Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. This appeal is presented against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya refusing to grant an injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding with a reference under the Bihar Bakasht Dispute Settlement Act (XIII [18] of 1947). 2. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 alleged that they had taken raiyati settlement of bakasht land from defendant 2nd party at a fixed rate of rent; that subsequently they sold the land to plaintiffs 3 to 18 by registered sale deeds. But defendants 1st party made a false claim to the land alleging that they had taken a previous oral settlement from the malik. Apprehending that there would be a breach of the peace, the Sub-divisional Magistrate started proceedings under Sec.145 and made an interim order of attachment under Sec.145 (4), Criminal P. C. Defendant 1st party then applied to the District Magistrate for making a reference under Bihar Act XIII [13] of 1947. On 5-9-1949, the District Magistrate after hearing the parties referred the dispute to a Board constituted under Sec.3 of the Act. The plaintiffs alleged that since there was no dispute between the landlord and tenant the reference made by the District Magistrate was ultra vires and illegal. The plaintiffs, therefore, asked for a declaration to this effect and prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding before the Arbitration Board. The principal defendant objected to the issue of temporary injunction on the ground that the plaintiffs had made a fraudulent claim to the land in collusion with the landlord, that the dispute was in substance a dispute between the landlord and tenant with respect to bakasht land, that the reference made by the District Magistrate was legal and valid. The principal defendant maintained that the Board was legally constituted under the Act and the civil Court had no jurisdiction to restrain the Board from proceeding with the case. 3. In support of this appeal Mr. The principal defendant maintained that the Board was legally constituted under the Act and the civil Court had no jurisdiction to restrain the Board from proceeding with the case. 3. In support of this appeal Mr. Lal Narain referred to Order 39, Rule 2, Civil P. C., which is to the following effect : "In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after Judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right," 4. Learned counsel argued that the reference made by the District Magistrate under Sec.3 of the Act was without jurisdiction and illegal. Learned counsel said that the plaintiff would suffer great injury if the Board should hold that the defendant 1st party were in possession and in consequence the Magistrate should deliver to them possession of the attached land. But the respondents object that the plaintiffs are in collusion with the landlord and that the dispute before the Board really involved a question between the landlord and tenant with respect to possession of bakasht land. I am not satisfied at this stage that the plaintiffs have shown a prima facie case on this disputed question of fact. On the contrary, the lawful exercise of a right vested in a person cannot be legally restrained by the Court under Order 39, Rule 2. It cannot be said that by prosecuting the reference before the Board constituted under the Act the respondents are Committing a breach of contract or "other injury of any kind" as enacted in Order 39, Rule 2, Civil P. C. 5. Apart from the provisions of the Code, it is true that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to restrain a person from prosecuting a case before another tribunal in exceptional cases. But there is authority for the opinion that the jurisdiction should be exercised with great caution and only on ample evidence that the action is vexatious and oppressive. On behalf of the appellant Mr. But there is authority for the opinion that the jurisdiction should be exercised with great caution and only on ample evidence that the action is vexatious and oppressive. On behalf of the appellant Mr. Lalnarain Sinha contended that the High Court may not order the Board to stay the proceeding but only restrain the respondent from prosecuting it. But as the same result is obtained and the effect is to interfere with proceedings in another jurisdiction this power should be exercised with great caution to avoid even the appearance of undue interference with another Court. The question then arises in what circumstances and upon what principle should the Court act in exercising its jurisdiction to stay another action between the parties and for substantially the same relief. The answer is that the Court will exercise jurisdiction where the circumstances are such as to satisfy it that continued prosecution of both the proceedings should be oppressive or vexatious. In Cohen V/s. Rothfield, 1919-1 K. B. 410 at P. 416 : (88 L. J. K. B. 468), two parties having cross claims arising out of the same transaction for substantially the same relief one commenced an action in England and the other an action in Scotland. The Court of Appeal held that in such a case the Court will not restrain the plaintiff in either action from proceeding with his action unless it is satisfied that the continued prosecution thereof would be oppressive or vexatious; and that it was incumbent on the party seeking to restrain the other to show that the proceeding he complains of is oppressive or vexatious and that the party instituting it can gain no advantage there-from. At p. 416, Eve J. states : "To restrain a man from proceeding with an action which prima facie he has a right to bring and prosecute is, as was pointed out by Fletcher Moulton L. J. in In re Connolly Brothers, (1911) 1 Ch. 731 at p. 746 : (80 L. J. Ch. 409) a very serious thing, but it is not disputed that there is jurisdiction to make the order, the basis of the jurisdiction being that it is a jurisdiction in personam and has nothing to do with any conflict between the tribunals: Bushby V/s. Munday, (1821) 5 Mad. 297 at p. 307: (21 R. R. 294)." 6. 409) a very serious thing, but it is not disputed that there is jurisdiction to make the order, the basis of the jurisdiction being that it is a jurisdiction in personam and has nothing to do with any conflict between the tribunals: Bushby V/s. Munday, (1821) 5 Mad. 297 at p. 307: (21 R. R. 294)." 6. In Logan V/s. Bank of Scotland, (1906) 1 K. B. 141: (75 L. J. K. B. 218) Sir Gorell Barnes States the same principle: "In my opinion, however, the jurisdiction of the Court to stay proceedings on the ground of vexation should be exercised with great care; indeed, I find that Cotton L. J. in McHenry V/s. Lewis, (1882) 22 Ch. D. 397 at p. 406 : (52 L. J. Ch. 325) of the report, said : In the first place, it is a jurisdiction which one ought to exercise with extreme caution. Stopping in the middle of a suit a plaintiff from going on, when he has a right of action as against the defendant, is a jurisdiction which has to be exercised with very considerable caution. " 7. It cannot be disputed that the Arbitration Board is vested with judicial powers under the Act and the proceedings before it are of judicial nature. On principle, a tribunal exercises judicial power if it decides a question of legal right in a lis inter partes involving either a finding of fact or the application of fixed rule or principle of law or involved with both. Reference should be made to R. V/s. Local Government Board for Ireland, (1910) 2 Ir. Rule 349 at p. 373 where Palles, C. B states: "To erect a tribunal into a Court or jurisdiction so as to make its determinations judicial, the essential element is that it should have power, by its determination within jurisdiction, to impose liability or affect rights. By this I mean that the liability is imposed or the light affected by the determination only, and not by the fact determined, and so that the liability will exist, or the right will be affected, although the determination be wrong in law or in fact. It is otherwise of a ministerial power. By this I mean that the liability is imposed or the light affected by the determination only, and not by the fact determined, and so that the liability will exist, or the right will be affected, although the determination be wrong in law or in fact. It is otherwise of a ministerial power. If the existence of such a power depends upon a contingency, although it may be necessary for the officer to determine whether the contingency has happened, in order to know whether he shall exercise the power, his determination does not bind. The happening of the contingency may be questioned in an action brought to try the legality of the act done under the alleged exercise of the power. But where the determination binds, although it is based on an erroneous view of facts or law, then the power authorizing it is judicial." 8. In my opinion, the proceedings before the Board constituted under Act XIII [13] of 1947 are of judicial nature and no injunction can be issued to restrain such proceedings since it is not prima facie shown that the continued prosecution of those proceedings would be vexatious or involve injustice to the appellant. 9. For these reasons I should dismiss this appeal with costs. Narayan, J. 10 I agree.