ORDER H. S. KAMATH, PRESIDENT. - The facts are simple. The applicant received gum worth Rs. 8,200 from a firm of Gondia - Narayandas Gourishankar. The latter's instructions were that he should sell it at Amravati - his place of business - at a price of Rs. 60 to Rs. 65 (per ?). If he could not do so, he was to despatch the goods to Narsi Mulji and Company of Bombay. A hundi for the full price was to be drawn on the Bombay firm and the railway receipt was also to be sent to them. The goods could not be sold at Amravati and were in due course, therefore, sent to Narsi Mulji and Company, from whom the full price was also realised. 2. The applicant's contention is that, in effecting the despatches to Bombay, he acted only as an agent of the Gondia firm. It has not been denied that he received his commission for the agency business he transacted. The facts of the case clearly bring him within the definition of "dealer" contained in Section 2(c) of our Sales Tax Act. "Dealer", as defined here, includes also an agent carrying on the business of selling or supplying goods, whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise. It has been contended that the applicant was not the owner of the goods, that he acted merely as the agent of the Gondia firm and that the sale price was also actually received by that firm. It is precisely for that reason that he is an agent - working on a commission basis - and not the principal in the transaction; but the fact of his being a commission agent does not give him immunity from the taxing provisions of our Act. 3. I have examined this case with reference to an available decision of the Madras High Court and also with reference to a case that I have decided myself recently. In The Provincial Government of Madras v. Neeli Veerabhadrappa and others ([1950] 1 S.T.C. 245), the Madras High Court held that a commission agent who sells or supplies on behalf of a principal is not a dealer within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Madras Sales Tax Act. But Section 2(b) of that Act was far less comprehensive than Section 2(c) of our Act. But Section 2(b) of that Act was far less comprehensive than Section 2(c) of our Act. According to the Madras Act :- "'Dealer' means any person who carries on the business of buying or selling goods; Explanation (1) - A co-operative society, a club, a firm, or any association which sells goods to its members is a dealer within the meaning of this clause. Explanation (2) - The agent of a person resident outside the Province who carries on the business of buying or selling goods in the Province, shall be deemed to be the dealer in respect of such business for the purposes of this Act." The definition scrupulously avoids any reference to a commission agent and the Madras High Court could not obviously come to a decision different from the one they did. 4. The decision of the Madras High Court referred to above and the definition of "dealer" contained in our Act were borne in mind, when I decided the case Dinanath Mahadeo Dalal v. The State (Appeal No. 47/XXXIII - 7 of 1950; Since reported at page 107 supra). How that case differs from the present one will be clear from the following extracts from my order in the former :- "If the expression 'commission agent' is to be confined to a person just described [as per definition contained in Section 2(c)], it should be clear that it cannot apply to a person like the appellant if we are to go by such facts about him as can be elicited from the record. For, he does not carry on any business of selling or supplying goods; he is hardly more than an intermediary between the seller or supplier on the one hand and the buyer on the other. For the services he renders as such intermediary, he recovers his remuneration either from one or both of the parties. For, he does not carry on any business of selling or supplying goods; he is hardly more than an intermediary between the seller or supplier on the one hand and the buyer on the other. For the services he renders as such intermediary, he recovers his remuneration either from one or both of the parties. To distinguish him from the 'commission agent' included in the definition in Section 2(c), he could perhaps be simply called as a broker and his remuneration as brokerage." The distinction essentially would be in the fact that a commission agent has dominion over and possession of the goods in which he deals, while the broker, as defined in Dinanath Mahadeo Dalal's case (Reported at page 107 supra), acquires at no time either dominion over or possession of the goods, the exchange of which for valuable consideration he brings about between seller and buyer, generally, in his immediate presence. That ownership in the goods is not essential, but that dominion over and possession of the goods is adequate in a case like the one we are dealing with is a principle that we could accept from the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Staynor and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer ([1951] 2 S.T.C. 111), because of the very comprehensive definition of "dealer" contained in our Act. 5. The only other plea advanced on behalf of the applicant is that the sale did not take place in the province. On the basis of the material available on the record, I find it difficult to agree with the Assessing Officer that the sale was completed at Amravati, "the moment the railway receipt was endorsed to the Bombay adatia". This appears to me rather an over-simplification. But I have no doubt that the contract of sale with Narsi Mulji and Company of Bombay must have taken place, while the goods were still in this province. In the absence of such a contract, which has to be inferred owing to the failure of the parties to produce the correspondence between the Gondia firm and the consignees of the goods at Bombay, it is impossible to believe that the Gondia firm would send such precise instructions to the applicant as have been referred to earlier. The despatches, therefore, constitute a sale within the meaning of Explanation (II) to Section 2(g). 6. For the reasons given above. The despatches, therefore, constitute a sale within the meaning of Explanation (II) to Section 2(g). 6. For the reasons given above. I hold that the case has been rightly decided by the learned Sales Tax Commissioner, and, therefore dismiss this application. Application dismissed.