JUDGMENT : 1. In this second appeal the sole question for determination is whether the appellant-plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation. 2. It is not the form of the relief claimed which determines the real character of the suit for the purposes of ascertaining under which article of the Limitation Act the suit falls. The plaint as a whole is to be examined to see whether it is a declaration properly so-called or whether it is an unnecessary claim and a mere surplusage and the suit is really suit for possession. 3. Mt. Bhoga, plaintiff - Appellant claims to be the daughter of one Durgaprasad real owner of the disputed portion of revenue paying land. The said Durga Prasad died in 1920 leaving this property in favour of his wife Mt. Ochhi. From the statement of Mt. Bhoga recorded in the trial Court on 1-2-1945 it transpires that the defendant remained in possession of the disputed property after Durga Prasad's death. Mt. Ochhi died in 1937 and the mutation proceedings ended in favour of the defendant on 25-8-1937. The plaint alleges that the defendant was not the adopted son of Mt. Ochhi and there was no adoption. It is further alleged that in the mutation proceedings there is a will of Mt. Ochhi dated 26-3-37 but this will is not valid. The plaintiff claims that she is the rightful heir of Durga Prasad's property and desires declaration of this right and possession of the property. 4. Though the relief claimed in the suit is declaration of right and possession of immoveable property, yet if the property used for is held by the contesting defendant under a will, or on the basis of an adoption deed, as has been stated in the plaint, the plaintiff cannot obtain possession without the will and the adoption deed being set aside; and, therefore, the suit must be regarded as one brought to set aside the will and the adoption deed, though no relief in these terms is prayed for, If this view is accepted to be correct then the suit must be brought within a period of six years dating from the plaintiff's knowledge. The lower Courts have not ascertained when plaintiff got this knowledge. The lower Courts have not ascertained when plaintiff got this knowledge. From paras 3 and 4 of the plaint, however, it is clear that the plaintiff's allegation was that she was at her father-in-law's place in District Mainpuri of Uttar Pradesh when Mahila Ochhi died and when mutation proceedings ended in favcur of the defendant. Consequently it can be fairly inferred that the plaintiff got the knowledge of the adoption deed or of the will only from mutation proceedings i. e., after 25-8-1937. There is nothing either in the written statement of the defendant or on the record to negative this inference or to lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff had any knowledge about the will or the adoption deed before this date. As the suit was filed before 25-8-1943 it is clearly within the period of limitation. 5. This is, however, a view which is the least favourable to the plaintiff. There is another view which is more favourable to her. The suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff is the heir of Durga Prasad and of Mahila Ochhi, and that after Ochhi's death the property ought to have gone to her. She, therefore, wants possession of the property was on behalf of Mt. Ochhi. Only after her death on 3-4-1937 defendant's possession became adverse to the plaintiff. As there is an express prayer in the plaint for recovery of possession Art. 144, (Gwalior Art. 59) applies to the case, and the period of limitation is 12 years. 6. In any case, it is definitely neither a suit for correction of entry in Record of Rights, nor, a suit by a plaintiff, who is in possession, for a declaration of proprietary right in respect of property wrongly recorded in the Revenue papers as belonging to defendant; and, therefore, I fail to understand how Art, 120, (Gwalior Art. 13) can be made applicable here. 7. A reference to Jagadamba v. Dakhina Mohun Roy, 13 Cal. 308 : (13 i. a. 84 P. C.) and Shidaramappa v. Narhari, 25 Bom. 337 : (27 i. A. 216 P. C.), by the learned counsel for respondent does not seem to be appropriate. 8. If the plaintiff is regarded as an heir to her father Durgaprasad, and, Mt. 7. A reference to Jagadamba v. Dakhina Mohun Roy, 13 Cal. 308 : (13 i. a. 84 P. C.) and Shidaramappa v. Narhari, 25 Bom. 337 : (27 i. A. 216 P. C.), by the learned counsel for respondent does not seem to be appropriate. 8. If the plaintiff is regarded as an heir to her father Durgaprasad, and, Mt. Ochhi is regarded to have a limited interest in the property, clearly the plaintiff was entitled to file a suit for possession within 12 years from the death of her mother. The two Privy Council cases cited on behalf of the respondents were based on the construction, of Art. 129, Limitation Act 1871. 9.Under the later Limitation Acts of 1877 and 1908 it has been authoritatively held by the Privy Council that a suit for possession involving the invalidity of an adoption does not come within the present Art 118 (Gwalior 39), which applies only to a suit for a declaratory relief pure and simple, and not to a suit for possession. (See Kalyandappa v. Chanlasappa, 48 Bom. 411 : (A. I. R. (11) 1924 P. C. 137). It has also been held that the omission to sue for a declaration within the period prescribed by Art. 118 was no bar to the suit for possession of the property which is governed by Art, 141 (Gwalior Art. 57). (See Tirbhuwan Bahadur v. Rameshar, 28 ALL. 727: (33 i. A 156 P. C.) and Mahomed Umar Khan v. Mahomed Niazuddin Khan, 39 Cal. 418 : (39 I. A. 19 P. C.), relied on by the Privy Council in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa, 48 Bom. 411: (a.i.r (11) 1924 P.C. 137). 10. Even if a suit, in which the plaintiff prays for a declaration that an adoption alleged by the defendant is invalid in law or in fact never took place, and the recovery of possession of immovable property, could be considered to constitute a combination of several claims (see Bhashyam Ayyangar J's. dissenting judgment in Ratnamasari v. Akilanandammal, 26 Mad. 291 at p. 319 : (13 m. L. J. 27), the claim to recover possession would be governed by the article appropriate to such a claim. After the decision of the Privy Council in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa, 48 Bom. 291 at p. 319 : (13 m. L. J. 27), the claim to recover possession would be governed by the article appropriate to such a claim. After the decision of the Privy Council in Kalyandappa v. Chanbasappa, 48 Bom. 411 : (A. i. R. (11) 1924 P. C. 137), the weight of authority is definitely in favour of the view that in a suit for possession of immovable property in which the defendant sets up a title by adoption, the burden is not on the plaintiff to disprove the fact or the validity of the alleged adoption, that at all events, it is not necessary for him to obtain a declaration from the Court that the alleged adoption is invalid in law or that it never took place in fact and that it would be enough for him to establish his own case and treat the alleged adoption as of no effect. 11. Taking into consideration every aspect of the case, I find that the suit was within limitation and has been wrongly dismissed by the lower Courts as time-barred. 12. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decrees and judgments of both the lower Courts and remand the case to the Court to the Subordinate Judge for decision of the remaining issues and for disposal according to law. The appellant will have the costs incurred in Court of the District Judge and of this appeal. The costs incurred in the Court of the Subordinate Judge will abide the result. Appellant will also be entitled to refund of court-fee.