Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by a sanyasin and a layman as two persons interested in the Trust after obtaining the sanction of the Diwan of the erstwhile Travancore State under S. 72 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which corresponds to S.92 of the Indian Code. The suit was filed in the District Court of Trivandrum and was numbered there as O.S. 83 of 1113. It was afterwards withdrawn by the erstwhile Travancore High Court for trial and disposal therein in the exercise of its extraordinary civil jurisdiction and was given a new number as O.S. No. 2/1119. A learned judge of the High Court tried the case and after an elaborate enquiry wherein a large volume of oral and documentary evidence was adduced, disposed of the matter by dismissing the suit on 14th Kanni 1120. The 1st defendant died pending the suit and two persons were sought to be impleaded in his stead to represent the Sree Narayana Dharma Sanghom as whose President the 1st defendant had been made a party. There was a competition between defendants 8 and 9 for the Presidentship. That dispute was tried by the learned judge who tried the suit but he was not able to come to a conclusion in favour of either of them and therefore he directed the continuance of both in array of parties. In the judgment, it is found that the 9th defendant is the representative of that institution and not the 8th. It appears that the 8th defendant has filed another suit in the District Court to establish his claim to Presidentship and that that suit is pending. 2. In the course of the suit the other members of the Dharma Sanghom got themselves impleaded as defendants. The 8th defendant is the appellant and the plaintiffs and the other surviving defendants are the respondents. 3. The learned judge has written an elaborate judgment in the case which runs to 39 pages in print. The ground for the dismissal of the suit is stated by the learned judge in paragraphs 26 and 28 of his judgment. He finds in para 26 that'the properties and institutions acquired by Narayana Guru now in the possession of the Sanghom and those acquired by the Sanghom do not constitute a public trust of a religious and charitable nature. The ground for the dismissal of the suit is stated by the learned judge in paragraphs 26 and 28 of his judgment. He finds in para 26 that'the properties and institutions acquired by Narayana Guru now in the possession of the Sanghom and those acquired by the Sanghom do not constitute a public trust of a religious and charitable nature. On the other hand, he held that the evidence shows that they belong absolutely to the Sri Narayana Dharma Sanghom'. He starts paragraph 28 thus:- "Even on the assumption that there is a trust as alleged in the plaint, it appears to me that the two plaintiffs cannot be characterised as persons interested in the trust, enabling them to institute the suit under S.72 C.P.C." He concludes the paragraph thus:- "If the scope of the suit had been restricted to temples included in the alleged trust, it might be possible for the plaintiffs to contend that a scheme suit like the present one is maintainable with respect to the temples on the ground that they worship therein. The suit however is not instituted in that way. In the way in which it has been conceived and filed, the plaintiffs cannot be held competent to maintain it, unless they prove that they have interest in the entire foundation, of which the Sanghom is alleged to be the trustee". 4. The entire foundation referred to in that paragraph and in the plaint consists of institutions such as, temples, mutts, ashramams, hospitals and schools. Had the suit been confined to temples it would have succeeded even according to the learned judge. It is on account of the fact that the plaintiffs have not proved an interest within the meaning of S.72 of the Tr. C.P.C. in respect of every one of the institutions comprised in the trust that the suit was dismissed. This view of the learned judge cannot be supported. In order to sustain a suit under S.72, it is not necessary that the plaintiffs should prove that they have interest in every part of the property comprised in the Trust. If there is any item of property not subject to the Trust, that item would be excluded from the operation of the decree. The inclusion of such an item should not entail dismissal of the suit. If there is any item of property not subject to the Trust, that item would be excluded from the operation of the decree. The inclusion of such an item should not entail dismissal of the suit. We need only refer to the decision of the Privy Council in A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 214 where it was found that a portion of the property over which the plaintiffs claimed interest did not form part of the Trust and it was excluded from the operation of the decree which was confined to the properties comprised in the Trust. The Privy Council did not consider the inclusion of an item free from the Trust to be a fatal defect which would entail dismissal of the suit. 5. Sree Narayana Guru who is the Founder of the Trust was admittedly a religious Leader and Reformer. The principle that he wanted to propagate was an absolute equality of human beings, of a casteless society and a life of sacrifice for Sanyasins. He organised various institutions for the benefit of the public. He established several institutions by donations received from his devotees and followers by way of immovable properties and money. Several institutions of a public, charitable or religious character were made over to him for management. He ordained many persons as Sanyasins. Besides these Sanyasin disciples he had lay disciples as well. An association mainly of laymen was formed called the "Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam" popularly called the S.N.D.P. Yogam. The association of the sanyasin disciples was called the "Sri Narayana Dharma Sangam". To ensure peace and prosperity and the perpetuation of his doctrines, he insisted upon the sanyasin disciples observing celibacy and not being entitled to earn property for themselves. Otherwise they were free to engage themselves in ordinary activities and avocations. Sree Narayana Guru, as the evidence shows, himself never touched money nor did he ever desire to own any property himself. All that was under his control was of and for, the public. He was not an individual but an institution with the headquarters, if it may be so called, at Sivagiri. Ext. 11 is a will executed by him in the year 1101. All that was under his control was of and for, the public. He was not an individual but an institution with the headquarters, if it may be so called, at Sivagiri. Ext. 11 is a will executed by him in the year 1101. He thereby nominates his prime sishya Boothananda who had been associated with him for over 28 years, to continue to be the manager and representative of the various charitable institutions and properties appurtenant there to that are under his control and provides that after the death of the nominee, the management must be in his sishya parampara and that the charitable institutions should be maintained for ever. Earlier in the year 1090, Swamiji had given a power of attorney in favour of another sishya, Swami Chythanya. In that document he details the various activities and institutions started and conducted by him with the co-operation and contribution of the public and of his sishyas. He makes an unequivocal declaration therein that all those properties and institutions that were organised or managed by him and the properties appurtenant thereto were all erected, earned and held for the benefit of the public. Detailed directions are given for the management of the properties and of the institutions. Provision is also made for consulting the public in the matter of management and in the matter of rectifying irregularities if any such happen to occur. These two documents make the matter perfectly clear that the holding of either the institutions or the properties as the private properties either of his or of his sishyas is opposed, if not obnoxious, to the fundamental principles of selflessness and public service advocated and demonstrated by him and whose perpetual continuation through his sishyas he desired. It is thus obvious that the institutions under his control or directions and the properties appurtenant thereto were all public charitable institutions. The plaintiffs are truly persons interested in these institutions within the meaning of S.72 of the Tr. C.P.C. It is not disputed that any member of the public would be entitled to resort to and offer worship in the Mutt at Varkala, which as already stated, as the headquarters of Swamiji wherein are established one or two temples and the Samadhi of the Swamiji after his demise. The public freely resort to that place for worship. This they used to do at all times. 6. The public freely resort to that place for worship. This they used to do at all times. 6. The following passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in 1948 P.C. 214 will elucidate the position. Their Lordships say: "The evidence establishes beyond doubt, in Their Lordships' view, that the properties in suit were either originally given, or were dedicated by the Swami, to the purposes of the Math which was a charitable or religious institution. It has been argued by counsel for the appellant that even if this be so the trust was not for public, but for private, purposes. But this is clearly not so. It is common ground that anybody was at liberty to go at any time to the Math to worship the Swami and take food there. The trust was plainly one for public purposes". That is the nature of the evidence in this case and that being so, the conclusion that we have to come to is the one that the Privy Council came to in that case. We have no hesitation to find that the Trust in question is a Trust for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature as contemplated in S.72 of the Tr. C.P.C. 7. Indeed it is not contended on behalf of the respondents that the Dharma Sangham is not an institution for public charitable purpose. What is contended is merely that the plaintiffs are not interested in that institution and that only members of that Sanghom are interested and can start action under S.72. This contention can hardly be accepted. The Sangham itself exists for the welfare of the public. The public therefore are the beneficiaries of the trust. When it was admitted that the members of the Sangham are the trustees, the question arose as to who the beneficiaries are and the answer given to our query was that the members of the Sangham constitute at once the trustees and beneficiaries which would be an unacceptable if not impossible position. 8. If, however, there is any institution or property that is not subject to the Trust, it would certainly be beyond the scope of the suit. 8. If, however, there is any institution or property that is not subject to the Trust, it would certainly be beyond the scope of the suit. The learned judge who tried the case has not considered the question as to whether there is any item which is not subject to the Trust, he having disposed of the suit on the basis that the properties except the temples are the sole property of the Sangham in which the plaintiffs were not interested. In the view that we take of the matter, there is necessity to consider the matter afresh to determine the scope of the Trust and the properties appurtenant thereto. 9. The judgment of the learned judge cannot therefore be supported and has to be set aside and the case remanded for fresh disposal. 10. It was contended that even if the Trust set up is established, no case is made out to frame a scheme for the management of the Trust. Reliance is placed on the fact that the Dharma Sangham has got itself registered as an Association under The Trusts Registration Act, 11 of 1088 (Cochin). The judgment of the learned judge itself contains sufficient grounds to justify, if not necessitate, the framing of the scheme. It is not necessary to detail the portions thereof. We are satisfied that on the evidence in the case a ground has been made out for the framing of a scheme. In framing the scheme the claims of the members of the Dharma Sangham to be managers of any of the institutions will be considered and given effect to. 11. In this state of the case Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar learned counsel for the respondents (contesting defendants) raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is incompetent having been one filed by the 8th defendant who was impleaded as the representative of the Dharma Sangham as its President and that it was not competent for him to file an appeal against the interests of the Dharma Sangham. The appellant's claim to Presidentship has been found against by the learned Judge. It is represented, as already observed, that the 8th defendant has filed a separate suit to establish that claim. The appellant's claim to Presidentship has been found against by the learned Judge. It is represented, as already observed, that the 8th defendant has filed a separate suit to establish that claim. The question of his Presidentship is therefore left open and the 8th defendant has to be regarded as a person interested in the Trust otherwise than as the President of the Dharma Sangham and so regarded, he as one of the persons interested in the Trust in respect of which the suit was filed by the plaintiff, is entitled to file an appeal against the decree dismissing the suit especially because the conduct of the plaintiffs in not having filed the appeal against the decree which, as mentioned already, is prima facie not supportable, leads to an inference of malafides on their part and their omission is against the interests of the persons interested in the Trust as whose representatives the suit was filed by them. A suit under S.92 C.P.C. is a representative suit and if properly conducted, a decision would bind all those persons who have some interest in the matter in common with the plaintiffs on record even though they are not eo nomine there. If a person interested, though not on record, would be bound by the decree passed in a representative suit, it is only reasonable to allow him the right of preferring an appeal against an adverse decree which is not sought to be set right by the parties on record. In this case however we need not go to that extent because the appellant was a party on record and as such in any view he is entitled to prefer the appeal. 12. In Sankaralinga Nadan and others v. Rajeswara Dorai and others (31 Madras 238 PC) it was held that the plaintiff in a suit under S.92 having obtained a decree in his favour, compromised the matter during the pendency of an appeal which compromise was sought to be recorded, other persons not on record but interested in the Trust were allowed to be impleaded and on their objection, the compromise entered into was thrown out. 13. In Kumaraswami Asari v. Poojari Lekshmana Goundan (1928 Madras 456) an appeal filed by the appellants plaintiffs in a suit under S.92 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code which was returned for representation was not represented by the appellants-plaintiffs. 13. In Kumaraswami Asari v. Poojari Lekshmana Goundan (1928 Madras 456) an appeal filed by the appellants plaintiffs in a suit under S.92 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code which was returned for representation was not represented by the appellants-plaintiffs. Other parties interested filed a fresh appeal and the question was whether they were competent to file the appeal and if so, whether the delay in the filing of the appeal could be condoned at their request. It was held that the plaintiffs-appellants having brought the suit under S.92, they did so in a representative capacity and that their omission to represent the appeal cannot be justified and was entitled to be made good by other parties similarly interested. The fresh appeal filed by the non-plaintiffs was therefore accepted and the delay condoned. Reference may also be made to I.L.R. 48 Cal. 493 P.C., 48 I.A. 12 and 65 I.A. 198. 14. It is not necessary to multiply authorities. It is sufficient to say that the 8th defendant as a person interested in the Trust in respect of which the plaintiffs, as persons interested filed the suit, is entitled to prefer this appeal against the decree dismissing the suit against which decree the plaintiffs on record omitted to take further action. In the facts of this case their omission must be attributed to a collusion with the contending parties and we therefore overrule the preliminary objection. 15. The result is that the appeal should be allowed, the decree of the learned judge reversed and the case remanded to the original side of this court for fresh disposal by framing a scheme in respect of the institution which forms the subject matter of the public Trust, excluding the institutions and properties, if any which are not entrusted with the Trust set up. The costs of this appeal will be provided for in the revised decree which will ultimately be passed in the suit. Allowed.