Thadani C. J.- This is a petn. by the judg­ment-debtor under Art. 133 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the 8. 0. of India from an order passed by this Ct. on 13-12-1949. The operative part of the order is in these terms: "This appeal is, therefore, allowed. The orders of the Cts. below are reversed & the ease is remanded to the learned Munsiff for disposal of the appln. for delivery of possession according to law." [2] The only question argued before us was as to whether the appln. by the decree-holder for execution of his decree for possession was time-barred. We came to the conclusion that the decree-holder's appln. to execute the decree for possession was not time-barrel & remanded the case to the Ct. that passed the decree for dis­posal of the decree-holder's appln. for delivery of possession in accordance with law. [3] The provisions of Art. 133 of the Consti­tution of India are in these terms: "133. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies. (a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or (b) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or (c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; and, where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court im­mediately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub-clause (a), it the High Court farther certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law." [4] The question for our decision is as to whether the order passed by this Ct. on 13-12 49 is a final order within the meaning of Art. 133 of the Const. Ind. We think that it is not. Harries C. J. had occasion to consider the meaning of the expression "final order" in Raj-kumar Chandra v. Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd., 64 o. w. N. 874. on 13-12 49 is a final order within the meaning of Art. 133 of the Const. Ind. We think that it is not. Harries C. J. had occasion to consider the meaning of the expression "final order" in Raj-kumar Chandra v. Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd., 64 o. w. N. 874. After referring to the case of Abiul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim & Sons, 60 I. A. 76: (A. I B. (20) 1933 P. 0. 58), Harries O. J., observed that the observations of Sir George Lowndes in the above case were followed by the F. 0. in Mohammad Amin Brothers •Ltd. v. The Dominion of India, 1949-50 P.O.B, 842: (A. I, B. (37) 1950 P. 0. 77) wherein it was observed; "The expression 'final order' in S. 205, Government of India Act, has been used in contradistinction to what is known as 'interlocutory order' & the essential test to distinguish the one from the other has been dis­cussed & formulated in several cases decided by the Judicial Committee. All the relevant authorities bearing on the question have been reviewed by this Ct. in their recent pronouncement in S. Kuppusujami Rao v. The King, 1947 F. C. R. 180 : (A. I. R. (36) 1949 F. C. I : 49 Cr. L. J. 625), & the law on the point, so far as the Ct. is concerned, seems to be well settled. In full agree­ment with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Firm Ram Chandra Manjimalv. Firm Goverdhandai Vishindas, 47 I. A, 124 : (A. I. R. (7) 1920 P. C. 86) and Abdul Rahman v. D,K. Cassim and Sons, 60 LA. 76 : (A. I. R. (20) 1933 P. C. 58), & the authorities of the English Cts. upon which these pronouncements were based, it has been held by this Ct. that the test for determining the finality of an order Is whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties. To quote the language of Sir George Lowndes in Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim and Sons, 60 I. A. 76 : (A.. I. R. (20) 1833 P. C. 38). The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If after the order the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it. I. R. (20) 1833 P. C. 38). The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If after the order the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it. The fact that the order decides an impor­tant & even a vital issue is, by itself, not material. If •the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order will undoubtedly be a final one, but it the suit is still left alive & has got to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order." [5] We think these observations apply with equal force to an order of remand, remanding Jan appln. for possession made in execution of a decree to be disposed of according to law. By our order, dated 18-12-1949, the execution pro­ceedings were kept alive in that the question of the delivery of possession in accordance with law «has still to be decided by the executing Ct. The pact that we have decided an important question of limitation is, as observed by their Lordships of the S. C. not, by itself, material. [6] In Barkat Ram v. Bhagwan Singh, A. I. R. (36) 1949 B. P. 222, Ram Lall C. J., and Bhandari J. had occasion to interpret the meaning of the words 'final order" in S. 109, Civil P. C. In the case before them, the order passed disposed of certain objections raised in execution proceedings, & the learned Judges pointed out that the orders passed by them did not decide the appln. & observed ; "It has been pointed out repeatedly that the test to find out whether an order is a final one is not whether the point decided thereby is a cardinal one, but whe­ther the rights of the parties in the suit are finally disposed of by it." [7] A Full Bench of the Lahore H. C. in Barkat Ram v. Rhagwan Singh, A. I. R. (30) 1943 Lab.. HO : (208 I. C. 89 F.B.) had also occasion to consider the meaning of the words 'final order' in 8. 109, Civil P. C. The learned Judges, after citing certain decisions which appear at p. 145 of the report Barkat Ram v. Bhagwan Singh., A. I. R. (30) 1943 Lah. 140 : (203 I. 0. HO : (208 I. C. 89 F.B.) had also occasion to consider the meaning of the words 'final order' in 8. 109, Civil P. C. The learned Judges, after citing certain decisions which appear at p. 145 of the report Barkat Ram v. Bhagwan Singh., A. I. R. (30) 1943 Lah. 140 : (203 I. 0. 89 F. B.), observed : "These remarks were no doubt made in a case in which the remand order had been passed on an appeal from a decree dismissing a suit on a preliminary point, but the same teat would apply to execution proceedings &, is the execution appln. is still pending & is a 'live' appln. the order cannot be said to be a final order." [8] Mr. Bora for the petnr. has referred us to a decision reported in Rahimbhoy Habibhoy v. C. A. Turner, 18 I. A. 6: (15 Bom. 155 P.C.). This decision was considered by Harries C. J., & he pointed out that while it is true that Sir George Lowndes had said that the case of Rahimbhoy Habibhoy, (18 I. A. 6 : 15 Bom. 155 p. C.), had been decided in the same way under the present code, he nevertheless observed that the order must be final, & further that the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. [9] In our view, the order against which leave to appeal is sought in the present case is not a final order & the question, therefore, of leave to appeal to the S. C. of India does not arise. In this view, it is unnecessary to express our opinion one way or the other on the point raised by Mr. Bora that assuming the order passed by us is a final order, his client is, as a matter of right, entitled to obtain leave to appeal as our order was passed before the Const. Ind. came into force & the value of the property has been determined to be Rs. 10,000 or more. On an appropriate occasion we will decide the ques­tion as to the right o£ a party to ask for leave to appeal when the order appealed from was passed before the Const. Ind. came into force & relates to property valued at Bs. 10,000 or more & the order appealed from is a final order. [9] The result is that the petn. Ind. came into force & relates to property valued at Bs. 10,000 or more & the order appealed from is a final order. [9] The result is that the petn. is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is fixed at BS. 50, [10] Ram Labhaya J.-I agree. D.H. Petition dismissed.