Judgment :- 1. The decree-holder in O.S. No. 1722 of 1108 of the Alleppy Munsiff's Court is the appellant in this second appeal. The appeal relates to an order in execution and the point raised is one of limitation. The decree is a simple money decree against three defendants who were made jointly and severally liable for the decree debt. The decree is dated 11.12.1108. The last execution application was filed on 30.12.1120 i.e. more than 12 years from the date of the decree. It is not disputed that the previous execution application has been judicially disposed of on 14.12.1118. The decree-holder pleaded that he was entitled to an extension of six months in the period of limitation by reason of the Travancore Judgement-debtors' Temporary Relief Proclamations dated 1.8.1110 and 30.10.1110. Under these proclamations execution of decrees against agriculturists was stayed for a period of six months and it was also provided in the Proclamations that this period should be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed in respect of execution of decrees. If this period is excluded the execution application will be in time. The 1st defendant contended that he is not an agriculturist, that the Proclamations would not apply to him and that therefore the decree-holder is not entitled to an extension of the period of limitation for executing the decree against him. The trial court held that the 1st defendant is an agriculturist, that the Proclamations applied to him and that therefore the decree-holder was entitled to an extension of six months in the period of limitation for executing the decree. In appeal filed by the 1st defendant the District Court held that the 1st defendant was not an agriculturist during the period the Proclamations were in force, that therefore the Proclamations would not apply to him and that the decree-holder was not entitled to an extension of the period of limitation. The lower appellate court therefore held that the execution of the decree was barred as against the 1st defendant. As the other defendants did not contend that they are not agriculturists the lower appellate court held that the Proclamations would apply to them and that therefore execution of the decree was not barred as against them. 2. The lower appellate court therefore held that the execution of the decree was barred as against the 1st defendant. As the other defendants did not contend that they are not agriculturists the lower appellate court held that the Proclamations would apply to them and that therefore execution of the decree was not barred as against them. 2. On the question whether the 1st defendant was an agriculturist during the period the Proclamations were in force we agree with the view of the lower appellate court. In the Proclamations "Agriculturist" is defined as "any person whose main occupation or main source of livelihood is agriculture". In the plaint in this case which was filed in 1108 and in the decree the 1st defendant is described as a trader. What P.W.1 swears is that when he gave evidence, namely in 1122, the occupation of the 1st defendant was agriculture. In the chief examination itself he admits that 12 years previously the occupation of the 1st defendant was trade. What P.W. 2 the plaintiff swears is that on the date of the suit the 1st defendant was a trader and that at the time of his giving evidence i.e. (1122) agriculture was the source of livelihood of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant swears that his occupation is trade, that he got some properties only in 1118 under a partition deed executed by his father and that until then his only source of livelihood was trade. It is therefore clear that on the date of the Proclamations the 1st defendant was a trader and not an agriculturist. The Proclamations could not therefore apply to him and the decree holder is not entitled to an extension of the period of limitation by reasons of the Proclamations. 3. In this Second Appeal a new point was argued by the learned Advocate for the appellant although it was not taken in the Appeal Memorandum. A property has been attached before judgment in this case and one of the prayers contained in the execution application dated 30.12.1120 is for sale of this property. It is argued for the appellant that so far as this prayer is concerned the execution application cannot be held to be barred by limitation. A property has been attached before judgment in this case and one of the prayers contained in the execution application dated 30.12.1120 is for sale of this property. It is argued for the appellant that so far as this prayer is concerned the execution application cannot be held to be barred by limitation. According to him the attachment before judgment continues to be in force even though the execution application has been dismissed and that the application to sell the property attached is only a step-in-aid of execution and not a fresh application contemplated by S.48 C.P.C. 4. With regard to the question whether upon the dismissal of an execution application the attachment before judgment will cease there is difference of opinion among the various High Courts in India. The Madras High Court has taken the view that when an execution application is filed for sale of the property attached before judgment the attachment before judgment becomes an attachment in execution and that therefore upon the dismissal of the execution application by reason of the decree holder's default the attachment will cease under 0.21 R. 57. It was so held by a Full Bench of five judges in I.L.R. 47 Mad. 483 (Mayappa Chettiar v. Chithambaram Chettiar.) The Bombay and Nagpur High Courts have also taken this view. But the Calcutta, Allahabad and Patna High Courts have taken a different view. The Travancore High Court also has taken the latter view (Vide 6 T.L.J. 252) (Eapen Thomas v. Iffy Kurien). 20 T.L.J. 898 (Ussan Kannu v. Sahul Ameethu) and 28 T.L.J. (Krishnan v. Jnanabharanam). The Cochin High Court has preferred to follow the Madras, Bombay and Nagpur High Courts (vide 30 C. 258 (F.B.) (Krishnan Namboori v. Madhavan Namboori). 5. It is however not necessary to decide this question in this appeal. In this case we are only concerned with the question whether S.48(1) C.P.C. applies to a case in which an execution application is filed for proceeding against the property attached before judgment. 5. It is however not necessary to decide this question in this appeal. In this case we are only concerned with the question whether S.48(1) C.P.C. applies to a case in which an execution application is filed for proceeding against the property attached before judgment. S.48(1) reads thus: "Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiry of 12 years from (1) the date of the decree sought to be executed or (b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree". According to the argument of the learned advocate for the appellant when there has been an attachment before judgment an application to proceed against the property attached can be made at any time and in such cases no question of limitation will arise. We are unable to accept this view. We are of opinion that even in cases in which there has been an attachment before judgment an application to proceed against the property attached is an application in execution. The only effect of an attachment before judgment is that if a decree is subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff it will not be necessary to reattach the property in execution. 24 T.L.J. 587 (Parvathi Bai v. Kanthimathi Ammal) is a direct authority on the point. It was held in that case that an attachment before judgment would not proprio vigore keep alive the decree and that if the decree has otherwise become barred the attachment before judgment would be nugatory. Their Lordships observed thus in that case: "The object of the limitation law is to give quietus to disputes and if attachments before judgments are to continue for ever, then an application for execution for the first time could be made any time after the decree, but this is obviously a contingency that the legislature could not have contemplated. The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 561 (F.B.). The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 561 (F.B.). (Hameed Rowther v. Arunachalam Pillai.) In that case Their Lordships observed thus: "We are unable to accept the argument that once there has been an order of attachment before judgment the decree which is subsequently passed remains alive until the order of attachment is cancelled." 6. The learned advocate for the appellant relied on two rulings of the Travancore High Court reported in 6 T.L.J. 252 (Eapen Thomas v. Iffy Kurien) and 20 T.L.J. 898 (Arunachalam Chettiar v. Varki Tharakan) in support of his position. The question that arose for consideration in 6 T.L.J. 252 was whether S.272 Paragraph 2 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code of 1065 would apply to attachments before judgment. Paragraph 2 of S.272 reads thus: "If the judgment-creditor fails to bring to sale any property attached in execution of a decree for money within three years from the date of the attachment, the Court may order the withdrawal of the attachment, unless for any special reasons to be recorded, it considers that the attachment should continue". It was held in that case that this provision would not apply to attachments before judgment. In 20 T.L.J. 898 also it was held that an attachment before judgment would remain in force notwithstanding the dismissal of the execution application. The question whether the provision contained in S.41 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code (S.48 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code) is applicable to an execution application for sale of the property attached before judgment was not considered in these cases. 7. It was next argued for the appellant that an attachment operates de die in diem as a process in execution of the decree and that therefore further process for sale of the property attached might be applied for at any time and that no question of limitation would arise in such cases. In support of this position reference was made to the rulings reported in 11 T.L.R. 13 (Upendra Kammathi v. Venugopala Prabhu),11 T.L.R.. 213 (Thanumalayaprumal v. Anandam Kozhalamanke), 19 T.L.J. 906 (Anantha¬padmanabhan Asari v. Krishna Pillai), 24 T.L.J. 69 (Eliyavoo v. Ouseph) and 8 M.L.J. 367 (Zamindar Garu v. Venkata Subharayadu). In support of this position reference was made to the rulings reported in 11 T.L.R. 13 (Upendra Kammathi v. Venugopala Prabhu),11 T.L.R.. 213 (Thanumalayaprumal v. Anandam Kozhalamanke), 19 T.L.J. 906 (Anantha¬padmanabhan Asari v. Krishna Pillai), 24 T.L.J. 69 (Eliyavoo v. Ouseph) and 8 M.L.J. 367 (Zamindar Garu v. Venkata Subharayadu). These cases relate to attachment in execution and it was held in these cases that so long as an attachment remained in force an application for sale of the property attached could not be treated as a substantive execution application but only as a step-in-aid of execution. We do not think that this principle will apply to attachments before judgment. An attachment is execution is a process in execution, and so long as the attachment subsists the process also may be said to be continuing. It is on this ground that an application for sale of the property attached is regarded only as a step-in-aid of execution and not a substantive execution application coming within the purview of S.48 C.P.C. But an attachment before judgment cannot be regarded as a process in execution. As observed by Mitter, J. in 4. B.L.R. 63 (Sri Ram Manik v. Tincouri Bai) "an attachment prior to a decree is not an attachment for the enforcement of the decree, but it is a step taken merely for the purpose of preventing the debtor from delaying or obstructing such enforcement when the decree subsequently passed shall be sought to be executed. An attachment after the decree is, on the other hand, an attachment made for the immediate purpose of carrying the decree into execution and it presupposes an application on the part of the decree holder to have his decree executed." The distinction between an attachment before judgment and an attachment in execution has been thus pointed out in 38 Cal. 448 (Basiram Malo v. Kathyayani Debi): "An attachment before judgment does not for all purposes stand on the same footing as an attachment in execution proceedings. This indeed is obvious from first principles. The attachment does not of necessity ensure the property to the person who attaches. 448 (Basiram Malo v. Kathyayani Debi): "An attachment before judgment does not for all purposes stand on the same footing as an attachment in execution proceedings. This indeed is obvious from first principles. The attachment does not of necessity ensure the property to the person who attaches. He becomes entitled to proceed against it only if he eventually gets a decree; it is not competent to him to proceed against the property attached until he has also taken the preliminary steps which the law requires for its enforcement, in other words, he must apply for execution, just like any other creditor". These observations are quoted with approval in 6 T.L.J. 252 (Eapen Thomas v. Iffy Kurien). The rulings cited by the learned advocate for the appellant cannot therefore apply to the case of an attachment before judgment. If on the other hand an attachment before judgment is regarded as a process in execution 0.21 R. 57 will apply to it and therefore upon the dismissal of the execution application the attachment will cease. 8. For the above reasons we hold that the execution application dated 30.12.1120 is barred under S.48 C.P.C. even in respect of the prayer for sale of the property attached before judgment. 9. We therefore confirm the order of the lower appellate court and dismiss the second appeal with costs. Dismissed.