Prasad', AIR (15) 1928 Pat 354: (7 Pat 496), the question {whether a notice is reasonable is a question 'of fact. The correctness of this view has not been questioned by the learned counsel for the applt. In this view it will not be open to him to challenge the finding that the notice in the circumstances of this case was not reasonable. He has, however, pointed out that there was a verbal notice preceding the written one & the lower Appellate Ct did not consider it. The learned Subordinate Judge has said nothing about the allegations relating to the verbal notice. I have heard the learned counsel on that point. He has referred to the statement of the pltf alone on this point. Even if that statement is believed, I would not hold that the notice was reasonable in the circumstances of the case. (10) The result is that the appeal fails & is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circum­stances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. D.H. Appeal dismissed.