JUDGMENT : CHATURVEDI, J. This is second appeal of the plaintiff Laxmibai who instituted a suit for recovering Rs.2,150/-/- (advanced from 30-12-1944 to 14/2/1945 to the minor's natural father) plus Rs.357-6-0 as interest total Rs.2497/6/-from the share of deceased minor Narendra Kumar. It was averred that the minor boy Narendra Kumar s/o Champalal was adopted by the respondent on 27-11-1943 according to the custom prevalent amongst Oswal Jain Mahajans and soon after the adoption, the real father of the minor, Champalal, fearing dissipation of the property of the minor by the adoptive mother, started the guardianship Case No.65/44 in the District Judge's Court and on 22-9-1944 a partition suit was filed by him as next friend of the minor in the Indore State High Court for partition of the property. During the pendency of the suit, on 26-4-45, the minor Narendra Kumar expired, and the suit was ordered to abate on 18-6-1945. For carrying on the partition suit the plaintiff had advanced Rs.2,150/-/- to Champalal from time to time during the period from 30-12-44 to 14-2-1945 and the plaintiff prayed that a decree for Rs.2497-6-0, be passed in favour of the plaintiff to be realised from the share of Narendra Kumar in the property of Mangilal deceased in the hands of the defendant respondent Pushpabai. 2. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that there was no adoption and that there was no dissipation of the properties and that it was not necessary for the next friend and natural father of the minor to incur any costs. A suit could have been filed in 'forma pauperis'. It was further alleged that if any sum was borrowed by Champalal it was borrowed by him in his personal capacity and the minor's estate cannot be held liable, for it. It was denied that the alleged costs incurred in litigation were not necessaries of the minor within the meaning of law: and it was added that the plaintiff had no right to be reimbursed from the property left by the minor. 3. The first issue was about the factum of adoption. It was denied that the alleged costs incurred in litigation were not necessaries of the minor within the meaning of law: and it was added that the plaintiff had no right to be reimbursed from the property left by the minor. 3. The first issue was about the factum of adoption. The trial Court did not express any opinion on the point: but held that the deceased Mangilal had not given any permission to his widow to adopt and on the basis of - 1934 Indore LR 77' (A) held that in Madhyabharat, Mitakshara as administered by the Benaras School prevails and a widow cannot adopt without the express authority of her husband or without the consent of her 'sapindas'. The trial Court, therefore, held that the adoption, even if it took place, was not valid. 4. The first appellate Court reversed this finding; after discussing the evidence it came to the conclusion that adoption of the minor Narendra Kumar by the respondent did not take place and cited - 'Prem Raj v. Mt. Chand Kunwar', AIR 1948 PC 60 (B) for the proposition that the custom of sonless Jain widow adopting a son to her deceased husband without a prior authority from him was so well known and well established by judicial decisions that it was no longer necessary to prove and plead it and that except in case of Madras and the Punjab, in the rest of India, the onus would now lie upon those who deny the existence of this custom. As regards the dictum of their Lordships of the Privy Council we have no doubt that the principle of law enunciated is the correct one and the finding of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court is binding on us in second appeal. 5. The four main issues, which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal then are: "(2) Whether the defendant dissipated the minor's property as alleged in para 3 of the plaint? and (3) Whether the plaintiff advanced a loan of Rs.2150/- between Dec.1944 and Feb.1945 to the minor's real father Champalal for the litigation as stated in paras 5 and 6 of the plaint. (4) Whether the costs of the litigation were the necessaries of the minor within the meaning of law as pleaded in para 5 of the plaint. (7) What relief the plaintiff is entitled to?" 6. (4) Whether the costs of the litigation were the necessaries of the minor within the meaning of law as pleaded in para 5 of the plaint. (7) What relief the plaintiff is entitled to?" 6. The Courts below have held that there is no evidence of any dissipation of the property and this is a concurrent finding of fact. As there was no dissipation the suit on behalf of the minor was uncalled for and the two Courts below held that the costs of the suits were not 'necessaries' of the minor within the meaning of S.68, Contract Act. On these grounds the suit and the first appeal have been dismissed. As regards the third issue, the trial Court found that only Rs.1225/- are proved to have been paid by the plaintiff to Champalal, real father of the minor. 7. The real question which we put before the counsel to be considered in this case is: Whether as far as the lender is concerned she advanced the loans to the natural father of the minor, Champalal, in his personal capacity, or, whether she intended to secure for these advances the direct liability of the minor's estate. It seems the plaintiff opened in her account books a ledger folio (Khata Ex.P.1) for recording the accounts of the money advanced. It was headed Chhogalal is brother of Champalal. The accounts were throughout continued under the same heading right down to the very end. There is no reference in these accounts to the minor or the minor's estate and this absence of any reference to the minor or minor's estate in the accounts is a strong argument in support of the view that the plaintiff and Champalal Chhogalal dealt with each other on the footing that it was the latter alone that were regarded as the borrowers. Our attention has not been called to any other document that may show that Champalal Chhogalal were not pleading their own credit, but only the credit of minor's estate in respect of these transactions. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that these transactions bound the borrowers alone and not the minor's estate. The form of 'Khata' is definitely against the possibility of the parties to it having had any other liability in mind than that of Champalal and his brother Chhogalal. 8. Para.6 of the plaint, also supports the same inference. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that these transactions bound the borrowers alone and not the minor's estate. The form of 'Khata' is definitely against the possibility of the parties to it having had any other liability in mind than that of Champalal and his brother Chhogalal. 8. Para.6 of the plaint, also supports the same inference. It runs as follows: "Champalal had no means to spend the necessary amount and the minor was incapable of contracting and incurring a loan; hence loan worth Rs.2150/-/- was given to Champalal himself personally and through his brother by the plaintiff as shown in the copy of the 'Khata' attached herewith." 9. Mr. Khabya, learned counsel for the appellant, has addressed to us much argument about the application of this money to suit proceedings. He contends that Rs.900/- were paid to Rai Sahib A.P. Bhargava on 23-12-45 who was conducting the partition suit in the High Court. We have carefully gone through the deposition of Mr. Bhargava who stated Asked why he did not file a suit in 'forma pauperis' R. S. Bhargava replied 10. From the statement it is clear that firstly there was no idea of making the minor's estate liable and secondly there was no necessity of incurring any costs for the suit; the suit could have been, if deemed necessary, filed in 'forma pauperis'. Champalal had taken a risk unnecessarily and the plaintiff had advanced him money without having the least idea of making the minor's estate liable for the money. Any person of ordinary prudence would not have advanced money to Champalal in the known circumstances of the case. Champalal could have waited for being appointed guardian of the minor by the District Judge's Court before filing partition suit. It may also be added here that Champalal, though natural father of the minor, was not his guardian; as the guardianship of an adopted son, who is minor, passes on his adoption from his natural father and mother to his adoptive father and mother (Hindu Law, page 590, Mulla). Many rulings cited by Mr. Khabya relating to the expenses undertaken by the natural guardian of the minor for the minor's "necessaries" do not apply to the facts of the case. Many rulings cited by Mr. Khabya relating to the expenses undertaken by the natural guardian of the minor for the minor's "necessaries" do not apply to the facts of the case. The facts of this case, as stated above, are peculiar and we do not think any purpose will be served by discussing rulings which have no material bearing on the question before us. 11. For reasons stated above, we dismiss the appeal with costs. 12. KHAN, J. :- I agree.