Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. The question for decision in this appeal is whether the respondent can lawfully execute an order dated 10th September 1946 made by the House Controller directing the appellant to vacate a house which is holding No. 175 of the town of Purulia. 2. The material facts are not controverted. On 1st July 1946 the respondent filed an application before the House Controller asking that the appellant should be directed to vacate the house. The respondent alleged that the appellant had not paid rent and that the house was required for his own use. On 16th September 1946 the parties filed a compromise petition to the effect that the appellant would quit and vacate the premises within six months from that date and would deliver possession of the same to the respondent. The parties asked that the case should be disposed of in terms of the petition of compromise. The Controller accepted the compromise and made an order in terms thereof. As the appellant did not vacate on the agreed date the respondent applied on 5th January 1948 to the Munsif of Purulia for evicting the appellant from the house. The appellant made an objection that the order of 16th September 1946 could not be executed. The objection wa3 overruled by the learned Munsif whose order has been upheld by the Subordinate Judge in appeal. 3. On behalf of the appellant Mr. S.C. Ghosh argued in the first place that the House Controller had no jurisdiction to make the order dated 16th September 1946. He maintained that Sec. 4 (i), Bihar House Control Order, 1942 , did not in express terms confer jurisdiction on the Controller to order eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, that no order of eviction for non-payment of rent could be validly made under Sec. 4 of the Order. In support of the argument learned counsel referred to Brindaban Behari Lal V/s. Badri Prasad, A.I.R.. (36) 1949 Pat. 335 : (27 pat. 925) in which a Bench of this Court decided that the Controller cannot legally make an order evicting the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent under Sec. 4, House Control Order of 1942. But the facts of the present case are different. (36) 1949 Pat. 335 : (27 pat. 925) in which a Bench of this Court decided that the Controller cannot legally make an order evicting the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent under Sec. 4, House Control Order of 1942. But the facts of the present case are different. For it is not disputed that on 1st July 1946 the respondent had applied for evicting the appellant alleging not merely that there was default in payment of rent but that the respondent required the house for his own use. Under Sec. 4 (1), House Rent Control Order, 1942 the Controller had jurisdiction on the application of a landlord to direct the tenant to vacate the house if he is satisfied that the house is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation. It is therefore plain that the House Controller had jurisdiction to make the order dated 16th September 1946 directing the appellant to vacate the house in terms of the petition of compromise. As pointed out by West J. is Amritrav Krishna V/s. Bala Krishna, 11 Bom. 488. "jurisdiction consists in taking cognizance of a case involving the determination of some jural relation in ascertaining the essential points of it, and in pronouncing upon them." In Pisani V/s. Attorney-General, Gibralter, (1874) L R. 5 P. C. 516 : (30 L. T. 729), the Judicial Committee pointed oat that where there was jurisdiction over the subject-matter but non-compliance with the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the defect might be waived. In Ledgard V/s. Bull, 13 I. A. 131 : (9 ALL. 191 P. C.), the Judicial Committee held on the facts of the case that there wag no want of jurisdiction but only an irregularity as to Its existence. In pronouncing the Committees opinion Lord Watson stated : "When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. In pronouncing the Committees opinion Lord Watson stated : "When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. But there are numerous authorities which establish that when, in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue, and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the ground that there wars irregularities in the initial procedure, which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit." Upon the admitted facts of the present case I am satisfied that the House Controller had jurisdiction to order the eviction of the respondent in terms of the petition of compromise dated 16th September 1946. 4. Mr. S.C. Ghosh next presented the argument that the order of eviction dated 16th September 1946 was not preserved and kept alive by Bihar Ordiance II [2] of 1946 and therefore the order could not be executed under Sec.17 of Act in [3] of 1947. Learned counsel pointed out that the Bihar Ordinance II [2] of 1946 was promulgated by the Governor on 1st October 1946, on which date it came into force. On the same date the Governor of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 92, Government of India Act directed that the Act shall apply to Ghola Nagpore Division and Santal Perganas District. Learned counsel argued that Sec.1 (2) of Ordinance II [2] of 1946 made the Ordinance applicable only to the local areas specified in the schedule annexed to the Ordinance, which schedule did not include Purulia. Learned counsel contended that the order of the Controller dated 16th September 1946 could not continue in force under Sec.22 of the Ordinance but the order actually expired with the expiry of the Defence of India Act under which the House Bent Control Order of 1942 was made by the Governor of Bihar. Learned counsel contended that the order of the Controller dated 16th September 1946 could not continue in force under Sec.22 of the Ordinance but the order actually expired with the expiry of the Defence of India Act under which the House Bent Control Order of 1942 was made by the Governor of Bihar. In my opinion this argument is not tenable for the learned counsel has failed to take into account Ordinance XX [20] of 1946 by which the Governor-General specifically provided for the continuance of certain provisions of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and of the Defence of India Rules made thereunder. This Ordinance was promulgated and came into force on 1st October 1946 and extended to whole of British India, Sec.2 of this Ordinance is to the following effect : "2. Continuance of certain emergency provisions-- (i) Notwithstanding the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1939 (XXXV [35] of 1939),-- the provisions of the Defence of India Rules mentioned in the first column of the schedule to this Ordinance shall continue in force and have effect subject to the modifications specified in the second column thereof; (ii) any order or other instrument made under or in pursuance of any of the said provisions and in force immediately before the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1939 (XXXV [35] of 1939), shall continue in forceso far as consistent with the provisions as continued in force by this section and be deemed to be made under the provisions so continued in force." Section 8 of the Order enacts : "The provisions of the Defence of India Rules as continued in force by Section 2 and all orders made or deemed to be made under such provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Ordinance or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Ordinance." 5. Even if the Governor-General had not promulgated Ordinance XX [203 of 1946 it is impossible in my opinion to accept the argument of the learned counsel that the order of 16th September 1946 ceased to have effect on the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1939, and the rules made under Sec.2 of that Act, For the principle is well-settled that if a right has once been acquired by virtue of some statute it cannot be taken away again by the repeal of the statute under which it was acquired. In Stevenson V/s. Olive. (1841) 8 M. & W. 234 at p 241 : (10 L. J. Ex. 338) Parke B. stated : "If an Act is repealed, it becomes (except so far as it relates to transactions already completed under it) as if it had never existed, but, it an Act expires the duration of its provisions is a matter of construction. " The case related to 6 Geo. IV, C. 133, Sec. 4, which enacted that every person who held a commission as surgeon in the army should be entitled to practise as an apothecary without having passed the usual examination. This Act was temporary, expiring on 1st August 1826 ; and it was contended that a person who under the Act was entitled to practise as an apothecary would lose his right after 1st August 1826. But the Court held that such a person would not be so deprived of his right, and Lord Abinger C.B., in giving judgment said : "It is by no means a consequence of an Act of Parliament expiring that rights acquired under it should likewise expire. But the Court held that such a person would not be so deprived of his right, and Lord Abinger C.B., in giving judgment said : "It is by no means a consequence of an Act of Parliament expiring that rights acquired under it should likewise expire. The Act provides that persons who hold such commissions should be entitled to practise as apothecaries, and we cannot engraft on the statute a new qualification limiting that enactment." Alderson B. was even more emphatic : "Independently, however, of this consideration, I agree in the opinion already expressed by my brother Parke, It seems to me that those persons who, during the year for which the last act was to continue in forces or previous to that period, had obtained rights under it had obtained rights which were not to cease by the determination of the act, any more than where a person commits an offence against an act of a temporary nature, the party who his disobeyed the act during its existence as a law is to become dispunishable on its ceasing to exist." Reference should next be made to Lenn V/s. Mitchell, (1912) A. C. 400: (81 L. J. P. C. 173) in which a Hong-Kong Ordinance of 1895 had abolished the action for criminal conversation but a later Ordinance of 1908 had repealed the Ordinance of 1895 and had by its retroactive effect given a right of action for criminal conversation committed before the enactment of the Ordinance of 1908. The respondent after 1908 brought an action for criminal conversation committed before 1908, but it appeared that he had already brought such an action before the enactment of 1908, and judgment had been given against him founded on the then state of the law. The Judicial Committee held that this judgment had given the defendant a vested right which was a bar to an action for the same cause brought after the enactment of 1908. Lord Robson stated : "The effect of this Ordinance was undoubtedly to revive the right of action for criminal conversation in Hong-Kong, if it had ever been in fact suspended. Lord Robson stated : "The effect of this Ordinance was undoubtedly to revive the right of action for criminal conversation in Hong-Kong, if it had ever been in fact suspended. It is also clear that the Ordinance had a retroactive effect to the extent of enabling actions to be brought in respect of criminal conversation during the period when the right of action had ceased to exist in the Colony, bat the question now to be determined is whether it went further and operated to annul a valid and subsisting judgment as between parties whose rights had beau duly determined under and according to the law which existed before the new Ordinance was passed." 6. For the appellant, it was nevertheless contended that even if the order of the House Controller dated 16th September 1946 continued to remain in force, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to execute the order under Sec.11 of Act III [3] of 1947. For the appellant, it was nevertheless contended that even if the order of the House Controller dated 16th September 1946 continued to remain in force, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to execute the order under Sec.11 of Act III [3] of 1947. Learned counsel made reference to Sec.25 (2) of Bihar Act III [3] of 1947 which provides that: "Any rule, order or direction made or given or deemed to be made or given under the said Ordinance and in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall continue in force and be deemed to be an order or direction made or given under this Act ; and anything done and any action taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been made, done or taken in exercise of powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act had commenced on the 1st day of 26th October 1946." Reference was also made to Sec.22 of the Ordinance II [2] of 1946 which states : "Every order or direction made or given under the provisions of the Bihar House and Business Premises Control Order, 1942, in respect of any of the matters specified in this Ordinance shall, so far as it could validly have been made or given by the Provincial Government or the Controller, continue is force and be deemed to have been made or given under this Ordinance until it is superseded or modified by a competent authority under this Ordinance." It was conceded that if Sec.22 of the Ordinance was applied to Manbhum, the order of the House Controller could be executed by the civil Court under Act III [3] of 1947. But learned counsel maintained that Sec.22 of the Ordinance never applied to Manbhum and the House Controllers Order dated 16th September 1946, cannot, therefore, be deemed to be an order under Act in [3] of 1947. Sec.1(2) of Ordinance II [2] of 1946 states that it applied to the "local areas specified in the schedule and such other areas as may be notified by the Provincial Government in the Official Gazette." The Ordinance was promulgated on 1st October 1946. Sec.1(2) of Ordinance II [2] of 1946 states that it applied to the "local areas specified in the schedule and such other areas as may be notified by the Provincial Government in the Official Gazette." The Ordinance was promulgated on 1st October 1946. On the same date the Governor of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 92 (1), Government of India Act, directed that the Act shall apply in Chota Nagpur Division and Santal Parganas District. For the appellant, learned counsel contended that this notification will not effectively apply the Act to the Chota Nagpur Division and Santal Parganas District unless the Provincial Government had made a previous notification under Sec.1 (2) of the Ordinance to the same effect. In my opinion, this argument is well founded and must prevail. Section 92 (1) Government of India Act is to the following effect: "The executive authority of a Province extends to excluded and partially excluded areas therein, but, notwithstanding anything is this Act, no Act of the Federal Legislature or of the Provincial legislature shall apply to an excluded area or a partially excluded area, unless the Governor by Public notification so directs, and the Governor in giving such a direction with respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to the area, or to any specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit." 7. This section gives complete authority to the Governor in his judgments and discretion to direct that a Federal or Provincial Act will apply to a particular excluded area or portion of such area The Governor is further given power to direct that the same shall apply subject to such exceptions and modifications as he thinks fit Reference should be made in this context to Chatturam V/s. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar, 1947 F. C. R. 116: (A.I.R. (34) 1947 F.C. 32) in which the Federal Court held that the Governor when making a notification under Section 92 (1), Government of India Act was clearly exercising legislative powers and was not a mere administrative delegate. 8. But the power under Section 92 (1), though legislative in character, is a very limited power. 8. But the power under Section 92 (1), though legislative in character, is a very limited power. It is a power to apply an existing Act of the Provincial Legislature to excluded or partially excluded area, and it is only on such application by the Governor that the Act can begin to operate in those areas. In my opinion, the Governor cannot go beyond the scope of the Provincial Statute but must function within it. He can exercise his legislative power within that field but he cannot go beyond the limits. This construction of Section 92 (1) is supported by Jatindra Nath V/s. Province of Bihar, A.I.R. (36) 1949 F. C. 175: (50 Cr. L. J. 897) in which Patanjali Sastri J. held that the Governor cannot under Section 92 (1) apply an existing Central or Provincial Act to an excluded or partially excluded area with retrospective effect. In the present case Ordinance II [2] of 1946 apply only to the local areas specified in the schedule and such other areas as may be notified by the Provincial Government in the official Gazette." The schedule mentions certain specific areas of Chota Nagpur but it does not include Purulia. It is true that the notification of the Governor of Bihar under Section 92 (1) directed that the Act shall apply to Chota Nagpur division. But in my opinion the provisions of Sec.1 (2) of the Ordinance effectively limit the Governors notification to operate only to areas mentioned in the schedule to the Ordinance. 9. If this conclusion is correct, the order of the House Controller dated 16th September 1946 cannot be deemed to be an order made under Ordinance 11 [2] of 1946 or Act III [3] of 1947 and the civil Court has no jurisdiction to execute the order so as to evict the appellant, 10. For these reasons I should allow this appeal and set aside the order of the lower Courts. But I do not propose to make any order as to costs. Sarjoo Prasad, J. 11 I agree that this appeal has to be allowed. The order of eviction dated 6th September 1946, was not capable of execution under Sec.17 of Act in [3] of 1947 unless it had been kept alive by Bihar Ordinance II [2] of 1946. But I do not propose to make any order as to costs. Sarjoo Prasad, J. 11 I agree that this appeal has to be allowed. The order of eviction dated 6th September 1946, was not capable of execution under Sec.17 of Act in [3] of 1947 unless it had been kept alive by Bihar Ordinance II [2] of 1946. This Bihar Ordinance II [2] of 1946 was promulgated by the Governor on 1st October 1946, on which date it came into force. It appears from the schedule to the Ordinance that certain specific areas of Chota Nagpur are mentioned therein, but it does not include the district of Purulia where the house in question lies. Ordinance II [2] of 1946 could not of its own force apply to Chota Nagpur or the district of Purulia, they being excluded areas. It is true that under Section 92 (1) there was a notification by the Governor of Bihar directing that the Ordinance should be extended to Chota Nagpur Division and the Santal Perganas. That, however, only meant that the Ordinance would apply to Chota Nagpur and the Santal Parganas as mentioned in the schedule to the Ordinance which, as I have said, excluded Purulia. Under Section l (2) of the Ordinance it was certainly open to the Provincial Government to extend the operation of the Ordinance to "such other areas as may be notified by the Provincial Government in the Official Gazette," but there was no such notification issued by the Provincial Government, and at any rate no such notification has been produced before us on behalf of the respondent showing that the Ordinance was so extended to the district of Purulia. The appellants learned counsel relied merely upon the notification under Section 92 (1), Government of India Act which, as I have already explained, could not operate to extend the operation of the Ordinance to any area beyond those specified in the schedule to the Ordinance. The notification under Section 92 (1), Government of India Act is distinct from the one contemplated by Sec.1 (2) of the Ordinance. That being so, the effect of the order sought to be executed could not be saved by virtue of the provisions of Ordinance II [2] of 1916, nor could it be saved under Act III [3] of 1947, and it was, therefore, inexecutable as such.