JUDGMENT : I am asked in this appeal to consider the propriety of an order dated 28-9-1951 by which the learned District Judge has recalled an order previously made on 8-4-1950 in Civil Miscellaneous Proceedings No. 22 of 1950 for the appointment of the appellant as guardian of the person and property of the minor boy, Prabhu aged 4 or 5 years, son of Mt. Dropadi the respondent. 2. The learned Judge has given several reasons for the removal of the guardian and Mr. Mungre contends that a guardian can be removed only on the grounds specified in S. 39 of the Guardians and Wards Act and not on any other grounds. Mr. Bhagwan Swaroop, on the other hand, contends that the application for removal of guardian was made at a time when the Qanoon Hifazat Zat Va Zayadad Gwalior State Samvat 1970 was in force; and the 11th Clause of Section 79 provided that the Court could remove the guardian for 'any sufficient reasons' (Vernacular Matter Omitted) 3. I would not go into all this detail. Under Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, the welfare of the infant is the prime consideration and in appointing a guardian for the minors, the main question is, who is most likely to contribute to their well being and look after their health and comfort. In this case the mother of the minor boy was alive and she was looking to the comforts of the boy. The Court in appointing Mule as the guardian overlooked the fact that the mother was already there. It has been held several times that it is a mistake to assume that merely because an application is made, and the mother does not come forward, a guardian must be appointed. In all such cases the first thing to be done is to consider whether it is really necessary to appoint a guardian at all. In my opinion where no guardian was needed for the protection of the person of the minor, an order to appoint a guardian of the minor was without jurisdiction. Sub-clause 3 of Section 7 moreover lays down that where a guardian has been appointed by will, an order appointing another person to be guardian shall not be made until the powers of the guardian appointed by the will have ceased under the provisions of the Act. The respondent Mt. Sub-clause 3 of Section 7 moreover lays down that where a guardian has been appointed by will, an order appointing another person to be guardian shall not be made until the powers of the guardian appointed by the will have ceased under the provisions of the Act. The respondent Mt. Dropadi, who is the natural guardian of the boy, was also appointed guardian under a will of her husband and in the presence of this will no other guardian could have been appointed either under sub-clause 3 of Section 41 of Gwalior Qanoon Hifazat Zat Va Zayadad or under sub-clause 3 of Section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act. It will be manifest that the appointment of Mule as guardian of the boy was neither proper nor legal and as soon as facts came to the notice of the learned District Judge the previous order was set aside. 4. The appellant Mule in his application had represented to the Court that he is an uncle of the boy and that Mt. Dropadi, the respondent was of bad character and was going to be remarried. Subsequently it came to the notice of the learned District Judge that both the allegations were without foundation and a Court is always competent to recall an order obtained from it by suppression or misrepresentation of facts. In 'RASHMONI DASI v. GUNADA SUNDARI DASI', 26 Ind Cas 275 (Cal), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Asutosh Mookerjee and Beachecroft, JJ., after considering the whole case law laid down that the principle of Section 151, C. P. C., is applicable quite as much to Courts called upon to deal with matters under the Guardians and Wards Act as to ordinary civil Court. Therefore a Court which exercises powers under the Guardians and Wards Act has ample inherent jurisdiction to deal with matters brought before it, of which cognizance may be required in the interest of justice. If even after an order has been made the Court is apprised that it has been made to assume jurisdiction in a matter over which it has in reality no jurisdiction, the Court has inherent power to investigate the matter and to recall the previous order if it transpires that it has been made without jurisdiction. 5. If even after an order has been made the Court is apprised that it has been made to assume jurisdiction in a matter over which it has in reality no jurisdiction, the Court has inherent power to investigate the matter and to recall the previous order if it transpires that it has been made without jurisdiction. 5. I respectfully concur with these views and in my opinion the learned Sessions Judge was fully justified in revoking his previous order. 6. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.