ORDER : 1. This petn. is for revision against the order of the Dist. J., Ujjain dated 17-12-1948. The opposite party who is the pltf. in the case filed a suit against the petnr. for the return of certain property which his father entrusted to the deft, for safe custody. One of the issues in the suit was whether Appibai is a necessary party in the suit. That issue was decided by the lower Ct. against the deft. Against that decision the deft, has filed this petn. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the opposite party that this petn. cannot be entertained. The learned counsel for the opposite party argues that the decision of the question whether Appibai is a necessary party in the suit or not does not affect the jurisdiction of the Ct, and hence under cl. (c) of S. 115, C. P. C. this petn. cannot be entertained. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on Lakshmi Shanker v. Ramakant, A. I. r. (37) 1950 ALL. 144 : (1949 A. L. J.438) and Brijmanohar v. Rama Nand, A. I. R. (26) 1939 Oudh 102 : (14 Luck. 447) and Kantimohan v. Ramballabh, A. I. r. (21) 1934 Pat. 370 : (152 I. C. 778) and Kunja Behari v. Chintomoni Das, A. I. R. (21) 1934 Pat. 425 : (148 I. C. 347). The learned counsel for the petnr. on the contrary relies on Gopi Nath v. Mamtaz Ali, A. I. r. (16) 1929 Oudh 148 : (116 I. C. 58) and argues that the question as to whether a party is a necessary party or not is revisable under S. 115, C. P. C. The case cited by the learned counsel for the petnr, has no bearing or the point raised. In that case it was held that the proceeding under which a person is ordered to be added as a deft, amounts to a case within the meaning of S. 115, C. P. C. and therefore the order was liable to revision. That is not the point at issue. The point raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party is that the decision of the question whether Appibai is a necessary party or not has no effect on the jurisdiction of the Ct. That is not the point at issue. The point raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party is that the decision of the question whether Appibai is a necessary party or not has no effect on the jurisdiction of the Ct. and hence even if the decision be wrong the order is not revisable under S. 115, C. P. C. In Lakshmi Shanker v. Rama Nand, a. I. R. (37) 1950 all. 144 : (1949 a. l. j. 439), relying upon Jay Chand v. Kamalaksha, A. i. R. (36) 1949 P. C. 339 : (76 I. A. 131) and Yakub Khan v. Sirajul Haq, A. i. R. (36) 1949 ALL. 771 : (1949 A. l. J. 288) the learned Judge came to the conclusion that if the decision of a question of law has no effect upon the jurisdiction of the Ct. it cannot be interfered with in a revision under S. 115, C. P. C. In Yakub Khan v. Sirajul Hag, a. I. R. (36) 1949 all. 771 : (1949 A. l. J. 288), the learned Judges observed as follows: "When a Ct. upon a wrong view of the law adopts a wrong procedure in the exercise of its jurisdiction it acta illegally within the meaning of S. 115 (c), C. P. C." Chitaley in his commentary on C. P. C. has expressed the following opinion on this point "Where the law has prescribed the manner in which a Ct. shall exercise its jurisdiction and the Ct. acts in disregard to those provisions it acts illegally or irregularly in the exercise of jurisdiction but where the Ct. exercises its jurisdiction in the manner prescribed but arrives at a conclusion or decision which is erroneous in law or fact it does not act illegally or with material irregularity but decides erroneously in the proper exercise of jurisdiction," In Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. H. R. E. Board, Madras, A. I. R. (36) 1949 P. C. 156 : (76 I. A. 67) their Lordships of the P. C. ruled as follows : "The section empowers the h. C, to satisfy Itself upon three matters: (a) that the order of the subordinate Ct. is within its jurisdiction (b) that the case is one in which the Ct. ought to exercise jurisdiction and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Ct. is within its jurisdiction (b) that the case is one in which the Ct. ought to exercise jurisdiction and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Ct. has not acted illegally, that is in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the H. C. is satisfied upon those three matters it has no power to interfere because it differs however, profoundly from conclusions of the subordinate, upon question of fact or law." This decision makes it abundantly clear that under cl. (c) of S. 115, C. P. C. the H. C. cannot interfere unless a subordinate Ct. has acted in breach of some provision of law or has committed some error of procedure which is material. 3. This being the position of law, we have to determine whether the lower Ct. has committed any breach of law or some material error of procedure. The Ct. had full jurisdiction to decide whether Mt. Appibai was a necessary party or not. It has not committed a breach of any provision of law nor has it committed any error of procedure. This Ct., therefore, has no power to interfere with the decision of the lower Ct. under cl. (c) of S. 115, C. P. C. The preliminary objection therefore, must be upheld. 4. Accordingly I dismiss the petn. with costs.