Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. It appears that the petitioner had filed an appeal in the lower Court together with a petition for dispensing with copy of judgment because an appeal had been filed in an analogous case disposed of by the same judgment, a copy of which had been attached to the memorandum of appeal in that case. The applicant was nevertheless directed to file a copy of the judgment within five days and upon his default the memorandum of appeal was rejected. He then filed an application under Order 41, Rule 19, Civil P. C. and Sec.161, for restoration of the appeal. The lower Court rejected the application on the ground that Sec.151 was not applicable. Against this order the applicant has obtained the present rule. 2. The question to be determined in this case is whether the order rejecting the memorandum of appeal for failure to furnish copy of judgment constitutes a "decree" within the meaning of Sec.2, Clause (2), Civil P. C. 3. Sec.2 (2) defines a decree as "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Sec. 47 or Sec.144, but shall not include ...... (b) any order to dismissal for default." In support of this rule Mr. Angad Ojha addressed the argument that in the present case the order of the learned District Judge rejecting the memorandum of appeal would not be a decree. In support of his argument he referred to Ramdhari Ahir V/s. Khedu Ahir, 17 Pat. 245 : (A. I. R. (25) 1938 Pat. 461). In that case a Judge being of opinion that the memorandum of appeal presented before him was argumentative and not in accordance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 1, Civil P. C., called upon the appellant to remove the defect and on his failure to do so rejected the same. A Bench of this Court held that the order was not appealable as it did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. A Bench of this Court held that the order was not appealable as it did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. Wort J. added that it could not be laid down as a universal proposition that an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal was appealable. On behalf of the opposite party Mr. Shambhu Pd. Singh made reference to Surajpal V/s. Uttim Pandey, 6 pat. L. J. 625: (A. I. R. (9) 1922 Pat. 281), in which it was held that an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal before the appeal was admitted, for insufficiency of court-fee, did amount to a decree and was appealable as such.In another case Ramsawari Kuer V/s. Motiraj Kuer, 17 Pat. 687 : (A. I. R. (26) 1939 pat. 83), also a Bench of this Court decided that an order of rejection of a memorandum of appeal on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped was a decree and was appealable as such. The learned Judges observed that the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 applied to appeals and therefore it was the duty of the Court, in cases coming under Clause (c), to require the appellant to make up the deficiency in court-fee within a time to be fixed by the Court before rejecting the memorandum of appeal. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel on an unreported decision dated 30th March 1949 in S. A. 503 of 1947. In my opinion all these cases must be distinguished for the reason that they dealt with a case of rejection of a memorandum of appeal for failure to make good the deficit court-fee for which specific provision is made in Order 7, Rule 11 Clause (c), Civil P. C The decision in the Full Bench case Ramkhelawan Singh V/s. Monilal Sahu, 19 pat. 159 : (A. I. R. (26) 1939 pat. 673 F. B.), is relevant in this contest. In that case an application was made to set aside an order of dismissal of an appeal for failure to file the appellants list within the time allowed. The stamp reporter suggested that the application was in fact one for a review of the order dismissing the appeal and that a court-fee of about Rs. 405 was leviable. On behalf of the petitioner on the contrary, it was contended that this was an application for restoration of the appeal on which Rs. The stamp reporter suggested that the application was in fact one for a review of the order dismissing the appeal and that a court-fee of about Rs. 405 was leviable. On behalf of the petitioner on the contrary, it was contended that this was an application for restoration of the appeal on which Rs. 3 stamp was leviable. The Full Bench after exhaustive review of the authorities held that the application could not be treated as one for review under Order 47, Rule 1, but the High Court had power to restore the appeal in a proper case. Apart from this decision I consider that the present case is fully covered by the authority of Ramdhari Ahir V/s. Khedu Ahir, 17 Pat. 246 : (A. I. R. (25) 1938 Pat. 461), to which the material facts of the present case are closely parallel. Since we are, bound by the ratio of this decision it must be held that in the present case an application under Sec.151, was competent. 4 As regards the merit also it was contended by the learned counsel for the opposite party that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court ought not to be invoked since the applicant had made default in carrying out the order of the Court. But upon the admitted facts it is manifest that the Court ought to have dispensed with the copy of judgment and ought not to have required the petitioner to furnish a copy within the short time of five days. It is therefore necessary that the order of dismissal of the appeal should be set aside by this Court under its inherent jurisdiction. The appeal should now be restored to file and should be disposed of in accordance with law. 5. Accordingly this rule is made absolute and the application is allowed but I do not propose to make any order as to costs. Sarjoo Prasad, J. 6 I agree.