Judgment :- 1. These appeals arise out of the decree dated 23rd Mithunam 1120 passed by the Temporary Second Judge of Trivandrum in O.S. No. 123 of 1113 in the District Court of Trivandrum. Defendants 2 and 4 are the appellants in the former and plaintiffs 1 and 3 are the appellants in the latter appeal. 2. The suit was for recovery of possession of 8 items of immovable property held in ownership and shown in Schedule A, one item of immovable property held under a mortgage right shown in Schedule B, and various items of movables shown in Schedule C to the plaint. 3. There were 3 plaintiffs when the suit was filed, of whom the 2nd plaintiff died subsequently and Appeal No. 566 of 1123 was, therefore, filed by the remaining plaintiffs 1 and 3. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the children of the 1st plaintiff. 1st defendant is the brother of the 1st plaintiff. Defendants 3 to 7 are the children of Kumaran Raman, the maternal uncle of the 1st plaintiff and 1st defendant and defendants 8 to 11 are his grandchildren. 2nd defendant is a stranger in whose favour Kumaran Raman gave a mortgage which is attacked in the suit. 12th defendant is another stranger and he is brought in as representative of his father, in whose favour the said Kumaran Raman executed a hypothecation in connection with a chitty, which document also is impeached in the suit. Defendants 3 to 11 are impleaded as claimants to and as in possession of Kumaran Raman's properties under a deed of settlement which is also impeached. 4. The parties, except defendants 2 and 12, belong to the Ezhava community belonging to that part of the Travancore area where in the rule of devolution is (what is there called) (Misradayam) that is to say, a combination of Makkathayam and Marumakkathayam. Under that system of devolution, the self-acquired or separate property of a male devolves, on his death, on his wife and children as also on his Seshakars i.e., members of his family, in equal moieties, subject to certain preferential claims in favour of the wife and children. These preferential claims are what are known as (vyivyLvWLwu) (Vatsaravakasom) and (Cheruthettam) (RrOSj•L) or (Cherunettam). These preferential claims are what are known as (vyivyLvWLwu) (Vatsaravakasom) and (Cheruthettam) (RrOSj•L) or (Cherunettam). Vatsaravakasom means the right of the wife and children to be in possession and enjoyment of the properties of the deceased for one year from the date of death without being accountable for the income to the Seshakars. Cheruthettam means the right to a share in the properties of the deceased towards the performance of the marriage and other ceremonies of minor children. 5. The properties sought to be recovered in the suit were acquired by the said Kumaran Raman in his name. They are claimed by the plaintiffs as the tarwad properties on themselves and of the 1st defendant who constitute the sole surviving members of the tarwad, on the ground stated in paragraph 10 of the plaint, viz., that the properties were acquired for the tarwad when Kumaran Raman was the karanavan, using the moneys of the tarwad in his possession by way of income from the ancestral and old tarwad properties from the properties earned by his elder brother Mathevan, and amounts left by the said Mathevan Kumaran Krishnan, and Kumaran Kali. Kumaran Krishnan was another brother of Kumaran Raman who predeceased him, and Kumaran Kali was the mother of 1st plaintiff and 1st defendant. 6. It has to be mentioned that this is the sole ground of claim. No part of Kumaran Raman's self acquisitions is claimed for the tarwad on the ground of the same being thrown into the common stock. It has also to be mentioned that the only relief claimed in the plaint is recovery of possession of the properties as tarwad properties, that is to say, no alternative claim is made with regard to any funds of the tarwad that may be found to have been used by Kumaran Raman in connection with the acquisitions of these properties, should such user be found ineffective to render the acquisitions tarwad properties. 7. The question that arises for determination therefore in this case is whether any moneys of his tarwad or income of tarwad properties existed or were available to Kumaran Raman for making the acquisitions in question. 7. The question that arises for determination therefore in this case is whether any moneys of his tarwad or income of tarwad properties existed or were available to Kumaran Raman for making the acquisitions in question. The contesting defendants claim the properties as the self-acquisition of Kumaran Raman who had a profitable trade of his own even from the time when he was an ananthiravan, and state that he had, in his control, other properties unconnected with the tarwad, but that Kumaran Raman never came into possession of any tarwad moneys or any ancentral tarwad properties except the properties of his elder brother Mathevan, which he obtained on partition whose net value was small and which did not yield an income even sufficient for meeting the ordinary expenses of the tarwad. 8. The lower court found that Kumaran Raman had a trade of his own even before he became karanavan that that trade was not claimed as tarwad concern, and that therefore the income therefrom was Kumaran Raman's own. The lower court also found that the evidence disclosed that Kumaran Raman came into possession of tarwad properties capable of yielding "some income" and held that "under such circumstance's the presumption will be either that tarwad funds were used to make the acquisitions (X T.L.T. 625) or that the acquisitions were made for the tarwad, in the discharge of his duty as karanavan (1943 T.L.R. 731). Either way the onus is on the defendants to prove that the private funds of Kumaran Raman were actually used for acquiring the properties". The defendants not having proved that Kumaran Raman actually used his own funds in making the acquisitions, the lower court considered that they must be regarded as having been acquired by the use of tarwad income and applying the provisions of S.19 Explanation 1, of the Travancore Ezhava Act, III of 1190, which provides that "if the deceased person was in management of his or her tarwad or of undivided Makkathayam property one half of the acquisition, if any, made by such person during such management with the aid of the income from such tarwad or Makkathayam properties, as the case may be, shall be treated as that person's self-acquisition for the purpose of this part in addition to other self-acquisition", passed a preliminary decree. This directed partition of the A and B schedule properties and certain items in the C schedule, into two halves, and delivery one-half with mesne profits to the plaintiffs. There was a consequential decree declaring the usufructuary mortgage in favour of the 2nd defendant, the hypothecation in favour of the 12th defendant's father, and the deed of settlement in favour of defendants 3 to 7, inoperative to the extent of that half. Hence the aforesaid two appeals. 9. The acquisitions in question were made within a period of 11 years commencing from Kanni 1075 and extending up to Chingom 1086. The first acquisition is an investment of 595 Fanams on mortgage over item No. 4, A schedule, under Ext. K dated 18th Kanni 1075. Item No. 4 was purchased under Ext. II in Vrischigom 1082 for a consideration of 4120 fanams out of which a cash payment of 2261/2 fanams is stated to have been made and the rest appropriated to two earlier transactions, of which Ext. K is one. The next acquisition was of item No. 3 in the A schedule, in Vrischigom 1077, under Ext. J for 1400 Fanams, which was made up of 585 Fanams due to Mathevan under a mortgage, 450 fanams for improvements and 365 Fanams paid as ready cash. In 1078, Kumaran Raman appears to have realised 1485 Fanams by giving a release (Ext. N) of a mortgage right of Mathevan, In the year 1080, Kumaran Raman invested 4575 Fanams and purchased the mortgage right over items, 1, 5 and 6 of the A schedule of the plant. Ext. F of Thulam 1080 is the assignment deed. That document recites the consideration as made up of 1575 Fanams as income from (kMfQBjAMfU) (pithurarjitham) properties, 7121/2 Fanams belonging to sister Kumaran Kali and 2281/2 Fanams Kumaran Raman's own money. These items were afterwards purchased by Kumaran Raman under Exts. IV and V in Kumbhom 1085 for 9300 Fanams appropriating the entire money due under the mortgage, Ext. F, and for other considerations by way of ready cash payments, appropriations towards other amounts due to Kumaran Raman under dealings and reservations of amounts for future payments to a creditor of the vendor. Items 2 and 4 in Schedule A to the plaint were purchased by Kumaran Raman in Vrischigom 1082 under Ext. II and item 3 was purchased under Ext. III in Meenom 1085. Items 2 and 4 in Schedule A to the plaint were purchased by Kumaran Raman in Vrischigom 1082 under Ext. II and item 3 was purchased under Ext. III in Meenom 1085. There is no document evidencing the purchase of item 8. The mortgage right shown in B schedule to the plaint was acquired in Chingom 1086 under Ext. S. 10. None of these acquisitions were made professedly on behalf of the tarwad. No document describes the acquirer Kumaran Raman as Karanavan. The tenor of the documents would clearly indicate the contrary i.e., that the acquisitions were Kumaran Raman's own. 11. The plaintiffs filed 3 documents Ext. G of the year 1053, Ext. R of the year 1056, and Ext. E of the year 1076, to show that Kumaran Raman came by and had in his possession tarwad properties from out of whose income the acquisitions in question could have been made. Ext. G would indicate that at a family partition Kumaran Mathevan came by property worth 572 Fanams net. Ext. R evidences a partition under which Mathevan Kali, the mother of Kumaran Raman and others got some properties. Except one item in Ext. R there is no identification of or proof regarding any other property alleged to have been obtained under the transactions of the years 1053 and 1056. The item identified is a Purayidom in the possession, admittedly, of the 1st defendant. There is no evidence that any property obtained under the said partition arrangements came into or was in the possession of Kumaran Raman. Ext. H dated 21st Chingom 1076 is a deed of partition of the properties of Kumaran Raman's deceased elder brother Kumaran Mathevan, who died in Chingom 1074. Ext. H shows that Kumaran Raman got properties by way of outstandings and otherwise to the tune of 13,400 Fanams subject to a liability to discharge Kumaran Mathevan's debt amounting to 10,300 Fanams that is to say, Kumaran Raman got properties of the value of 3,100 Fanams net. The debts directed to be discharged by Kumaran Raman have all been discharged by him. The details of the collection of the outstandings allotted and the discharge of debts are not in evidence. Under the circumstances, the only assets to be reckoned with as having come to Kumaran Raman would be 3,100 Fanams. It will be noticed that the earliest investment by Kumaran Raman evidenced by Ext. The details of the collection of the outstandings allotted and the discharge of debts are not in evidence. Under the circumstances, the only assets to be reckoned with as having come to Kumaran Raman would be 3,100 Fanams. It will be noticed that the earliest investment by Kumaran Raman evidenced by Ext. K was made before Kumaran Raman got the properties of his elder brother on partition. There is no evidence in this case regarding the income of the properties obtained by Kumaran Raman under Ext. H, nor is there any evidence that Kumaran Raman came by any other moneys or properties of the tarwad as alleged in paragraph 10 of the plaint. 12. The position thus reduces itself to this: Kumaran Raman, even from the time that he was an ananthiravan, had a trade at his own which, according to the evidence accepted by the lower court, brought him about Rs. 200 a month. There was one item of ancestral property which was a house and site, not shown to yield any income and which has, admittedly, been in the possession of the 1st defendant. Properties obtained by Kumaran Raman on partition under Ext. H are not such as to yield an income sufficient to acquire the properties in question, though those properties were under the management of Kumaran Raman. There is no evidence either way as to the fund that was actually used for making these acquisitions, except the aforesaid recitals contained in Ext. F. Under the circumstances, the question has to be decided on the principles of law applicable to the case. 13. Membership of a family or management thereof as a de facto manager or a de jure kartha or karanavan is no disqualification for making self-acquisitions. Title to property would vest in the acquirer and whoever claims the property or any interest therein against the tenor of the title has to make out the claim. Mere existence of an ancestral nucleus would not render an acquisition made by its custodian other than his own. The person claiming the property for the tarwad, will have to show that the nucleus was substantial if not ample, and available to the acquirer to admit of the acquisitions being made from out of that nucleus or out of the income thereof. The person claiming the property for the tarwad, will have to show that the nucleus was substantial if not ample, and available to the acquirer to admit of the acquisitions being made from out of that nucleus or out of the income thereof. The case in X T.L.T. 625 relied upon by the lower court is not an authority for the position that ancestral nucleus however unsubstantial it may be, would be enough to lead to a presumption in favour of the tarwad in respect of acquisitions made by the karanavan. The adequacy and availability of tarwad resources for making the acquisitions in question in that case would appear to have been unquestioned. The only contention was that because the acquirer had his own self-acquisitions, the presumption of tarwad character could not be raised. That contention was rightly repelled. The case in 1943 T.L.R. 731 relied upon by the lower Court only decides "Where a person is the karanavan of a tarwad and he has separate funds of his own, and there are also tarwad funds available, and a transaction is put through with funds which could have been drawn from either source, in the absence of definite evidence the law steps in with a presumption and the party to the transaction is presumed to have acted for the benefit of the tarwad whose interest he is under a duty to protect rather than that he acted for his own benefit". This position is unexceptionable, but will not solve the question arising in this case. The latest case of the Travancore High Court is Padmanabhan Raman v. Krishnan Raghavan (XIX T.L.T. 26) which held that "the presumption that acquisitions of a karanavan have been made from tarwad funds can obtain only where it can be shown generally that there have been surplus funds available after meeting the ordinary and recognised needs of every member who lived indenting upon such proceeds and not from the mere fact of some nucleus however inconsiderable the proceeds from which may be". This question came up for the consideration of the Madras High Court in Kotikelapudi Venkatramayya v. Digavalli Seshamma (AIR 1987 Mad. This question came up for the consideration of the Madras High Court in Kotikelapudi Venkatramayya v. Digavalli Seshamma (AIR 1987 Mad. 538) where Varadachariar, J. approving of the decision of Ananthakrishna Ayyar, J. in A.I.R. 1930 Madras 662, stated that "a party alleging that property held by an individual member of a joint family is family property must show that the family was possessed of some property with the aid of which the property in question could have been acquired" and added "that the learned Judge (Ananthakrishna Aiyyar, J.) takes care to add that, it is only after this is shown that the onus shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate". Ananthakrishna Aiyyar, J. in AIR 1930 Mad. 662, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, came to the aforesaid conclusion and approved of the remarks of Venakatasubba Rao, J. in AIR 1927 Mad. 38, that "the law on the point may now be taken as being clearly settled". Reference may also be made to the 11th Edition of Mayne's Hindu Law, 1950, page 359, paragraph 293. "The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property is in the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparcenary property. Where the possession of a nucleus of joint family property is either admitted or proved, an acquisition made by a member of the family is presumed to be joint family property. But this is subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. And it is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition, affirmatively to make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate. 14. Applying the above principles of law to the facts of the present case, only one conclusion is possible and that is that the plaintiffs on whom the burden rests to establish the existence of family nucleus such as to lead to the presumption of tarwad character as regards the acquisitions in question, have failed to prove the existence of such a nucleus. On the other hand, there is ample material to show that Kumaran Raman who made the acquisitions could have made them from out of his own earnings independent of any tarwad properties. The plaintiffs have, therefore failed to make out that the properties claimed belong to the tarwad. The claim for recovery of possession of the properties, must, therefore, be rejected. 15. Regarding the movables, apart from the above infirmity, the plaintiffs must fail for another reason, viz., that it has not been proved the movables to which they lay claim ever came into the possession of any of the defendants. 16. Kumaran Raman executed a deed of hypothecation in Kanni 1099 and a usufructuary mortgage in Thulam 1102 in favour of the 12th defendant's father and the 2nd defendant respectively. Kumaran Raman also executed a deed of settlement in Kumbhom 1104 in favour his children, defendants 3 to 7. Exts. C, B and A respectively are the documents. The properties were put into and continue to be in, the possession of, the respective parties pursuant to Exts. B and A. Kumaran Raman died towards the end of 1104, and the suit was filed only in 1108. 17. This case is peculiar more in respects than one. Ordinarily where anathiravans claim property acquired by their karanavan in his name as tarwad property, they impeach the conduct of the karanavan and attribute motives to him as regards the acquisitions themselves not being professedly in the name of the tarwad. Subsequent transactions relating to the properties as the acquirer's own would be attacked as the outcome of selfishness. In this case it is significant that the plaintiffs make no whisper against Kumaran Raman the acquirer, either in not having made the acquisitions professedly for the tarwad, or in having afterwards dealt with the properties as his own under the aforesaid documents which are all impeached as not binding upon the properties. Plaintiffs do not attribute anything blameworthy to Kumaran Raman. The case of the plaintiffs in respect of those documents is that Kumaran Raman was a victim of fraud and misrepresentation as a result of which the documents were brought into existence and that in fact Kumaran Raman was, in a way, non compos mentis when those documents were executed. Of this, however the plaintiffs have not sought to adduce any evidence. Of this, however the plaintiffs have not sought to adduce any evidence. One can, therefore confidently rely upon the apparent tenor of the documents evidencing the acquisitions as representing the true state of affairs. Whenever a fraud which was not his self-acquisition was used, Kumaran Raman acknowledged that fact expressly as is seen from Ext. F. 18. In the view, of the law as aforesaid applicable to the case S.19, Explanation 1, of the Travancore Ezhava Act III of 1100, relied upon by the lower court, does not come up for consideration of application. 19. We cannot conclude this judgment without a retrospect of the history of this litigation. The suit was filed with an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis on 28.12.1108. It was registered as a suit in Kanni 1113, and disposed of by the lower court in Mithunam 1120. No reason appears as to why it should have taken more than 4 years for the petition for permission to sue in forma pauperis to be enquired into and decided. After the petition was allowed, a period of 7 years and 9 months was taken for the trial and disposal of the suit. The issue in the case was simple and the evidence was not much. Besides the parties and the Commissioner, only 4 stranger witnesses were examined and their depositions are not lengthy. Why it should have taken such a long time for the lower court to dispose of this suit, passes comprehension. Notwithstanding the long delay for the trial and disposal of the suit, we find the plaintiffs filing in the suit for not adducing that evidence viz., regarding the existence of properties and the quantum of income from the properties on which the plaintiffs based their claim. It may be that the plaintiffs might have been entitled to some relief in respect of the amounts shown in Ext. F, as "Pithurarjitham" and in respect of the amount shown in the same document as money belonging to the mother of the 1st defendant and the 1st plaintiff, but no relief in respect of those amounts was claimed in the case and that matter does not call for any consideration. F, as "Pithurarjitham" and in respect of the amount shown in the same document as money belonging to the mother of the 1st defendant and the 1st plaintiff, but no relief in respect of those amounts was claimed in the case and that matter does not call for any consideration. The 1st defendant was sought to be removed from management on account of his not having taken action to get the reliefs on behalf of the tarwad that are now sought by the plaintiffs in the suit. It is clear that that was a prayer inserted mala fide with a view to obviate objections as to the maintainability of the action which is brought by anathiravans claiming relief on behalf of the tarwad, whose karanavan did not care to make the claim himself. The conduct of the parties in the course of the suit disclosed that the plaintiffs and 1st defendant are in collusion in this matter. The prayer for removal of the 1st defendant from management, which was rejected by the lower court, was not pressed in appeal. The remarks of the Supreme Court in Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Jemshedji (AIR 1950 Supreme Court, p.1) "The long time taken in deciding the suit which involved determination of a few simple issues is such as is calculated to bring to ridicule the administration of justice" apply with even greater force to this case. 20. In the result Appeal Suit No. 179 of 1122 is allowed with costs. Appeal Suit No. 566 of 1123 dismissed, but without costs. The plaintiffs having been permitted to sue as also to appeal in forma pauperis directed to pay the requisite court fee to the State. A.S.179 allowed. A.S. 566 dismissed.