Sharma, J.—This is a plaintiffs application to revise the order of the learned Judicial Officer, Shamlat area, Sambhar refusing to amend the plaint. The plaintiff brought the suit with the allegation that the plots, Nos. 1607, 1608, 1609 and 1610, along with a few other plots, in the town of Sambhar, belonged to him and had been in his possession as owner for a very long time. In August 1943, the defendants encroached upon a piece of land, 185 ft. x 24ft. which formed part of Khasra No. 1607. The land in dispute was shown in the sketch attached to the plaint. The plaintiff prayed that the possession be delivered to him of the said land which was denoted by letters A, B, C, D, on the sketch. 2. The defendants denied the plaintiffs title to the land in suit, and pleaded that they had been in possession thereof for about 17 years. The learned Judicial Officer framed issues the material one being the issue No. 1 which runs as follows:- "Whether the land in dispute, ABCD, is owned and possessed by the plaintiff?" The plaintiff produced his evidence and when one of his witnesses, Devi Narain, Revenue Inspector, who had prepared a plan, was being examined it appeared from his statement that the land in dispute did not form part of the plot No. 1607, but of 1610. Thereupon the plaintiff made an application for amendment of the plaint to the effect that instead of plot No. 1607 plot No. 1610 might be substituted in the plaint. The learned Judicial Officer, holding that the amendment substituted a new subject matter, dismissed the application. The plaintiff has now come in revision to this court. 3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the amendment did not seek to change the subject-matter. The only amendment that was sought, was with respect to the description of the property in dispute. According to the plaintiffs case, the plots Nos. 1607 & 1610 belonged to the plaintiff, and therefore the amendment did not cause any prejudice to the defendants. 4. On behalf of the opposite party it has been argued that no revision lies, because the order under revision is an interlocutory order and a revision is not permissible against such an order. 1607 & 1610 belonged to the plaintiff, and therefore the amendment did not cause any prejudice to the defendants. 4. On behalf of the opposite party it has been argued that no revision lies, because the order under revision is an interlocutory order and a revision is not permissible against such an order. For this reliance has been placed upon a Full Bench ruling of Allahabad High Court reported in A. 1. R. 1936 Alld., 688 (Mst. Surajpali vs. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha). In that case the amendment of the plaint had been refused by the lower court and the High Court held that no revision lies from an order refusing to allow the amendment of an appeal. Cases where an amendment comes under some other order of the court, as for example, addition or substitution of the parties or the striking off of pleadings, may amount to cases decided. The order passed purely under Or. 6 R. 17 does not, 5. On behalf of the applicant I have been referred to the rulings reported in A.I.R. 1933 Alld. 374 (Kishanlal Babulal vs. Ramchand), A.I.R. 1935 Alld. 353 (Rurmal Ramnath vs. Kapil-man Misar & others), A.I.R. 1925 Madras 585 (Kariya Ganundu & another vs. Tirukkaivalu Chetty & others), A.I.R. 1934 Calcutta 102 (Loknath Mukerji & others vs. Abani Nath Mukerji & others) and A.I.R. 193b Calcutta 102 (Indubala Desai & others vs. Laxmi Narain Gangoli & others). In these rulings it has been held that a revision lies against an order refusing to amend the pleading. 6. I have considered the rulings reported by both the learned counsels. No, doubt, so far as the Allahabad High Court is concerned, it is now an established law that an order refusing to amend the pleadings is not a case decided within the meaning of sec. 115 C.P.C. The two rulings of Allahabad High Court cited by the learned counsel for the applicant have, therefore, no longer any force. 7. The fact, however, remains that so far as the other High Courts are concerned it has been held that a revision lies against an order refusing to amend pleadings. 115 C.P.C. The two rulings of Allahabad High Court cited by the learned counsel for the applicant have, therefore, no longer any force. 7. The fact, however, remains that so far as the other High Courts are concerned it has been held that a revision lies against an order refusing to amend pleadings. The ground, on which a revision was disallowed in the Full Bench case of Allahabad cited above, was that, though the word case is more comprehensive than the word, suit, no instance can be quoted of its use in the Code, where it would not at least include, suit and that where the case in which revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, happens to be also a suit, then the suit itself is the case which requires to be decided before the record is called for. An interlocutory order in suit, which did not decide the suit itself, is not a case decided, and cannot be interfered with under sec. 115 C.P.C. In a Full Bench ruling of Lahore High Court (Bivi Gurdevi vs. Chaudhary Mohammad Baksh), reported in A I.E. 1943 Lahore 65, it was held that the word case under sec. 115 C.P.C. is wide enough to include interlocutory order passed in a suit. An order by the court staying a suit before it on receipt of Robkar from a Debt Conciliation Board under sec. 25 of the Punjab Relief Indebtedness Act, is a case decided, within the meaning of sec. 115 C.P.C. and therefore is revisable by the High Court. The Full Bench case of Allahabad High Court reported in 1936 Alld. 686 was cited before their Lordships. Their Lordships, however, held that the view that a branch of a suit is not a case within the meaning of sec. 115 C.P.C. is too narrow. Bhide J., who gave the leading judgment, said "I would accordingly hold that from the standpoint of language alone, the word case is wide enough to include decision on any matter in controversy affecting the rights of the parties to a suit. 115 C.P.C. is too narrow. Bhide J., who gave the leading judgment, said "I would accordingly hold that from the standpoint of language alone, the word case is wide enough to include decision on any matter in controversy affecting the rights of the parties to a suit. This interpretation is supported by the dictionary meaning of the word by the sense in which it is used in some other sections of the Code itself and by the rule of interpretation which requires that a beneficial construction should be placed upon the provisions of a statute, when this appears to be consonant with its object. The main objection to this wide interpretation seems to be the feeling that it may cause great inconvenience to the parties by delay in the disposal of suits by petitions for revision. But this objection loses its force when it is remembered that the exercise of the provisional powers under S. 115, Civil P. C, is subject to two-fold restrictions. Firstly, there are various restrictions expressly mentioned in the section itself. Secondly, there are the other implied restrictions which are to be deduced from the very nature of the extraordinary jurisdiction under S. 115, Civil P.C. ........." The very fact that the majority of the High Courts have generally upon the above wide interpretation of the word case, as pointed out already would show that the danger of possible inconvenience in this respect has been exaggerated." Another member of the Bench, Tek Chand J. said that the interpretation placed on the word case, that a branch of a suit is not a case within the meaning of sec. 115 C.P.C, is too narrow. I can see no warrant for the proposition laid down therein that the word case when used with reference to a suit means the whole suit and that no interlocutory order passed during the pendency of a suit is open to revision until the whole suit is decided. The word case is wide enough to include a decision on any substantial question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights, even though such order is passed in the course of the trial of the suit. An interlocutory order deciding a question of this kind (as distinguished from purely formal incidental) is a case decided, but it will be open to revision only if the other conditions expressly laid down by sec. An interlocutory order deciding a question of this kind (as distinguished from purely formal incidental) is a case decided, but it will be open to revision only if the other conditions expressly laid down by sec. 115 are satisfied. 8. The weight of the authorities is in favour of the view that a revision lies against an order refusing to amend a pleading. The reasons given by their Lordships of the Lahore High Court in the Full Bench ruling quoted above, appeal to me and I hold that the order now before me is open to revision. 9. The only question remains whether, under the circumstances of the case, the order should be interfered with in revision. A revision lies whether when a jurisdiction has been usurped or there has been a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in a subordinate court. It also lies when the lower court commits any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In the present case, the plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of the plot No. 1607 as well as of the plot No. 1610. He attached a sketch of the land in dispute along with the plaint. The subject matter of the suit was the land A B C D shown in the sketch. The number of the plot has been mentioned only in connection with the description of the land in suit. The plot itself is not the subject matter of dispute. The lower court was, therefore, wrong in its view that by the amendment sought for, the subject matter of the suit would be changed. Under Or. 6. 17 C.P.C., all amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The real question in controversy between the parties is whether the land in suit belongs to the plaintiff. Looking to the contention of the plaintiff that he is the owner of the plot No. 1607 as well as of the plot No. 1610, it would not be reasonable to shut him out from proving his case simply because he has mentioned a wrong plot in connection with the land in suit. By doing so the court will be prevented from determining the real question in controversy. By doing so the court will be prevented from determining the real question in controversy. In my view, the lower court committed illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction in refusing to amend the plaint and acted in breach of the mandatory provisions of Or. 6 R. 17 C.P.C. which lays down that all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. The order of the lower court is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 10. The application for revision is allowed, and the order of the lower court refusing to amend the plaint, as prayed, is set aside. The case is |ent back to the lower court with a direction that the plaint be amended as prayed, provided the plaintiff pays Rs. 25/- as costs to the contesting defendants. So far as the costs of this revision are concerned, the parties shall bear their own costs.