JUDGMENT : CHATURVEDI, J. 1. We have before us an appln. dated 30-9.50 under S. 24 (1), Madhya Bharat Press (Emergency) Powers Act Samvat 2007 (lxix) [69] of 1950) by the appct. Shree Ram Dayal Singh (Keeper of the Ranabheri Press) against an order of the Madhya Bharat State made under sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the said Act demanding a security from the appct. for the amount of Rupees three thousand. It is alleged that a notice was posted on 21-9-50 on the doors of the building of the Ranabheri Press and 1-10-1950 was fixed as the date by which the security must be furnished. The pamphlet printed in the said Press with reference to which the order was made by the Madhya Bharat State was stated in the said notice to come within the provisions of S. 4 (1) (f) of the Act. 2. A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned Dy. Govt. Advocate that an appln. can be entertained under S. 24 (1) only if there is an order of forfeiture. If there has been forfeiture of security which was furnished, contends the learned Dy. Govt. Advocate, then and then only the H. C. has jurisdiction to interfere. It follows that the keeper of a Printing Press who has been ordered merely to deposit security under sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the Act cannot apply to the H. C. to set aside such an older. 3. The learned Dy. Govt. Advocate, in support of this contention at first refers to the marginal note to S. 24 which is as follows: "Appln. to H. C. to set aside order of forfeiture." It has however been laid down again and again and by the highest authority that marginal notes cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute (Balraj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh, 31 I. A. 132: 26 ALL. 393 at p. 406 (P. C.) and I.T. Commr. v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co., A. i. r. (37) 1950 S. C. 134 at p. 141 Col 1: (1950 S. C. R. 335)). I have therefore to eliminate the marginal note from consideration. 4. Then the Dy. Govt. Advocate, places reliance on the following observations of a Single Judge, (Vivian Bose J.) in Vishnu Ghanshyam v. Emperor, A.i.R. (28) 1941 Nag. I have therefore to eliminate the marginal note from consideration. 4. Then the Dy. Govt. Advocate, places reliance on the following observations of a Single Judge, (Vivian Bose J.) in Vishnu Ghanshyam v. Emperor, A.i.R. (28) 1941 Nag. 97:(42 Cr.L.J. 108): "Section 23 provides that if an order of forfeiture has been made under S. 4,6, 8, 10. or 19 of the Act in respect of security which has been deposited under S. 3 (3) or S. 7 (3), then, provided an appln. is made to the H. G. under S. 23 (1) within two months, the H. C. shall have jurisdiction to determine whether the publication in respect of which the order was made did or did not contain the words, signs, etc, described in S. 4 (1)." 5. The order of the Addl. Dist. Mag. which was questioned in the above ruling purported to have been made under S. 7 (1) of the Act. It was not a case under S. 7 (3) or S. 3 (3) of the Acs. Consequently, there could not have been any occasion to consider the provisions of S. 23 which corresponds to S. 24 of our Act. The above observations can then be taken to be in the nature of mere obiter. Even then there is nothing in the above observations to indicate that the learned Judge was definitely of the opinion that the H. C. has no jurisdiction to set aside an order demanding security under S. 3 (3) of the Act. In several later rulings the H. Ct. have assumed that they have such jurisdiction. In re "New Sind" M. U. Abbasi, A. I. r. (28) 1942 Sind 65 : (43 Cr. l. j. 838 S. b.) the Sp. B. consisting of Davis C. J., Weston and Tyabji JJ. went to the length of laying down that the H. C. can interfere under S. 25 even if the security demanded by the Govt. under S. 3 (3) or S. 7 (3) is in escess of what is permitted by law. In Murali Manohar Prasad v. Emperor a. I. R. (21) 1934 Pat. 344: (35 Cr. L. J. 1022 S. B.) before the Sp. B. the Govt's, orders demanding security from the 'Search light' under S. 3 (3) and a. 7 (3) were challenged and were upheld. In Murali Manohar Prasad v. Emperor a. I. R. (21) 1934 Pat. 344: (35 Cr. L. J. 1022 S. B.) before the Sp. B. the Govt's, orders demanding security from the 'Search light' under S. 3 (3) and a. 7 (3) were challenged and were upheld. In (Kidar Nath v. The Crown) A. I. R. (36) 1949 e. P. 289 : (50 Cr. l. j. 756 S. b), the Punjab Govt's, order to dep;sit security under S. 3 (3) was challenged and the Sp. B. set it aside. Abdul Hamid v. Emperor, a. I. R. (35) 1948 Lah. 161: (49 Cr. l. j. 480 S. B) Raja Gopala Rao v. Province of Bengal, a. I. R. (35) 1948 Mad 326: (42 Cr. L. J. 390 S. B.), In the matter of Co. operative Capital Press Lahore, A. I. R. (35) 1949 Lah 218 (51 or. L. 3. 98 S. B.). In the matter of Naya Zamana, a. i. r. (36) 1949 Lah. 259 (51 Cr. L. J. 24 S. B) and In the matter of Daily Ehsan, Lahore, A. I. r. (37) 1950 Lah. 24: 51 Cr. L. J. 316 F. b.) are recently reported cases wherein the orders of the Provincial Govts. for depositing security either under S. 3 (3) or 7 (3) or both were challenged, and after hearing arguments on merits, the orders were set aside. All these casts seem to have been argued and decided on the assumption that such orders can be challenged under S. 23 which corresponds to S. 21 of our Act. 6. With these preliminary observations I now pass on to a consideration of the wording of S. 24 (1) of our Act which is to be interpreted. It runs as follows (and for the sake of convenience and further reference the section is arranged in paras): "The keeper of a Printing Press who has been ordered to deposit security under sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of this Act, or the publisher of a newspaper who has been ordered to deposit security under sub-s. (3) of S. 7 of this Act, or any person having any interest in any property in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under S. 4, S. 6, S. 8, S. 10 or S. 19 may. Within two months from the date of such order, apply to the H. C. to set aside, such order, and the H. C. shall decide if the newspaper book or other document in respect of which the order was made did or did not contain any words, signs, or visible representations of the nature described in S. 4, sub S. 1 of this Act." 7. Mr. Shiv Dayal, learned Dy. Govt. Advocate urges that the words 'such order' in the fourth para can mean only 'order of forfeiture' and he would like to read us the first para as below : "The keeper of a Printing Press who has been ordered to deposit security under sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the Act in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made may apply to the H. C. to set aside such order." 8. The learned Dy. Govt. Advocate contends thai except 'an order of forfeiture' no other order is referred to in this section and he also emphasises the fact that if there had been a comma before the word "may" in para three above he would have conceded that a keeper of a Printing Press could have applied to H. C. to set aside an under asking the keeper to deposit security under S. 3 (3) of the Act. But the comma coming after 'may' and not before the word leads him to the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the first para would be read as shown above. 9. There is no doubt that the section is not happily and carefully worded and if the omission of a comma before the word 'may' in the third para cannot be explained, the insertion of a comma in the fourth para after the words 'set aside' and before the words 'such order' would remain inexplicable if Mr. Shiv Dayal's contention is upheld. If the intention of the Legislature was only to provide for appeals against orders of forfeiture paras 3, 4 and 5 would have been sufficient to convey the meaning for, the words "any person having any interest in any property in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made" are of too wide an import and would include the keeper of a Printing Press or Publisher of a newspaper whose securities are forfeited under S. 4 or S. 8 respectively. The first two paras about the keeper of a printing press and about the publisher of a newspaper, along with references to S. 3 (3) and 7 (3), then, will be redundant. Words of a statute must however be construed so as to give a sensible meaning to them and full effect is to be given to every word. The rules of grammar in such cases must yield readily to those of common sense. In my opinion, the first two paras in the section have been inserted with a definite purpose and an appeal is allowed against orders of demanding security under S. 3 (3) or S. 7 (3) of the Act. The emphasis in S. 24 of our Act is not on an 'order of forfeiture' but on any order passed by the Govt. on the footing that a certain article or publication comes within the mischief of S. 4 (1) of the Act. The H. C. has been given the power of setting aside such an order, whether it is merely of demanding security under S. 3 (3) or under S 7 (3), or it is of forfeiture under S. 4, 6, 8, 10, or 20 (19 is an obvious mistake) of our Act, if the H. C. is of the opinion that the article or the publication does not contain words of the nature described in the said S. 4 (1). 10. In the view I take, the preliminary objection is untenable and I would overrule it. 11. A. H. Khan, J. :-I agree. 12. Shinde, J :- I agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother that the preliminary objection is not tenable. As the point raised is of some importance I propose to add a few words. 13. The point raised by the learned Dy. Govt. advocate is that an appln. under S. 24, Madhya Bharat Press (Emergency) Act of Samvat 2007, can be entertained only when an order of forfeiture is passed. In the interest of clear exposition I propose to reproduce the section and divide it in five parts. The section reads as follows: (1) The keeper of a Printing Press who has been ordered to deposit security under subs. In the interest of clear exposition I propose to reproduce the section and divide it in five parts. The section reads as follows: (1) The keeper of a Printing Press who has been ordered to deposit security under subs. (3) of S. 3 of this Act, or (2) The publisher of a newspaper who has been ordered to deposit security under sub-s. (3) of S. 7 of this Act, or (3) Any person having an interest in any property, (4) in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under S. 4, S. 6, S. 8, S. 10 or S. 20, (5) may, within two months from the date of such Older, apply to the H. C. to set aside, such order, and the H. C. shall decide if the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order was made did or did not contain any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in S.4, subs. (1) of this Act. The learned Dy. Govt. Advocate contends that the words 'in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under S. 4, S. 6, S. 8, S. 10 or S. 20' govern not only the word 'property' but also 'security' under S. 3 (3) and under S. 7 (3). It may be mentioned first of all thai between the word property' and 'in respect of there is no comma; the absence of comma indicates that the wards 'in respect of etc. qualify the word, 'property' only. The section contemplates three different persons, the keeper of a Printing Press, the publisher of a newspaper and a person having an interest in any property. If forfeiture clause were to govern all the three cases then it follows as a natural sequence that Ss. 4 and 6 mentioned in the said clause refer to the security deposited by the keeper of a printing press and Ss. 8 and 10 mentioned in the same clause refer to the security deposited by the publisher of a newspaper and S. 20 refers to a person who is interested in any property. The security forfeited under S. 4 is no doubt deposited under S. 3 (3); but the security forfeited under S. 6 is not deposited under S. 3 (3); but is deposited under S. 5. The security forfeited under S. 4 is no doubt deposited under S. 3 (3); but the security forfeited under S. 6 is not deposited under S. 3 (3); but is deposited under S. 5. Again security forfeited under S. 8 is no doubt deposited under S. 7 (3); but the security forfeited under S. 10 is not deposited under S. 7 (3); but is deposited under S. 9. This clearly proves that the forfeiture clause is not intended to govern all the three cases. Besides if the object of S. 24 is only to revise an order of forfeiture, then the mention of the third case alone is quite sufficient. The order of forfeiture passed under S. 4, 6, 8 or 10 relates either to security or to the press or copies of newspapers books and other documents. Hence, any person, interested in the forfeiture of any of the above property, can submit an appln. under S. 24. Mention of security deposited under S. 3 (3) and that deposited under S. 7 (3) is superfluous. Legislature cannot be presumed to have incorporated both these cases in S. 24 without any purpose. According to the golden rule of construction, an Act of Legislature is to be read according to the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words unless it leads to some absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency. The construction predicated by the learned Dy. Govt. Advocate, therefore, cannot be accepted. 14. For the above reasons I agree with the view taken by my learned brother.