Nawal Kishore, J.—This application is made by Kasturchand Jain, resident of Rajnandgaon, situated in Central Provinces, under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the order of detention dated 15th of September 1949 passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of the United State of Rajasthan. This order was made under section 2 of. the Marwar Public Security Act 1947 (3 of 1947) and stated that where as the Government of the United State of Rajasthan was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that Kasturchand Jain had acted and was about to act in a manner prejudicial to Public safety and peace, the Government of the United State of Rajasthan was pleased to authorize the Inspector of Police Jodhpur to arrest the said Kasturchand Jain without warrant and to commit him to the custody of the Central Jail, Jodhpur to be detained therein for a period of six months from the date of his arrest. In the present application by Kasturchand it is stated that on 17th March 1949, he was arrested at Jodhpur while on his way from Phalodi to Rajnandgaon and detained for a period of six months under section 2 of the Marwar Public Security Act. He completed this term of imprisonment on 16th of September 1949 and Was accordingly released on that day but was immediately re-arrested and again detained for a further period of six months under the same Act. On 3rd of November, 1949 the applicant applied to the District Magistrate, Jodhpur, requesting him to communicate to him the grounds on which the order of detention had been made against him and such other particulars as may, in his opinion, be sufficient to enable him to make a representation against the order. On 19th of November r949> the applicant was informed that he had been detained under the orders of the Chief Secretary but the grounds on which this order had been passed were not communicated to him. Accordingly, on 23rd of November 1949, the present application was filed in this court. In this application he made it clear that he bad never anything to do with any kind of political activity in any part of the Union or with the activities of any political party in India as he had severed all connections with the Communist party. Accordingly, on 23rd of November 1949, the present application was filed in this court. In this application he made it clear that he bad never anything to do with any kind of political activity in any part of the Union or with the activities of any political party in India as he had severed all connections with the Communist party. The Chief Secretary has replied to the above application and supported his reply by means of an affidavit stating as below:— 1. That from information received, the Government of the United State of Rajasthan was satisfied that Kasturchand Jain is a well-known and active Communist and as an agitator had been fomenting and organizing industrial strikes. 2. That the Government of the United State of Rajasthan was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that Kasturchand Tain "would act" in a manner prejudicial to public safety and peace. 2. On a persistent demand by the applicant for the grounds on which he had been detained in custody, the Government of the United State of Rajasthan ultimately communicated them to him and the original communication has been placed by the applicant on the record.The grounds mentioned in this communication are identical with those mentioned above. 3. It may be pointed out that prima facie the order of detention passed by the Government being in the language of Section 2 of Marwar Public Security Act, appears to be in order and,accord-ingly, it has been urged by the learned Government Advocate that it is not open to this court to go behind it and examine the circumstances in which it came to be passed. In other words, the learned Government Advocate contended, in terms of Section 34 of the Marwar Public Security Act, since repealed on 29th of October 1949 and Section 64 of the Rajasthan Public Security Ordinance, now in force that an order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under the above Ordinance could not be called in question by any Court. He produced a number of authorities but they do not support him to the entire extent and we will deal with them in proper places. Of late there has been a plethora of cases dealing with points arising under applications for habeas corpus and the legal position has more or less crystallized and does not admit of any doubt or difficulty. Of late there has been a plethora of cases dealing with points arising under applications for habeas corpus and the legal position has more or less crystallized and does not admit of any doubt or difficulty. Accordingly, it is not quite correct to say that an order made by the detaining authority can not be called in question by any court on any ground whatsoever. The contention of the learned Government Advocate is correct only to this extent that the court cannot consider the adequacy of the reasons or of the information available to the Government which led to its satisfaction before the order for detention was passed. This means that sufficiency of the material on which satisfaction is based cannot be the subject of scrutiny by the courts as the legislature has chosen in its wisdom, as held in 1949 Nag. 50, (1. Vasudev Anant Shastri V. Emperor.) to invest the Government with the power to detain persons after satisfying itself that they are either acting or likely to act in a particular manner and make the Government the sole judge of this matter. But it is equally well established that the detenu can be allowed to show that the order was not made bonafide or was made without sufficient application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts or requirements of the law. Ghosh C.J. in 1948 Jaipur Law Reports (2. Chiranjilal Agrawal V. Chief Secretary.) 230 (237) has summed up the position tersely and the following extracts from his Judgment may be cited with advantage: — "Easily these cases fall into two classes. First, there is a class of cases in which the Court has looked into the form of the order and held that the grounds therefor cannot be gone into. In this class of cases, generrlly speaking, there has been no plea of malafide, but even then it may be observed that in order to come to a decision the courts have found it necessary to go into the merits The second group of cases is furnished, generally speaking, by those in which the plea of malafide is taken. In such cases the court,in examining that plea, has looked beyond the form of the order and has interfered when it found that the detention was illegal or improper." 4. In such cases the court,in examining that plea, has looked beyond the form of the order and has interfered when it found that the detention was illegal or improper." 4. It may be further pointed out that Section 64 of the Rajasthan Ordinance would protect only such orders as may have been passed in exercise of the power conferred by or under the Act. If, however, the order was not in exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act, that order surely is not protected by this section. In other words, if the order stands on false basis or on no basis at ail, it cannot be said to have been passed in exercise of the power conferred by the legislature. In the words of Waliullah J., in 1948 All. 414, (3. Gaurinandan V. Rex) the sufficiency or insufficiency of the material is a matter for the authority which passed the order of detention and is not a matter which can be scrutinized or enquired into by a court of law, but the order is open to challenge on the ground that it was not made in conformity with the power conferred and the court has to satisfy itself on this question. We now propose to refer to and discuss a few more authorities where the above position has been distinctly supported. Durgadas and others V. Rex (1949 All 148), a Full Bench Judgment is a leading case on this subject. On the point whether it was open to the High Court to question the satisfaction of the District Magistrate contemplated in Section 3 of the U. P. Maintenance of Public Order Act with respect to its being arrived at reasonably or otherwise, reliance was placed on section 15 which reads as follows: "No order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall be called in question in any Court ". 5. Malik C.J. who wrote the judgment held that this section would protect only such orders as may have been passed in exercise of the power conferred by or under the Act or any rule made thereunder. 5. Malik C.J. who wrote the judgment held that this section would protect only such orders as may have been passed in exercise of the power conferred by or under the Act or any rule made thereunder. When to a writ of habeas corpus the detaining authority produces the order of detention, the court would presume in favour of its validity, provided the authority passing the order had jurisdiction to do so under the statute or under any properly delegated power. It would, however, be open to the detenu to prove that he was not the person for the detention of whom the order had been made or that the order was malafide or a fraud on the Act. It was contended by the learned Advocate General that it was not open to the court to go into the question of satisfaction of the detaining authority but Malik C.J. held that if the detenu could prove that the detaining authority was, in fact, not satisfied, the order of detention would be illegal. In other words, the power to issue a valid order depended upon the fulfillment of a condition and the courts had a right to see that the condition was fulfilled, that is, whether the detaining authority was in fact, satisfied. In 1949 Bom. 87.2 Sen, J. held that it was well established that the court could not consider the adequacy of the reasons or of the information available to the detaining authority but it is open to the detenu to show that the order was not made bonafide but for ulterior purposes or that it was made without sufficient application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts or requirements of law or that it was passed on a ground outside the scope of the Act or that it was passed at least partially on a proposition of fact which is shown to be false. The court would, to start with, assume that the authority had made every reasonable endeavour consistently with its responsibilities to ascertain the facts correctly. Where, however, a fact, relied on, is found to be false and the said authority by applying its mind to materials before it could have found out the falsity of the said fact, such falsity would vitiate the order as showing an insufficient application of mind on its part to the facts before it. Where, however, a fact, relied on, is found to be false and the said authority by applying its mind to materials before it could have found out the falsity of the said fact, such falsity would vitiate the order as showing an insufficient application of mind on its part to the facts before it. Where, however, the falsity was such as could not ordinarily be found out in the process of applying its mind to the facts, the question would indeed be somewhat more difficult. It is, therefore, legitimate for the detenu to rely on the statement of grounds and particulars furnished to him in order to show that a fact alleged therein is false. In In re Moinudin Abdullamian Kuroshi, (1949 Bom. 87) there is a reference to Gureenes case (1942 A.C. 284) and Liversidgers case (1942 A.C. 206) where also it was held that it was open to the detenu to prove facts which might successfully controvert the order of detention although it might be ex facie a good and valid order. In the Bombay Case, good faith of the detaining authority was challenged and it was held that in suitable cases, the court would be competent to go behind the order and enquire into the truth of the information on which the detaining authority had acted. This, it may be noted is different from sufficiency of the material on which the information is based. The court as stated above, is not concerned with sufficiency but is entitled to investigate into its truth. If the fact relied on is found to be false and the detaining authority could by applying its mind find out the falsity, such falsity would vitiate the order as showing an insufficient application of the mind on its part to the facts before it. To repeat therefore, normally the order of detention passed by the detaining authority will be accepted as correct and it is only in exceptional cases where it is successfully shown to be malafide or without basis that the Court may interfere and release the detenu. In In re Moinuddin Abdullamian Kureshi (1949 Mad. 307) Rajamannar C.J. held that once a duly authenticated order of detention is produced, it must be taken prima facie to have been properly made and that the requisite as to the belief of the Government or the detaining authority was complied with. In In re Moinuddin Abdullamian Kureshi (1949 Mad. 307) Rajamannar C.J. held that once a duly authenticated order of detention is produced, it must be taken prima facie to have been properly made and that the requisite as to the belief of the Government or the detaining authority was complied with. The burden to prove will lie on the challenger and; of course, the burden is likely to be heavy. An order of detention could, be challenged where there is a mistake of an identity or when there is a lack of bonafides. If these grounds do nor exist, the High court cannot investigate the sufficiency of the material or the reasonableness of the ground upon which the Government had been satisfied. Narain Swami vs. Inspector of Police (1949 Md. 761) is also to the same effect and it was held by Rajagopalan, J. that in considering the question whether the apparent satisfaction recorded by the District Magistrate was in good faith in exercise of the statutory powers conferred upon him, it was certainly permissible to view the order of detention in relation to the apparent and avowed object with which the order of detention was passed, i.e. had been passed, not to prevent a breach of the peace or a danger to public safety but to prevent the petitioner from coming out of Jail if he could not find the sureties he was requested to do by the Sessions Judge such an exercise of power, it was held, was malafide and where a detention was traceable only to such an exercise of power, detention must be held to be illegal. All these authorities referred to and are based on In the matter of N.R. Shriniwasan (1945 P.C. 156) where it was contended on behalf of the Crown that orders of detention were, on their face regular, and in conformity with the language of the rule and, therefore, it was not open to the High Court to investigate their validity any further. Their lordships said that this contention of the crown went too far and approved of the following statement by the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court. Their lordships said that this contention of the crown went too far and approved of the following statement by the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court. "It is quite a different thing to question the accuracy of a recital contained in a duly authenticated order, particularly where the recital purports to state as a fact the carrying out of what I regard as a condition necessary to the valid making of that order. In the normal case the existence of such a racial in a duly authenticated order will, in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by a court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled. The presence of the recital in the order will place a difficult burden on the detenu to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish even a prima facie case that the recital is not accurate." 6. As pointed out by Sen. J. the expression "any evidence as to its inaccuracy and will place a difficult burden on the detenu to produce admissible evidence" show that consideration by the court of evidence in such a case was not ruled out Emperor vs. Shibnath Banerjee (1948 All. 414) was cited by the learned Government Advocate in support of the proposition that an order of detention made under the Ordinance could not be called in question in any court but it has already been referred to above and it is not necessary to repeat over observations. It would be sufficient to state that this authority does not go all the way as contended by learned Government Advocate. Basheshardayal vs. Emperor (1946 Lah. 36) is another authority relied upon by the learned Government Advocate but this also does not: support him. In this case, two persons, namely, Baij Nath and Khushia Singh were taken in custody by the Police under the orders of Inspector C.I.D. under rule 129 Defence of India Rules because they were "hampering the efficient prosecution of war " by seriously damaging war supplies. In this case, two persons, namely, Baij Nath and Khushia Singh were taken in custody by the Police under the orders of Inspector C.I.D. under rule 129 Defence of India Rules because they were "hampering the efficient prosecution of war " by seriously damaging war supplies. On a question being raised, Tejasing J. who wrote the judgment, held that in spite of S. 16, Defence of India Act, that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any court, the High Court was quite competent to determine whether the arrest had been really in bad faith for a co-llateral purpose and was hence an abuse of power and fraud upon the statute. This view found support in 1943 Lab. 41(1. Lahore Electric Supply Co. V. The Province of Punjab.), 1944 Lah.373 (2. Dilbagh Singh V. Emperor) 1945 Lah. 293 (3. Teja Singh V. Emperor.) and 1945 Nagpur 8 (4. Vimlabai Deshpande V. Emperor.) to which reference was made in the judgment. In 1949 Nag.50 (5. Vasudev Anant Shastri V. Fmperor.), another authority relied upon by the learned Government Advocate and already referred to above, it was held that the petitioner must satisfy the court that there had been, in fact, a misuse of the powers. Fraud had to be pleaded and proved and it was open to the detenu to show on the record that there was, in fact, no satisfaction. He could also allege facts tending to show that there had been a mistake in identity or fraud on the statute or other misuse of the powers The position then, in a nutshell is, to repeat, that where the basis of the order is, as a matter of fact, found to be erro-neous, in the words of 1949 Bom. 87(6. In re Moinuddin Abdullamian Kureshi.)(92) "at least in some essential particulars it is not possible to hold that the deprivation of the subjects liberty is justified", In 1949 All 406(7. Shah Mohd. V. The Croon.) Bind Basni Prasad J. held that the High Court was not concerned with the orders of detention, as it was not sitting as a court of appeal against the order passed by the detaining authority. In spite of this view, the learned Judge considered all the same whether the order of detention was malafide. Shah Mohd. V. The Croon.) Bind Basni Prasad J. held that the High Court was not concerned with the orders of detention, as it was not sitting as a court of appeal against the order passed by the detaining authority. In spite of this view, the learned Judge considered all the same whether the order of detention was malafide. It follows from a discussion of the above position that if an order of detention is established not to have been made in conformity with the power conferred, this court will have power under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to direct the release of a person detained by reason of such an order. A question was raised by the learned Government Advocate that under Section 34 of the Marwar Public Security Act, it was not open to a court of law to invoke a provision of Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But while this Act has been repealed, according to Section 62, the provisions of the Rajastha Public Security Ordinance are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force in the whole or in part of Rajasthan. A similar question arose in 1950 Pesh. I (8. Nawabzada Mohd. Hussain Khan V. Rex.) and it was held, although on slightly different grounds, that the Public Safety Act could not be held to operate in derogation of the provisions of other laws, for instance Sec. 491 Criminal Procedure Code and had to be enforced in addition to them. In 1949 Mad. 307(9. Narain Swami V. Inspector of Police.)(324) it was held that in spite of the provisions of Section 16 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order act or any other provisions, the power and jurisdiction of the High Court to pass an order under Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code remained the same, subject to the same conditions, qualifications and limitations. The residuum of power and jurisdiction of the High Court was the power to interfere and set at liberty a person who was being detained by an order which, though purporting to be made under special Act was, in fact, no such an order. The residuum of power and jurisdiction of the High Court was the power to interfere and set at liberty a person who was being detained by an order which, though purporting to be made under special Act was, in fact, no such an order. The contention of the learned Government Advocate that the words in Section 62 "any other law" should mean law relating to detention only is without force as he promptly conceded that there was no support for the view. According to Ghose C.J. in 1948 Jaipur Law Reports 230 (10. Chiranji Lal Agrawal V. Chief Secretary.) the true rule is to be found in Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code which governs the law in this country and according to it, a High Court, whenever it thinks fit may direct that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within the limits of its jurisdiction, be set at liberty. The High Court, therefore has to determine whether the applicant was illegally or improperly detained, but while doing so, will go into the merits for determining, not whether the material before the Government was sufficient, but whether the order was bonafide and made after sufficient application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts before it. 7. The next question argued and calling for consideration is with reference to Section 3 (I) (b) and 5 of the Rajasthan Public Security Ordinance. According to Section 3 (I) (b) the Government if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order or communal harmony or the relations of the Government with the Government of India or of any Indian Province or of any Indian State, it is necessary so to do, may make an order directing that he be detained. According to Section 5, within a week after an order in respect of any person is made under Section 3 (0 (b), the officer or authority making an order shall communicate to the person affected thereby the grounds on which the order against him has been made such other particulars as may in the opinion of such officer or authority be sufficient to enable him to make a representation against the order and such person may thereafter make a representation in writing to such officer or authority against the order. 8. A two fold contention has been put forward on behalf of the applicant and it is as follows : (1) That the grounds were not furnished within one weeks time of the order of detention. (2) That the grounds when furnished were vague and indefinite. 9. It is accordingly argued that on account of non - compliance with a mandatory provision of the law and the further fact that the grounds when disclosed were vague and indefinite, it must be held that the order of detention was improper. Now according to the provisions of Section 5 which are indeed mandatory, the detenu has two valuable rights firstly, to know within one week of his deten-tion why he has been detained and secondly, to make a representation questioning the validity of the detention. The learned Government Advocate conceded that the Rajasthan Ordinance had come into force on 9th of September 1949 when it was promulgated by His Highness the Rajpra-mukh and, therefore, it was imperative on the part of the Government to furnish the grounds as required by Section 5. It may be pointed out that, although in the Marwar Public Security Act there was no provision for furnishing grounds of detention to the detenu as affirmed by the Chief Secretary in his affidavit, owing to the Rajasthan Ordinance havin come into force, it became imperative for him to do so. The learned Government Advocate was heard to argue at one time that non-compliance with the above provision was due to a bonafide mistake on the part of the Government and should be held to be of no consequence This contention is, however against the current view of the entire law on the point according to which it was now well established that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5 makes further detention illegal or improper. After holding this in 1949 All 148 (F.B.)(1. Durgadas V. Rex.) Malik C . J. proceeded to consider further whether the aforesaid non-compliance only made further detention illegal or also made the order of detention void oh initio and came to the conclusion that mere non-compliance with a subsequent requirement of the statue did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the previous order of detention must have been made without any justification and was not a bonafide act. In 1948 Pat. 135 (2. Murat Patwa V. Province of Bihar.) also it was held that further detention became illegal if grounds for detention were not communicated to the detenu. This ruling was followed in 1948 All 435.(3. Kasi Parsad V. Emperor.) In 1948 All. 225 (4. J. Ahmad V. Emparor.) it was argued on behalf of the Crown that omission to inform the detenu of the grounds of his detention was merely a slip and the applicant had not been prejudiced thereby. Sarkar Saran J. held that the enactment was seriou sencroachment upon the liberty of the subject and it was the business of the High Court to see that the terms of the statute were strictly construed and so far as may be in favour of the subject. Where, however, there had been a violation of the mandatory provision of the law any further detention of the applicant was improper. We respectfully agree that non-compliance with the provisions of section 5 only makes further detention improper and does not make the initial order of detention void ab initio. It may be further pointed out in this connection that the grounds communicated to the detenu must not be vague, indefinite or incomplete, as held in 1949 All. 748(1. Rambilas Gupta V. Rex) and must convey sufficient information to him to make a representation that the detaining authority was wrong in its belief that his detention was necessary in the interests of public safety. If in the opinion of the court the grounds of detention supplied are vague,indefinite and insufficient this court must hold that further detention was illegal or improper. 1949 Mad.605 (2. Venkat Raman V. Commissioner of Police Madras) cited by the learned Government Advocate is clearly distinguishable as it only holds that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5,cannot have the effect of invalidating an order validly passed. 1949 Mad.605 (2. Venkat Raman V. Commissioner of Police Madras) cited by the learned Government Advocate is clearly distinguishable as it only holds that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5,cannot have the effect of invalidating an order validly passed. This is correct so far as it goes but the further point whether further detention of the detenu became improper was not discussed. 10. After enunciating the law as above, we will now proceed to determine. (1) Whether there is anything in the circumstances of this case to show that the order of detention was not bonafide or was made without sufficient application of the mind of the detaining authority to facts ? (2) Whether grounds of detention were communicated to the applicant within one week of the order of detention and were they definite and sufficient ? 11. In our opinion, on both these grounds this application must succeed. On 16th of March 1949 the applicant was detained in custody for six months and this period expired on 16th of September 1949. On 15th of September, 1949 an order was sighed by the Chief Secretary that Kastur-chand Jain the applicant may be arrested and detained in Jail for six months as he had acted and was about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and peace. This order was served on him on 6th September 1949 as soon as he came out of the Jail. It is urged that if the applicant had indulged in any activity prejudicial to public safety previous to 16th of March, 1949 he had suffered for it as he had been detained for six months already. If the Government had carefully considered the above facts, it certainly could not possibly come to the conclusion that he bad again acted in the manner mentioned above as he was in Jail. This is conceded by the learned Government Advocate but it is urged that he was detained in custody a second time as he was "about to act" in a prejudicial manner. In the reply to the petition which has been filed on behalf of the Government these words are not used and instead it is stated that there were many reasonable grounds for believing that he "would act" in a manner prejudicial to public safety and peace. The reply on behalf of the Government is supported by an affidavit of the Chief Secretary. The reply on behalf of the Government is supported by an affidavit of the Chief Secretary. In the order for detention dated 15th of March 1949, however it is stated that he had acted and was about to act in this manner. It is plain that there is a great difference between "would act" and "about to act" and that the Government had simply repeated the language of Sec-ction 3 of the act without carefully considering its applicability to the facts before it. The use of the words Acting in contradistinction to about to act" which should apply to acts in future could only be interpreted to mean to relate to something in the recent past if not in the immediate present. As held in 1949 Mad. 761, (3. In the matter of N. R. Shreeniwasan.) since the applicant was in judicial custody for a period of six months before his second arrest, the recent past was absent and could not have been considered while ordering the detention. As stated above already, we are not concerned with whether there was sufficient reason for the Government to be satisfied and the sole question is whether the exercise of power by the Government was in good faith or bad faith. In the circumstances of this case it must be held that the order of detention dated 15th of September 1949 was not passed in the exercise of good faith. For aught we know, the detention in Jail may have had salutary effect upon the applicant and he may have abstained from activity in which he was possibly indulging previously. How did the Government assume that he was about to act or would act in the same manner again. The Government should have given him a chance and allowed sometime to elapse befo re passing the second order of detention and this is not legally permissible. 1943 All. 285 is practically on all fours with this case except that while in this case the order of fresh detention was served on the applicant as soon as he was released from Jail, in this authority the fresh order was communicated as the period of detention was expiring. 1943 All. 285 is practically on all fours with this case except that while in this case the order of fresh detention was served on the applicant as soon as he was released from Jail, in this authority the fresh order was communicated as the period of detention was expiring. Wanchoo J. while holding that this was not per-missible in law observed as follows:— "By ordering a further detention of the person by a fresh order without releasing him and giving him a chance to act normally and thus proving that the period for which the appropriate authority considered he should be detained in the first instance had the right effect on him, the authority concerned is nearly looking to the atmos-phere prevailing in the district or the province without giving due weight to the likely action of the person detained. It seems to me, therefore, that it could not be the intention of the Act that the authority concerned should act in this manner rather unjustly towards a detenu and that is why no provision is made for the extension of the period of detention". 12. On the other question also that grounds of detention were not communicated to the detenu within one week and were vague and indefinite, this application must succeed. The only ground mentioned is that he was an active Communist and as an agitator has been fomenting and organizing industrial strikes. This ground is indeed very vague and indefinite. Neither the place or places where the detenu had fomented or organized industrial strikes nor the names of the industries he wanted to be hit by his agitation nor yet the dates on which this had been done were indicated in the grounds supplied to him. These observations have been made only to show that the grounds furnished were vague and indefinite otherwise we have already held that if all this had been done previous to his first detention, it could not be made use of over again for detaining him a second time. Another point argued in-terns of 1949 All. 7 ,8 is that a person cannot be detained simply for organizing a strike; a strike may be legal or illegal. Another point argued in-terns of 1949 All. 7 ,8 is that a person cannot be detained simply for organizing a strike; a strike may be legal or illegal. In the words of Bind Basni Prasad J. "he could be detained also for the instigation of a legal strike if in the opinion of the detaining autho-rity it was likely to lead to distur-ban;e of peace. In other words, it would not be legal to detain a person simply on the ground that he was instigating a strike in accordance with the law. But it is not wrong in law to decain a person if he has indulged in the instigation of a strike which, though legal, is, in the opinion of the detaining authority, likely to lead to disturbance of peace". As in that case, in the present case also there is nothing to show that the strikes which the applicant was fomenting and organizing previous to his first detention were illegal. In any case this would not be a sufficient ground for his detention in Jail a second time as he could not have organized these strikes while he was in custody. 13. In view of the foregoing discussion, further detention of the applicant is illegal. We, therefore, allow this application and direct that he be released from custody and set at liberty forthwith unless required by law for any other purpose. 14. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record our appreciation of the ability with which Mr. Chandmal, amicus curiae, addressed arguments in this case.