Judgment These three civil revision petitions arise out of three suits instituted in the Court of the District Munsiff of Tenali, by the head of the Uttaradi Mutt as trustee of a religious endowment, for the recovery of lands in the possession of the defendants in the respective suits. The averments in the pleadings, the issues raised and the evidence adduced are common to the three suits which were tried together and decided by a common judgment, both original and appellate. The lands in suit are situate in Devarapalle agraharam. The plaintiff’s case was that the defendants in each of the three suits were his lessees whose term had expired but who, nevertheless, continued in possession of the lands under an untenable claim of permanent occupany rights. The defendant contended that the lands in the suit were “ryoti” lands situated in an “estate” and that they had therefore acquired occupancy rights therein under section 6(1) of the Madras Estates Land Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. They also pleaded that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suits. The learned District Munsiff upheld the plea of the defendants and returned the plaints in the three suits for presentation to the revenue Court. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge reversed that decision and directed the lower Court to proceed with the trial of the three suits holding that the lands in question were not ryoti lands and that the suits for the ejectment of the tenants of those lands were cognizable by the civil Court. The defendants in the three suits have preferred these civil revision petitions against the decision of the appellate Court. The point involved in these civil revision petitions and on which the rights of the parties depend, is whether the lands in suit are "ryoti" lands as defined in section 3(2)(d) of the Act, and that question again depends upon whether the Devarapalle agraharam granted in inam to the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff is an "estate" as defined in the Act. According to the plaintiff this point is concluded in his favour by the decision of a Bench of this Court in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru1, which dealt with other lands of the same character situated in the same village. The plaintiff was a party to that decision but not the defendants, and therefore there is no question of res judicata. The plaintiff was a party to that decision but not the defendants, and therefore there is no question of res judicata. According to the defendants, Madras Act II of 1945 was enacted in order to supersede the decision in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru1 and the matter is now res Integra to be decided on the evidence in this case. Section 3(2)(d) of the Act declares that an inam grant is an "estate" if the grant was of a village and had been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government. It is a matter of common knowledge that whole inam villages or major inams as they were called, were alone brought under the purview of the Act but not grants of portions of a village styled as minor inams. In many cases it was found that though the grant was stated to be of a named village described by boundaries, small areas situated therein which had already been granted away on service or other tenure, were not included in the grant. In some cases poramboke lands set apart for the use of the village community were excluded from the inam grant of a village. Inam villages of this description were also regarded as "estates" and the tenants of "ryoti" lands in such villages were considered to have acquired permanent rights of occupancy under the Act. In Narayanaswami Naidu v. Subramanyam2, the distinction between major and minor inams was brought out in these terms: "The definition in sub-section (2), clause (d) (of section 3) was obviously intended to exclude from the definition of ‘estate’ what are known as minor inams, namely, particular extents of land in a particular village as contrasted with the grant of the whole village by its boundaries. The latter are known as ‘whole inam villages’. The existence of ‘minor inams ‘in whole inam villages is very common and if these inam villages do not come within the definition of ‘estate’ almost all the agraharam, shrotriem and mokhasa villages will be excluded. This certainly cannot have teen the intention of the legislature. The latter are known as ‘whole inam villages’. The existence of ‘minor inams ‘in whole inam villages is very common and if these inam villages do not come within the definition of ‘estate’ almost all the agraharam, shrotriem and mokhasa villages will be excluded. This certainly cannot have teen the intention of the legislature. These minor inams are generally granted for services to be rendered to the village or to the owner." Besides the minor inams granted on service or other tenure referred to in the passage above cited, there might be communal porambokes such as streets, pathways, house-sites, threshing floors, tanks, cremation grounds, etc., which might have been excluded from the inam grant of the village. Even if porambokes of this kind had been included in the grant, the inamdar would hold them only as trustee for the community and not as his absolute property. Therefore the law was understood to be that the omission of these minor inams and communal porambokes from grants of an inam village, did not make the grant any the less a grant of the village if the rest of the area of the village had been granted to the inamdar. The decisions in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru1 and Soori Reddi v. Agrnihothrudu3 took the view, for the first time, that a grant of anything less than the entire area of a village, as for instance, by the exclusion of minor inams or porambokes from the grant, would make the inam a minor inam and therefore take it outside the purview of the Act. Evidently, the decision in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Subramanyam2 was not placed before the learned Judges of the Division Bench that decided the two later decisions above referred to. The Legislature promptly superseded these two decisions by passing Act II of 1945 which added Explanation (1) to section 3(2)(d) of the Act in these words: Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes." It is the effect of the Amending Act on this case that falls to be decided. Explanation (1) to section 3(2)(d) states that if an inam grant is expressed to be of a named village then, notwithstanding the non-inclusion of minor inams or communal porambokes in the grant, the inam would be an estate. The question whether an inam satisfies the terms of Explanation (1) to section 3(2)(d) must be decided primarily on a construction of the original grant, if it is forthcoming, or, from the title deed issued at the time of the inam settlement. If it is shown therefrom that the grant in terms was of a named village excluding minor inams and communal porambokes and not merely of an extent of lands situated in a village falling short of the remaining area of the village Explanation (1) would be attracted. Madras Act II of 1945 had not the effect of converting minor into major inams but was merely intended to restore the conception of minor inams as it prevailed before the decisions in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru1 and Soori Reddi v. Agnikothrudu2. Even after the Amending Act if it is shown that an inam grant did not comprise the entire area of a village other than lands granted on service or other tenure and communal porambokes, the inam would not be an estate within section 3(2)(d). If for instance in a pre-settlement inam grant by a Zamindar (which is the present case) some lands, cultivated, uncultivated or waste, situated in a village had been retained by the zamindar for his own use or enjoyment and the entire remaining area had been granted in inam, the inam would not be an “estate” within section 3(2)(d) as amended by Explanation (1). As pointed out in Venkanna v. Lakshmipathiraju3, from the use of the word Agraharam in a grant, it cannot be implied that the grant was of the whole village when there are “other lands in the village” not included in such grant. The expression “other lands in the village” meant lands other than minor inams and communal porambokes, which however, were not included in the grant. This decision was given after the enactment of Explanation (1) to section 3(2)(d) of the Act and it applies to the present case as I shall presently show. The expression “other lands in the village” meant lands other than minor inams and communal porambokes, which however, were not included in the grant. This decision was given after the enactment of Explanation (1) to section 3(2)(d) of the Act and it applies to the present case as I shall presently show. The original grant as well as the inam title deed not being available to show whether the grant was expressed to be of a named village, we have to look to the other evidence to find out the nature and extent of the inam grant. The evidence consists of an extract from Ram’s register prepared some time about the year 1800, the inam statement and extract from the inam register of 1861, and two maps of 1892 and 1920 respectively. In Ram’s register the village is described as Devara-palle agraharam and the year of the inam grant is stated to be fasli 1173. No further particulars are stated as regards the area of the village or the extent of the inam grant. There is no reference to any minor inam. This register was taken into consideration at the time of the inam settlement and formed part of the material on which the conclusion of the Inam Commissioner was based as would appear from the extract of the inam register filed in this case. The inam statement and the extract from the inam fair register, however, furnish valuable and authentic information about the nature and extent of the original grant and it is to these documents that I attach great importance. The inam settlement of this village took place in 1861. The original grant had been lost even then. Neither the area nor the boundaries specified in the original grant could therefore be ascertained and the column appropriate to these particulars according to the original grant was not filled up in the inam register. The gudikat (total extent) of the village was stated to be 6-6 kuchelas or 158 acres, 22 cents out of which an extent of one kuchela or 25 acres 10 cents was savaram or seri land under Government, i.e., ryotwari land, an extent of 0.4 kuchela or 5 acres 6 cents was a minor inam and the balance of 128 acres 6 cents was the extent of the inam granted to the predecessor of the plaintiff. It appears from pages 320 and 321 of the Krishna District Manual that the zamindar who made the inam grant fell into arrears of peishcush and the Government attached and sold his lands and purchased them in 1846. Among the lands so purchased by the Government must have been this extent of 1 Kuchela or 25 acres 10 cents retained by the zamindar as his savaram or seri, that is to say, as his own private and in the village of Devarapalle agraharam. After the purchase by the Government it became a ryotwari land and it is described in the inam settlement as savaram land under the Government and in the inam register as seri. It follows that the inam grant in this case was of an area comprised in a village which was less than its total area (excluding minor inams) by 25 acres 10 cents representing the savaram or seri land. In other words the grant was not of a village even under Explanation (1) to S.3 (2)(d) of the Act. Exhibits D-3 and D-4 are plans prepared in 1892 and 1920 to show blocks of zamindari lands or inam lands within zamindaris, which were under wet cultivation, locally known as mamool wet. Evidently these plans were prepared in order to fix the lands which are entitled to a right of irrigation from existing sources before the Government undertook the construction of new irrigation works of the Krishna river system. These maps do not throw any light on the nature or extent of the original grant. There is no evidence that Devarapalle agraharam is designated as a village in the revenue accounts or that there are separate revenue accounts for the village, maintained by a karnam. I therefore agree with the opinion of the learned Subordinate Judge, that neither at the time of the original grant nor subsequently was the extent of 128 acres in Devarapalle agraharam granted to the plaintiff’s predecessor treated as a village. In this view it is unnecessary to consider at length the other contentions raised by the learned advocate for the respondent but I shall briefly advert to them. Mr. In this view it is unnecessary to consider at length the other contentions raised by the learned advocate for the respondent but I shall briefly advert to them. Mr. Ramanarasu argued that the extent of 5 acres 6 cents shown as minor inam in the inam register extract was a personal inam and could not be said to be lands held on “service or other tenure” within the meaning of Explanation (1) to section 3(2)(d) of the Act. There is no authority on this point beyond a passing observation of Panchapagesa Sastri, J., in Suryanarayana v. Venkatadu1, to the effect that personal inams might fall within the category of lands held on service or other tenure within the meaning of Explanation (1) to section 3(2)(d) of the Act. In this case, the minor inam in question of the extent of 5 acres 6 cents was originally granted by the zamindar and it is probable that he reserved a right of resumption or a right of reverter on failure of the grantee’s heirs. Consequently it might be said that there was some kind of tenure in respect of the original grant of the inam though not a service tenure. It is, however, unnecessary to express a final opinion on this point in view of my decision on the main question. The last contention of Mr. Ramanarasu, the learned counsel for the respondent, was that the lands in question which were granted to the Uttaradi Mutt Swamigal for the Nitya Naivedya Deeparadhana of Sri Ramachandraswami and which were described as Devadayam lands and confirmed free of any quit rent at the time of the inam settlement, were lands held on service tenure and therefore taken out of the category of “ryoti” lands under section 3(16)(c) of the Act. This contention is wholly untenable. The lands vest in the deity as owner, the Uttaradi Mutt Swamigal being merely the manager for the time being. There was no grant to any person as remuneration for any designated service to be rendered by him and his successors, to the deity. The income of the lands is to be appropriated to the daily worship of the deity and both the income and the corpus belong to and vest in the deity as owner. The deity is a juristic person capable of holding property and the deity cannot be said to be rendering service to itself. The income of the lands is to be appropriated to the daily worship of the deity and both the income and the corpus belong to and vest in the deity as owner. The deity is a juristic person capable of holding property and the deity cannot be said to be rendering service to itself. The argument of the learned counsel has been consistently rejected in decisions of this Court, both reported and unreported, on which I am unable to lay my hands at the moment. I agree with the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss these civil revision petitions with costs. V.S. ----- Petitions dismissed.