Judgment Das, J. 1. This appeal arises out of an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Motihari, dated the 10th of April 1948, in Execution Case No. 218 of 1947. The facts are these: The appellant, who is the decree-holder, obtained a decree for Rs. 6,400.00 plus costs, etc., in Money Suit No. 75 of 1934. The decree was obtained on the 8th of January 1946, against Ajodhya Prasad, son of Bhagwan Prasad, deceased, and Sat Narain Prasad, minor son of Ajodhya Prasad, under the guardianship of Mt. Dhano Kuer, his grandmother. The suit was brought against all the three persons mentioned above, but as against Mt. Dhan Kuer, the suit was dismissed. This decree was put in execution Case No. 218 of 1947. Satnarain Prasad was dead by the time, and the decree-holder made a prayer which indicates the mode in which he desired to levy execution. I am quoting below the prayer portion of his execution petition: "The judgment-debtor has made a wakf of all his property to his mother Mt. Dhano Kuer widow of Bhagwan Prasad deceased, and it has been stipulated in the deed of wakf that the judgment-debtor should be paid a sum of Rs. 125/- a month by way of salary for his expenses, and as covenanted in the deed of wakf, the judgment-debtor has been receiving the salary. That there is no property standing in the name of the judgment-debtor other than this (salary) and the property covered by the deed of wakf. The decree-holder, therefore, prays that this execution petition may be registered and after service of necessary processes, half the salary of the judgment-debtor may be attached, and Mt. Dhano Kuer, widow of Bhagwan Prasad deceased, resident of Purani-godown, Bettiah, tappa Khada, thana Bettiah may be directed to deposit half the salary of the judgment-debtor in this Court every month in any manner deemed proper till satisfaction of the entire decretal amount together with costs and costs of this execution so that the grievances of the decree-holder applicant may be redressed." 2. Apparently, a notice was issued to Mt. Dhano Kuer, who filed an objection under Sec. 47 and Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection, in substance, was that by reason of an award dated the 5th of June 1934, made by certain arbitrators who had been appointed to settle the disputes between Mt. Apparently, a notice was issued to Mt. Dhano Kuer, who filed an objection under Sec. 47 and Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection, in substance, was that by reason of an award dated the 5th of June 1934, made by certain arbitrators who had been appointed to settle the disputes between Mt. Dhano Kuer and her son Adhya Prasad, the maintenance allowance of Ajodhya Prasad was reduced from Rs. 125/- to Rs. 40.00 and this amount was not liable to attachment under Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On behalf of the decree-holder, it was contended that the award was neither genuine nor effective in law, not having been filed in Court, and that the allowance of Ajodhya Prasad fixed at Rs. 125/- was in the nature of a salary or annuity, and was, therefore, liable to attachment. The learned Subordinate Judge heard the evidence of the parties and came to the following findings: (1) the award dated the 5th of June 1934, was genuine and valid in law; (2) by the said award the maintenance allowance of Ajodhya Prasad was cut down to Rs. 40.00 per month; and (3) this allowance is not liable to attachment under Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly allowed the objection and dismissed the execution case. It is against this order of the learned Subordinate Judge that the present appeal is directed. 3. Mr. Prem Lall, appearing on behalf of the decree-holder appellant, has urged the following two points before us. Firstly, he has contended that the allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasad by his mother Mt. Dhano Kuer is in the nature of an annuity or salary, and is not, therefore, hit by Sec. 6 (dd) of the Transfer of Property Act, nor by Sec. 60 (n) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, he has contended that even if Sec. 60, Code of Civil Procedure, has any application, the only person who can claim the exemption under that section is the judgment-debtor, Ajodhya Prasad and Mt. Dhano Kuer, his mother, who is not a judgment-debtor, is not entitled to raise any objection under Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. It is necessary first to determine the nature of the payment which has to be made to Ajodhya Prasad by his mother Mt. Dhano Kuer. Dhano Kuer, his mother, who is not a judgment-debtor, is not entitled to raise any objection under Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. It is necessary first to determine the nature of the payment which has to be made to Ajodhya Prasad by his mother Mt. Dhano Kuer. The first document on the question is a deed of gift. Ex. 1, dated the 4th April 1923. This document shows that Ajodhya Prasad completely divested himself of all his right in the properties which he had after the death of his father, and made a gift of the same to his mother. He said in the document: "Hence, I, the executant, have of my own accord and free will, in a sound state of body and mind, without any coercion, pressure on the part of any body else, given in gift, the whole and entire properties specified below.......... to Mt. Dhano Kuer, widow of Bhagwan Prasad." The document then recited: Mt. Dhano Kuer, the said claimant shall have to pay a monthly sum of Rs. 125/- half of which comes to Rs. 62/8/- to me, the executant till my death, and after my death to my wife during her life time for the purpose of maintenance and worship, etc., on obtaining a receipt thereof which will continue to be the prior charge on the entire properties given in gift." This was in 1923. Thereafter certain disputes arose between Mt. Dhano and her son, and on the 22nd of February 1934, a deed of agreement was executed by both parties by which five persons were appointed as punches or arbitrators to settle the disputes. It was agreed to by the parties that whatever decision was given by the arbitrators would be binding on the parties. Then, on the 5th of June 1934, the arbitrators made their award on the several points of dispute. We are concerned with issue no. 1, and under that issue, the arbitrators stated as follows: "No doubt, by virtue of a deed of gift executed by the 2nd party in favour of the 1st party, Rs. 125/- was affixed as monthly maintenance allowance for the 2nd party. But at present the business of the Firm Chhotelal Bhagwan Prasad is altogether dull, it is not in a position like the past, and the income has been reduced. 125/- was affixed as monthly maintenance allowance for the 2nd party. But at present the business of the Firm Chhotelal Bhagwan Prasad is altogether dull, it is not in a position like the past, and the income has been reduced. Accordingly, from the statement of the parties and from the enquiry, we the arbitrators have come to the conclusion that at present the annual in come of the estate of Chhotelal Bhagwan Prasad is not more than Rs. 1500.00 out of which all expenses are to be met with. Hence, in the opinion of us the arbitrators, we do not see any reason to allow more than Rs. 40.00 a month as maintenance allowance and salary for the 2nd party. Hence, we, the arbitrators, fix Rs. 40.00 a month as the maintenance allowance for the 2nd party. Out of this amount, the 2nd party shall have to meet the maintenance expenses of himself and of those whom he will keep with him. He shall not be entitled to claim for extra maintenance allowance." It appears that the arbitrators separated the maintenance allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasad from the maintenance allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasads wife, Ramdulari Kuer. No particular property was charged with the maintenance payable to Ajodhya Pd. or his wife Ramdulari Kuer. The agreement to appoint arbitrators and the award made by the arbitrators were done without the intervention of the Court. I have no doubt in my mind that the agreement to appoint arbitrators and the award made by the arbitrators are both genuine and effective in law. Nothing has been shown to us which would lead us to think that those transactions were colourable transactions to defeat or delay creditors. 5. It is equally clear that the maintenance allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasad was a personal right the enjoyment of which was restricted to himself; and it was neither salary nor annuity. An annuity usually owes its origin to the bounty of the testator or grantor. In the case before us, Ajodhya Prasad made a complete gift in favour of his another, and then stipulated that his mother would pay a certain sum to him by way of maintenance allowance. This maintenance allowance was subsequently reduced to Rs. 40.00 only by the arbitrators. It is obvious that for some reason or other Ajodhya Prasad was incapable of managing the properties or even maintaining his wife. This maintenance allowance was subsequently reduced to Rs. 40.00 only by the arbitrators. It is obvious that for some reason or other Ajodhya Prasad was incapable of managing the properties or even maintaining his wife. Therefore, the properties were given to his mother, and the mother agreed to maintain the son by payment of a certain sum of money to cover the boarding, lodging, clothing and other necessaries of life. It seems to me that the obligation was a personal obligation and, in that view of the matter, was neither a salary nor an annuity. Mr. Prem Lall has drawn our attention to a single Judge decision of the Madras High Court in Sivaji Govinda Rao V/s. N. N. C. T. C. V/s. Firn, AIR (22) 1935 Mad 815, where the view expressed was that where the right was created for the first time by contract, it was always alinable and subject to attachment. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath has drawn our attention to a number of decisions which have held that a mere right to future maintenance, howsoever the right may arise, is not liable to attachment. The decisions are Tara Sundari Debi V/s. Saroda Charan, 12 Cal L J 146; Secy. State V/s. Bai Some, 57 Bom 507 and Palikandy Mammad V/s. Chingpron Keloth Valia Appa, 40 Mad 302. There has been some discussion before us if the allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasad can be considered to be a "reservation of his own property", as was held in the Raja of Ramnad V/s. Subramaniam Chettiar, 52 Mad 465. Having examined the relevant documents on the point, I am of the opinion that the allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasad cannot be considered to be "reservation of his own property". There has also been some discussion before us as to what should be the test in determining whether the right to recover future maintenance allowance is alienable or not. Having examined the relevant documents on the point, I am of the opinion that the allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasad cannot be considered to be "reservation of his own property". There has also been some discussion before us as to what should be the test in determining whether the right to recover future maintenance allowance is alienable or not. Our attention has been drawn to some decisions where the test said down is not whether a charge has been created for the maintenance allowance but the true intention of the parties: namely, if the right was restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally or it was a right in property, in my opinion, it is unnecessary to discuss that question in detail in the present case, and for two reasons; firstly, the award made by the arbitrators altered the position, and the right to enjoy the maintenance was restricted personally to Ajodhya Prasad, and no right in any particular property was given to Ajodhya Prasad; secondly, Sec. 6(dd) of the T. P. Act, as introduced by the amending Act of 1929, has made it quite clear that a right to future maintenance in whatsoever manner arising, secured or determined, cannot be transferred. Before the amendment, there was some conflict of opinion on the question. That conflict seems to have been resolved. Commenting on the amendment, the learned commentator of Sir D. F. Mullas T. P. Act has said : "The words in whatsoever manner arising, secured or determined are very comprehensive; and it is submitted they overrule cases in which when the right has been created by a deed of transfer it was held that the question whether or not the right was alienable depends upon the intention of the parties as expressed in the deed." In Anirudha Mitra V/s. Official Receiver, AIR (29) 1942 Cal 241, their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court had to consider the words of Sec. 6(dd) of the T. P. Act, with particular reference to the view expressed in some of the Madras decisions that where the allowance is given as a matter of favour and is the result of a contractual agreement between the parties the allowance is liable to attachment. Their Lordships said that this would be attaching a very much restricted meaning to the plain words of the section. Their Lordships said that this would be attaching a very much restricted meaning to the plain words of the section. Their Lordships then said; "The policy of the law undoubtedly is to interdict alienation, of what is intended to be given for the personal enjoyment of the grantee. It is not proper that in such cases the grantee should starve whereas the property which was intended to be enjoyed by him personally should be held by a stranger." Their Lordships further expressed the view that whatever doubts might have existed on this point previously were removed by the clear words of Section 6(dd) of the T. P. Act. 6 From a consideration of the case law on the subject, I am of the view that the allowance payable to Ajodhya Prasad by his mother is a mere right to future maintenance and is not liable to attachment under Sec. 60(n) of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor can such a right be transferred by reason of Sec. 6(dd) of the T. P. Act. 7. The other contention of Mr. Prem Lall that it is open to the judgment-debtor to waive his right of exemption under Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that Mt. Dhano Kuer is not entitled to raise an objection under that section, seems to me to be equally untenable. In this case, though the judgment-debtor was Ajodhya Prasad, the appellant decree-holder really wished to levy execution against Mt. Dhano Kuer. The prayer portion of the execution petition which I quoted earlier in this judgment, shows that clearly enough. What the decree-holder was really trying to do was to obtain an order like a garnishee order and attach the alleged debt which, it was stated, Mt. Dhano Kuer owed to her son by reason of the provision of maintenance allowance in the deed of gift of 1923. In such circumstances, it was, I think open to Mt. Dhano Kuer to raise the objection that the maintenance allowance was not really a debt which she owed to her son, but was a right the enjoyment of which was restricted personally to her (sic), and this right was not liable to attachment under Section 60(n) of the Code of Civil procedure. Dhano Kuer to raise the objection that the maintenance allowance was not really a debt which she owed to her son, but was a right the enjoyment of which was restricted personally to her (sic), and this right was not liable to attachment under Section 60(n) of the Code of Civil procedure. It appears that the learned Subordinate Judge thought that the amount payable to Ajodhya Prasad was in the nature of a salary, and the amount being Rs. 40.00 only was not liable to attachment. That I do not think is the correct view of the matter. The correct view is that the right which the decree-holder is seeking to attach is a mere right to future maintenance, and is not, therefore, liable to attachment under Section 60(n) Code of Civil Procedure. It was, I think, open to Mt. Dhano Kuer against whom the order of attachment was sought, to raise the objection which she did. Mr. Prem Lall has referred us to several decisions of the Lahore High Court to the effect that an exemption under Sec. 60, Code of Civil Procedure, can only be claimed by the judgment-debtor Bhagu V/s. Batna Singh, AIR (20) 1933 Lah 251 and Natha Singh V/s.` Bhag Mal, AIR (26) 1939 Lah 316. He has also referred to some decisions of this Court in which it has been held that the judgment-debtor can waive his right to exemption under Sec. 60 C. P. Code. That may be so. it is true that Ajodhya Prasad himself has not raised any objection in the present case. But in view of the fact that it was really against Mt. Dhano Kuer that execution was sought, it is, I think, open to Mt. Dhano Kuer to deny the existence of any debt which she is stated to owe to her son, and to raise the plea that the right which her son has is a mere right, to future maintenance which is not liable to attach. ment. The contention of Mr. Prem Lall that Mt. Dhano Kuer cannot raise the objection must, I think, be overruled. 8. It is unfortunate that in this case the decree holder finds himself unable to realise his dues for such a long period. We made an effort in this case to bring the parties to a compromise, but without success. ment. The contention of Mr. Prem Lall that Mt. Dhano Kuer cannot raise the objection must, I think, be overruled. 8. It is unfortunate that in this case the decree holder finds himself unable to realise his dues for such a long period. We made an effort in this case to bring the parties to a compromise, but without success. While not oblivious of the hardship which is caused to the decree-holder, I am of opinion that it will be wrong in principle to make bad law on account of hard cases. 9. For the reasons given above, I hold that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in refusing to attach the mere right to future maintenance of Ajodhya Prasad. The appeal fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order for costs. Sarjoo Prosad, J. 10 I entirely agree, and I feel that I have nothing to add to this very lucid pronouncement of my learned brother.