JUDGMENT Wali Ullah, J. - This is a Plaintiff's application^ revision u/s 25, Small Cause Courts Act, against the order passed by the court below dismissing his claim. 2. The suit was instituted to recover Rs. 514/1/6/- on the basis of a promissory note dated 22nd of February, 1945, for Rs. 500/-. The promissory note was executed by Prabhu Dayal and Rameshwar Prasad, Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of the Plaintiff. 3. The suit was contested inter alia on the ground that promissory note in suit was without consideration and was obtained under pressure. It was also contended that the promissory note in suit was void u/s 23, Contract Act, as its object was to stifle a criminal prosecution. A number of issues were framed by the learned Judge of the court below but in view of his finding on issue No. 1, viz. *Is the promissory note in dispute void u/s 23, Contract Act.*, to the effect that the promissory note was void, no findings were recorded on other issues and the suit was dismissed. 4. The only point for consideration in this revision is; if the promissory note in suit is void u/s 23, Contract Act, as the consideration, or object, of the agreement was to stifle a criminal prosecution. In order to decide this question, it is necessary to set out the relevant facts and circumstances in which the promissory note was executed. It appears that on the 26th December, 1944, Prabhu Dayal, Defendant No. 1 took some dushalas worth Rs. 500/-from the shop of the Plaintiff ostensibly as the agent of a firm Abdul Samad Mukhtar Ahmad. The relevant entries were made by the Plaintiff in his Bahi Khata. Later, when the price for these dushalas was demanded by the Plaintiff from from the firm Abdul Samad Mukhtar Ahmad, it was discovered that the firm had not made the purchase through Prabhu Dayal Defendant. Thereupon the Plaintiff made a report to the police against Prabhu Dayal on the 13th of February, 1945, which was recorded u/s 406 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that on the 22nd of February, 1945, both Prabhu Dayal and his brother Rameshwar Prasad, Defendant No. 2, came to the Plaintiff and executed the promissory note in suit for the price of the dushalas taken away by Prabhu dayal. It appears that on the 22nd of February, 1945, both Prabhu Dayal and his brother Rameshwar Prasad, Defendant No. 2, came to the Plaintiff and executed the promissory note in suit for the price of the dushalas taken away by Prabhu dayal. On these facts, in the court below, the Defendants contended that the promissory note was void, inasmuch as the consideration for it was the dropping of the criminal prosecution, of Prabhu Dayal by the Plaintiff. In this connection, reliance was placed by the Defendants on the cases of Kamini Kumar Basu v. Birendra Nath Basu , and Bannu Mal v. Ratan Deo, 1937 A.W.R. (H.C.) 308, decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court, Niamat Ullah, J. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff that the promissory note in suit was perfectly valid and reliance was placed on Ali Husain v. Mohammad Nasir Ali, 1930 A.L.J. 1297, decided by two learned Judges of this Court, Sen and Niamat Ullah JJ. As mentioned above, the learned Judge of the court below was of opinion that u/s 23 of the Contract Act, as interpreted in the rulings relied upon by the Defendants, the promissory note was void, inasmuch as the consideration for it was to stifle a criminal prosecution. 5. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-applicant has strenuously contended that the view of law taken by the court below was not correct. In addition to the decision in Ali Husain's case, 1930 A.L.J. 1297, (ubi supra) learned Counsel has relied in particular on two other cases viz., London and Lancashire Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Binoy Krishna Mitra, AIR 1945 Cal 218 , decided by two learned Judges of that Court, and Chandanmal Vs. Rupakula Ramakrishnayya and Another, AIR 1942 Mad 173 , of that Court. 6. The question whether or not there is an agreement to stifie a Criminal prosecution in a particular case, is always a question of fact. Further, it is to be borne in mind that the question whether consent obtianed was brought about by threat of prosecution is quite distinct from the question that the promise was given because it was agreed that there would be no criminal prosecution. The first question relates in reality to the method of procurement of the contract and the second relates to the substance or purpose of the contract. The first question relates in reality to the method of procurement of the contract and the second relates to the substance or purpose of the contract. In the first case, if the plea is substantiated, the result will be that the contract will be only voidable, where as in the second case, it would be void. Here I am not concerned directly with the plea of undue pressure. 7. The stifling of a criminal prosecution is one of the recognised heads of public policy and it has been made clear by judicial decisions that, even if part of the consideration be ah undertaking not to proceed with a prosecution, the entire agreement would be illegal. In particular this has been clearly laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kamini Kumar Basu v. Birendra Nath Basu . It must however, be noted that in that ease a prosecution for forgery had been actually launched and during the pendency of criminal proceedings an agreement was entered into, the validity of which came up for consideration. Further, all the offences in respect of which prosecution had been launched were non-compoundable. In view of the circumstances of that case, the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the Iqrarnama, which was executed in that case, had, as a part of its consideration, a promise to drop the criminal prosecution. 8. The question remains whether in a case where the offence is a compoundable one, and no criminal proceedings in respect of it are pending in a court of law, an agreement by way of a compromise to drop the-criminal prosecution and accept pecuniary consideration by way of reparation is necessarily bad in law and is opposed to public policy. There can be no doubt that public policy requires that in cases where public interests are involved, the parties should not compound an offence. But in a case where an offence is compoundable, it seems to me, there is no rule of public policy which would prevent the parties from entering into a compromise before the matter has reached the criminal court. But in a case where an offence is compoundable, it seems to me, there is no rule of public policy which would prevent the parties from entering into a compromise before the matter has reached the criminal court. But once the matter has reached the criminal court, an agreement to compound it without the leave of the Court, would, if permitted, defeat the provisions of Section 345 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence it would be void under paragraph 2 of Section 23 of the Contract Act. I may add here, in passing, that it is now well Under stood that the doctrine of 'public-policy' will not be extended beyond the classes of cases already covered By it for, as observed in the House of Lords, in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, (1902) A.C. 484 at P. 49l7, ''public policy is always an unsafe and treacherous guide for legal decisions''. 9. In the ease of Bannu Mal v. Ratan Deo, 1937 A.W.R. (H.C.) 308, (ubi supra) the Defendant Ratan Deo, when he executed the promissory note in suit was being prosecuted for an offence u/s 408 I. P. C. It was a non-compoundable offence. The promissory note itself referred to the fact that-the prosecution was pending. The essential question which had to be decided, therefore, was whether the consideration or object of the promissory note was an agreement to drop a pending prosecution for a non-compoundable offence. The question was one of fact and in view of these considerations and the surrounding circumstances of the case, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that a part of the consideration, at any rate, was an abandonment of the pending criminal proceeding. In this view of the matter, it was held that the promissory note was not enforceable. The decision in the case of Ali Husain v. Mohammad Nasir Ali, 1930 A.L.J. 1297, can be supported on the short ground that it was a second appeal and in that case the lower appellate court had, upon a consideration of the entire evidence, come to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the prosecution was not the consideration of the mortgage deed than in suit. This was a finding of fact binding upon the High Court. This Court consequently upheld the decree. 10. This was a finding of fact binding upon the High Court. This Court consequently upheld the decree. 10. In the present case, the criminal offence alleged to have been committed by Prabhu Dayal, defendent No. 1, would appear to be the offence of cheating either u/s 419 or 420 I. P. C. If the prosecution for such an offence is pending in a court of law, it can be compounded by the parties concerned only with the permission of the Court. When, however, before any prosecution has actually started, parties enter into a compromise, for dropping the prosecution, such compromise, if permitted, would not defeat the provisions of Section 345(2) of the criminal Procedure Code for simple reason that permission of the Court is required by that Sub-section for compounding an offence of cheating only when a prosecution of such an offence is pending before the Court. In other words the matter may be lawfully compounded even if it concerns one of the offences specified in Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before it goes to court. The view which I am disposed to take in this case finds support from the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Chandan Mal (ubi supra). The facts of that case were very similar to those of the present ease. A promissory note had been executed by the Defendants in that case in circumstances which showed that there had been a case of cheating. On cheating being discovered before anything happened there was a mediation by certain persons as a result of which the promissory note was executed by the Defendants which purported to be in full settlement of all the claims of the Plaintiff. 11. It has been urged that in the present case there was, at any rate, a threat to prosecute Prabhu Dayal Defendant, in as a report had been lodged with the police. But, to my mind, a threat to prosecute is not by itself illegal. According to the law of India compounding of certain offences enumerated in Section 345 Code of Criminal Procedure is permitted under the conditions specified therein. A therat to prosecute by itself is not prohibited by law. But, to my mind, a threat to prosecute is not by itself illegal. According to the law of India compounding of certain offences enumerated in Section 345 Code of Criminal Procedure is permitted under the conditions specified therein. A therat to prosecute by itself is not prohibited by law. Where there is a debt actually due, the creditor may legitimately make use of threat of prosecution in order to induce the offender either to pay up his debt or to give security for it. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Flower v. Sadler, (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 572 where Cotton, L.J. said; "A lease for a period exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made by a registered instrument only." 12. In view of the clear words of this section the decision of Mr. Sathe cannot be taken to be good law. 13. With regard to the principle of part performance, there are two objections to its applicability in the present case; (a) the person who disputed the lense was not the lessor or his representative, and (b) the Plaintiffs were not in possession. 14. With regard to the first of these points Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act provides: 15. With regard to the principle of part performance, there are two objections to its applicability in the present case; (a) the person who disputed the lense was not the lessor or his representative, and (b) the Plaintiffs were not in possession. 14. With regard to the first of these points Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act provides: 15. Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transferee can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done gone act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed be is willing to perform his part of the contract, then notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken of continued in possession other than a right expressly provided the terms of contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof. 16. Thus this section only debars "the transferor or any person claiming under him" "from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property." 17. In the present case the transferor admits the transfer and does not challenge and the person disputing the right is a third person not claiming under the transferor. Thus Section 53 does not apply. 18. I, however, considered the question of possession also, since, if the Plaintiffs were found to have been in possession, whether under a valid title or not, they could claim the protection of the court for their possessory title at least, The Plaintiffs no doubt state that they had been in possession for six months before their dispossession on the 1st November, 1944. This is however, hardly possible because the lease was for the Fasli year 1352 which did not commence before the 1st July, 1945. Further in the course of the statement in Court Plaintiff - No. 1, although he claimed that he got the lease in Phagun (March), stated that "Defendants did not allow me to cultivate the plot in suit". 19. Thus the Plaintiffs were not in possession and there was no possessory title which could be protected. 20. The last point taken was that, since the landlord has admitted the title of the Plaintiffs as his tenants, no one else could challenged that title. This is not correct proposition of law. The Plaintiffs came to court on the beside of this title as tenants. It was for them to make good that title in the manner provided by law. It was open to the Defendants who were in possession to take advantage of all defects in that title to defeat it. 21. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 22. The stay order dated 2nd May 1946 and 30th September 1946 are vacated.