Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. The question to be decided in this appeal is whether the lower appellate Ot. was right in granting the pltf. a decree for ejecting the deft. Surya Lall Karmakar, from a small piece of land located in Bhatta Bazar of the town of Purnea. 2. The pltf. Tulsi Modak brought the suit alleging that he had taken settlement of 1 kathas of land in Bhatta Bazar from Sm. Charusila Debi & that he had executed a registered Kabuliat dated 27-7 1914 for a period of five years from 1321 to 1326 Mulki Sambat. It was said that the pltf. held over after expiry of the term & had been paying rent to the sons of Charusila Debi after the latters death. The deft. had taken settlement from the pltf. by a registered Kabuliat dated 1-5 1939 for a period of six years. After the expiry of the period of the lease the pltf. had asked the deft. to give up possession & had also served upon him a notice to quit. Since the deft. refused to give up possession pltf. brought the suit for a declaration of title & ejectment of the deft. from the land. The main ground of defence was that the kabuliat executed by the deft. was not given effect to & the document was inoperative. The deft. on the contrary, alleged that there was a special agreement between him & the pltf. according to which deft. agreed to pay rent direct to Janendra Nath Dey & his brothers who were the successors in interest of Sm. Charusila Debi. The deft. maintained that the pltf. had no title & that he ought not to be granted a decree for ejectment. The learned Munsif accepted the defence case & refused to grant decree to the pltf. The learned Dist. J. Purnea, reversed the decision of the Munsif in appeal holding that the pltf. was entitled to a decree for ejecting the deft. from the land in suit. 3. In support of this appeal Mr. Baidya Nath Jha submitted a twofold argument. In the first place he contended that no registered patta was executed by Sm. Charusila Debi in favour of the pltf. & in consequence the lease was invalid under Sec.107, T. P. Aot. The learned counsel argued that the pltf. was a mere trespasser & cannot succeed in the suit for ejectment. Baidya Nath Jha submitted a twofold argument. In the first place he contended that no registered patta was executed by Sm. Charusila Debi in favour of the pltf. & in consequence the lease was invalid under Sec.107, T. P. Aot. The learned counsel argued that the pltf. was a mere trespasser & cannot succeed in the suit for ejectment. In my opinion, this argument is untenable & cannot succeed. It has been found in the present case that in pursuance of the invalid lease the pltf. had obtained possession of the land & had continued to remain in possession till the date of the institution of the suit. It has also been found by the lower appellate Ct. that the pltf. had paid rent to the landlord for several years & had obtained rent receipts. Upon these facts it is manifest that the ratio of the case Alauddin Ahmad V/s. Aziz Ahmad, A.I.R. (21) 1934 Pat. 369, 148 I.C. 684) will apply & it must be held that the pltf. will be deemed to be a tenant from month to month under the provisions of Sec.116, T. P. Act. In the case to which reference has been made the tenant remained in possession of the property under a verbal lease for six years & it was held by the Division Bench that a verbal lease for more than one year accompanied by delivery of possession was valid for the first year & if there was holding over on the part of the tenant he was estopped from denying the relationship of landlord & tenant & he cannot escape payment of rent for the period he was in occupation as tenant on the ground that the verbal lease was not binding as a lease for the period agreed upon. In the present case, therefore, it is plain that the pltf. had proved sufficient title to maintain the suit for ejectment of the deft. from the land. 4. There is another aspect of the case which must be dealt with. The rule is well-established that possession is a good title against all persons except the rightful owner & entitles the possessor to maintain an ejectment suit against any other person than such only who dispossesses him. In Pemraj Bhawaniram V/s. Narayan Shivaram, 6 Bom. from the land. 4. There is another aspect of the case which must be dealt with. The rule is well-established that possession is a good title against all persons except the rightful owner & entitles the possessor to maintain an ejectment suit against any other person than such only who dispossesses him. In Pemraj Bhawaniram V/s. Narayan Shivaram, 6 Bom. 215 (F.B.) S obtained a money decree against the sons & heirs of A, & under that decree attached a shop as part of As estate. N (father of A) applied to have the attachment removed under Sec.246, Civil P.C., (VIII [8] of 1859), alleging that the 3hop was his. The appln. was rejected & the shop was sold in execution & bought by P, the deft. N, then brought this suit against P, (the purchaser) to establish his title. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. In appeal, the Dist. J. reversed that decree, holding that the pltf. had been in possession of the shop, & had proved his title. The deft. appealed to the H. C. Upon these facts an F. B. held that the pltf. having his possession at the date of the execution sale, it lay upon the deft. (P), who claimed the property, to prove a title in himself or in the judgment-debtor A, & that, he having failed to do this, the pltf. was entitled to a decree declaratory of his right to the property as against the deft. At p. 215 the report states : "It is true that the pltf. in the present case did allege title by conveyance, & that the Dist. Ct. has not found that title to be proved; but the pltf. by his plaint also relied upon his possession, & the Dist. Ct. has found that possession to be proved. We have seen that possession is a good title against all persons except the rightful owner & entitles the possessor to maintain ejectment against any other person than such owner who dispossesses him. The pltf. does not ask the Ct. to declare that he had a good title against the world He merely asks for a declaration that he has a good title against the deft. Pemraj who has purchased the premises (whereof the pltf. The pltf. does not ask the Ct. to declare that he had a good title against the world He merely asks for a declaration that he has a good title against the deft. Pemraj who has purchased the premises (whereof the pltf. is in possession) as the property of Anant Narayan, but is unable to show that Anant Narayan had either title to or possession of those premises. Nay more, we understand the Dist. J. as substantially finding that the pltfs. have shown that Anant Narayan had not any such possession. There cannot be any doubt that under those circumstances, if Pemraj had caused the plaintiff to be evicted, the pltf. would within the time limited by law, have been entitled to maintain ejectment against Pemraj, because the pltfs. possession was a good title against everybody except the owner. This being so, we fail to perceive any good reason for requiring the pltf. to wait until he is evicted, or for preventing him from obtaining a declaration of that which is, beyond all doubt, his right, viz., that his title as possessor is good against a person who is seeking to disturb that possession, & who has not a colour of title to the land in dispute & has never had possession of." 5. Reference may be made in this context to Asher V/s. Whitloch, (1866) 1 Q.B. l, 35 L.J.Q.B. 17) in which it was held that a person in possession of land, without other title, has a devisable interest; and the heir of his devisee can maintain ejectment against a person who has entered upon the land, & cannot show title or possession in any one prior to the testator. Cockburn C. J., said : "I take it is clearly established that possession is good against all the world except the person who can show a good title; and it would be mischievous to change this established doctrine." And again he said: " It is too clear to admit of doubt, that if the devisor had been turned out of possession, he could have maintained ejectment. What is the position of the devisee ? What is the position of the devisee ? There can be no doubt that a man has a right to devise that estate which the law gives him against all of the world, but the true owner." and again: "We know to what extent encroachments on waste lands have taken place; and if the lord has acquiesced, & does not interfere, can it be at the mere will of any stranger to disturb the person in possession"? Finally he said: "On the simple ground that possession is good title against all but the true owner, I think the pltf. is entitled to succeed," Mellor J. after saying that "the fact of possession is prima facie evidence of seisin in fee", added: "In the common case of proving a claim to landed estate under a will, proof of the will & of possession or receipt of rents by the testator is always prima facie sufficient, without going on to show possession for more than twenty-years. I agree with the Lord Chief Justice in the importance of maintaining that possession is good against all but the rightful owner." 6. Upon a review of these authorities it ia manifest that the pltf. can properly maintain the present suit for ejeotment of the deft. 7. It was pointed out by the learned counsel in support of the appeal that the pltf. has died subsequent to the filing of the second appeal in the H. C. Reference was made to Charan Mahto V/s. Kamakhya Narayan, 6 P.L.T. 98, A.I.R. (12) 1925 Pat. 357) & it was contended that Sec.116, T. P. Act, did not contemplate the position of the heirs or assignees of the original lessee but it contemplated the position of the lessee himself after the determination of the tease & it was only in the case of the lessee of a property who remained in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted bo him that the lease is in the absence of an agreement to the contrary renewed from year to year or month to month according to the purposes for which the property is leased. But it is well established that as a general rule a Ct. of appeal in considering the correatness of the judgment of the Ct. But it is well established that as a general rule a Ct. of appeal in considering the correatness of the judgment of the Ct. below will confine itself to the state of the case at the time such judgment was rendered & will not take notice of any facts which may have arisen subsequently. As illustrations of the general rule, reference may be made to the oases of Govinda V/s. Perumdevi, 12 Mad. 136 where it was held that a suit for a declaratory decree by a reversioner to impeach the validity of alienations by a Hindu widow is not affected by the death of the widow during the pendency of the litigation; Ramananaan V/s. Pulikutti, 21 Mad. 288 : (8 M. L. J. 121) where a pltf. who had sued at a time when he had no subsisting title was not allowed the benefit of a title which had accrued to him during the pendency of the litigation & Wamanrao V/s. Rustomji, 21 Bom. 701 where a pltf. who had sued for a declaratory decree was allowed to proceed with the suit even after he had acquired title to the property & had become entitled to consequential relief. In Ponnamma V/s. Arumogam, (1905) A. C. 383 : (74 L. J. P. C. 102) a suit was brought in 1898 for partition, or alternatively for a sale of certain parts of an intestates estate, & it appeared that the intestate had died in 1884, that no letters of administration had been taken out, that the widow & son had made a division of the immovable estate between themselves. The S. C. of Ceylon dismissed the suit on the ground that by Sec. 547, Civil P. C., which was the law in force when the action was commenced, it was not maintainable in the absence of any administrator on the record. Before the case was heard Ordinance No. 12 [XII] of 1904 was enacted by which a proviso was added to Sec. 547 to the effect that no action for the recovery of, or involving proof of title to, any property movable or immovable included in the estate of any person who died intestate before the commencement of the Ordinance of 1889 should be defeated by reason only that letters of administration to the estate of such person have not been issued. On behalf of the applt. On behalf of the applt. it was contended that Sec. 547 was not applicable & the suit ought to have been decreed, by the Judicial Committee in appeal. The prayer was rejected & Lord Davey pronouncing the judgment of the Judicial Committee states at p. 888: "To the first argument it is sufficient answer to point out that the judgment of the S. C. was given more than four years before the new Ordinance was passed, & their Lordships have only to say whether that judgment was right when it was given. It is unnecessary, therefore, to discuss the question whether any intention is sufficiently shown to take this case out of the well-known rule on the construction of statutes, that the rights of the parties must be decided according to the law as it existed when the action was commenced." 8. It is true that the Ct. of appeal will in exceptional cases take into account the facts & events which come into existence after the decree appealed against; but the Ct. will do so only for the purpose of shortening litigation & for meeting the ends of justice. In the present case, there is no exceptional reason suggested on behalf of the applt. why the H. C. should take into account in disposing of the appeal the circumstance that the pltf. is dead & his heirs have been substituted in his place. 9. Upon these grounds I should affirm the decree of the lower applt. Ct. & dismiss this appeal with costs. Rai, J. 10 I agree.