Judgment The question raised in these civil revision petitions relates to the proper Court-fee payable by the plaintiff on the plaints in three suits filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai. The plaintiff is a company which owns a fleet of motor vehicles. The plaintiff’s case is that it entrusted the sums necessary for the payment of license fees and the obtaining of licenses for its vehicles to its agent, the second defendant, with a direction that the money should be paid to the first defendant, the Government, and licenses should be obtained. Receipts for the payment of the fees as well as the licenses in respect of the vehicles purporting to be issued by the duly authorised officer of the Government were handed over to the plaintiff by the agent. The plaintiff’s further case is that the Government, the first defendant, under threat of prosecution for non-payment or deficient payment of the licence fees again collected considerable sums of money from the plaintiff. The suits have been laid for the recovery of these amounts alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff twice over, once through its agent, the second defendant, and once directly by the plaintiff in pursuance of a demand made by the first defendant. The Subordinate Judge observes that there has been some malpractice on the part of the plaintiff’s agent or the servants of the Government or both. No objection as regards the deficiency of the Court-fee paid was taken in the written statement filed by the Government but the learned Subordinate Judge on his own initiative, raised an issue as regards the sufficieny of the Court-fee paid and directed the plaintiff to pay ad valorem Court-fee on the amount sought to be recovered from the first defendant, the Government, and again another ad valorrn Court-fee on the same amount in so far as it was sought to be recovered alternatively from the second defendant. The plaintiff contends that the order of the Court below is erroneous and the direction calling upon him to amend his plaint and pay ad valoren Court-fee twice over on the single sum for which a decree is sought is illegal. The plaintiff contends that the order of the Court below is erroneous and the direction calling upon him to amend his plaint and pay ad valoren Court-fee twice over on the single sum for which a decree is sought is illegal. The question turns on the correct interpretation of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act which runs thus: "Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memorandum of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act." Now the words”two or more distinct subjects“in section 17 do not admit of a precise definition applicable to all cases. Where reliefs are claimed in the alternative with reference to the same facts and in respect of the same sum of money against two defendants, the suit cannot be said to embrace two or more distinct subjects. The relief claimed is one and the same, namely, the recovery of the money of which the plaintiff had been wrongfully deprived and the amount for which a decree is sought is one and the same though the claim is sought to be made out on alternative grounds against one or the other of the two defendants. If the first defendant is found liable, then on that very finding, the second defendant has to be exonerated. Alternatively, if it is proved that the money alleged to have been paid to the second defendant was in fact paid by the plaintiff but was not transmitted to the first defendant and the first defendant is exonerated from liability, then on that very-ground the second defendant must be made liable to repay the money paid to him and not duly accounted for. The causes of action against the first and the second defendants are different, but, as observed by the Full Bench in In re Parameswara Pattar1, the test under section 17 is not whether the causes of action are distinct. Nor is it a conclusive test to apply that different suits could have been brought separately against each of the defendants in respect of the relief claimed in this suit. Nor is it a conclusive test to apply that different suits could have been brought separately against each of the defendants in respect of the relief claimed in this suit. The decision of the learned Chief Justice in Ramasami v. Krishnayya2, does no more than point out that the fact that the causes of action are different and different suits could be filed in respect of them, though not conclusive, is relevant to a consideration of the question whether a suit embraces two or more different subjects, see also Raja of Vizianagaram v. The Government3. It was clearly necessary for the plaintiff to get an adjudication as regards his right to a return of the sum claimed by it either from the first defendant or from the second defendant in the presence of both the defendants. It is for cases like the present that Order 1, rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, enacts that, Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to obtain redress, he may two or more defendants in order that the question as to which of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties.” Otherwise if a separate suit were brought against each of the defendants the finding in one suit may not conclude the issue in the other suit and there might possibly be contradictory findings of the same Court on the same issue in two different suits. It is to avoid this anomalous result that Order 1, rule 7, permits the joinder of two defendants against whom relief is claimed in the alternative in order that the question as to which of the defendants is liable and to what extent, may be determined not only as between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other, but as between the defendants inter se. Further under the illustration to Order 41, rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, where the plaintiff sues A and B and claims relief in the alternative against A or B and the Court passes a decree against A who takes the matter in appeal impleading the plaintiff and B, it is open to the appellate Court to exonerate A, the appellant, and pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff against B, the co-respondent. Only one Court-fee is paid on the memorandum of appeal and the plaintiff gets a decree gainst A or B, whoever is ultimately found liable to him. I consider, therefore, that it cannot be said in the present case that the suits in the Court below embraced two or more distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17, Court-Fees Act. I set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge in the three suits, directing payment of additional court-fee. The civil revision petitions will therefore be allowed but having regard to the fact that the Government did not take any objection on the score of deficient court-fee, there will be no order as to costs. K.C. ----- Petition allowed