Judgment Narayan, J. 1. This is a reference by the Addl. Ses. J. of Manbhum-Singhbhum recommending that the order of the Sub-divisional Mag. of Dhalbhum in relation to a Proceeding under Sec.147, Cri. P. C. be set aside. On the report of the Police that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed between the parties with regard to certain plots of land said to be a playground, a proceeding under Sec.147 was drawn up on 14-5-1948. In this proceeding Ramkrishna Singh & another were the first party, & Bankim Chandra Chakraverty was the second party, & on 22 9-1948, the case was transferred to one Mr. G. K. Prasad for disposal. On 17-3-1949, the second party, Bankim Chandra Chakravarty, filed a petn. before the learned Mag. in which he stated that a civil suit having been filed before the Subordinate Judge of Chaibassa with regard to the land in dispute, the proceeding might be stayed till the decision of that civil suit. It was further stated in this petn. that there was no likelihood of any breach of the peace on account of the conduct of the second party & that the right, which was in question in the proceeding, was pre-eminently a matter to be dealt with by the Civil Ct. On this petn. the learned Mag. passed the following order : "17-3-1949 -Second party file a petn. stating that a civil suit is pending between the parties & the suit lands are the same as the subject-matter of the present proceeding. I am satisfied from the papers shown to me by the party that a civil suit for the suit land is pending between the parties. The proceeding has been pending for a long time. There does not seem to be any apprehension of breach of the peace now that the matter is pending before a civil Ct. The proceeding is, therefore, stayed." For about six months after this order had been passed, none of the parties took any step & the first party did not move any higher Ct. against this order of the learned Mag. It was on 6-9-1949, that a gentleman of the name of Priparesh Mukharjee filed a petn. before the Sub-divisional Mag. of Dhalbhum praying that he might be allowed to get the games played on the land in dispute. This petn. is an unstamped petn. against this order of the learned Mag. It was on 6-9-1949, that a gentleman of the name of Priparesh Mukharjee filed a petn. before the Sub-divisional Mag. of Dhalbhum praying that he might be allowed to get the games played on the land in dispute. This petn. is an unstamped petn. & though on this petn. the learned Sub-divisional Mag. wrote an order on 6-9-1949, directing that the petn. should be sent to the Ct. concerned for disposal, on that very date he wrote another order in the order sheet of this case which runs as follows : "This record has been put up to me today. I do not know of any provision of law under which a Mag. can stay a proceeding under Sec.147, Cr. P. C. There does not appear to be any injunction from the civil Ct. to that effect. As a civil suit is likely to take an indefinite period of time, this case is withdrawn to general file & transferred to Mr. B. Singh for favour of restarting the hearing & concluding the trial." The second party then moved the learned Ses. J. of Manbhum-Singhbhum against this order, & his appln. was heard by the Addl. Ses. J. who by his letter dated 23-12-1949, referred the matter to this Ct. with a recommendation that the order of the learned Sub-divisional Mag. reviving the proceeding be set aside. The view taken by the learned Addl. Ses. J. is that the proceeding had come to an end by virtue of the order which had been passed by the Mag. Mr. G. K. Prasad under Sec.145 (5), Cr. P. C. & that the subsequent order of the learned Sub-divisional Mag. dated 6-9-1949, for "re-starting the hearing & concluding the trial" was without jurisdiction. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned Addl. Ses. J. is correct, & this reference must be accepted. Sub-section (4) of Sec.147 lays down that an order under this section shall be subject to any subsequent decision of a civil Ct. of competent jurisdiction, & Sub-section (1) of Sec.147 says that an enquiry has to be made in the manner provided in Sec.145, & that the provisions of that section shall as far as may be, be applicable in the case of such inquiry. It need not be pointed out that the object of Sec.145 or Sec.147 is to enable a Mag. It need not be pointed out that the object of Sec.145 or Sec.147 is to enable a Mag. to intervene & pass a temporary order with regard to the property in dispute which will be effective only so long as the actual right of one of the parties has not been determined in a civil litigation. The Legislature never intended that this section should be used by any party manoeuvring for possession for the purpose of civil litigation, the sole purpose, which the Legislature had in view, being the prevention of the breach of the peace. These provisions are additional weapons in the hand of the Mag. for maintaining peace in the area for the peace of which they are responsible. I have referred to this well-known principle, because the argument of Mr. Bhabanand Mukharji for the first party has been that the grounds as contemplated by Sub-sectioin (5) of Sec.145, Cr. P. C. did not exist in this case so as to enable the Mag. to drop the proceeding. In Manindra Chandra V/s. Barada Kanta, 30 Cal. 112 : (6 c. w. No. 417), it was held by a D. B. of the Calcutta H. C. that a Mag. had jurisdiction to cancel an order passed under Sub-section (1) of Sec.145, Cr. P. C. & to stay proceeding if he felt satisfied, whatever the source of his information might be, that the state of things did not exist, which would give jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry. In this case, their Lordships quoted a passage from the judgment of the same H. C. in Tarini Charan V/s. Amulya Ratan, 20 Cal. 867, which runs as follows: "Now the first question which arises is the effect of an order striking off proceedings under Sec.145, Cr. P. C. As Mr. Woodroffe has told us, there is a series of decisions with regard to the effect of striking off the file of a Court applns in civil matters; but we think that those stand on an entirely different footing from proceedings of a quasi-criminal description. The section itself provides for a case; where a Mag. can cancel his order. Woodroffe has told us, there is a series of decisions with regard to the effect of striking off the file of a Court applns in civil matters; but we think that those stand on an entirely different footing from proceedings of a quasi-criminal description. The section itself provides for a case; where a Mag. can cancel his order. Those are cases where parties show him that no dispute exists, & if the likelihood of a breach of the peace has ceased to exist before the proceedings under Sec.145 have terminated, it follows that there can be no necessity for a continuation of such proceedings. The result of those applns which were sanctioned by the Mag. practically amounted to cessation, at any rate, for the time being of any likelihood of a breach of the peace. That must have been the view which the Mag. took of it, as he considered it unnecessary to proceed, at any rate then, with those proceedings. We think that unless it can be shown that there is a legislative enactment, giving a power to that effect, cessation by the order of the Mag. of any Criminal proceedings must, until that order is set aside, operate, not only as staying the proceedings, but destroying them." It follows that whenever a Mag. is satisfied that there is no likelihood of a breach of the peace, he discontinues the proceeding; the Mag. can stay it, & the order of stay passed by him will be tantamount to a termination of the proceeding. A single Judge of the Madras H. C. in Suryanarayana V/s. Ankineed Prasad, 47 Mad. 713 : (A. I. R. (11) 1924 Mad. 795 : 25 Cr. L. J. 978) observed that when the Mag. is able to act on a police report or other information in starting proceedings under Sec.145, there is no reason why he should not stay further proceeding on similar information without being obliged to record such evidence as the parties may produce with the same formality as he would have done, if he had gone on with his enquiry instead of dropping it. In another Madras case D. Narasayya V/s. G. Venkiah, 49 Mad. 232 : (A. I. R. (12) 1925 Mad. 1252: 27 Cr. L. J. 95) also the same principle was reiterated & it was pointed out that it was open to a Mag. In another Madras case D. Narasayya V/s. G. Venkiah, 49 Mad. 232 : (A. I. R. (12) 1925 Mad. 1252: 27 Cr. L. J. 95) also the same principle was reiterated & it was pointed out that it was open to a Mag. to drop the proceeding if he was satisfied that there was no likelihood, of a breach of the peace. Krishnan J. made the following observations with regard to Clause (5) of Sec.145: Clause (5) of Sec.145 provides for a special case-where as the Mag. is proceeding with the trial of the question of possession, the parties to the proceedings or even other persons who are interested are given the right to show that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists or has existed. The existence of this Clause does not take away the power of the Mag. himself to drop proceedings, if he is satisfied that there is no further likelihood of a breach of a peace." At one stage of his argument, Mr. Mukharji, expressed the view that staying the proceeding does not mean dropping the proceeding, & he also pointed that the order of Mr. G. K. Pd. does not show that he had cancelled the previous order under Sub-section (1) of Sec.145. But the word "stayed" has been used in Clause (5) and the authorities referred to above conclusively establish that it means the dropping of the proceeding or the termination of the proceeding. It is true that the learned Mag. did not say in so many words that he had cancelled the order-under Sub-Section (1) of Sec.145 but when he said that he had stayed the proceeding, he certainly, meant that the order under Sub-Section (1) stood cancelled. There can be no doubt that in this case the Mag. had very good grounds to make the order which he made. As already pointed-out, an order under Sec.147 would be subject to any subsequent decree of a civil Ct. of competent jurisdiction, & the second party had rightly, stated in his petn. that the right which was-the subject-matter of dispute could only be properly determined by a civil Ct. & that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace when, the parties had already begun to fight in the-civil Ct. with regard to the right in question. of competent jurisdiction, & the second party had rightly, stated in his petn. that the right which was-the subject-matter of dispute could only be properly determined by a civil Ct. & that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace when, the parties had already begun to fight in the-civil Ct. with regard to the right in question. The proceeding terminated when the order was passed on 17-3-1949, & this proceeding could not be revived unless the Mag. received fresh, information about a breach of the peace. As was pointed out by the Calcutta H. C. in Kalananda Singh V/s. Rameshwar Singh, 15 C. W. No. 271 : (11 Cr. L. J. 729), the jurisdiction is solely based on the imminence of a breach of the peace, & the Mag. must be satisfied that a dispute exists which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The information & the grounds on which the proceedings could be revived in September 1949, could not be the same on the basis of which they had been started in October 1948. I have already pointed out that when the learned Sub-divisional Mag. passed his order dated 6 9-1949, for re-starting the proceeding six months had elapsed & during those six months the first party had not moved any higher Ct. against the order dated 17-3-1949, & had not applied for the revival of the proceeding. Mr. Mukharji was not right in submitting that the order of the learned Sub-divisional. Mag. should be taken to be an order under Sub-section (2) of Sec. 528, Cr. P. C. In fact, the order of the learned Sub-divisional Mag. is open to very serious criticism. He revived the proceeding on an unstamped petn. filed by one who was no party to the proceeding, but a complete stranger, without at all considering the circumstances under which the Mag. Mr. G. K. Prasad had passed the order dated 17 3-1949 & the powers which he had for making an order in terms contemplated by Sub-Section (5). The learned Sub-divisional Mag. has said in his order that he does not know of any provision of law under which a Mag. can stay a proceeding under Sec.147, Cr. P. C. & that there was no injunction from the civil Ct. for staying the proceeding. The learned Sub-divisional Mag. has said in his order that he does not know of any provision of law under which a Mag. can stay a proceeding under Sec.147, Cr. P. C. & that there was no injunction from the civil Ct. for staying the proceeding. As already pointed out, the word stayed has been used by the Legislature in its wisdom & there are several authorities which have interpreted this word to mean the termination or the dropping of the proceeding. I, therefore, wonder how the Mag. thought that there was no provision of law under which a Mag. could stay a proceeding under Sec.147, Cr. P. C. It further appears that he was unmindful of what is contained in Sub-section (4) of Sec.147 & also of the fact that since the termination of the proceeding in March 1949, the first party had taken no step for the revival of the proceeding, which is a clear indication of the fact that he was satisfied that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace. 2. Mr. Mukharji referred to a decision of this Ct. in Sastu Sahu V/s. Nathuni Thakur, 6 P. L. T. 258 : (A. I. R. (11) 1924 Pat. 689 : 26 Cr. L. J. 105). But the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. What happened in that case was that a Mag. after examining the witnesses & after hearing the arguments of a case under Sec.145 did not pass any order for about ten months. To quote from the judgment of Kulwant Sahay J., "the learned Sub-divisional Mag. apparently forgot all about the case until he was reminded of it when he was going away on transfer " & he then hurridly disposed of the case with an order which runs as follows: I find I passed no final order in this case. As so long time has elapsed, I do not think any breach of the peace is likely. I, therefore, strike the case off." Certainly this was a most dishonest way of disposing of a case under Section 145, Cr. As so long time has elapsed, I do not think any breach of the peace is likely. I, therefore, strike the case off." Certainly this was a most dishonest way of disposing of a case under Section 145, Cr. P. C. & the decision is that case cannot be cited as a precedent in this case in which the proceeding was stayed or dropped because a civil suit had been instituted & because there was no likelihood of breach of peace after the institution of the civil suit. 3 In my opinion, the order that has been passed by Mr. G. K. Prasad was an order which the was competent to pass according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, & the learned Sub-divisional Mag. had no jurisdiction to revive the proceeding & to transfer it to another Mag. for disposal As has been pointed out by this Cr. in Luti Singh V/s. Ramkirit Singh, A. I. R. (28) 1941 Pat. 105 : (42 Cr. L. J. 340), even a Dist. Mag. has no power to revise an order under Sec.145 passed by a Mag. subordinate to him, & all that he can do is to call for the record under Sec. 435, & if he considers that the order should be interfered with, his duty, is to refer it to the H. C. It seems obvious that this learned Sub-divisional Mag. assumed a jurisdiction which he never possessed & at the instance of one who had been no party to the proceeding. I, therefore, agree with the learned Addl. Ses. J. that the order of the learned Sub-divisional Mag. should be set aside. 4. The reference is accepted, & the order of the learned Mag. dated 6-9-1949, is set aside.